IR 05000382/1989024
| ML19325F032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1989 |
| From: | Powers D, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325F030 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-89-24, NUDOCS 8911130246 | |
| Download: ML19325F032 (9) | |
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j, APPENDIX i
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
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REGION IV.
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NRCInspectionReport: '50-382/89 24; Operating License:
NPF-38 l',,, ;
Docket:
50-382.
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_ Licensee: ' Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
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317 Baronne Street
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'New Orleans, Louisiana 70160
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t Ficility'Name: Waterford-3 Steam Electric Station (WSES-3)
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Inspection At: 'WSES-3 near K111ona, Louisiana
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h Inspection Conducted:
August 29 through September 1, 1989
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/*O #7 Inspector:
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i Nemen M. Terc, Emergency Preparede Date-
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NRC Team Leader, Security and Emefess Analyst
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Preparedness Section
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Accompanying i
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y Personnel:
_ R. Van Niel, Chief, Central and Western Section, Emergency'
t Preparedness Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ~
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T. Staker, Resident Inspector, Waterford-3
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J. Boardman, Reactor Inspector.
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D. Spitzberg, Senior Radiation Specialist
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f G. Bethke, President, Comex Corporation.
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G. Bryan, Engineer, Comex Corporation
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f Approved:
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- 3 Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Date
[,,j Emergency Preparedness Section
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' Inspection Summary
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' Inspection Conducted August 29 through September 1, 1989 (Report 50-382/85-24)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced team inspection of the licensee's
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performance and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan
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8911130246 691101 i
PDR ADOCK 0".000382
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i and procedures. The-inspection team observed activities in the control
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room (CR), technical support center (TSC), emergency operations facility (EOF),
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and operations support center (OSC) during the exercise.
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Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
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ioentified.
Four exercise weaknesses were identified by the inspection team
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(paragraphs 4, 5, 7, and 8). Weaknesses identified include problems with:
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delayed notification to NRC of a reportable event, coordination and direction
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by the OSC, degraded information flow between the CR and the TSC, and lack of
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technical support from the TSC to dose assessors. Generally, the licensee's j
response during the course of the exercise was adequate to protect the health
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and safety of the public.
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DETAILS l
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1.
Persons Contacted LP&L
'J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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'R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operttions t
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- J. R. Hand, Facilities Coordinator f'
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'A. S. Lubinski, Drills and Exercise Coordinator t
- J. J. Lewis, Onsite Emergency Planning Coordinator
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- R. G. Azzarella, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Construction Manager
- T. F. Gerrets, Nuclear Services Manager
'J. R. McGaha, Plant Manager, Nuclear i
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- P. M. Melancon, Reactor Engineering and Performance
'G. G. Miller, III, Plan and Procedures Coordinator
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- R. F. Burski, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager i
- F. J. Englebradit, Nuclear Emergency Plan and Recovery Manager
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NRC
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- C, R. Van Niel, Section Chief I
- W. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector l
- D. L. Wigginton, Licensing Project Manager
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The inspection team also held discussions with other station and corporate
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personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training, j
and emergency response.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(Closed) Violation (382/8604-01):
Inadequate Training of Emergency
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Responders - This violation was identified during a routine inspection and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/86-04.
This violation i
consisted of emergency coordinators not demonstrating adequate knowledge
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of protective action decision making procedures and health physics j
technicians not demonstrating adequate knowledge of fundamental radiation
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protection techniques required during emergencies. The inspectors noted that the licensee conducted remedial training for emergency coordinators
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and health physics technicians during the period June through
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September 1986.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (382/8622-01):
Inadequate Space in the TSC -
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This item tres identified during the 1986 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/86-22 and invc1ved the lack of space in the TSC.
In order to increase the space of the TSC and accommodate more staff, the licensee i
replaced the old furniture in April 1989 with new ergonomic furr.iture l
which resulted in a more efficient use of the existing space.
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addition, to improve information flow between the decisionmakers in the
main TSC space and the dose assessors located in a different space, a
l closed circuit television system is being considered.
(Closed) Violation (382/8807-01):
Failure to Follow Emergency l
Procedures - This violation was identified during a routine inspection and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-07 It involved the lack of signing and updating the emergency management resources book. Since the l
identification of the violation, the book has been kept updated and
properly initialized.
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(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-02):
Failure to Recognize Plant
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l Conditions - This deficiency was identified during the 1988 exercise in
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NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 and involved two failures to identify
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plant conditions.
One required an Alert emergency classificatior, and the
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other a Site Area Emergency (SAE) emergency classification. The inspectors noted that during the 1989 exercise, the licensee was able to promptly recognize existing plant conditions and to classify these
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adequately.
(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-04):
Failure of Offsite Monitoring Teams to i
Provide Air Sampling Results - This deficiency was identified during the
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1988 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 and involved.offsite
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monitoring teams Iot providing exposure rates and air sampling results to i
the TSC. The inspectors noted that during the 1989 exercise, offsite
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teams provided timely information to decision makers in the TSC and that
the information enabled the decision makers to declare a General Emergency in a timely manner.
(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-05):
Inadequate Information Concerning In-Plant Radiation Monitors - This deficiency was identified during the i
1988 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 and involved the failure of personnel to convey increasing radiation levels near the Post-LDCA monitor to the dose assessment cocedinator (DAC).
This information was needed to allow decision makers to readily identify the true release path to the environment.
The inspectors noted that during the 1989 exercise, in plant radiation data was provided in a timely manner to the OAC and decision making was efficient.
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(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-06):
Inadequate Briefings of In-Plant Emergency Repair / Corrective Action Teams - This deficiency was identified i
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during the 1988 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 and s
involved inadequate radiological and security briefings of OSC
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repair / corrective action teams.
During the 1989 exercise, the inspectors e
noted that all repair / corrective action teams entering the radiologically
controlled area were properly briefed by members of the OSC staff.
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(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-07):
Inadequate Personnel Accountability -
This deficiency was identified during the 1988 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 and involved several problems in personnel accountability during site evacuation such as not following procedures,
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and accountability not being accomplished in a timely manner.
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1989 exercise, the inspectors noted that accountability procedures were
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properly followed and that accountability of all personnel within the protected area was accomplished within 30 minutes.
(Closed) Deficiency (382/8824-08): Medical Emergency Response
Inadequacies - This deficiency was identified during the 1988 exercise in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-24 during the medical response part of the r
scenario and involved improper handling of the medically injured / contaminated person.
Immediately following the 1988 exercise, the
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licensee performed additional training of medical response teams and
evaluated training results during the site drill conducted on July 19, 1989. The inspectors reviewed the results of the drill and noted that
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licensee observers and evaluators indicated that emergency responders performed correctly.
The licensee has committed to include a practice medical casualty scenario during the conduct of any full scope site drill.
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Program Areas Inspected The inspection team observed licensee activities in the CR, TSC, OSC, and EOF during the exercise. The inspection team also observed emergency
response organization staffing, facility activation, detection.
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classification, and operationel assessment, notifications of licensee
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personnel, and offsite agencies, formulation of protective action recommendations, offsite dose assessment, in-plant corrective actions and rescue, security / accountability activities, and recovery operations.
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Inspection findings are documented in the following paragraphs.
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There were various deficiencies identified during the course of the
exercise; however, none of the observed deficiencies were of the l
significance as defined in 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii).
Each of the observed deficiencies has been characterized as an exercise weakness according to
10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.F.5.
An exercise weakness is a finding that a
licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded
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effective implementation of the emergency preparedness plan in the event
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of an actual emergency.
It is a finding that needs licensee corrective mea ures.
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Control Room (82301)(1)
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The inspection team observed and evaluated the CR staff as they performed
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tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included detection and classification of cvents, analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions, protective action decision making, notifications, implementation
of protective actions, dose assessment, post-accident sampling, and environmental monitoring.
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The CR staff demonstrated (a) an excellent knowledge of emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and (b) formal, professional, and synergistic team work. The use of the CR simulator and an experienced exercise r
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controller group provided considerable realism and free play allowing various operator system manipulations aimed at mitigating transients.
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The inspection team, however, noted the following problems in the notification of offsite authorities:
The CR staff did not notify (as required by 10 CFR 50.72[a][3)) NRC
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l of a reportable event immediately after the state authorities were notified.
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The fact that initial notifications were not always performed in a timely
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manner is considered to be an exercise weakness (285/8929-01).
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Technical Support Center (82301)(2)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the TSC staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included activation of the TSC, accident assessment and classification, dose assessment, protective action decision making, notifications, implementation of protective actions, technical support to the CR, post-accident sampling, and environmental monitoring.
The inspection team noted considerable improvement in the operation of the TSC as compared with the 1988 exercise.
Noise levels were acceptable and permitted the clear exchange of information between emergency responders.
Announcements were clear, frequent and informative, and classifications and notifications were accurate and timely. Decisions were sound and emergency workers were properly protected, The inspection team noted, however, the following problems in the TSC:
The capabilities of the TSC staff to assess plant status was degraded by the absence of the primary plant data information flow from the
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CR. This shortfall of information lasted 39 minutes and occurred when the systems parameter display system (SPDS) was inoperative.
The TSC staff did not pursue the lack of information flew with sufficient concern.
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The TSC staff who received plant information did not provide the applicable information about the extent of fuel cladding damage
(0.04 percent) to the dose assessors. As a result, the dose assessors based their 9:00 a.m. offsite dose projections on a default value, which greatly exaggerated the consequences of the ongoing release.
The fact that information flow was degraded is considered to be an exercise weakness (285/8929-02).
No violations or deviations were identified in this program are :
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Emergency Operations Facility (82301)(3)
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The inspection team observed and evaluated the EOF staff as they performed taskc in response to the exercise. These tasks included activation of the EOF, accident assessment and classification, offsite dose assessment, protective action decision making, notifications, implementation of
protective actions, and interaction with state and local officials.
The inspection team noted that the EOF was activated in a timely manner and that all functions were carried out adequately, It should be noted however, that in this scenario the demands placed on EOF staff performance
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were minimal.
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r No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Operational Support Center (82301)(4)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the OSC staff as they performed
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tasks in response to the exercise.
The tasks included activation of the
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OSC, personnel staffing, and support to the CR, TSC, and EOF.
The inspection team noted that radiological briefings in the OSC of in-plant repair / corrective action teams were properly conducted.
t It should be noted that about 20 in plant teams were dispatched during the
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exercise. Most of them were properly directed and coordinated by the OSC; t
however, there were at times some problems in the coordination and
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direction of some repair / corrective action teams as follows:
The team assigned to reposition valves in order to redirect radioactive releases through filtration units was delayed for more than 10 minutes because the tool room was unmanned. A second delay i
of the same team occurred because the health physics technician was
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misinformed about the identity of the team members and had to contact
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the OSC for clarification.
Other delays occurred because the auxiliary operator had to return to the OSC to retrieve another
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drawing. As a consequence, valve manipulations were started 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
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after the task was identified.
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Another emergency repair team sent to investigate the problem with Containment Spray Pump "A" did not have information on preceding actions by the operators and repeated actions that had already been accomplished. A final delay occurred because the auxiliary operator was not available at the job site. Additionally, the inspectors noted that the wrong drawings were taken to the scene, and that a circuit tester required for the task was not included in the equipment retrieved for this emergency repai._.
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The fact that occasional lack of proper coordination and technical
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direction to in plant teams resulted in unnecessary delays of vital repair
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actions is considered to be an exercise weakness (285/8929-03).
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Offsite Monitoring Team (82301)(6)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the performance of offsite
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monitoring teams from the EOF as they performed tasks in response to the L
exercise. These tasks included the determination of radiation levels i
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offsite, and air sampling of the radioactive plume,
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The inspectors noted that offsite teams properly relayed information to
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the TSC staff on radiation levels and air sampling data.
However, personnel taking offsite data were exposed to high radiation field; resulting from the plume and were also exposed to high levels of
radioiodine contaminat' ion without their having adequate protection (e.g.,
protective clothing and respiratory equipment).
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emergency workers is considered to be an exercise weakness (285/8929-04).
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Security / Accountability (82301)(8)
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The inspection team observed the security staff's response to the i
exercise.
These tasks included accounting for personnel in the protected area during the site evacuation, controlling access, and evacuating the owner controlled area.
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L were evacuated and acce;ated for in a timely manner.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Licensee Self-Critique The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's self-critique for the exercise and determined that the process of self-critique involved adequate staffing and resources and involved the participation of higher management. The inspectors noted that the licensee was able to properly
identify and characterize a number of exercise weaknesses and that several coincide with findings by the inspection team, t
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Exit Interview.
The inspection team met with the resident-inspectors and licensee representatives indicated in paragraph I on August 31, 1989, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this
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report, The licensee acknowledged their understanding of weaknesses and
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The licensee aid not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the L
inspection.
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