IR 05000382/1989003
| ML20235M756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M746 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-89-03, 50-382-89-3, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8902280410 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20235M756 (12) | |
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'; e U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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NRC Inspection' Report: 50-382/89-03 Operating License:
. Docket: 50-382-
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' Licensee: 'LouisianaPower&LightCompany~(LP&L)~
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142 Delaronde Street-'
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c-New Orleans ~,< Louisiana.
70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Stat' ion, Unit 3 Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana.
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' Inspection Conducted: January 1-31, 1989
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'I'spectors:
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.W. F. Smith, _ Senior Resident Inspector Date
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.T. RT Staker,Jesident Inspector Date
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Approved:
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D. DFChamberlain, Chief, Project Section A Date
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Ins ection Conducted Januar
1-31 1989 Re Areas Ins surve ected:
Routine ort 50-382/89-03 verificationance o servation,,onsite followuunannounced inspection of:
monthly maintenance observatioNRC Bull quality assur,ance operational safetyplant statu p of events identified items,,and license n
Ticensee:'s failure to correct aOne violation was id Results
, foll uel oil resulted in the operators being procedural deficiency on the fin paragraph surveillance procedure for several s
unable to fully comply with a weekl
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poor administrative support f e
inspectors pointed out to li weeks re pumps.
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and perhaps several months or the opera, tors is not typical ensuring procedure compliance y
censee management that this is no;t however. Such related to the fire protectionParagraph 4 of this repor
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, the NRC conducive to e ers to problems the licensee h actuator tubing inspectors appra.
area and safety-related air operat d The licensee identified these i as addressed ised of progress on a routine b to seek out and correct defi ito these issues ssue e valve asis. s and has kept the NRC c encies, and to assess generic improv without NRC prompting.
The licensee's approach e self-crit The control element assembly d implications,ical, described in paragraph 4 were h rop and spray valve failure incidandle procedural compliance and excell during night and weekend hou ents also ent management participation rs.
e During a plant tour with good on January 5
, particularly January 26was described in paragraph S. pumps may not ec rculation flow when there is1989, the 1989 describes a fire pump failure bNRC Information Notice 89 the W3 fire pumps are protectThe license,e was, alerted at the fire no demand.
This
, published on s possible problem and reecause of low flow conditions ed from low flow conditions. quested to describe how
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' Inspection' Summary Inspection Cbnducted January 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-03)
AreasInspectedi Routine, unannounced inspection of: plant status. monthly
- surveillance observation, onsite followup of events, operational safety E
verification,- monthly maintenance observation, diesel generator fuel oil
' quality. assurance, NRC= Bulletin 87-02 followup, followup of previously
' identified items, and licensee event report followup.
Results: One violation was identified in paragraph 3 pertaining to the licensee's failure to correct a' procedural deficiency on the fire pumps. This
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resulted in the operators being unable to fully comply with a weekly surveillance procedure for several weeks, and perhaps several months. Such poor administrative support for the operators is not typical; however, the NRC inspectors pointed out to licensee management that this is nat conducive to ensuring procedure compliance.
Paragraph 4 of this ' report refers to problems the. licensee has addressed related to the fire protection area and safety-related air operated valve actuator tubing. The licensee identified these issues and has kept the NRC inspectors appraised of progress on a routine basis. The licensee's approach to these issues demonstrated improvements in the-ability to be self-critical,
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~ to-seek out and correct deficiencies, and to assess generic implications,
.without.NRC prompting.
The control. element assembly drop and spray valve failure incidents also
' described in paragraph 4 were handled well by operating personnel with good procedural compliance and excellent management participation, particularly during night and weekend hours.
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During a' plant tour on January 5,1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the' fire pumps may not.have sufficient recirculation flow when there is no demand. This was. described in paragraph 5.
NRC Information Notice 89-08, published on January 26, 1989, describes a fire pump failure because of low flow conditions.
The licensee was alerted to this possible problem and requested to describe how the W3 fire pumps are protected from low flow conditions.
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DETAILS
_P_e,rsons Contacted 1.
e Principal Licensee Employees R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear S. A. Alleman, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager P. V. PrasanPumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. J. Zabritski, Quality Assurance Manager D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments
- J. R. McGaha, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses
- L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent A. F. Burski, ifanager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent
- C. R. Gaines, Event Analysis Supervisor
- Present at exit interview.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Plant Status (71707)
l At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was at 70 percunt power because of reduced power demand over the holiday weekend. The plant
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was restored to full power by January 3,1989, and remained at that level through January 26, 1989.
l On January 26, 1989, power was reduced to 80 percent when a control l
element assembly (CEA) dropped during corrective maintenance on the CEA control system. A few hours after a failed sequencing card was replaced, full power was restored.
On January 27, 1989, the plant was shut down to hot standby (Mode 3)
because of a pressurizer spray valve failing to fully close.
Repairs were completed on the valve and the plant was returned to full power on January 30, 1989, where it remained until the end of this inspection period.
Details on the two problems identified above are discussed in paragraph 3 below.
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3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
a.
Procedure OP-903-053, Revision 5. " Fire Protection System Pump Operability Test." On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors witnessed the weekly operability test of the fire pumps. The surveillance was observed previously by the NRC inspectors on December 8,1988, with no problems observed except that Step 7.1.8 of the procedure could not be performed in sequence. The step required the operator to secure the motor driven pump while the diesel driven pump was running, but upon pressing the stop button, the motor would not stop.
Since the header pressure was being maintained (by procedure) below the motor driven pump starting pressure setpoint, there appeared to be a logical explanation as to why the pump would not stop. The operator was given permission from the shift supervisor to proceed and secure the motor driven purrp after the testing of the diesel driven pumps was complete. The action appeared appropriate on the basis that the licensee would resolve the procedure problem after the test.
On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the procedure had not been changed. Upon witnessing the test on January 5,1989, the same problem occurred again, but this time, a different operator proceeded on his own to complete the procedure out of sequence, without shift supervisor concurrence.
I Except for the problem of being unable to comply with Step 7.1.8 in sequence, the operator followed the procedure and ran the equipment in accordance with the operating procedure as required by the surveillance procedure. All prerequisites and precautions were l
complied with. The surveillance test acceptance criteria were met and the operator recorded the data in a neat and professional manner.
On January 5,1989, the NRC inspector expressed concern to licensee management that failure to correct either the procedure or the motor driven fire pump setpoint (or both) is not conducive to the licensee's efforts to instill procedure compliance among operators.
On January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector observed the test to verify corrective actions. The motor driven fire pump setpoint had been reportedly corrected, and in addition, a problem with the motor starting relay was found and corrected shortly after January 5,1989.
Again, the procedure did not work in that Step 7.1.8 could not be followed. This procedure was apparently conducted on a weekly basis
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p for many weeks 'and, as of this reporting period, three times in the a
presence of NRC inspectors without the licensee having corrected:the
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problem with the procedure.
Failure to provide an adequate procedure;
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is'in violation of NRC' regulations (382/8903-01)
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Procedure OP-903-068, Revision 6. " Emergency Diesel. Generator Operability Verification." On January 3,1989, the NRC: inspector observed performance of the monthly operational test of Emergency Diesel Generator A. 'In addition, the biannuals" fast loading" of the diesel-was performed. The surveillance test was conducted in a professional manner in accordance with the procedure.
4.
Onsite Followup of-Events (93702)
a.
Discovery of Excessive Number of Impaired Fire Rated Assiemblies
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NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/88-28 and 50-382/88-31 discussed the licensee's actions to address an excessive number of impaired fire rated ~ assemblies which have been identified. During this inspection period, the licensee' continued to evaluate nonconforming condition identification reports (NCIs). Of the 2,014 fire seals inspected,
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401' required an NCI for evaluation'. As'of the end of this -inspection
period, 307 NCIs were dispositioned; Of these,187~ ~ seals have been declared operable and 201 required some form of rework.
In addition, the licensee had 58 seals on hold pending removal of material so that a detailed in'spection could be. performed in response to.NRC Information W
Notice 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals." The Notice referred to a 10.CFR 21 report on nonconformances found on fire seals at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
The licensee plans to inspect seals similar to those found at Wolf Creek Generating Station to ensure that similar nonconforming conditions do not exist at W3. The licensee continues to target May 1989 for completion. The:NRC inspectors will continue to monitor licensee activity in this area and provide updates in future inspection reports.
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Air Operated Valve Actuator Tubing Deficiencies During the performance of a safety system functional inspection W
conducted by the licensee on the component cooling system, the
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licensee identified a possible problem with the tubing on the air operators for Valves SI-602A and -B.
These valves serve as the safety injection system recirculation sump outlet valves and, thus, have a safety function. ~ The drawings associated with the operator tubing
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installation called for Class ~P7 (nonsafety-related).
Initial field inspections revealed that the tubing had the appearance of P3 tubing, in'that it had weld identification numbers, and had what appeared to be seismic supports. The licensee found that documentation existed showing that the tubing and fittings used on W3 were drawn from the same qualified stock as those used for ASME Section III
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installations.- The,weldors were qualified'for;P3, the weld filler material'was correct, and the supports were adequate.
Parallel.to the evaluations, the' licensee performed dye penetrant tests on' the welds to complete the requirements for P3 tubing.
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i Within approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery. the licensee made an
. operability. determination with a supporting engineering evaluation..
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The NRC inspectors reviewed the evaluation and found.no problems with J
it. - At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that this will be
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reportediin accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.
t The licensee identified a similar problem with Valve CC-620 in the component cooling water system and was performing a review and inspection of 26. additional valves which have a potential for the.
same problem. From all indications, it appears. thatithis problem.
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will have minor' safety-significance.due to' the generic use of qualified tubing and fittings for such applications where'P7 may have'
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been erroneously specified in lieu of T3. The NRC inspectors will i
continue to monitor licensee activities in this area.
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Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drop Incident.
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On January 26,1989, at 5:07 p.m.,' part-length CEA 28-dropped due to failure of: the' automatic control timing. module (ACTM) card. The plant was operating at full power at the time.
Prior to the CEA drop, maintenance personnel had corrected a voltage problem associated with the control element drive mechanism grippers. The ACTM card failed just as the licensee transferred CEA 28 from the hold bus to the ACTM. The NRC inspector was on site and observed operator actions.during most.of the' event. The operators promptly entered the off-normal procedure and took the actions required by the
procedure and the plant Technical Specifications. 'The ACTM was promptly replaced and the CEA~ withdrawn in a controlled manner.
Power distribution limits were not' exceeded.- Reactor power was reduced to about 80. percent as required by procedure before the.CEA could be withdrawn and power remained 'at 80 percent for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to allow-the core to stabilize. To preclude another CEA drop, the shift supervisor elected to place CEA-28 back on the hold bus until the exact cause of the ACTM failure was determined and corrected.
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The NRC-inspectors will monitor the licensee's' actions to determine the cause of the failure.
d.
Failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve to Close On January 27, 1989, at 2:40 a.m., the operators noted a slow decrease in reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure equal to about i
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containment entry was made to check for leaks and to ascertain whether or not the pressurizer spray valves were closed.
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experiences with Spray Valve RC-301A positioner adjustment prompted a check of the valve for the closed position. By 3:33 a.m., it was
' determined that RC-301A was again not fully seated, but this time it could not be~ adjusted. A plant power reduction was commenced.in.
anticipation of a plant shutdown.- At 5:50 a.m., RCS pressure had reached 2025 psia. Technical Specification 3.2.8 required restoration of pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or a reduction in power to less than 5 percent in the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. At 6:43 a.m., the main turbine was taken off the grid and, at 6:46.a.m., the reactor was shut down. -By that time ~ RCS pressure had stabilized at 1900 psia.
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The NRC inspector noted that plant procedures were followed during-the shutdown.
During the next-2 days, the licensee attempted to determine why.
RC-301A would not seat.- It appeared that the valve operator was reaching a mechanical stop before the valve seated, and that this was possibly caused by operator-to-stem. coupling slippage. The exact failure mode could not be determined without disassembling the valve, which could not be done while the plant was in hot standby-(Mode 3).
The licensee was hesitant to cool down, thus placing the plant through a thermal cycle, unless there was no alternative. A temporary alteration was made on the valve operator to preclude further slippage of the coupling. This was appropriately reviewed and~ approved by the Plant l0perations Review Committee. The NRC inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and found no problems. The valve operator was adjusted to ensure plenty of clearance.thus allowing the valve to seal. The plant was returned to full. power at-6:40 a.m. on January 30, 1989, after having tested the spray valve for several hours. The NRC inspectors requested the licensee to-provide the records showing the manner in which the valve was assembled during the fall of 1988 when the body to bonnet gasket and valve stem were replaced. The NRC inspector will review these records to establish confidence that the valve was properly assembled. The licensee also committed to disassemble RC-301A during the next' cold shutdown as required to determine and correct the cause of failure. This shall be tracked as Open Item 382/8903-02.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were:
(1) to ensure that this facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, (2) to ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, (3) to assure that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection programs were implemented in confonnance with plant policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements, and (4) to inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical security l
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The NRC inspectors verified that proper control room staffing and operator behavior was consistent with NRC regulations. Operators were observed to be adhering to approved procedures as the NRC inspectors witnessed the various operations that were conducted in the control room.
On a daily basis, when on site, the NRC inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators and confirmed that the operators understood the reasons why the annunciators were illuminated.
The NRC inspectors selectively reviewed emergency core cooling system lineups using control room indication each day the control room was visited and found no problem.
Tours were conducted in the plant on a rotating basis to maximize the number of areas inspected.
Equipment condition was found to be satisfactory. During a tour on January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector noted that the motor driven fire pump did not appear to have a recirculation line and could be left running for an undetermined amount of time with no demand which could lead to pump damage. This fire pump does not secure automatically when the jockey pump becomes sufficient to maintain fire header pressure. Once the pump is automatically started by reduced fire header pressure, it continues to run until an operator goes to the fire pump building and manually shuts the pump off. The licensee was requested to explain how this pump is protected from damage due to extended operation at shutoff head. As of the end of this inspection period, a satisfactory answer has not been provided.
This shall be tracked under Open Item 382/8903-03.
At least once per week, a shift turnover was observed. The meetings were conducted in a professional manner, and there was a clear exchange of pertinent information.
The NRC inspectors monitored the licensee's chemistry sampling program.
No problems were found. At the daily plan-of-the-day meeting, the chemistry department alerted plant management of adverse trends and conditions, if any, and what actions were being taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The below listed station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed and documentation reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes or standards.
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Work Authorization 01027406. The NRC inspector observed the coupling alignment check per Procedure MM-06-004, Revision 4, " Shaft Coupling Alignment and Belt Tensioning Procedure," and reassembly during the l
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l performance of routin' e preventive maintenance on Emergency Feedwater
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No problems were identified.
b.
Work Authorization 01030621. After having failed functional testing, a power supply for the Safety: Channel C nuclear instrument was
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replaced.. The NRC inspector witnessed the subsequent. retest'as-performed per Procedure'0P-903-102, Revision 4, " Safety Channel
' Nuclear Instrument Functional.. Test, Safety Channel C,"; prior. to returning the instrument to service. The NRC inspector observed that all acceptance criteria were met.
c.
Work Authorization 01027914. -The NRC inspector observed portions of the reinsta11ation of dry cooling tower (DCT) fan motor 3A. The fan
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motor had been removed for bearing replacement.. The NRC inspector
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noted.that repairs were.made to the high speed power ' supply leads...
One of the leads had apparently overheated. The licensee determined that the overheating originated at the crimp = on the high. speed motor
- supply lug. The high speed power supply lugs were replaced with an improved type. The licensee commented that the DCT fan motors not
- yet worked'on since construction have the old type lugs-and would be replaced..The: licensee-committed to establishing a program for replacement of all. dry cooling tower fan motor high speed power supply ' l ugs.'
Followup on the licensee's lug-replacement program shall be an open item (382/8903-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil Quality Assurance (25593)
~The objective of this inspection was to. verify that the licensee has included EDG fuel oil in its quality assurance (QA) program to complete inspection requirements for NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/93.
The NRC inspector. reviewed Procedure OP-03-009, Revision' 5, " Fuel Oil Receipt," and noted that QA receipt inspection is required for EDG fuel
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oil. The laboratory performing fuel oil analyses for the licensee was on the licensee's QA approved vendors' list. NRC Temporary
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Instruction 2515/93 is closed.
j No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
NRC Bulletin 87-02 Followup (25025)
The purpose of this inspection was to complete the inspection requirements for NRC Bulletin 87-02, " Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance With
< Applicable Material Specifications." This inspection was implemented in accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction 2500/26. The first half of this inspection was conducted during the period November 30 through December 4, 1987. Details were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-29, dated January 8,1988.
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During the week of January 16, 1989, the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's files related to their response to Bulletin 87-02. On January 18, 1988, the licensee responded to the bulletin and on July 25, 1988, the licensee provided the additional information requested by Supplements 1 and 2 to Bulletin 87-02. The responses appeared to provide all of the information requested.
The NRC inspectors confirmed, through examination of the information on the Fastener Testing Data Sheets (Attachment 1 to 8ulletin 87-02), that the sample fasteners were properly tagged.
Information provided to the independent testing laboratory reflected the requirements associated with the relevant specification, grade, and class of the fasteners.
In the enclosure to the licensee's response, the NRC inspectors noted that all tests were satisfactory with some listed exceptions. This was supported by the certified documents provided by the testing laboratory.
The exceptions included marginally low carbon content in a number of Type A194, Grade 2H nuts according to the test results from Partek Laboratories. This had no adverse impact on the mechanical properties of the nuts, since the actual hardness valves were within specification limits. However, the samples were retested by Materials Evaluation Laboratory using what the licensee considered a more accurate process.
The results were at or above the minimum carbon content. The NRC inspectors examined the certification sheets and found no problems.
The inspection requirements of Temporary Instruction 2500/26 are completed for W3.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701 & 92702)
a.
(Closed) Open Item 382/8417-01:
Followup on possible use of commercial solenoid valves manufactured by Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) in safety-related applications. During the week of April 16, 1984, the NRC inspector was unable to verify whether or not all ASCO solenoid valves installed in safety-related applications were certified as safety-related (Class 1E).
In November 1988, the NRC inspector obtained a data printout and found 33 of 249 ASCO valves listed as commercial in lieu of Class 1E.
This was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-28.
There was also some discussion on this open item with regard to the ASCO valves installed on the emergency diesel generator in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/89-02.
Since then, the licensee completed walkdowns of all the ASCO valves installed in safety-related applications. The NRC inspector also field inspected all of the readily accessible valves which represented about a 10 percent sampling. The licensee identified errors in the database and 11 valves possibly requiring replacement.
The first was a comercial ASCO valve installed, by design change, on ACC-1398. The licensee could not justify the
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I design change. The ASCO valve had a commercial body and a Class 1E solenoid coil, and its function was to close ACC-1398.
Since the safety function of this fail-as-is valve was to open, there was no safety significance to this item. The licensee conservatively replaced the solenoid valve with a Class IE valve on January 7,1989.
The remaining ASCO valves had no label plates, but they appeared to be of the proper type based on the shape of the solenoid coil enclosure. The licensee was able to verify this through procurement and installation records. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 382/8725-01: The NRC inspector performed a review of work records and determined that the licensee has verified that fully threaded bolts were installed in all dry cooling tower fan hubs. The NRC inspector verified that the fan technical manual has been upgraded appropriately to ensure that only fully threaded bolts are used. The licensee also installed lock washers on the dry cooling tower fan hub bolts as recommended by the fan vendor. The fan technical manual has been upgraded to include the lock washer installation and to add bolt torque requirements as recommended by the vendor. This violation is closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation 382/8804-01:
Failure to adhere to fire protection procedures. The licensee revised Procedure FP-01-017. " Transient Combustibles and Hazardous Materials," to strengthen controls over transient combustibles. The licensee also conducted training to ensure that personnel were fully aware of requirements regarding transient combustibles. No further problems in the control of combustibles have been identified. This violation is closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation 382/8813-02:
The licensee's corrective actions for this failure to implement quality assurance procedures and issue quality notices for conditions adverse to quality were previously reviewed in NRC In section Repcrt 50-382/88-26. The NRC inspector performed additional reviews and determined that Quality Notice QN-QA-88-80, which documented the problem and specified permanent corrective action, was closed, Licensee identified corrective action appeared appropriate. This violation is closed, e.
(Closed) Violation 382/8825-02:
Failure to follow procedures. The licensee failed to have a lock installed as required on Valve SI-2421. The licensee promptly installed the lock and discussed this failure to follow procedures with the operations staff. No further problems with the control of locked valves have since been identified. This violation is closed.
No violations or daviations were identified.
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10.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92712)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verified I
that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspectors confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of Technical Specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately described.
(Closed)LER 382/88-005, " Blown Undervoltage Circuit Fuse Replacement Results in Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry" (Closed)LER 382/88-018, " Fire Protection Valve Float Locked Open Due to Personnel Error" (Closed)LER 382/88-024, " Missed Sealed Source Leak Test Due to Procedural Inadequacy" (Closed)LER 382/88-028, " Containment Radiation Monitors Declared Out
of Service Due to Discrepancy in Technical Specification Range" (Closed)LER 382/88-031, " Valid Actuation of Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit Due to Cognitive Personnel Error" No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on February 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection.
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