IR 05000387/1986010
| ML20205H347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1986 |
| From: | Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H318 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-86-10, 50-388-86-10, NUDOCS 8608200056 | |
| Download: ML20205H347 (44) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-387/86-10 and 50-388/86-10 Docket Nos.
50-387 and 50-388 License Nos.
CPPR-101 and CPPR-102 Priority
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Category
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Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Berwick, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Berwick, Pennsylvania j
Inspection Conducted:
May 12-16, 1986 I
Inspectors: /
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Hawx@t, EP SpecialistV
' date M. Lindell, Battelle M. Good, Battelle (COMEX)
E. G. Hickey, Battelle PNL G. Stoetzel, Battelle PNL K. C. McBride, Battelle i
E. F. Williams, Jr., NRC HQ D. Vito, NRC Team Leader Approved by:
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W. L ( us, Kftion Chief, date Eme ncy Preparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 12-16, 1986 (Report Nos. 387/86-10 and
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50-388/86-10)
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced appraisal of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
The areas evaluated included-the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the respective data acquisition systems, instrumentation, supplies and equip-ment for these facilities.
Results:
One deviation was identified relating to the meteorological monitor-ing program.
Three unresolved items were identified relating to habitability monitoring of OSC holding areas for craft personnel.
Several other areas were determined to be Open Items requiring additional attention from the licensee.
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TABLES OF CONTENTS
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i 1.0 Technical Support Facility l
1.1 Physical Facilities
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1.1.1 Design 1.1.1.1 Size 1.1.1.2 Layout 1.1.1.3 Location
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1.1.1.4 Structure 1.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment
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1.1.1. 6 Display Interfaces
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1.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies l
1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring
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1.1.3 Non Radiological Equipment and Supplies
1.1.3.1 Meteorological Monitoring Program 1.1.3.2 Communication 1.1.3.3 Records / Drawings 1.1.3.4 Support. Supplies
1.1.3.5 Power Supply
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j 1. 2 Information Management i
1.2.1 Variables Provided 1.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 Variables 1.2.1.2 Other Variables
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1.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs i
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1.2.2 Data Acquisition 1.2.2.1 Data Collection Method 1.2.2.2 Time Resolution 1.2.2.3 Isolation
1.2.3 Data Communications
1.2.3.1 Capacity 1.2.3.2 Error Detection 1.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs
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1.2.4 Data Analysis 1.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support 1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment
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Source Term i
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Dispersion l
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Dose Conversion 1.2.4.3 Central Processor Capability i
1.2.5 Data Storage
1. 2. 5.1 Storage Capabilities
1.2.6 System Reliability
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1. 2. 6.1 Verification
i 1.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems i
1.2.6.3 Manual Systems i
i 1.2.7 On-Shift Dose Assessment
1. 2. 7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency
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1.2.7.2 Dose Assessment Technical Adequacy 1.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs
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1.3.1 Operations i
1.3.1.1 Organization
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1.3.1.2 Staffing l
1.3.1.3 Activation 1.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces 1. 3.1. 5 Offsite Interfaces
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1.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities
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1.3.2 Control Room Support
1. 3. 2.1 Technical Support 1.3.2.2 Walk-Throughs i
2.0 Operations Support Center (OSC)
2.1 Physical Facilities
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2.1.1 Design
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2.1.1.1 Location
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2.1.1.2 Alternate Location (s)
2.1.1.3 Layout and Environment
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2.1.1.4 Display Interface i
2.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies
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i 2.1.2.1 Radiation Manitoring 2.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters
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j 2.1.2.3 Protective Supplies i
i 2.1.3 Non Radiological Equipment and Supplies
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2.1.3.1 Communications 2.1.3.2 Support Supplies
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2.2 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs 2.2.1 Operations 2.2.1.1 Staffing 2.2.1.2 Activation 2.2.1.3 Onsite Interface 2.2.2 OSC Functions 2.2.2.1 Coordination, Assignment, Proficiency, and Walkthroughs 3.0 Emergency Operations Facility 3.1 Physical Facilities 3.1.1 Design 3.1.1.1 Size 3.1.1.2 Layout
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3.1.1.3 Location 3.1.1.4 Structure 3.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment 3.1.1.6 Display Interfaces 3.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 3.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters 3.1.2.3 Protective Supplies 3.1.3 Non Radiological Equipment and Supplies 3.1. 3.1 Communications 3.1.3.2 Records / Drawings 3.1.3.3 Support Supplies 3.2 Information Management Systems 3.2.1 Variables Provided 3.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 Variables 3.2.1.2 Other Variables 3.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs 3.2.2 Data Acquisition 3.2.2.1 Data Collection Method 3.2.2.2 Time Resolution 3.2.2.3 Isolation 3.2.3 Data Communications 3.2.3.1 Capacity 3.2.3.2 Error Detection 3.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs
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3.2.4 Data Analysis i
3.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support
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3.2.4.2 Dose Assessment 3.2.4.3 Central Processor Capability 3.2.5 Data Storage
l 3.2.6 System Reliability 3.2.6.1 Verification j
3.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems j
3.2.6.3 Manual Systems 3.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs
3.3.1 Operations
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3.3.1.1 Organization 3.3.1.2 Staffing i
3.3.1.3 Activation 3.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces 3.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces 3.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities 3.3.2 TSC Support
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3.3.2.1 Technical Support l
3.3.2.2 Logistic Support i
3.3.2.3 Implementation of Mitigating Actions
3.3.3 E0F Functions
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3.3.3.1 Notification / Communication j
3.3.3.2 Dose Assessment
3.3.3.3 Protective Action Decisionmaking
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3.3.3.4 Coordination of Radiological and Environmental Assessment
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3.3.3.5 EOF Walk-Through i
l 4.0 Persons Contacted i
l 5.0 Exit Interview
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DETAILS
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1.0 TSC f
1.1 Physical Facilities
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1.1.1 Design
1.1.1.1 Size
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The TSC is located in the observation gallery over?ooking the Control Room.
The 2500 square foot TSC will serve as the duty station for 14
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individuals identified by title in the emergency plan, plus an un-
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specified number of data engineers, technical support engineers and j
administrative support engineers and administrative support staff.
.The TSC also serves as the dispatching point for damage control and.
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J radiological monitoring teams consisting of operations, maintenance and health physics technicians.
There are distinct work areas as-signed for each of the functions (e.g., communications, technical support, radiation protection, and emergency direction).
The opera-
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tional space allocated for performance of each of these functions is
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adequate.
Circulation space, however, is quite limited.
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ly, movement from one location to another in the TSC can generally be accomplished only by passing through operational spaces.
Potential adverse impacts of the limited circulation space upon functional
l performance are offset by the layout of the TSC and by the informa-tion management system provided by the plant computer system (PCS)
and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).
Because the layout and the information management system significantly reduce the amount of circulation within the TSC, and between the TSC and other locations, the size of the TSC is adequate.
1.1.1.2 Layout
l The layout of the TSC adequately supports the flow of personnel, i
materials and information within this ERF.
The Emergency Director j
is located on the central corridor of the TSC with the telephone
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communicators.
Dose Assessment, Security and Administrative Support
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flank the Emergency Director on one side, while Technical Support
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and Damage Control are adjacent to the Emergency Director on the
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other side.
The Damage Control area-is located immediately adjacent
to the doorway through which Damage Control teams must enter the TSC i
to receive their briefings.
The Document Control Area and Conference l
Areas, which have relatively weak adjacency requirements, are located j
in more distant areas of the TSC.
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1.1.1.3 Location
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1.1.1. 4 Structure
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l The Technical Support Center (TSC) is located in the Control Room
mezzanine above the Control Room at elevation 741' of the control
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structure.
The TSC is in close proximity to both the Control Room
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both facilities.
The TSC location in the observation gallery over-
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looking the Control Room allows the TSC staff to observe the acti-I vities in the Control Room without causing overcrowding.
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1.1.1. 5 Habitability / Environment
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same habitability provisions as the Control Room. TSC personnel are I
protected from gamma radiation hazards by shielding that.is designed j
to limit the total ~ radiation dose during the course of a ' Design j
Basis Accident' to less than 5 rem whole body.
The TSC is provided j
with the same habitability as the Control Room which has a ventila-
tion system that includes high efficiency air particulate filters j
(HEPA) and charcoal filters.
The TSC ventilation system automatical-
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j ly isolates and is' switched to recirculation mode upon receipt of a j
high radiation signal from the air intake monitors.
The system can i
be manually isolated if necessary.
Permanent commercial grade area
radiation monitors are provided and alarm on high gross gamma dose
rates.
1.1.1.6 Display Interfaces The TSC has the following display capabilities.
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CRTs Four terminals are available for plant status and envi-ronmental data.
Two terminals are dedicated to the Plant Com-puter System (PCS) and two terminals are dedicated to the Safety
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Parameter Display System (SPDS).
The number of available termi-e
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nals provides the capability for monitoring Unit 1 and Unit 2
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In addition, information can also be obtained j
simultaneously about different systems of a single unit.
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additional computer terminals are available for dose projection.
i The primary system is the STREAM (Susquehanna Terrain - incorpo-i rating Region Effluent Assessment Model) system, which has back-up provided by an Apple II microcomputer.
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Status Boards Plant status and radiological status boards are
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located on a wall where they can easily be observed by the Emer-i gency Director and the key technical support, damage control,
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radiation protection and communications staff.
Updates of plant
status can be obtained when needed by accessing the desired data
either through PCS or SPDS and printing a video copy.
The in-
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formation on the hard copy can then be transferred to the status
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board.
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k All computer displays can easily be manipulated following a min-imum of training due to the availability of a hierarchical sys-tem of display pages and permanently labeled function keys,
i Required input is requested by user prompts and input data are tested to determine whether they are within an acceptable range.
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Function keys are labeled, grouped by type and color coded.
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There are predetermined plant status variables for which data can be trended within computer displays.
Other variables can be
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trended by generating hard copy from the PCS or SPDS displays and plotting the data points by hand.
The PCS provides 20 user definable display pages which are listed in a directory that is accessed by depressing a single function key.
One of the exist-
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status board.
User documentation is quite limited.
There is a reference list of I/O specifications for SPDS but no user man-
ual.
There is a manual for the operation of the PCS consoles
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that is suitable for an experienced user, but it is not suitable for a novice user, nor is it available at all locations.
The primary dose projection system, STREAM, uses the same
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19-inch CRTs as are used for the PCS and SPDS.
Both STREAM and
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j the Apple II (backup) can print hard copy.
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i The following recommendations are made to improve the licensee's j
presentation and dissemination of data:
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The quality and availability of documentation for computer
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all potential users.
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Display compatibility could be improved by establishing a
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common variable set on PMS-47 and SPDS-14 (Environmental
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Conditions) and on PNS-68, SPDS-12 and the Status Board (Reactor Parameters).
SPDS variable sets could be grouped according to parameter
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from computer displays to other uses such as status boards.
l For example, meteorological variables could be grouped l
either by parameter (wind speed, direction) or location 10
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meter, 60 meter).
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Displayed values should be carried to the number of signi-
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ficant digits required, without misleading the operator by j
an excessive number of digits.
Displayed precision should
be consistent with the precision required in the event that l
the data values must be taken off the display and entered j
into another calculation.
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1 Questionable data values are indicated on the screen by
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color coding.
Hard copy is not capable of conveying this coding.
An asterisk or other character could be used in addition to color coding to ensure that unreliable data are highlighted when hard copy is distributed.
1.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies
1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring 1.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters f
1.1.2.3 Protective Supplies
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An installed radiation monitor is located in the conference room (TSC library) associated with the TSC.
The radiological equipment
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for the TSC is located in a storage cabinet located in the back of the Control Room.
The only monitoring equipment available in the locker are two friskers which will be used to frisk personnel coming into the TSC.
Respiratory equipment and protective clothing are available in the storage cabinet.
KI is available, but it is not
stored in the TSC.
All other equipment for monitoring must be
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obtained from the Health Physics office or the trailer adjacent to j
the plant where radiological equipment is stored. Air samples taken i
in the TSC will be analyzed at the count room near the Health j
Physics office.
Dosimetry will be obtained from the count room and
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Issued to TSC personnel. Decontamination of TSC personnel will be
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performed at the decon area at the Health Physics control point.
It is recommended that additional survey equipment be available in the TSC for individuals to use when traveling to the assembly areas
or other areas in the plant.
1.1.3 Nonradiological Equipment and Supplies 1.1.3.1 Meteorological Monitoring Program The current meteorological monitoring program at SSES consists of a t
primary meteorological tower, a backup tower (pole) and two supple-mental offsite measurement locations.
The primary 91 meter tower provides two levels of wind data,.10 and 60 meters, and a measure of atmospheric stability between the two levels.
It is located approxi-mately 500 meters ESE of the station; and has a twenty minute battery backup, uninterrupted power supply (UPS).
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The backup pole is located onsite.
The offsite meteorological moni-
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toring sites are located up-valley and down-valley, at 2.5 KM NNE and i
The backup and supplemental measurement l
locations provide measures of wind speed and direction at 10 meters.
Also, a measure of atmospheric stability can be determined from the i
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horizontal standard deviation of wind direction at all locations (sigma-theta).
Open Item 50-387/86-10-01, 50-388/86-10-01 - A full description of this meteorological monitoring program was not readily available.
Part of the program and some equipment are described in the SSES E Plan (Section 6.2.5.1) and the FSAR (Section 2.3.3).
An adequate description of this program is needed specifying equipment, location, provisions for the use of the data and details on additional informa-tion that may be requested or needed from the local National Weather Service (NWS).
1.1.3.2 Communications The licensee has provided multiple systems for transmitting and receiving emergency information between the various ERFs and offsite locations.
The normal telephone service for the TSC is the Electronic Tandem Network (ETN) system and commercial telephone lines.
Hotlines provide priority access voice communication links to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Control Room, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), County emergency management agencies, NRC, ENS and HPN, Department of Environmental Resource / Bureau of Radiological Protection (DER /BRP), Operational Support Center (OSC), Allentown General Office and the Media Opera-tions Center (MOC).
The TSC has a four-channel 450 MHz UHF radio which provides primary and backup communications to security, and onsite/inplant locations and a two-channel 150 MHz VHF radio system which is used to communicate with the field monitoring team.
Ad-ditional communications include the public address system, telecopy machines, Total Office Support System (electronic mail), and the computer systems.
Periodic communication test are performed as required and communica-tions were verified as adequate through exercises and drills.
1.1.3.3 RECORDS /ORAWINGS Technical documentation required for use in the TSC during an emer-t gency is located in the TSC satellite library.
The main station
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library is located in the Service and Administration building on the second floor.
Complete plant documentation to backup the TSC satel-lite library is located in the main document library.
The main library is approximately a 5 minute walk from the TSC.
The TSC contains plant operating procedures, dose calculation manuals, drawings of plant systems and structures, plant technical specifications, emergency plan implementing procedures, the emergency plan, emetgency operating procedures, final safety analysis report,
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and operating manuals for specific equipment in the TSC such as the SPDS.
The TSC library contains a file of plant diagrams which includes
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mechanical, electrical, control, elevation, distribution, and site layout drawings.
All major systems and subsystems appeared to be represented by available drawings.
Lesser used drawings are main-
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tained in the TSC aperture card file.
The combination of the drawing file and aperture card file included most drawings except for iso-metrics and foundation drawings.
Drawings in the file are posted with Drawing Change Notices and the drawing changes are appended to the drawing.
The proper drawing can be located / retrieved using any of several methods.
The TSC library contains Systems Description Manuals which contain all procedures associated with that system.
These include normal operating procedures, abnormal procedures, emergency procedures and alarm procedures.
The procedures reference prints associated with the described system.
Two other retrieval /
locator systems are available in the TSC library.
The Storage and Information Retrieval System (STAIRS) is an IBM computer system that interfaces with the Pennsylvania Power and Light mainframe computer system in Allentown, PA.
The interface is via high speed modems on dedicated telephone lines.
Several STAIRS terminals are located on the site with redundant telephone lines to the corporate office where the mainframe resides.
Information available on STAIRS includes availability of drawings, technical manuals, and spare parts through the use of search formats.
Information can be searched by noun name (e.g., valve, pump, etc.), vendor, print number, print title, etc.
The print number for a Safety Relief Valve was quickly located during the walkthrough with the STAIRS system.
The Design Document Manage-ment System (DDMS) is used to track Drawing Change Packages (DCP)
Interim Drawing Change Notices (IDCN), Plant Change Notices (PCN),
and Drawing Change Notices (DCN).
This system uses the same terminal and computer as STAIRS and has similar search capabilities.
1.1.3.4 SUPPORT SUPPLIES The TSC appeared to have all necessary support supplies that would allow it to function properly during an emergency.
Walkthroughs demonstrated that placement of documents, procedures, graphs, EPZ maps, and isopleths would support TSC personnel in their assigned duties.
Procedure EP-IP-101, Inventory, Inspection, Operational Testing, and Calibration of Emergency Equipment and Supplies provided measures to ensure that emergency equipment and supplies were checked at prescribed intervals.
During walkthroughs, it was noted that primary and backup program disks for the backup dose assessment method using the Apple computer were stored one on top of the other.
This is not a recommended practice,as both are subject to the same environment and could suffer l
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simultaneous damage.
TSC personnel stated that the closest additional disks were located in the EOF.
It is recommended that the licensee establish a safe storage area for backup disks.
1.1.3.5 TSC POWER SUPPLIES In evaluating the ability of the TSC to function under loss of power considerations, a list of essential equipment was considered.
This list included lighting, ventilation and cooling, primary dose assess-ment computers, radiation monitoring system, SPDS consoles and prin-ter, Unit Monitor consoles and printer (plant process computer), VHF radio console, and phone communications.
Other equipment utilized in the TSC included the reader printer, copying machines, telefax, docu-ment computer, backup dose assessment computer, General Electric Transient Analysis Hesponse System (GETARS) and local habitability monitors.
Observations of each area are presented below:
Lighting - Lighting is supplied by station power with about 10% of the TSC lights backed by diesel generators.
A loss of all site power and all diesel generators would result in a loss of all TSC lighting.
Ventilation and Cooling - The TSC is in the same ventilation envelope as the Control Room.
Ventilation and cooling are supplied from site power backed by diesel generators.
A loss of all site power and all diesel generators would result in a loss of all TSC ventilation and cooling.
Primary Dose Assessment - The primary dose assessment computer is powered from a wall outlet in the TSC.
This wall outlet is powered from a distribution panel that is backed by batteries through a static inverter.
Radiation Monitoring System - The Eberline Radiation Monitoring System is powered from instrument AC which is a class IE interrupted circuit.
If all offsite power is lost, the system will loose power and regain power when the diesels start and come on the line.
A loss of all offsite and onsite power will result in a loss of the Radiation Monitoring System.
Unit 1 SPDS - The unit 1 SPDS is powered from instrument power from the Motor Control Center.
The Motor Control Center is backed up by station diesel generators.
A loss of site power and all diesel generators would result in a loss of Unit 1 SPDS.
Unit 2 SPDS - The unit 2 SPDS is powered from its own IE class AC supply with a battery backu *
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Unit 1 & 2 Unit Monitors - Unit Monitors are powered from Motor Control Centers which are backed by station diesels.
Station black-out procedures address a loss of instrumentation caused by a loss of all site feeders and a failure of all diesel generators.
VHF Radio Console - The two-channel VHF desktop control console is used as an emergency backup to the telephone system for communication with offsite agencies and to communicate with field monitoring teams.
The console was found to be powered from an unmarked outlet in the TSC.
Investigation by removing overhead panels and tracing the un-scheduled conduit run indicated the outlet was puwered from overhead lighting panels.
The lighting panels are fed from station power only and would not be available on a loss of offsite power.
The VHF console could be powered from a nearby outlet (1Y629) which is pro-vided battery backed UPS power.
Phone Communications - Station telephone systems, hotlines, and control systems are powered from nonessential station power but are backed by emergency battery systems.
The telephone system battery is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> battery and is located in the Service and Administration building.
Other Equipment - Other equipment listed with the exception of the GETARS system is powered from nonessential station power which would not be available on a loss of off-site power.
The GETARS system is powered from inverter / battery backed power.
OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-02, 50-388/86-10-02 a) The TSC does not appear to have any source of emergency lighting during a station blackout (e.g., a loss of both site feeders and all four diesels).
b) Outlets used to power ERF equipment should be labelled on power source (s)
determined, documented and readily available to ERF staff.
The majority of overhead fluorescent lighting fixtures in the TSC (about 40 fixtures) are powered from station power (designated OLP).
Additional fixtures (about 9) are powered from station power but are backed up by station diesels on a loss of site power (designed OEP).
The station blackout procedure was reviewed and did not appear to address loss of TSC lighting or measures necessary to insure conti-nuity of the Emergency Response Facilities in the event of a station blackout.
The addition of two or three commercial emergency lighting battery floodlight sets could provide a relatively inexpensive in-terim or possible permanent solution to the lighting problem.
OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-03, 50-388/86-10-03 - Several cabling, phone, and power cord runs in the TSC are subject to mechanical damage by being bumped, walked on, or stretched during movement of personnel or equipment.
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Frayed cords, missing covers, trip hazards and protruding cabling connections were noted in several areas of the TSC during walk-throughs and inspection activities.
Of particular concern were i
signal cables to the SPOS and Unit Monitor displays, keyboards, and
printers as these appear to be the main source of plant data that is i
used to operate the TSC during an emergency situation.
Discussions with plant staff indicated.that there have been incidents of loss of
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equipment capability due to bumping the cables.
The elimination of, l
or marking of trip hazards in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building i
appears to have been carefully addressed.
This " attention to detail" l
does not appear to have been extended to the TSC.
In addition, emergency situations briefings for teams, possibly dressed out or
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carrying repair equipment, are conducted in a small (about 4' by 6')
]
area where most of the cables are protruding.
l OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-04, 50-388/86-10-04 - Emergency procedures i
should address any serious degradation of Emergency Response Facili-l ties.
Procedures should address what capabilities / functions have j
been degraded and measures to maintain emergency response.
During a station blackout, in addition to all lighting in the TSC
.
!
being lost with no backup emergency lighting, power would also be
lost to the backup dose assessment computer, aperture card reader, l
VHF console, and Eberline Radiation Monitoring System printer indi-I cator.
Due to the type of plug and outlet installed (110VAC-twist j
lock) for the primary dose assessment system (STREAM), the backup
dose assessment Apple computer would not plug into.UPS power if the
primary system failed.
A simple adapter would provide one solution.
!
The other items mentioned above could likewise be powered if needed i
during a loss of station power providing circuit capacity is ade-l quate.
J'
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This portion of the licensee's program appears adequate, except as j
noted above.
i 1.2 Information Management i
i 1.2.1 Variables Provided i
j 1.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97,-Rev. 2, Variables
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i The Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L) in a letter dated i
May 31, 1984 responding to Generic Letter 82-33 (Supplement 1 to i
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NUREG-0737) provided the Susquehanna conformance to Regulatory Guide
1.97, Revision 2.
The NRC indicated that the PP&L design i
conformance was acceptable subject to the test and evaluation of the
!
powgr test of the neutron flux measuring system to meet the range of
10- to 100% of full power in'a supplement to the Susquehanna Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1985.
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A Safety Evaluation on Susquehanna, Units 1 and 2 was conducted on instrumentation provided for meeting the recommendations of Regula-tory Guide 1.97.
It was based on a Technical Evaluation Review (TER)
dated October 1984.
The SER concluded that the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 design is acceptable with respect to overall conformance to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
The variables from Reg. Guide 1.97 that are not provided in the TSC data acquisition systems are:
1) Suppression Chamber Spray Flow; 2)
Drywell Spray Flow; 3) Main Steamline Isolation Valves Leakage Con-trol System Pressure; 4) Cooling Water Flow to ESF System Components; 5) High Radioactivity Liquid Tank Level; and 6) Emergency Ventilation Damper Position.
All the other Reg. Guide 1.97 variables provided to the control room are also provided to the TSC by operating consoles from the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Plant Computer System ((PCS) or the Particulate Iodine Noble Gas Monitoring System (SPING) computerized data acquisition systems.
The six variable which are not available in the TSC can be obtained easily from the
control room by either telephone or sending an individual from the
!
TSC to the control room which is in close proximity to the TSC.
1. 2.1. 2 Other Variables The other variables provided to the TSC by voice communications or other manual techniques include:
the post accident sampling data from the primary coolant, containment sump and containment atmosphere; onsite and offsite radiological field monitoring data; onsite meteorological data; offsite meteorological data, and forecasting from the National Weather Service from an airport within a 50 mile radius of the plant site.
The TSC has access to emergency medical assistance and emergency vendor assistance by telephone.
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The combination of the above information and data systems together with procedures, records and drawings described in 1.1.3.2 is adequate to allow the TSC to perform its function of technical and
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l logistical assistance to the control room.
Also the variables
!
provided to the TSC are adequate for it to perform the E0F functions until it becomes necessary to activate that facility.
1. 2.1. 3 Relationship to Functional Needs l
The primary source of plant data for input to the TSC is the SPDS and Plant Computer System (called Unit Monitor).
The TSC has two CRTs housed in the SPDS console each switchable to either Unit 1 or Unit 2 and two Plant Computer System unit monitoring consoles with each switchable to either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
Both the SPDS and unit monitors provide graphic and parameter information on the condition
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of plant systems.
Both systems have a separate video copier for hardcopy output.
The unit monitor generally provides non-safety operations data and the SPDS provides safety data.
SPDS - There are 3 SPDS systems, one for Unit 1, one for Unit 2, and one in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) that is switchable between Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The TSC SPDS consoles are fed from the plant SPDS computers.
Computers for the plant SPDS systems are located within the control structure.
The E0F SPDS computer is located in the EOF computer room.
The SPDS has about 115 analog and 240 digital inputs per unit and uses four types of displays which are Primary, Secondary, E0P, and Auxiliary.
The primary display is tabular / graphic displaying reactor power, reactor pressure vessel water level, reactor vessel
,
pressure, drywell pressure, and radioactive effluents.
Secondary displays are tables, curves and plots of parameter information that support the primary displays.
The E0P formats display a duplication of a decision curve in the Emergency Operating Procedure.
Message /
alarm displays generate message / alarm information on the screen responding to the various algorithms for individual parameters.
SPDS displays are programmable fixed displays.
Individual parameter call-up and display, other than that available on the " fixed" aisplays are not user available.
PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM (Unit Monitor) - The Plant Computer System at Susquehanna includes 10 CRTs in the control room with fixed displays for the operation and monitoring of all major plant systems with few exceptions.
The ECCS system is not monitored by the Plant Computer j
System. Major system displays indicate flow rates, equipments status, selected valve status, temperatures, and pressures.
The Unit Monitor System can also monitor annunciators panels.
Control con-soles in the TSC and EOF can monitor all functions that the control room can monitor and in addition can monitor any control room screen.
The TSC and EOF screens then change as control operators select dif-ferent displays.
Several displays serve the Emergency Response Faci-lity data needs and provide a source for manual entry of data on to status boards.
1.2.2 Data Acquisition Susquehanna Emergency Response Facility (ERF) plant status monitoring and reporting functions were satisfactory.
Two completely indepen-dent computer controlled systems have been utilized to satisff ERF requirements in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Three recommendations for improvement were made.
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Meteorological Data - The plant process computers provide numerous data point values from the onsite meteorological measurements.
Wina speed, wind direction and atmospheric stability measurement are also provided in real-time from the offsite (remote) sensors to the plant computer.
Meteorological forecast data is provided by verbal com-munication with the NWS at Arcola.
A modem is used to communicate an analog signal to a digital converter for each unit's data processing computer.
All these data points are available in locations with terminal access to the plant computer. Both instantaneous (1 second reading) and average values (2, 10 and some 60 minute) are available.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 currently can provide meteorological parameters.
A third computer system is used to screen the data and generate 15 minute average values for use in radiological dose assessment.
The meteorological measurements made are readily available for use in both plant computers and the stream computer system.
At this time, no offsite remote interrogation capability of this data by the State, Federal and/or other local government agencies exists.
Based on the review of meteorological data acquisition, a recom-mendation to add a remote interrogation capability was made.
1. 2. 2.1 Data Collection Method The Plant Computer System is the primary data acquisition and report-ing system available in the TSC and E0F.
It routinely monitors the following inputs:
Unit 1 Unit 2 Analog 1232 1230 Digital 1537 1528 SSES FSAR Section 7.7.1.7.3.1.3 describes this system and its func-tions.
The plant computer system has been designed as a multiproces-sor system that partitions data gathering, data preprocessing, data processing, data storage, and data display functions using separate computers joined together by a shared common memory region.
The Plant Computer System supports TSC/ERF requirements well.
Users interact with the plant computer system with a TSC graphics display terminal and associated hard copy device.
Plant safety status can be obtained by requesting roughly 250 different displays using function key and common keyboard key inputs.
The second system that monitors plant safety status is the Susque-hanna SPDS.
Three Digital Equipment Corporation 11/24's have been installed to configure the SPDS.
One 11/24 monitors Unit 1, one monitors Unit 2, and one 11/24 is located at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Each SPDS computer has 768 kilobytes of main memory, a 10 megabyte hard disk and a magnetic tape drive.
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an extra 10 megabyte hard disk and a 600 line per-minute line printer for software development.
Software development can be done only on the E0F SPDS.
Units 1 and 2 SPDS are loaded with data files and executable code only and contain no programming languages and
{
associated libraries.
Changes to SPDS software are done in confor-mance to configuration control practices.
Users can review plant status using a menu / function key driven SPDS
'
at the control room, the TSC, and the EOF.
Requested displays are
generated on Aydin 5215 graphics CRTs.
Based on the review of data collection methods, the following recom-mendations are made:
i
Currently trend plotting and sensor versus sensor plotting can be
>
l performed for a limited number of cases using the Plant Computer d
System and the SPDS.
It is recommended that trend plotting capabi-
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lity be extended to include any selected sensor (s).
This suggestion,
,
if implemented, will give PP&L plotting capability equal to other
utilities and will improve the ability to review more data faster and with more flexibility.
It is further suggested that enhanced plot-
,
j ting capability, if implemented, should include real-time as well as t
historical data plots.
'
It is also suggested that PP&L develop a limited number of " big picture" displays on the Plant Computer System to analyze plant
,
i status quickly, 1.2.2.2 Time Resolution t
i Complete plant sample sensor sets are scanned and processed every two seconds.
This data rate is considered low speed and poses no threat to the system raultitasking capability yet is fast enough to allow effective plant status monitoring.
Should high speed data acquisition be required (i.e., on a turbine trip), the GETARS (General Electric Transient Analysis and Recording System) has been j
acquired and installed.
i 1.2.2.3 Isolation
,
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The SPDS is isolated from the 1E data acquisition system by electrically isolated multiplexers.
The multiplexers are used, one i
for each unit and for plant common equipment.
Multiplexers supply
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input signals to Remote Data Concentrators which feed SPDS computers a
i j
via fiber optic cables.
The multiplexers were tested both on the
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input power supply and signal output with AC and DC, common and
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transverse mode faults while monitoring simulated plant class 1E
circuitry inputs.
Results of these tests were documented by
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company in an April 14, 1986 letter:
'
Subject - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station SPDS IMUX Qualification Testing.
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1.2.3 Data Communications l
1.2.3.1 Capacity 1.2.3.2 Error Detection, and 1.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs Data communications between %nse computer systems described in Section 1.2.2 and the corresponding output display devices in the TSC and the EOF are accomplished using fiber optic links and RS232C standard protocol.
Transmission rates are 9600 bits /second and are acceptable.
Error detection methods have been included in the system's handshake mechanisms.
Communications capability for the plant Computer System, the SPDS, and the Remote Data Acquisition System and the associated display terminals was reviewed and found to conform to industry practices and NRC requirements.
1.2.4 Data Analysis 1.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support Plant information to accomplish reactor technical support function is readily available from the SPDS, Unit Monitors, and Radiation Monitoring System.
Several forecasting (trending) plots are directly available on the SPDS.
These include containment pressure vs. time, containment H levels vs. time, coolant temperature vs. time, primary
coolant pressure vs. time, primary coolant inventory vs. time, and power level vs. time.
Information is available to conduct manual plotting of containment temperature vs. time, containment radiation level vs. time, offgas radioactivity vs. time and primary coolant radioactivity vs. time.
Procedure EP-IP-048, Revision 2, Estimation of Core Damage during an Emergency, contains several additional trending plots to estimate core damage.
The General Electric Transient Analysis Recorder is available and is normally set up to record pre-trip and trip data and provide a historical sequence of selected plant signals and parameters.
The technical support function at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station depends heavily on the General Office engineering groups which are in direct contact with TSC and E0F technical support engineers via hotlines during an emergency requiring activation of the Emergency Response Facilities.
Engineering calculations such as core uncovery times, time until battery failure, etc. would normally be done in the General Office.
Susquehanna EALs are written such that each is associated with specific plant indications that are available on displays so that these values can be associated with a specific EA.
.
1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment Two computerized methods and one manual dose assessment method are available in the TSC.
All methods assume a ground-level release.
The primary dose assessment method (STREAM-Susquehanna Terrain-incorporating Regional Effluent Assessment Model) is run on the Remote Data Acquisition System (RDAS) computer located in the EOF from a terminal in the TSC.
DOSE is the backup computerized dose assessment method run on an Apple II personal computer.
Both STREAM and DOSE use whole body dose conversion factors.
However, the State, and initially the licensee still may rely on this method for dect-sionmaking.
The capability (equipment) currently exists to quickly use the Stream system to classify and make the appropriate recom-mendations.
The training lesson plan for EPIP-009 (Emergency Off-Site Dose Calculations) addresses differences between the three dose assessment methods but does not address how these differences might affect nu-merical results.
It is recommended that this information be provided in the training.
In addition, specific accident scenarios should be calculated using each method with a discussion of the reasons for any differences.
The licensee has also performed a comparison of their DOSE model with IRDAM.
For the same accident release rate, DOSE results were 2-4 times greater than IRDAM.
The licensee has documented the reasons for the differences.
The State of Pennsylvania has three potential ways of calculating offsite doses:
IRDAM, PP&L's manual overlays, and EPA X/Qs.
The EPA X/Q method would be of limited value at Susquehanna due to the complex terrain.
The state indicated that they would do parallel calculations during an emergency probably using IRDAM, but would rely on the licensee's calculations.
Since the licensee provides state personnel training each year on EPIP-009, it is recommended that part of this training include a discussion of how DOSE and IRDAM results compare and the reasons for any differences.
Recommendations to improve the licensee's dose assessment capability include:
complete the development of a technique to allow automatic
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entry of real time vent release data into STREAM and perform acceptance testing, include information on the affected sectors on the STREAM
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printou.
.
A.
Source Term Adequate information and data are available in the TSC to deter-mine a source term for all anticip.sted release paths during ac-cident transients.
The primary r,ystem for measuring airborne radioactive releases is the SPING vent monitoring system.
This system continuously monitors the five major plant vents located on top of the SSES reactor building which contains both reactor units. On the east side of the reactor building two roof vents are located, one for each reactor unit.
The other three vents are located on the west side of the roof, one vent for each unit turbine building and one common vent for the standby gas treat-mentsystem.7gchventisseparatelymonitoredforgrogyalpha, gross beta, I gamma energies, gamma energies above I
, low range noble gas (beta), mid-range noble gas (gamma) and high range noble gas (gamma).
Continuous sampling is performed isokinetically after the vent gas is passed through an airflow equalizer and profiler.
Thesamplesteamforeacg3yentis analyzed on a continuous basis for noble gases, I and particulates providing the following historical print outs from an Eberline microcomputer controlled data terminal located in the TSC:
past 24 daily averages, past 24 hourly averages, past 25 10 minute averages, and past 24 1 minute averages.
In addition the system can be commanded to produce continuous 10 minute averages on demand.
This system is designed for both 10 9al operatigns and emergencies (e.g., covers a range of 2 x nor to 1 x 10 microcuries/cc for noble gases).
Procedures to classify unusual Events and Alerts based on comparison the Technical Specification release limits are provided to the operating crew.
The SPING release rates are also available on the SPDS readout in the TSC and the control room.
Th.e sample lines for the SPING system are heat traced and line bends are limited to greater than five times the line diameter.
Corrections for line losses are made based on both the testing of mock-ups of actual sampling lines and computer modeling.
Also corrections are included for large changes in airborne concentrations producing transmission variations and changes in equilibrium between deposition and resuspension of deposits in the sampling lines.
In addition to the SPING system, SSES has a Post-Accident Vent Sampling System (PAVSS) which can obtain grab samples from the
'
exhaust of the five main plant vents for noble gases, radioiodines and particulates.
These samples can be transported to a laboratory either in plant or at the EOF for radiochemical analysis.
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SSES is equipped with a Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
which can obtain grab samples from the containment.
Gas samples can be obtainet from either the wetwell or drywell for noble gases, radioiodines and particulates.
This system can also be used to obtain small liquid grab samples of either reactor cooling water through the RHR system or from the jet pumps as well as water samples from the suppression pool.
There are 45 unmonitored equipment vents that are open to the atmosphere that involve systems that normally do not contain radioactive effluents (e.g., oil vents, steam vents, refrigerant
'
(chiller) vents).
These systems could become radioactive through accidental interfaces with radioactive systems due to valving alignment errors or undetected piping leaks.
To ensure that airborne offsite releases under accident conditions are detected and evaluated, a health physics technician is dis-patched under any declared emergency in a van equipped with direct measuring portable radiation instrumentation and air sampling equipment to collect radioiodines and particulates, to locate and measure the plume.
These measurements are made close to the site boundary and attempt to establish the plume width, centerline, and intensity.
An air sample is obtained as close to the centerline as possible.
The air sample is evaluated in the field.
All the data obtained is used to correct the pro-jected noble gas and radioiodine releases.
SSES has an EPIP to determine the degree of reactor core damage from the measured fission product concentrations in either PASS water or gas samples.
The procedure assumes LOCA conditions and the fission products are released under either rupture of the fuel cladding or if the fuel is melted depending on the quantity
'
of fission products released to the RCS and/or containment and their volatility as well as other reactor systems conditions such as reactor water level and hydrogen concentration in con-tainment.
Radionuclides included in the analysis are 131-I,
,
137-Cs, 133-Xe, 85-Kr, 132-Te, 99-Mo, 140-8a, 140-La, 103-Ru, 141-Ce, 95-Zr, 97-Zr, 91-Sr, and 92-Y.
Graphs are provided to give the assumed percent core damage based on the concentration
'
of 131-I or 137Cs in primary coolant and 133-Xe or 85-Kr in the containment atmosphere.
Also direct monitoring of the contain-ment atmosphere can be used as an indication os serious fuel damage ~.
Source terms for water born releases can be obtained from a composite sampler which continuously collects discharge from the liquid radwaste and cooling tower blowdown lines before it enter a diffuser located near the bottom of the Susquehanna River.
An EPIP is provided which can be used for sampling calculations to determine the arrival time and activity at
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Danville, PA, the nearest down river community using the river as a water supply.
In addition there are a number of other
i waterborne monitoring systems inplant which should alert the
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t operating crew of problems before water reaches this final j
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discharge point (e.g., liquid radwaste discharge line monitor,
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l service water monitor which would include leakage form the fuel
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pool heat exchangers, RHR service water monitors).
l j
There are 16 emergency TLD sites out of 66 TLD sites available for environmental monitoring around the plant that are specifi-
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cally equipped with 3 TLD's; one for initial offsite assessment,
one for dose determination during the release period and one for total accident dose assessment.
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The STREAM and DOSE computerized dose assessment programs also
,
contain a manual input for the type of accident occurring at
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SSES including:
radioactive release without fuel damage,
,
release with fuel damage, fuel handling accident, charcoal bed
'
failure, waste gas tank failure and a default accident based on
,
a LOCA detected by plan systems status.
These programs can be i
used if data are unavailable to obtain an accident source term
.
for offsite dose assessment.
Although the source term capability of SSES in the TSC is i
'
adequate to meet the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737, the following recommendation is made to improve it's source
term capabilities:
i
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The menu of accident types for STREAM and DOSE should be enlarged to include a few accidents from the FSAR (e.g.,
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control rod drop accident, instrument line break, steam
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system piping break outside containment, LOCA accidents-a inside containment) as well as several severe accident
'
sequences from WASH-1400 or more recent information from j
the latest source term studies.
I B.
Dispersion j
STREAM uses a straight-line Gaussian atmospheric dispersion
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model out to two miles from the plant and a Lagrangian puff i
dispersion model for all other areas.
Capabilities of STREAM j
are listed below-
calculates whole body and thyroid dose rates, integrated
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doses, and projected doses (up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />) in the-plume-
.l EPZ.
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provides for automatic input of-meteorological data from I
onsite meteorological ~ towers.
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nuclide composition of effluents is based on one of five
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accident types or vent grab sample analyses.
Releases can include noble gases, radiciodines and particulates.
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accounts for dry and wet deposition and decay of activity in transit.
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calculates grour.d deposition activities.
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provides area map plots and trend plots of dose rates,
integrated doses, and projected doses.
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allows use of forecast meteorological and release rate data in dose projections.
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calculates release rates based on field monitoring team j
data.
The STREAM code has been (systematically) verified by the licensee.
This verification process included range checking input parameters to assure that the user is prompted should values outside specified limits be entered.
The STREAM model was developed from MES0I Version 2.0 (NUREG/CR i
3344) a model originally developed by National Reactor Testing Station.
(Start and Wendell 1974).
Some of the site specific modifications to the model were available in draft at the
,
site.
'
The latest modification excludes the use of a plume rise algorithum.
This may decrease the overall accuracy of the model, for hot buoyant plumes.
In addition, the STREAM system can not effectively handle a puff type release of (short dura-tion <2 hrs.) inside 5 miles.
.
The modeling approach appears to be adequate to continually
assess the transport and diffusion, with certain exceptions.
The following items need to be addressed:
,
OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-05, 50-388/86-10-05 a) The approach
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used for dose assessment of discrete puff-type releases needs review and clarification.
The straight-line guassian and lagrangian puff models are not effective as-used in providing timely results.
b) Finalize documentation on STREAM.
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The stream system does not consider any plume rise due to buoyancy or inertia.
This results in an effective plume height of zero; which, may be unrealistic and misleading during an emergency under certain releases and meteorological conditions; consider this for improvement.
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22 DOSE is the backup computerized dose assessment method run on an Apple II personal computer.
The program uses a straight-line Gaussian atmospheric dispersion model and includes fixed terrain correction factors. Other capabilities of DOSE are listed below:
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calculates whole body and thyroid dose rates, integrated doses, and projected doses (up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).
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nuclide composition of effluents is based on one of five accident types.
(Does not have the capability to enter vent grab sample isotopic analyses.
Only has the capability to handle noble gases and radioiodines.)
accounts for wet deposition and decay of activity in transit.
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calculates release rates based on field monitoring team data.
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allows calculations based on certain plant parameters.
The licensee uses isopleth overlays as a backup manual method should both computerized methods be inoperable.
The manual method consists of a set of 32 transparent isopleth overlays for use on a ten-mile plume EPZ (emergency planning zone) map.
Overlays were developed for four stability classes (C,D,E,G) with four overlays for each class based on wind direction and wind speed.
A straight-line Gaussian atmospheric dispersion model was used in developing most of the overlays.
Several overlays consider terrain effects (follow the river valley).
These are used under pre-designated wind directions.
Other capabilities of the manual overlay method are listed below:
manually calculates whole body and thyroid dose rates,
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integrated doses, and projected doses at distances of 2, 5, and 10 miles.
Not usable for distances less than 1.5 miles from the plant.
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nuclide composition of effluents is based on loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), considers only noble gases and radiciodines in the effluent.
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does not consider any wet or dry deposition or decay of activity in transit.
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can manually calculate release rates from field monitoring team data.
Meteorological Data - The STREAM system provides 15-minute
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average values for use in dose assessment methods and protective action decision making.
A screening program is used to identi-fied bad or questionable data points.
This area was found to be adequate.
However contrary to the recommended method in the-
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" Standard for Determining Meteorological Information at Nuclear
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Power Sites", ANSI /ANS 2.5 (1984) 15 minute average values are based on running two-minute means taken 15 times once a minute.
- Also, the data dump, from the plant computers, to the prime occurs at different times.
Hence, the average for the same 15
,
minute period are slightly different, which causes confusion and statistical bias.
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C.
Dose Conversion
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Both STREAM and DOSE use.whole body dose conversion factors from MES0 RAD (NUREG/CR-4000-Scherpelz et al. 1986) and Kocher
,
(1980) and inhalation dose factors for the child thyroid from Regulatory Guide 1.109 (U.S. NRC).
The manual overlay method l
uses whole body dose conversion factors from Regulatory Guide 1.109 and inhalation dose factors for the infant thyroid from Regulatory Guide 1.109.
STREAM and DOSE use the child breathing rate (light activity) in ICRP 23 (ICRP 1975) while the
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manual method uses the Regulatory Guide 1.109 value for infant
!
breathing rate. All values discussed above are acceptable.
It i
is recommended that-the license included information on the
"
affected sectors in the STREAM model and indicate which STREAM puffs are radiologically significant on the graphic display.
STREAM can calculate ground deposition levels and graphically display deposition levels in terms of high, medium, and low i
ground contamination levels.
These displays can be used.to assist in determining the best areas for taking environmental samples (e.g., soil, vegetation, milk, etc.).
The licensee
,
should consider adding appropriate dose conversion factors to STREAM to enable the calculation of dose rates from ground contamination levels.
- At the time of this ERF appraisal ~the RDAS was configured with:
t
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Central Processing Unit:
Prime 750.
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Random access memory:
6 megabytes.
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Hard disk drives: 2(350 megabyte).
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Magnetic tape drive:
1/ Prime 750.
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Also,-the security of the Susquehanna computer systems.was reviewed.
The following is a summary of that review:
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The Plant Computer System is housed within the plant
!
controlled zone and requires keycard authorization for access.
)
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SPDS Computers are located within the plant controlled zone j
and in the EOF computer room.
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RDAS is located in the EOF computer room.
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Based on this review, computer access security is adequate for
the Plant Computer System and the SPDS with regard to TSC q
function.
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1.2.5 Data Storage 1.2.5.1 Storage Capabilities There are four data storage areas involved with data storage:
1)
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local memory of the data gathering and range checking processor; 2)
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shared common memory:
3) drum storage:
and 4) magnetic tape.
These four components work together to store data that significantly changes as per Susquehanna guidelines.
Data residing in the local random access senery of the Data Acquisi-tion Processor (DAP) are the current values for plant sensors.
When sensors are scanned, the current readings are compared to the prior readings in local memory.
If the difference (s) are significant (as per Susquehanna compression limit definitions) then shared common values are updated.
If no significant changes are observed, shared
common data are not changed.
ERF displays show the data in shared
,
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common.
If current data readings show a significant change (as per Susquehanna compression limit definition) from the last corresponding i
data sent to a history file, then current readings are stored in a
history file.
History files are stored on a system drum and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (or sooner if the drum is more than 80% full) history files are
i moved from drum to magnetic tape.
>
Data storage methodology developed by Susquehanna provides for
continuous data storage yet uses magnetic media resources only when-necessary as a function of data change magnitude.
The SPDS also performs data storage.
There are two cases when the
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SPDS will store data:
when alarm limits are exceeded, and alarm messages are stored,
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and
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'when data trends need to be recorded.
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Also, the RDAS has data storage' capability.
For meteorological data ong minute averaged data.is stored in a data file with'
i 15-minute average data stored in a separate data file.
Dose assessment used by." STREAM" is also stored.
Here all input and output data is stored to disk files.
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OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-06, 50-388/86-10-06 - During the ERF
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appraisal, complete details were not available concerning.the
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methodology employed to determine when plant computer wriables are j
modified in shared common memory and when variables are to be stored
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l to the system drum and eventually to magnetic tape.
Clarification
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E of how PP&L engineering personnel specify compression limit ranges for the plant computer data set is needed.
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1.2.6 System Reliability j
The PCS is capable of performing internal checks.to verify that certain hardware systems are operating and to screen measured and calculated values to assure that they are within preset limits.
In
,
addition, displayed values for the PCS data are periodically cor-t related with sensor readings by I&C technicians.
The frequency of
these instrumentation checks is based upon the criticality of the indicators.
For the SPDS, an independent verification and. validation was conducted by correlating the outputs ~of data acquisition systems, l
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algorithms and displays with the corresponding inputs.
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1.2.6.1 Verification The meteorological monitoring program requires daily channel checks
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and semi-annual calibrations.
The channels checks are performed in
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the control room by the plant operating staff and also remotely by
corporate personnel.
The I&C department is responsible for the
maintenance and calibration.
Presently, no routine maintenance check i
is performed at the sensor locations.
Data unavailability goal of-10% (R.G. 1.23) annual joint frequency distribution was exceeded at the 60 meters level in 1984.
The instrument-calibrations have been performed as scheduled; however, the tolerance limits set for accept-ance exceed the commitment made in FSAR Section 2.3.3 and the SSES letter addressing the parameters in R.G. 1.97 (see APPENDIX A, NOTICE i
0F DEVIATION (50-387/86-10-07, 50-388/86-10-07).
'
In addition, the calibration procedure used for-the delta-temperature
measurements is in question.
The sensors, themselves dual'thermis-
[
tors, are not calibrated in the-field during the routine calibra-
tions.
The inspector also was told that NQA during a routine audit j
also had identified this as a problem.
The typical calibration
'
method used is a water bath, as recommended by an independent con-
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tractor; however, the inspector noted it has not yet been implemen-ted. Consequently, the sensor itself is not calibrated.
.
OPEN ITEM (50-387/86-10-08, 50-388/86-10-08).
During routine opera-
'
tion an aspirator motorJorces air over the sensor for.a.represen-
tative measurement.
A standard practice is to have an indicator light or meter showing that the motor is operable. No such device.
i was evident for the SSES primary meteorological system.
This is an j
area for improvement.
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1.2.6.2 Computer-Based Systems
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Quarterly records are maintained un the availability of the computer
systems that drive ERF displays.
The computer systems (PCS, SPDS, RDAS) have at least 99% quarterly availability.
In particular, RDAS
'
which is used to run the STREAM dose calculation code, has never been down.
The configuration of the computer systems also promotes reliability.
Data displays required in the TSC are generated via independent data acquisition, processing and display systems.
All
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systems have uninterrupted backup power supply systems.
i 1.1.6.3 Manual Systems Reliability of manually displayed (e.g., status board) data is
enhanced by using trained engineers to detect missing or questionable
data points.
In addition, those data values that have been hard j
copied from the PCS or SPDS can be compared to previous values to determine if they are outlines from the time-trended sequence.
t 1.2.7 On-Shift Dose Assessment 1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency Upon declaration of an emergency, two health physics technicians report to the OSC.
Two technicians are assigned on each shift who would have this responsibility.
Both technicians are trained in the use of EPIP-009 and if requested by the shift supervisor would report i
to the the TSC to perform dose calculations or ready equipment for j
any future calculations.
If a release har occurred or is likely, one l
HP technician would perform dose calculations and the other HP tech-nician would become the OSCAR team and perform onsite monitoring.
'
i During the TSC walkthrough, one HP technician (dose calculator) was not familiai with manually inputting meteorological data into the STREAM code.
1.2.7.2 Dose Assessment Technical Adequacy
The on-shift staff should be able to perform dose assessment calculations without interfering with the immediate response to an accident.
The primaryLmeans for dose assessment is provided by the on-shift HP Technician through the STREAM model. The overlays can i
be used to aid in the assessment of the downwind affected sector.
,
Extensive training is provided to both the HP technician and the Emergency Director in the use of STREAM and in the formulation of
,
Protective Action Recommendations.
3 1.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs f
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1.3.1 Operations 1.3.1.1 Organization, 1.3.1.2. Staffing, and 1.3.1.3 Activation The functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by presenting a hypothetical accident scenario based on an event that had occurred at the plant, to individuals knowledgeable of the TSC organization, staffing and activation.
Licensee personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by describing to the inspectors their ac-tions and use of equipment and supplies available in the TSC.
The TSC would be staffed as described in the Emergency Plan, 5.0 Organi-zational Control of Emergencies, and EP-IP-003 Emergency Management Responsibilities.
Licensee activation and augmentation of the emergency organization and activation of the TSC was observed as being adequate as noted during an inspection (exercise observation) on April 7-9, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-388/86-07).
EP-IP-002 Emergency Management Notifications addresses notifications for staffing the TSC during an emergency.
Staffing levels meet the criteria of Table 2 of Supple-ment 1 to NUREG-0737.
1.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces 1.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces The communication interfaces between the Control Room, TSC, OSC and E0F are established in the Emergency Plan and have bee, adequately demonstrated during drills and exercises.
EP-IP-003, Emergency Management Responsibilities, clearly defines the responsibility of each member of the emergency organization and how that member
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interfaces with staff in other ERFs or offsite organizations.
Priority access voice communications links are provided in the TSC for contacting the licensee's key onsite (Control Room and Operations Support Center) and offsite (Emergency Operations Facility, Media Operations Center and Allentown General Office) facilities.
In addition, hotline links can be established to key local, state and federal agencies. Additional communications links are provided by UHF radio to onsite groups and VHF radio to field monitoring teams and offsite agencies.
Communications equipment and prccedures appeared to be adequate.
Offsite communication interfaces are described in EP-IP-003,
Emergency Management Responsibilities.
The Emergency Director l
directs the notification of appropriate offsite agencies.
The
)
Radiation Protection Coordinator coordinates dose projections and off-site protective action recommendations with DER /BRP and NRC.
The Technical Support Coordinator is responsible for co.nmunicating with DER /BRP technical personnel.
The Communications Coordinator is
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responsible for notifying off-site agencies and transmitting information between the Emergency Director and off-site emergency groups.
1.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures and discussed trans-fer of responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC and then to the EOF.
EP-IP-029, Activation of TSC, addresses the relief.of the Control Room of overall management of the emergency.
The periodic status reports are used to notify onsite and offsite personnel of the transfer of responsibilities.
The TSC will assume the responsibili-ties of the EOF if the EOF must relocate to the backup EOF.
1.3.2 Control Room Support 1.3.2.1 Technical-Support and 1.3.2.2 Walkthrought The ability of the TSC to support emergency response was evaluated in part by presenting key TSC personnel with an accident scenario.
The scenario presented involved a station blackout due to a loss of both site feeders and a failure of all station diesel generators.
Walkthroughs concentrated on availability of procedures, checklists, equipment, manuals, sources of data, power supplies, and methods rather than the knowledge of individuals within the Emergency Re-sponse Organization.
Unresolved questions in each area were noted for detailed examination by individual NRC inspectors at the conclu-sion of the walkthroughs.
Drawings, manuals, and support equipment such as floppy disks were requested in response to imposed scenario conditions.
Comments and discussion of specific findings noted by NRC inspectors during walkthroughs and subsequent inspection activi-ties are covered in applicable sections of this report.
2.0 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)
2.1 Physical Facilities 2.1.1 Design 2.1.1.1 Location and 2.1.1.2. Alternate Location According to the Emergency Plan, the OSC is located in the Shift Supervisor's Office adjoining the Control Room on EL. 729'1" of the control structure.
This facility is used as the OSC during an j
Unusual Event only and houses the " operations support team person-
'
nel".
At the Alert or higher declaration, the OSC coordination func-tion transfers to the TSC.
Personnel supporting the OSC assemble in their designated assembly areas (I&C shop, maintenance shop, electri-
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cal shop, and the Health Physics office).
The Emergency Plan does not address these assembly areas a: part of the OSC.
The plan and procedures address the need for habitability monitoring and recognize that the assembly areas may become uninhabitable; however, there are no procedures in place which address alternate locations for the assembly area personnel and the means for relocating the personnel.
OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-09, 50-388/86-20-09 - Address the assembly areas (after site evacuation), in the Emergency Plan and EP-IPs, as part of the OSC.
2.1.1.3 Layout and Environment The " initial OSC", which is located adjacent to the Control Room, has adequate size, layout and environment for the operators, chemistry and health physics technicians who would report there during the initial phase of offshift emergency activation.
During day shift or during full emergency activation on back shifts, maintenance person-nel are recalled to assembly areas that are located in their normal duty stations (e.g., Electrical, Mechanical, I&C shops and Health Physics office).
The size, layout and environment of these assembly areas are also adequate.
2.1.1. 4 Display Interface Planning and dispatch of OSC personnel will take place in the TSC after its activation.
There are no status boards or other display devices available in the OSC or assembly areas, however, a status board which notes the teams that have been dispatched inplant is in
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the TSC.
Other information necessary to planning prior to dispatch of teams is also available in the TSC where briefing will be made before the teams go into the plant.
2.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 2.1.2.1 Radiati n Monitoring
The OSC which is located in the Shift Supervisor's office has the same habitability as the Control Room and is monitored by the same ARMS as the Control Room.
Additional monitoring for this location is not necessary.
The assembly areas which are outside of the con-trol structure have no special shielding or radiologically protected ventilation system, therefore, these areas require radiological monitoring to ensure the facilities are habitable.
There is no equipment available for such monitoring in the assembly areas.
Radiological Monitoring equipment would be obtained from the Health Physics office or the trailer next to the building.
The only loca-tion where radiological monitoring of the assembly areas is pro-
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i ceduralized is in EP-IP-007 Personnel Assembly and Accountability.
In this procedure, the Radiation Coordinator in the TSC is to be
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directed by the Emergency Director to establish a plan for ensuring
.
habitability of the assembly areas.
[
UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-387/86-10, 50-388/86-10-10 - Provide a specific proceduralized plan for performing frequent radiological surveys of i
"
assembly areas to ensure habitability.
The Radiation Protection Coordinator should be assigned the responsibility for providing
,
monitoring of the assembly areas.
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At least a minimum amount of radiological monitoring equipment
'
should be stored at each of the assembly areas to ensure that
personnel would not have to travel from the OSC to the TSC-without' survey equipment.
Formally address the potential need for having backup locations
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for the assembly areas in the event that one or all of these areas become uninhabitable due to high radiation.
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2.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters
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Dosimeters are not issued to personnel in the OSC until they are sent into the plant.
Doses received from teams dispatched inplant are tracked.
Personnel waiting in the assembly areas do not have dosimeters nor are the assembly areas continuously monitored so as-to track dose to individuals.
UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-387/86-10-11, 50-388/86-10-11 - Provide dosimeters
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to all personnel in the assembly areas and routinely have the indivi-j duals read their dosimeters.
Record and track dose of all assembly
area personnel.
i 2.1.2.3 Protective Supplies Respiratory equipment and protective clothing for operations support
.
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staff.in the OSC is stored in the cabinet in the back of the Control
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-Room..This is the same supply cabinet used for the TSC.
There is no protective equipment stored in the assembly areas for the j
personnel that make up the largest portion of the OSC staff.
All
equipment necessary would have to be brought from the Health Physics, office or the trailer where most of the equipment'and supplies are stored.
.
UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-387/86-10-12, 50-388/86-10-12 --Protective supplies (protective clothing and respiratory protection) should be
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stored in the assembly areas to assure OSC staff are adequately protected from radiological-hazards while traveling from the'0SC to the TSC and into the plant.
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Planning for alternate assembly locations should also include stores of protective equipment.
2.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies 2.1.3.1 Communications Communications equipment in the OSC and assembly areas consists of the plant public address system, normal telephone service for the plant (ETN), telephone lines tied through the plant switchboard and the priority access voice links hot-lines.
Communications have been verified during exercises and have been found to be satisfactory with the exception of the radio which is used to dispatch the onsite monitoring teams.
(This radio is actually in the TSC, but performs an OSC function.
See IE Inspection No. 50-388/86-07.)
2.1.3.2 Support Supplies Since the assembly areas are really only holding areas for OSC staff, there are no special support supplies stored for emergency use.
This is the normal work location for many of the OSC personnel and much of their day to day supplies and equipment are available to them if the need arises.
Data sheets, plant diagrams etc. are stored and available in the TSC where all teams will assemble for briefings prior to dispatch into the plant.
There is a discrepancy in the Emergency Plan which states " Equipment required for these teams to perform their functions......... is stored and maintained in this facility".
This statement refers to the OSC located adjacent to the Control Room.
However, equipment for most teams is not stored in the OSC.
OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-13, 50-388/86-10-13 - Change the Emergency Plan to correctly address the location of supplies and equipment available for use during an emergency.
2. 2 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs 2.2.1 Operation 2.2.1.1 Staffing, 2.2.1.2 Activation, and 2.2.1.3 Onsite Interface The functional capability of the OSC and assembly area was evaluated by presenting a hypothetical accident scenario to personnel knowledge-able of the OSC operation and function.
Licensee personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by describing the actions that would be taken and how the equipment and supplies necessary for.0SC func-tion would be obtained and used.
All teams are sent from this
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location during an Unusual Event. When an Alert or higher is de-clared, station assembly and accountability is performed.
A decision is made as to which personnel should remain onsite to staff the as-sembly areas.
Also at an Alert or higher declaration, the function of the OSC is moved to the TSC.
Decisions to dispatch, planning, and briefings all occur in the TSC.
2.2.2 OSC Functions 2.2.1 Coordination, Assignment, Proficiency and Walkthroughs
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During an emergency at Susquehanna, an office adjacent to the Control Room becomes the Operational Support Center and provides support for the control room as directed by the Shift Supervisor.
Available personnel such as auxiliary and equipment operators provide the manpower for this immediate support.
Once activated, the TSC directs OSC type functions from the TSC with repair teams, maintenance teams and personnel being drawn from individual work centers within the plant such as the mechanical and electrical maintenance areas. This TSC/OSC function continues in parallel with the " formal OSC" adjacent to the Control Room providing support to the shift supervisor.
All teams are routed to the TSC for briefing and instructions prior to being dispatched to the plant.
There is no single "0SC Manager" as described in NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, who whould assemble the teams, ensure they have all required equipment and environmental protection, and conduct a briefing, prior to the time that the teams are routed to the ISC.
The functional capability of the OSC was evaluated during the OSC walk through, by review of previous inspection reports and during
,
discussion with licensee personnel.
The OSC appears to function effectively, although many OSC functions and operations are not proceduralized.
For example, there is no predetermined list of support personnel which should be retained in the assembly areas after accountability.
However, it is advisable to predetermine a minimum staffing level for each assembly area to ensure that the personnel are not inadvertently evacuated.
Habitability checks which have been performed during exercises may be overlooked during an actual event due to other necessary responses. Another potential problem is that of OSC personnel accessing the TSC during a radio-logical release.
Since survey instruments, protective clothing and respiratory equipment are not maintained in the assembly areas, these individuals may have to walk through a radiation or contamination area without appropriate equipment.
Other sections of this report
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. amplify these findings and provide details of other investigative work.
Although key functions, responsibilities, and personnel qualifica-tions are proceduralized for operation of the Emergency Response Facilities, the actual minimum number of personnel that would respond
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during an emergency is not formalized.
During walkthroughs as-
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sociated with the TSC/0SC function, it was noted that a minimum (
number of electricians, mechanics, and.I&C Technicians.that would be l
available to fulfill,the OSC function to support investigation, damage control, and repair functions was not specified.
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OPEN ITEM 50-387/86-10-14; 50-388/86-10-14 - The licensee needs to formalize minimum staffing standards for the Operational Support Center.
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3.0 Emergency Operations Facility'(EOF)
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i 3.1 Physical Facilities
3.1.1 Design
!
l 3.1.1.1 Size The 16,500 square foot EOF is adequately sized to accommodate emergency operations, support and data processing functions.
The EOF is divided into a large open space,.which is available for
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technical and administrative support personnel, and offices for the i
Recovery Manager, Radiological Support Manager, Site Support Manager, FEMA /PEMA representatives and an NRC team.
In additioih, there are conference rooms, a document library. an equipment storage room, laboratory facilities and computer rooms.
3.1.1.2 Layout
,
The layout of the E0F provides adequate control over access into the facility as well as supporting the interaction among personnel r
l within it.
The large open space contains modular workstations that i
are arranged to control noise and congestion within the EOF.
This design provides the flexibility to modify the layout of this space,
I if desired.
i
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I 3.1.1.3 Location i
3.1.1.4 Structure l
The EOF is located approximately 2,500 feet southwest of the control j
structure.
The EOF fronts en County Road T-438..This location meets Option 1 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
A backup EOF is located at the PP&L Central Division Service Center auditorium at 344 South Poplar Street, Hazelton, PA.
This location is-13 air.
miles from Susquehanna SES.
Both the EOF'and backup EOF provide adequate space for all functions of the EOF.
The location of the
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j backup EOF was not coordinated with offsite officials; however, no
!
opposition to the location has been expressed.
During an emergency, security guards are stationed at the entrance
,
to the EOF to prohibit unauthorized entry into the facility.
During l
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normal working hours there is a receptionist stationed at the front area of the E0F, but access to the facility is not restricted.
Intrusion detection devices are located in and around the facility to monitor the EOF when it is unoccupied.
Security guards are stationed at the entrance to the backup E0F when it is activated.
During all other times, normal building security is in operation.
The EOF was designed and built using the Basic Building Code /1978 (B0CA), and the Uniform Building Code /1979 (UBC).
The EOF will remain operable under adverse environmental conditions and loss of electrical power.
3.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment The EOF is within 10 miles of the plant and has a protection factor greater than 5.
The exterior walls of the facility are 12" reinforced concrete with a brick facing. The shed roof is a 9.5" reinforced concrete slab.
All entrances and exits from the building and all penetrations through walls and ceiling have a labyrinth design which prevents direct shine from outside sources into any part of the building which is normally occupied.
The ventilation system can be manually isolated and outside air filtered through a filter
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system consisting of HEPA filters.
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Environmental condition including temperature, humidity and venti-
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lation are adequately controlled.
Lighting is adequate and sound
!
levels are kept to a minimum by use of special wall coverings which are on the walls and room dividers.
Water and restroom facilities are available in the EOF.
A supply of nonperishable food is avail-able in the EOF.
This backup facility has not been activated during a drill or exercise to test its capabilities.
It is recommended that a full activation of this facility be performed.
3.1.1.6 Display Interface All computer displays available in the TSC are also available in the
EOF.
In addition, the EOF has a more extensive system of status boards, especially for plotting plume projections and field team measurements.
3.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies
>
3.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring, 3.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters, and 3.1.2.3 Protective Supplies The EOF has an installed air intake radiation monitoring system to monitor air brought in through the ventilation ducts.
Airborne
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iodine sampling is performed using portable air samplers with silver i
zeolite cartridges.
The cartridges are counted with a frisker.
An
Eberline RMS II monitor is used to monitor E0F habitability.
Port-l able survey instruments are also available to confirm the installed j-monitor readings.
Frisking stations are set up at the entrance of j
the. EOF and everyone entering when the EOF is activated must frisk.
TLDs and pocket dosimeters are available in the EOF and issued to all personnel when the EOF is activated.
Dose is recorded at the
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security station set up at the EOF entrance when people enter or
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exit the building.
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An adequate supply of protecti.ve clothing, respiratory equipment and
'
KI is stored and available to all EOF staff.
A decontamination area I
is located in the back of the EOF. Water from the shower is collected in a tank for processing.
.
J 3.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies
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3.1.3.1 Communications i
The SSES E0F utilizes the same communications systems previously
discussed in Section 1.1.3 above.
3.1.3.2 Records / Drawings The EOF has essentially the same capability as the TSC with regard to availability of records and drawings.
Because the EOF has its l
own backup diesel generator and UPS power, reader printers, document j
control terminals, and records / drawings _ support equipment would j
still be operable in the event of a station blackout.
3.1.3.3 Support Supplies
i j
The EOF has an adequate stock of support supplies which are specified in procedure EP-IP-101, Inventory, Inspection, Operational Testing,
and Calibration of Emergency Equipment and Supplies.
Supplies were
stored in an orderly and readily accessible manner.
Procedures pro--
vided for inventory and control at prescribed frequencies and
'
provided guidance to correct discrepancies as they were found.
3.2 Information Management Systems
)
3.2.1 Variables Provided i
3.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 Variables /3.2.1.2 Other Variables
The data in the E0F is identical to the information and systems in the TSC with the exception of the SPING terminal which.is located i{
only in the.TSC.
However, this information can be obtained from the i
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SPDS terminal in the E0F or by telephone from the TSC.
The selection of variables is adequate to perform the EOF functions.
3.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs The EOF has nearly an identical data acquisition capability as the TSC. Dose assessments capabilities of the EOF are identical to the TSC. The management and display of data from the SPDS and Unit Monitor consoles is the same as the TSC.
3.2.2 Data Acquisition 3.2.2.1 Data Collection Methods The E0F SPDS is similar to Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS computers described in Section 1.2.2.1 except it has an extra 10 megabyte hard disk and a
600 line per-minute line printer for software development.
Software development can be done on the E0F SPDS.
3.2.2.2 Time Resolution Description essentially the same as that in Section 1.2.2.2.
3.2.2.3 Isolation Isolation is discussed in Section 1.2.2.3.
3.2.3 Data Communications 3.2.3.1 Capacity, 3.2.3.2 Error Detection, 3.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs Description essentially the same as that in Section 1.2.3.
3.2.4 Data Analysis 3.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support l
The E0F has the same capability for reactor technical support as the TSC.
Section 1.2.4.1 provides details of this capability.
3.2.4.2 Dose Assessment
The EOF has available for use, the same three dose assessment methods as the TSC.
The only hardware difference is the color graphics printer found in the E0F for use with STREAM.
Source term data (vent release rates) and meteorological data can be obtained from the plant process computer terminal located in the EOF dose assessment area.
Meteorological data for STREAM is automatically entered into the code.
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3.2.4.3 Central Processor Capability I
The description is essentially the same as that in 1.2.4.3 with the
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exception of computer security.
The RDAS and SPDS are installed in
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the computer room of the EOF.
Access to the computer room is via
push-key combination door locks.
Also, access to computer resources
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is restricted by user login identification and corresponding pass-
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words.
Further, the use of programs such as the dose assessment
" STREAM" program requires another independent password.
L NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requires that the EOF be protected by
industrial security both during an emergency and when it is idle, to
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maintain its readiness.
The protection of the E0F computers will be i
improved if the following changes are made:
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the hinges on the door between the computer work room and the i
computer room could be mounted so that the hinge bolts are inside the computer room, a
the glass between the computer work room and the computer room
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could be replaced with wire mesh or otherwise hardened glass,
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the routine practice of taping the latch open on the computer r
room / computer work room should be discontinued.
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3.2.5 Data Storage Essentially the same as Section 1.2.5.
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j 3.2.6 System Reliability i
j 3.2.6.1 Verification, 3.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems, and 3.2.6.3 Manual Systems i
All computer displays in the EOF are driven by the same computer systems as those in the TSC.
3.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs
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3.3.1 Operations
j 3.3.1.1 Organizations, 3.3.1.2 Staffino, and 3.3.1.3 Activation A hypothetical accident scenario and walkthrough were used to
l determine how the SSES EOF would function during an emergency.
The l
availability and locations of key equipment, procedures, supplies
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and other necessary materials were identified by E0F staff.
The EOF j
would be staffed and activated according to the Emergency Plan and i
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EP-IP-030, Activation and Functional Operation of Emergency Opera-tions Facility and Transfer of Control From the Technical Support
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Center.
Licensee activation and augmentation of the emergency organization
of thm E0F was observed as being adequate as noted during an j
inspection on April 7-9, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-388/86-07).
3.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces
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l 3.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces
j The communication interfaces between the Control Room, TSC, OSC and E0F are established in the Emergency Plan and have been adequately demonstrated during drills and exercises.
EP-IP-003 clearly defines
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j the responsibility of each member of the emergency organization and EP-IP-030 further defines the responsibilities of the EOF staff.
i All computer displays available in the TSC are also available in the EOF.
In addition, the EOF has a more extensive system of status
boards, especially for plotting plume projections and field team
measurements.
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The EOF /offsite interface is clearly defined in EP-IP-003.
It i
should be noted that the initial organization of the EOF Support
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Manager does not have responsibility for communications with offsite
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agencies and public information.
Once the permanent organization which includes a recovery manager is in place, offsite protective measures and other information is provided from the EOF.
3.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities i
The transfer of responsibilities from the Emergency Director to the l
Recovery Manager is stated in EP-IP-030.
The periodic updates
given in the facilities and to offsite agencies is used to inform l
others that the transfer has occurred. -The procedure also addresses the transfer of responsibilities back to the TSC in the event that
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the backup EOF must be activated.
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i 3.3.2 TSC Support
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3.3.2.1 Technical Support The E0F support groups coordinate all support for the TSC and Plant
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during an emergency.
This would include requests for offsite equip-
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ment, parts,. personnel or any other resources that might be needed.
j Responsibility for these functions is formalized in. procedure E0-IP-030, Activation and Functional Operation of Emergency Opera-tions Facility and Transfer of Control From The Technical Support Center, Revision 6.
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3.3.2.2 Logistic Support Technical support to the TSC is provided by the Technical Support Manager and his staff located in the EOF and the staff of the General Office Engineering Support Center (ESC) located in the PP&L Offices in Allentown, PA.
The ESC in Allentown was not evaluated, but the information and drawings located in the E0F were reviewed and were adequate to support the TSC.
3.3.2.3 Implementing of Mitigating Actions The EOF provides assistance to the TSC in determining the advisabi-lity of mitigating actions which may impact offsite.
As soon as the E0F is activated it assumes the responsibility for offsite notifi-cations and communications as well as all dose projection activation and formulates PAG recommendations.
However, control of the total plant response and the approval of PAG recommendations prior to their transmission to offsite authorities remains with the Emergency Director located in the TSC until the Recovery Manager from the cor-porate offices in Allentown arrives in the EOF and assumes overall control of the PP&L response to the emergency. At that point all of the offsite assistance, communication, dose assessment, coordination of mitigating actions with offsite authorities and assessment of plant mitigating actions are carried out under the direction of the Recovery Manager.
The only offsite organization which continues to deal with the TSC directly, is the ESC for technical and engineering support.
This organizational approach has been evaluated in several annual exercises and meets the requirements of Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737.
3.3.3 E0F Functions 3.3.3.1 Notification / Communication Notification and communication are addressed in Section 3.1.3.1, 3.3.1.4 and 3.3.1.5.
Based on discussions with the licensee and observations made from previous exercises and drills, notification and communication from the EOF appears adequate.
3.3.3.2 Dose Assessment There are adequate procedures to perform dose assessment in the TSC and EOF, except as previously noted.
3.3.3.3 Protective Action Decisien Making Discussions with the licensee indicated a clear understanding of the process for making protective action recommendations and notifying the appropriate offsite authorities of the recommendation.
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Observations in previous drills and exercises determined that the correct protective actions would be made in a timely manner.
3.3.3.4 Coordination of Radiological and Environmental Assessment The Radiation Support Manager in the EOF is responsible for coordi-nating the activities of the offsite monitoring teams.
In addition, this individual is responsible for evaluating the magnitude and ef-fects of the radioactive releases from the plant and providing input on protective action decision recommendations.
The coordination of these activities appears adequate, however, findings from the pre-vious two exercises observed by NRC (Inspection Nos. 50-387/85-14 and 50-388/85-14 and 50-388/86-07) indicate that there are deficiencies in monitoring the EPZ.
3.3.3.5 EOF WALKTHROUGH Walkthroughs to demonstrate the capability of the E0F to support a plant emergency were conducted in the same manner as discussed Sec-tion 1.3.2.2.
The same scenario was used and escalated to a General Emergency due to core damage and containment breach.
Methods of activation, locations of equipment, references, supplies for all EOF functions were reviewed and discussed. Walkthrough resulted in con-tact points for NRC inspectors to examine their individual areas.
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Observations of those areas are discussed within individuals sections of this report.
OPEN ITEM - Correct temporary wiring, extension cord runs and jury rigged phone patch cords in the EOF.
Hard wire, permanently tag or otherwise devise a means to insure critical equipment remains powered from an uninterruptable source.
(50-387/86-10-15, 50-388/86-10-15.)
Phone cords in the Radiological and Environmental Monitoring room are rigged with wall mount jack boxes which are not wall mounted and had tie wraps holding cables together.
Phone cables were mounted such
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that there was no outer insulating jacket to absorb the stress when the cable is flexed or stretched.
The Uninterruptable Power Supply outlet feeding the dose assessment computer was very loose. There were numerous extension cord runs throughout the EOF which were unprotected on the floor and subject to mechanical damage by person-nel, vacuum cleaning, furniture moves, etc.
4.0 PERSONS CONTACTED C. Angione Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE) Electrical A. Watsula NPE, Civil Engineer H. Radvansky NPE, Electrical Engineer
- S.
Heacock NPE, Resident Engineer R. Fedor Document Control Supervisor J. Hunsinger Document Control
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M. Yatsko Assistant Document Control Supervisor
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P. Taylor Supervisor,. Emergency Planning
- C. Wike.
Supervisor, Emergency Planning
T. E. Widner Health Physicist, Nuclear Support Group B. W. Graham Senior Health Physicist, Environmental Group-Nuclear K. Shank Environmental Group, Supervisor - Nuclear
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- H. Saeger NPE, Sr. Project Engineer, Computer Group
- K. Trubela Project Digital Control Analyst
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M. Adelizzi Shift Technical Advisor
1 J. Rowe I&C Supervisor D. Steffenauer Shift Supervisor
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- W. Williams Licensing Engineer
- M. Buring Radiological Protection Supervisor j
- Loren Plisco NRC Resident Inspector j
- Attended exit meetings on May 16, 1986.
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5.0-Exit Interview
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J The appraisal scope and findings were summarized on May 16, 1986,
with those persons. indicated in paragraph 4, above.
The team leader i
defined the specific areas evaluated and discussed in detail all findings and recommendations presented herein.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this appraisal.
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No written material was provided to the licensee.
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