IR 05000388/1986007
| ML20198L310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1986 |
| From: | Harpster T, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198L301 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-388-86-07, 50-388-86-7, NUDOCS 8606040261 | |
| Download: ML20198L310 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-388/86-07 Docket No.
50-388 License No.
CPPR-102 Category C
Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Berwick, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Berwick Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: April 7-9, 1986 Inspectors:
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D. Vito Team Leader
/ d&te W. Thomas, NRC Region I, EP Specialist G. Stoetzel, PNL T. Lynch, PNL B. Haagensen, PNL T. Guilfoil, PNL Approved by:
6 Lt iia T. L. $rpster, Chfef
'dath Emergefcy Preparedness Section Inspection Summary:
Insoection on April 7-9, 1986 (Report Number 50-388/86-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the partial scale annual emergency exercice conducted on April 8, 1986.
The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and NRC Contractor personnel.
Results: The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. No violations were identified.
8606040261 860521
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DETAILS
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on April 9, 1986.
H. Keiser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations S. H. Cantone, Manager Nuclear Support J. H. Lex, E.P. Instructor, Nuclear Training Group H. Woodeschick, Special Assistant to President, SSES F. Gruscavage, Superintendent Nuclear Safety Assessment E. Heckman, Superintendent Nuclear Operations Support R. L. Doty, Radiation and Environment Services Supervisor R. Hoban, Safety and Health Consultant T. Dalpiaz, Instrumentation and Control C. Roszkowski, Nuclear Emergency Planning C. Wike, Supervisor Nuclear Emergency Planning G. Gallagher, Security B. W. Graham, H. P. Environment Group 3. Laser, Nuclear Operations Engineer Emergency Planning F Taylor, Plant Staff Emergency Plan Coordinator S Walter, Nuclear Training Group T. Markowski, Operations A. Sabol, Nuclear Quality Assurance T. Crimmins, Plant Superintendent C. M;dara, Health Physics In addition the inspector interviewed or observed the actions of numerous licensee personnel during the conduct of the exercise.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Susquehanna Steam Electric Station partial participation exercise was conducted on April 8, 1986 from 0800 - 1500.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, minor re-visions were made by the licensee of certain scenario data.
In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and observers on April 7, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during various phases of the scenario.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Injured and contaminated individuals.
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A feedwater transient resulting in a reactor trip.
- Consequent water hammer causing an unisolable leak in the RCIC
steam supply line.
A bomb explosion within the secondary containment
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Primary containment leakage through stuck open containment
isolation valves j
Radiation release through the standby gas treatment system.
- The above events caused the activation of all of the licensee's
emergency response facilities.
l 2.2 Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made
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detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the
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emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities;
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and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of i
the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
(1) Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies; (4) Communications /information flow, record keeping, and sample distribution; (5) Assessment and projection of radiological doses and protective action recommendations; (6) Off-site and in plant radiological surveys; (7) Technical support to operations; (8) Repair and corrective actions; (9) First Aid and rescue; (10) Radiological controls for emergency workers; (11) Security and access controls.
(12) Activities at the Media Center and news release.
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l The NRC Team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization and activation of the emergency response i
facilities were generally consistent with their emergency plan and
implementing procedures.
The team also noted the following areas'
where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and
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efficiently implemented
The players and controllers were knowledgeable of their duties i
and of plant EP procedures and related documentation.
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It was readily apparent within the response facilities (Control
Room (CR), Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support
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Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) as to who
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was in control.
Facility briefings were timely and informative.
l The transfer of responsibilities to facilities as the emergency
escalated was performed in an effective manner.
Communications to and control of offsite monitoring teams were
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generally excellent. Offsite monitoring teams were knowledge-
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able and dispatched in a timely manner.
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Offsite dose calculations were scrutinized and checked against
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offsite monitoring results.
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Forward planning and positioning of offsite teams were very
good. Teams were directed in a manner to maximize their
effectiveness and minimize dose.
I, Plant conditions and projected changes in weather were used to
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a develop protective action recommendations.
l In plant teams were adequately briefed and equipped prior to
dispatch.
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Technical assessment by the control room operators and
technical support in other facilities was good.
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PASS sample collection and analysis was performed quite a
effectively.
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ALARA was considered and proper radiological controls and
practices were implemented during in plant activities.
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Operational support provided continuous accountability for all
in plant corrective action teams.
News releases were timely and accurately prepared.
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The following are the NRC team findings in areas requiring additional licensee attention. Mest of these findings were also identified by the licensee as part of their post-exercise critique, i
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Although the ambulance response to the medical emergency was timely and efficient, the on-the-scene medical treatment of the contaminated injuries was lacking. The first aid team waited approximately five minutes before attending to the victims.
In addition, it took about 40 minutes for the initial report that the injured persons were contaminated to reach the control room.
This notification appeared to be unnecessarily delayed until a full survey had been completed by health physics. This is an Open Item (50-388/86-07-01).
The licensee stated in their post-exercise critique that a remedial drill would be held in an attempt to resolve some of the medical treatment problems.
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The offsite emergency notification message for the Site Area Emergency did not contain information that a release is in progress per Item II.E.3 of NUREG-0654. This is an Open Item (50-388/86-07-02).
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NRC observers in the control room and TSC felt that the players did not consider the potential of a General Emergency condition when the Site Area Emergency was declared. At that time, there was a breath of containment, a ruptured RCIC steam supply line and all discussions and indications clearly pointed to a condition of fuel cladding damage. The players appeared to be relying on the more specific SAE emergency action level (Stcam Line Break) without considering that a more severe EAL may have been reached.
This is an Open Item (50-388/86-07-03).
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The radio communications between the in plant teams and the TSC was poor. This was a repeat item from the previous drill (see Section 2.3 of this report).
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Although PASS sampling was quite good, the person who was being used to transport the samples from the PASS area to the chem-istry lab was not accompanied by a health physics technician nor did he have a survey meter with him.
This is an Open Item (53-388/86-07-04).
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The Technical Status and " Big Picture" portions of the EOF status boards were not used effectively.
_A similar concern was raised during the previous exercise (see Section 2.3 of this report).
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Problems with Procedure EP-IP-013, Revision 4, Offsite Emergency Monitoring Teams, resulted in some less than effective offsite monitoring practices:
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No open and closed window reading for plume monitoring (repeat item from previous exercise).
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Inefficient geometry used for counting the Silver Zeolite i
cartridge.
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No contamination survey meter or respirators included with l
monitoring kits.
(repeat item from previous exercise)
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See Section 2.3 of this report for a discussion of corrective
actions proposed by the licensee.
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No consideration was given to checking the vehicle used for i
offsite monitoring for contamination per Procedure EP-IP-014,
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Revision 4, Personnel and Vehicle Contamination Surveys. This is an Open Item.
(50-388/86-07-05)
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It was difficult to ddtermine the ability of the offsite moni-
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toring team to monitor"the plume because of indirect prompting i
by the controller.
The controller supplemented his messages with oualifying statements such as rising quickly, peaking, falling rapidly...
This is an Open Item. (50-388/86-07-06)
2.3 Review of Open Items Identified During The Previous Exercise I
(Closed) 50-387/85-14-01; 50-388/85-14-01. Deficiencies noted in the dose assessment area.
The deficiencies noted in this item were not repeated during this f
exercise. This item is closed.
(0 pen) 50-387/85-14-02; 50-388/85-14-02. Deficiencies noted in the
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operational support area.
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All of the deficiencies noted in this item were closed with one
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exception.
The quality of radio communications between the TSC and
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the in plant teams remained inadequate during this exercise. This
item will remain open pending corrective actions by the licensee to improve radio transmission quality.
(0 pen) 50-387/85-14-03; 50-388/85-14-03. Deficiencies noted in the offsite monitoring area.
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Procedural problems which were evident during the previous exercise
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were repeated during this exercise. The licensee has stated that in addition to upcoming procedural changes-(EP-IP-013, Revision 4), the
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method by which the EPZ is monitored is to be changed in that site
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j personnel will be assigned to monitor the EPZ out to the 2-mile
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radius. The remainder of the EPZ will be monitored as it is
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currently by PP&L employees who work outside the EPZ. The licensee
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was informed by the inspectors that this area will be reviewed more
closely during the next graded exercise.
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(0 pen) 50-387/85-14-04; 50-388/85-14-04.
EOF Technical Support status board not maintained.
This problem was repeated during this exercise. The Technical Sup-port Status Board was not used at all.
The inspectors were told that the players did not need the information posted because they were being adequately informed through telephone communications and fa-cility briefings.
The inspectors stated that although those directly responding to the emergency may not need to review the status board, there would be a number of other people in the EOF who are not directly responding to the emergency.
These people would be in need of up-to-date technical information for various reasons. Having this information on the status board would provide a point from which this information could be gathered without interfering with the emergency responders. This concern was reflected immediately af ter the exer-cise by the NRC team players (NRC incident response tea'm involved in exercise play) who stated that a number of questions of licensee representatives in the EOF may have been precluded had certain in-formation been provided on the status board.
This item remains open.
3.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader sum-marized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the findings of the inspection as noted in this report.
The licensee was informed that no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified which required additional licensee attention, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could imple-ment their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be -taken regarding the identified items of concern.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide written information to the license _
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