IR 05000373/1993012
| ML20035G001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1993 |
| From: | Louden P, Ploski T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035F994 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-12, 50-374-93-12, NUDOCS 9304260012 | |
| Download: ML20035G001 (21) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-373/93012(DRSS); 50-374/93012(DRSS)
Dockets No. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-19; NPF-25 f
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
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Downers Grove, IL 60515
i Facility Name:
LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois i
t Inspection Conducted: March 30 - April 2, 1993
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Inspectors:
M8tmond 4-l5-93 i
H. Simons Date
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P. Louden Date
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Accompanying Inspectors:
R. Jickling C. Phillips
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F. Kantor
J. O'Brien
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Approved By:
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5/93
/J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Ddte '
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V Emergency Preparedness and
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Non-Power Reactor Section Insoection Summary l
Jnsoection on March 30-Aoril 2.1993 (Reports No. 50-373/93012(DRSS):
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50-374/93012(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the LaSalle Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving a review of the exercise scenario l
(IP 82302), observations by seven NRC representatives of key functions and (
locations during the exercise (IP 82301), followup on licensee actions on i
previously identified items (IP 82301), and followup on emergency plan
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activations (IP 82701).
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9304260012 930419 PDR ADOCK 05000373 O
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Overall, exercise
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performance was excellent. Communications to the control room from other
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emergency response facilities continued to be weak and will be tracked as an
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Inspection Followup Item (Section 7a). A new Operational Support Center (OSC)
l was used for this exercise; however, the layout was not finalized.
Because of l
the lack of a formal OSC layout, the licensee set up the area used-as the OSC
prior to the exercise (Section 7c).
Finalization of the OSC layout and
demonstration of setting up the facility during an activation will be tracked
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as an Inspection Followup Item.
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I The maintenance and testing of the Technical Support Center's emergency
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ventilation system continued to be a concern. Three other concerns were resolved during this inspection.
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Two Unusual Events (UE) were properly classified and the appropriate l
notifications were made. Another event occurred which satisfied the emergency
action levels for an UE; however, the event was terminated before any
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emergency declaration was made. No guidance is given in the licensee's
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procedures on events that terminate before they are declared (Section 4).
-l This concern will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item.
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DETAILS-l
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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i H. Simons, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center
(OSC)
C. Phillips, Control Room Simulator i
J. O'Brien, TSC
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P. Louden, OSC
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T. Ploski, Corporate Emergency Operations facility (CE0F)
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F. Kantor, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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Persons Contacted
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W. Murphy, Site Vice President
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G. Spedl, Plant Manager l
J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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D. Hieggelke, Radiation Protection Services Supervisor J. Houston, Emergency Planning (EP) Coordinator J. Atchley, Operating Engineer
D. Carlson, NRC Coordinator L. Holden, Corporate Emergency Planning Supervisor T. Nettles, Corporate Health Physicist
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K. Jackson, Corporate Emergency Planning
J. Roman, Illinois Department'of Nuclear Safety Resident Engineer i
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C. Richards, Site Quality Verification (SQV) Engineer i
J. Young, EP Trainer l
t The personnel listed above attended the NRC exit interview on i
April 2, 1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the
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inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Items (IP 82301)
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(Ocen) Insoection Followuo Item No. 50-373/92009-01: During the 1992
.l exercise, significant information was not fully communicated to all
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emergency response facilities (ERFs).
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Although a reading package was issued to address this concern, the concern was not successfully demonstrated during the 1993 exercise.
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Section 7a of this report describes the weak communication of i
information to the control room simulator.
Further corrective actions i
are needed to resolve this concern. This item will remain open.
(Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-373/92009-02: During the 1992 exercise, the use of emergency action levels (Eats) in the Technical
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Support Center (TSC) was weak.
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During the 1993 exercise, EAls were properly used by the TSC staff to classify each condition which warranted an emergency declaration. This item is closed.
(0 pen) Inspection Followup Item No. 50-373/92009-03:
Inadequate maintenance of the emergency ventilation system in the TSC.
The licensee performed all the required tests of the ventilation system by March 31, 1993. However, due to the test results, the licensee determined that charcoal replacement was necessary. The licensee committed to complete this replacement and perform a retest by June 30, 1993. This item will remain open pending successful retest of the charcoal adsorbers.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 50-373/92009-04: During the 1992
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exercise, radiation surveys were not documented such that they could be
used for other team briefings.
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During this exercise, radiation surveys were accumented, posted, and
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used for other team briefings.
In addition, the Operational Support i
Center Supervisor used a status board to highlight all changes in radiation conditions. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followup 12 ems No. 373/93005-01 and 374/93005-01:
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The need to fully review the Reportability Manual for consistency with-
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the Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP).
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The licensee's corporate emergency planning staff was responsible for
performing this review. The licensee's interpretation of a "significant
loss of communications capabilities" was reevaluated by the licensee and
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changes were made to the Reportability Manual. The inspectors reviewed
these changes and determined that they were adequate.
This item is
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closed.
4.
Emeraency Plan Activations (IP 82701)
j Since the last routine inspection, two Unusual Events (UE) were declared l
when shutdowns were required by Technical Specifications due to the l
inoperability of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) valve on
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February 13 and February 27, 1993. Notifications to the State and NRC l
were performed in a timely manner in sufficient detail.
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On January 26, 1993, at 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, while performing surveillance
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LOS-MS-R2, " Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Manual Cycling Test For Conditions 1, 2, or 3,"
a safety relief valve (SRV) stuck open.
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licensee manually scrammed the reactor, in accordance with the technical
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specifications limiting condition for operation action statement, after l
two minutes when the SRV did not close.
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Emergency Action Level (EAL) 3A states that an UE be declared when i
" equipment described in the Technical Specifications is degraded such j
that a limiting Condition for Operation requires shutdown and power
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decrease for reactor shutdown has commenced." - When the reactor was-l scrammed, this clearly was a power decrease, thus an UE should have been l
declared. However, per procedure the UE would be terminated after the i
Technical Specification action statement no longer applied.
Therefore, i
the licensee passed through the UE. The NRC was notified of this event i
via a one hour non-emergency telephone call while the State and-locals
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were not notified. The NRC position is that licensees should report all
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pass through emergency classifications to State and locals in the same
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manner that they reoort non-pass through classifications. The licensee l
indicated that they will provide guidance as to the required actions.for l
events that have terminated before they are declared to ensure that the State and locals are notified of events requiring an emergency j
classification.
This item will be tracked as an Inspection Followup i
Item (No. 373/93012-01).
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~i No violations or deviations were identified; however, one Inspection i
Followup Item was identified.
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5.
General (IP 82301)
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An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations
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Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at LaSalle Station on April 2,1993.
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This was a utility only exercise. The exercise tested the licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to an accident i
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scenario.
The attachments to this report describe the scope and objectives of the exercise and the scenario.
i The licensee successfully responded to an accident scenario in an
orderly, coordinated, and timely manner in accordance with the emergency
plan and implementing procedures.
If scenario events had been real, the
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actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the l
accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate
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actions to protect the public's health and safety.
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6.
Specific,.i'hservations (IP 82301)
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a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
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.i The performance of the Control Room Simulator (CRS) staff was j
excellent. The CRS staff did an excellent job assessing
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conditions which warranted the emergency classifications.
I Notifications to the State and NRC were completed in a timely and
appropriately detailed manner.
i Communications within the CRS were excellent.
Briefings by the
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Shift Engineer to the CRS staff were a strength.
The CRS crew l
used " repeat backs" to ensure all information was properly
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understood.
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Communications from the CRS to other emergency response facilities
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were excellent; however, communications to the CRS were weak.
It-i took 40 minutes before the CRS was informed that the site had been l
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evacuated.
It took 20 minutes for the CRS to find out that the
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Station Director had declared a General Emergency and this i
information was only given after it was specifically requested.
In addition, the CRS was never aware that the Corporate Emergency Operations facility (CEOF) took command and control of the i
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emergency response. Communications to the CRS were a concern during the 1992 exercise as was documented in Inspection Reports No. 50-373/92009(DRSS) and 50-374/92009(DRSS). The weak flow of
information to the CRS will continue to be trached as an Inspection Followup Item (No. 373/92009-03).
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No violations or deviations were identified; however, one
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Inspection Followup Item remained open.
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b.
Technical Support Center iTSC)
The activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) was accomplished in a timely and organized manner. As each staff j
member reported to the TSC, they signed in and quickly assumed
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their duties. The Station Director (SD) immediately recognized when minimum staffing was met and promptly took command and
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control of the emergency response.
Management and control of the TSC by the SD was excellent.
Briefings to the TSC staff were frequent and thorough. The SD held good table top discussions with his key staff.
The TSC
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directors and their assistants provided good support to the SD.
The Maintenance Director could have been physically positioned to
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better support the emergency response efforts. Due to his distance from other directors, he was not included on all the
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discussions among the SD, Technical Director, and Operations i
Director.
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Technical evaluations of plant conditions were good; however, certain conditions could han been more thoroughly evaluated.
For
example, the possible source of the leak in the drywell was not
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aggressively investigated. The possibility for an increase in the i
drywell leak rate, considering the increasing reactor pressure
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following the main steam line isolation valve closure, was not discussed.
In addition, the TSC was slow to fully assess and
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determine that a small steam leak from a turbine driven feedwater pump satisfied a second Site Area Emergency classification.
Core damage assessment was performed in a timely manner and an accurate estimation of the core damage postulated by the scenario was obtained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
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The licensee demonstrated the use of a new Operational Support I
Center (050) location. However, the facility was set up prior to the beginning of the exercise. The layout for this facility had
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not been finalized and set up was not demonstrated during this
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exercise. The need to finelize the OSC layout and demonstrate the
setup will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item
(No. 373/93012-01).
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Upon the announcement of the Alert declaration, OSC personnel began reporting to the facility and it met minimum staffing within
about 20 minutes and declared. fully operational after about
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i Excellent command and control was displayed by the OSC Director,
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who provided the facility with frequent detailed briefings on
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plant conditions, tasks to be accomplished, and updates on
dispatched in-plant teams. The OSC Director also conducted pre
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and post job briefings to crews assembled for tasks in the plant.
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lhe briefings were detailed in nature as to the specific job assignment, plant radiological conditions, and turn back points.
The excellent performance of this individual was evaluated as 'a facility strength.
The inspectors accompanied a chemistry team, dispatched to the High Radiation Sample System room, to observe the setup of the sampling panel to perform coolant sarnpling. The team followed procedure LZP-1330-24, to set the sampling panel up for sample i'
collections. The inspectors noted good teamwork between the crew, and the lead chemistry technician displayed excellent familiarity with the sampling system.
Overall, teams were issued dosimetry in a timely manner; plant radiological conditions were routinely updated as areas changed and were displayed behind the radiation protection desk; and all workers were observed to follow' appropriate radiation protection procedures for dose and contamination control. Appropriate job coverage was provided by radiation protection technicians observed in the field.
No violations or deviations were identified; however, one Inspection Followup Item was identified.
d.
Corporate Emeraency Operations Facility (CEOF)
The overall performance.of the eight persons whe staffed the Corporate Emergency Operations facility (CEOF) was excellent.
The corporate nuclear duty off'.er, who became the Corporate Manager of Emergency Operations-(CME 0), conservatively decided to activate the CEOF.
Following a detailed briefing by the CME 0, the i
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CEOF staff began performing their duties in an efficient, well
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organized manner. The CME 0 made it clear to the CEOF staff and-
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the Station Director (SD) in the Technical Support Center (TSC)
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degraded. Later due to degraded plant conditions, a smooth
transfer of command and control was demonstrated from the TSC to l
the CEOF.
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The CE0F staff made excellent use of computerized displays to l
monitor changing plant conditions and they did not hesitate in
advising the TSC or EOF counterparts when noteworthy changes were
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detected. The CME 0 maintained excellent communications with the
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SD and the Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) in the Emergency
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Operations Facility (EOF) and remained very well informed of plant conditions and associated emergency response efforts.
The CEOF staff did an excellent job of determining and keeping the-
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State informed of the protective action recommendations (PARS) and l
their bases.
Even after the transfer of command and control to
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the EOF, the CEOF staff continued to assist in determining the
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appropriate PARS. The CEOF staff were careful to provide complete
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and correct information to the State.
i During recovery discussions, the CEOF staff made several
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noteworthy inputs such as preparing for an NRC incident
investigation team, involving the NRC in the decision making on
what plant equipment should be quarantined, and obtaining
contractor support.
No violations or deviations were identified, e.
Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)
The Emergency Operations facility (EOF) players were prestaged at l
a local motel; therefore, timely activation of the facility was not evaluated. As the EOF staff arrived, they effectively
performed their duties. The transfer of command and control was
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performed in a smooth and timely manner from the Corporate
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Emergency Operations Facility.
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Command and control of the EOF staff by the Manager of Emergency Operations (ME0) was effective. The MEO was knowledgeable of his
responsibilities and effectively directed his staff in the
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anticipation of possible events.
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The ME0 was proactive in contacting the simulated State and kept I
them well informed of plant conditions and the basis for the
protective action recommendations. The ME0 was especially
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effective in briefing the State on the rationale for stating that i
a release was in progress on the Nuclear Accident Reporting System
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(NARS) form when there was some debate over whether a release was actually occurring. At times, these discussions were being
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conducted on the speaker phone in the Emergency Management Center and were hampered by briefings being conducted using the public j
address system in the E0F.
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The E0F staff were knowledgeable of their duties.
In particular, the LaSalle Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) played a key role in assisting other EOF staff with his in-depth knowledge of the pl ant.
Radiological assessment was used to determine the potential consequences of the event once the validity of the release path was established. However, dose assessment results were not available in the EOF until a monitored release path was verified.
l The ME0 requested dose estimates near the time of the General Emergency based on default values; however, these were not provided.
Some confusion existed in the Executive Management Center over the use of subareas by the State versus the licensee's use of sectors to describe the offsite areas involved in protective actions. A
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map depicting the subareas in relation to the sector was not l
readily available to the EOF staff.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Ob_iectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to NRC within the proper timeframes. The licensee adequately answered the inspectors' questions pertaining to the scenario.
The scenario was challenging and included use of the simulator, mock NRC personnel, and an unmonitored release path.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Control and critioues (IP 82301)
Exercise control was very good. There were adequate controllers to control the exercise. No instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they might not otherwise have taken, were observed.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well detailed. The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview which were in strong agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview-The inspectors held an exit. interview on April 2,1993, with the-r licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss-l the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none
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of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
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Attachments:
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1.
Exercise Scope and Objectives
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2.
Exercise Scer.ario Summary j
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LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SCOPE OF PARTICI?ATION
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O MIf:
March 31, 1993 TY_Pf:
Daytime, Utility Only
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OFFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION None PURPOSE:
Test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP).
The Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency.
CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED:
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Control Room
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CEOF
EOF CECO FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATED:
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The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basis.
The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Corporate Emergency
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Response Organization will be prepositioned close to the CEOF to permit use of personnel from distant locations.
Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercise.
Comonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Company.
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O ZLASALLE/146/1
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LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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1993 GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 31, 1993
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OBJECTIVES LIST
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I PRIKARY OBJECTIVE:
r Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at one of its Nuclear Power Stations.
i SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
l NOTE:
An EOF designation includes all EOFs, the CEOF and BEOF if activated.
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- Denotes critical objectives
1)
Assessment and Cla.isification a. Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions which warrant
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declaring a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15)
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minutes.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to determine the highest Emergency l
Action Level (EAL) applicable for usessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to determine the correct specific EAL(s) for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.
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2)
Notification and Communication 1 a. Demenstrate the ability to correctly fill out the NARS
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form for conditions presented in the scenario.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and
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local organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of an Emergency classification ar significant changes in NARS information.
c. Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately l
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after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of
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the Emergency classification using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate.
d. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the States at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes
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of significant changes in conditions reported on the State Agency Update Checklist.
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ZLASALLE/148/l i
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e. Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support
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organizations such as INPO, ANI, General Electric or
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Hestinghouse, the fuel Vendor, Murray & Trettel or
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Teledyne, for assistance during the Exercise.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Emergency Notification
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System (ENS) upon request.
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g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of I
communication with the NRC on the Health Physics Network l
(HPN) upon request.
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h. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate to the NRC within thirty (30) minutes of changes in reportable conditions when an open-line of communication (ENS or HPN) is not maintained.
1. Demonstrate the ability to provide informational
announcements over the plant PA system.
-(CR)
j. Demonstrate the backup means of communications for the NARS network.
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3)
Radioloaical Assessment and Protective Actions
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a. Demonstrate the ability to collect and document radiological surveys for conditions presented in the scenario.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to trend radiological information l
for conditions presented in the scenario.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to provide protective clothing and
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respiratory equipment for onsite personnel in accordance
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with Station procedures and policies.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with Station procedures and policies.
ZLASALLE/148/2 i
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l e. Demonstrate the ability to issue and administratively
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control dosimetry in the OSC in accordance with Station O
procedures and policies.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to perform habitability surveys in
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the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures.
g. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain radiological controls in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures.
h. Demonstrate the ability to control personnel exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits in the course of lifesaving and other emergency activities, in accordance with procedures.
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1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document
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radiation exposure to inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with Station procedures and policies.
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j. Demonstrate the ability to respond to and perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individual (s) in accordance with Station procedures and O
policies.
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k. Demonstrate the ability to identify appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) within fifteen (15) minutes of determining an Offsite Dose Projection or using an
Emergency Classification flowchart.
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1. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of the
source term of a release.
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m. Demonstrate the ability to establish the relationship
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between effluent monitor readings and onsite and offsite
exposures / contamination for various meteorological conditions.
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n. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of a
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release based on plant system parameters and effluent i
monitors.
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ZLASALLE/148/3
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O. Demonstrate the ability to calculate release
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rate / projected doses with primary assessment
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instrumentation offscale or inoperable.
p. Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with emergency procedures.
q. Demonstrate the ability to collect RCS and Containment Atmosphere samples using Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) equipment in accordance with PASS procedures and health physics controls.
-(CR, OSC)
r. Demonstrate the ability to perform core damage assessment in accordance with emergency procedures.
l s. Demonstrate the ability to collect and count field samples
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in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.
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t. Demonstrate the ability to document field samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.
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l u. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose rate measurements O'
in the environment.
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v. Demonstrate the ability to assess and trend field sample
results in accordance with procedures.
w. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Field Teams within
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forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field samples.
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x. Demonstrate the ability to control / coordinate Field Team
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activities in accordance with procedures.
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y. Demonstrate the ability to transfer control / coordination of Environs Teams activities in accordance with Station and EOF procedures.
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ZLASALLE/148/4
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Emeraency Facilities f)
a. Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in v
the TSC and OSC within thirty (30) minutes of an Alert or higher Classification during a daytime event [within sixty (60) minutes of an Alert or higher Classification during an off hours event] in accordance with GSEP Section 4.
b. Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty (30) minutes of an Alert or higher Emergency Classification in accordance with GSEP Section 4.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the Control Room to the TSC in accordance with appropriate checklists.
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-(CR, TSC)
e d. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the TSC to the EOF in accordance with appropriate checklists.
e. Demonstrate the ability to assess minimum manning and to assess the capability to assume the non-delegable
responsibilities of Command and Control in accordance with GSEP Section 4.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to maintain current and accurate information on Status Boards by updating at least every thirty (30) minutes.
g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain information on the Electronic Status Board in accordance with' procedures.
i h. Demonstrate the ability to exchange data and technical
information between the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with CEPIPs and Station procedures.
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5)
Emeroency Direction and Control a. Demonstrate the ability of the Directors and Managers to provide leadership in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in GSEP and position-specific procedures.
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f b. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and dispatch Inplant
Teams in accordance with Station proceduret.
c. Demonstrate the ability to prir ritize resources for
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Inplant Team activit',es in ac'1rdance with Station
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procedures.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport Emergency i
equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant conditions.
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e. Demonstrate the ability of the Acting Station Director,
Station Director, OSC Director and HE0 to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event
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classification, and activities in progress at least every sixty (60) minutes.
f. Demonstrate the ability to provide access for the NRC Site
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Team in accordance with Access Control procedures.
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j g. Demonstrate the ability to interface with the NRC Site l
Team.
h. Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to perform their assigned duties and
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responsibilities in accordance with position specific procedures.
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i. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within thirty (30) minutes after completion of Site Accountability.
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l. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for
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On-site personnel within 30 minutes of a Site Emergency
declaration.
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m. Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, brief personnel and arrange for traffic control within one
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(1) hour of starting site evacuation.
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6)
Recoverv
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a. Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter f
a Recovery classification in accordance with procedures.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to generate a Recovery Plan which
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will return the plant to normal operations in accordance l
with CECO policies and procedures.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term recovery
staffing requirements.
d. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate recovery actions with the State.
7)
SECURITY
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a. Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond
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to an emergency situation in accordance with procedures.
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b. Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to
coordinate actions and interact with the Emergency
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Response Organization.
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C ZLASALLE/148/7
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LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 31, 1993
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY
"THIS IS AN EXERCI1Fl" INITIAL CONDITIONS UNIT ONE:
Unit One is operating at - 83% power on the 1001 flow control line.
The station is in an Unusual Event due to a Tech Spec required shutdown in progress at 100 MWe/HR., due to expiration of the seven (7) day time clock for T.S. 3.5.1.A.1 (Standby liquid control system).
The 1A SBLC pump (IC41-C001A) was replaced, and the replacement was faulty, resulting in expiration of the seven (7) day time clock at 0530 this morning.
UNIT TH0:
Unit 2 is in week 11 of a 12 week refueling outage. All fuel movement is complete.
Work activities for the refueling outage are progressing on schedule.
UNIT COMMON:
Per the Load Dispatcher system status is GREEN.
Thunderstorms are approaching from the southwest.
The Unit 0 station air compressor (OSA01C) is Out of Service.
Alert (0815-0945)
At 0800, sustained wind speed will exceed 80 mph. At 0940, a UAT fault will occur, resulting in a main turbine trip.
Following the main
turbine trip, the auto scram will fail but the manual will work, minor
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fuel damage and a very small loca will occur.
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Excetted Actions At 0815, the Acting Station Director should declare an Alert per EAL
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6.m (sustained winds > 80 mph for 15 minutes). Once the OSC is manned,
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and the storm has passed, operators should be dispatched to assess wind i
damage.
i Following the main turbine trip /ATHS at 0940, the NSO should manually
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trip the reactor via the reactor mode switch or the manual pushbuttons.
The Station Director should recognize the ATHS as being a
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2nd Alert per EAL 3.g (Auto RPS fails / manual works), and may consider upgrading to a Site Emergency due to multiple Alerts, though this is not expected.
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Site Emeraency (0945-1130)
At 0945, the group I isolation setpoint will be reached on high main steamline radiation resulting from fuel damage caused by the i
pressure / power spike which occurred during the ATHS at 0940.
The
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inboard and outboard A main steamline isolation valves (MSIVs) will
fail to close resulting in an unisolable breach of containment.
At 1015, a small unisolable steam leak will occur on lA Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) HP steam supply line, resulting in a release of fission products to the Turbine Building atmosphere and subsequently to
the environment.
l Excetted Actions i
At 0945, the Station Director should declare a Site Emergency per EAL 2.j (challenge to twg of the three Fission Product Barriers). The j
Control Room crew should continue to perform LGP 3-2 (reactor scram)
and should attempt to manually isolate the A main steamline HSIVs from i
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1H13-P601, as well as by requesting the TSC to dispatch operators from the OSC to pull fuses and isolate air locally.
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At 1015. the Control Room should respond to reports of a steam leak in the IB RFPT room, by attempting to close the aux steam isolation valves
(lB21-F418 A & B) and the IB RFPT steam isolation valves (IB21-F4228 &
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1821-F4238). The Control Room crew should determine that IB21-F4188 l
and 1821-F422B failed to close. The TSC may decide to attempt to manually close these valves, depending on local temperature and l
radiation conditions.
l The Station Director should recognize the RFPT steam leak as a 2nd Site
Emergency per EAL 2.1 (A Main Steam Line break outside of primary
containment with one or more Main Steam Lines having no isolation l
valves closed), and may elect to declare a General Emergency due to j
multiple Site Emergencies.
General Emeraency (1130 - 1300)
l At 1130, Drywell radiation will exceed 100R, resulting in meeting the criteria for loss of the 3rd Fission Product Barrier.
At 1215, MSIV IB21-F022A closes, terminating the release to the environment.
j Expected Actions i
At 1130, the Manager of Emergency Operations should declare a General Emergency per EAL 2.m (Challenge to Iwn of the three Fission Product Barriers and probable loss of the third Fission Product Barrier).
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Recovery
(1300+ on 4/1/93)
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At 1300, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jump will be introduced.
The Control Room, OSC and Field Teams will terminate participation. The TSC, EOF and CEOF i
will continue.
The Unit I reactor will be in cold shutdown with all f
MSIVs closed.
ExDetted Actions
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The TSC, EOF and CEOF should plan recovery for the plant, pursuant to the conditions provided above, as well as planning long term manning
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requirements for Field Teams and the Emergency Response Facilities.
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