IR 05000373/1993002
| ML20034H585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1993 |
| From: | Burgess S, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034H576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-02, 50-373-93-2, 50-374-93-02, 50-374-93-2, NUDOCS 9303190035 | |
| Download: ML20034H585 (14) | |
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U.
S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
i Reports No. 50-373/93002(DRS); No. 50-374/93002(DRS)
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t Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 300
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Downers Grove, IL 60515
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Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL 61341 Inspection Conducted:
January 11 through February 11, 1993
Inspection Team:
S.
Burgess, Team Leader Z.
Falevits
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R. Langstaff R. Lerch r
D. McNeil G.
Nejfelt T. Tella R. Winter
i Approved By:
hhb 6*pu*
3 - 11-9 3 S.'-0. Bdigess, Team Leader Date Region III
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Approved By:
,G.
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Wright,' Chie f Date i
/ Engineering Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on January 11 throuch February 11. 1993 (Reports No.
50-373/93002(DRS): No. 50-374/93002(DRS))
l Engineering and Technical Support (E&TS) and EDSFI follow-up
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inspection in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 37700 and
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Temporary Instruction 2515/111.
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i Results: Overall, the team determined that engineering and technical support was good.
Modifications reviewed contained
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adequate design control and well documented safety evaluations
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(Section 4.1.1).
Effective communications between engineering i
and other organizations resulted in the identification and
resolution of plant problems (Sections 4.3.1, 4.4.1, and 4.4.2).
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A weakness was noted in the documentation of engineering l
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evaluations and post-modification testing of temporary system changes (Section 4.1.2).
Ten previously identified inspection items were closed.
No violations or issues requiring further NRC
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review were identified as a result of this inspection.
'i 9303190035 930312 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G
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DETAILS
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i 1.0 Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
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W. Murphy, Vice President, LaSalle County Station
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Gieseker, Manager, Site Engineering and Construction
- + T. Hammerich, Assistant Supervisor, System Engineering
- + W. Huntington, Supervisor, Technical Staff Suppcrt
K. Kociuba, Superintendent, Site Quality Verification
- + J.
Lockwood, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance
- + J. Miller, Supervisor, Station Support Engineering
- + M.
Reed, Superintendent, Technical Services
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J.
Schmeltz, Manager, Operations
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Spedl, Plant Manager, LaSalle County Station Euclear Reaulatory Commission
T. Martin, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety
D. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle County Station Illinois Department Nuclear Safety I
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J. Roman, Resident Inspector, LaSalle County Station
Denotes those present at the E&TS exit meeting on February 11, 1993.
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Denotes those present at the EDSFI follow-up exit meeting on January 15, 1993.
r Other persons were contacted as a matter _of course during the-inspection.
2.0 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/111
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The team determined that the licensee had taken adequate corrective action for safety-significant findings identified during the electrical distribution system functional inspection
(EDSFI).
The documentation presented for close out of the
findings.was auditable, complete, and thorough.
The items
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inspected during the performance of TI. 2515/111 are contained in.
Sections'3.1 through 3.11.
t 3.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection'Findinas
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3.1 (Closed) Violation (373/91019-01A; 374/91019-01A)
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Low voltage 480Vac breakers had been tested at higher than
recommended-trip currents.
The licensee revised breaker testing
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procedure, LES-GM-105 (Rev. 9), after consultation with the
vendor.
About 23% of the breaker trip coils in the plant.were
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replaced with more reliable solid state ~(RMS-9) devices.
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licensee will consider replacing.the coils on other safety-related breakers.
Presently,.the breaker trip current settings
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are specified by the Commonwealth' Edison Company (Ceco) Nuclear Engineering Department and verified by the station technical i
staff engineer, prior to each breaker test.
To prevent a l
potential damage to the breaker contacts or the coils, the l
licensee limited the breaker test currents to 130% tx) 300% of the
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trip device settings.
This item is considered closed.
j 3.2 (Open) Violation (373 /9101'9-01B; 374 /91019-01B)
Not all relays were included in the calibration program.
LaSalle
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had not been checking timing relays to verify settings.
The station utilized logic and functional tests to' ensure that systems perform their intended function.
LaSalle continues to review station electrical design drawings to identify timing relays for which the time delay performs.a i
function that is important to the safety of the plant.- The i
inspectors were informed that a calibration program will be established and implemented to insure the proper performance of'
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This program was expected to be developed by
March 31, 1993, and implemented at the first refueling outage j
thereafter.
Pending further review of the completed program,.
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this item will remain open, j
l 3.3 (Closed) Open Item (373/91019-02; 374/91019-02)
'l The 4kV engineered safety feature (ESP) circuit breaker had j
overcurrent protection set for the normal bus but apparently was
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not properly set for the alternate source, the emergency diesel generator (EDG).
j The 4kV ESF circuit breaker had been set to provide protection when powered from the system auxiliary transformer because this would be the source of the-largest fault current.
The licensee
concluded that existing protective. relay settings for the ESF.
Division 1, 2,
and 3 circuit breakers would clear a fault when powered from the EDG.
There were no further concerns.
This-item
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is considered closed.
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,1 3.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/91019-03; 374/91019-03)
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Voltage drop analyses were not performed to verify that cables feeding 125Vdc loads were properly sized.
The licensee performed comprehensive voltage drop calculations on all three 125Vdc divisions for both units.
Results indicated that the unit 1 and 2 EDG "0" main feed breaker closing circuits
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needed significantly more than the 105Vdc at the battery terminal due to voltage drop.
Minor plant changes P01-1-91-561 and
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P02-2-91-555 were implemented in 1992 to correct this voltage
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drop problem.
In addition, the licensee identified power-supplies and alarms in the battery and battery charger current
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monitoring portions of the de instrumentation that require more l
than 105Vdc to operate properly.
The licensee's analysis i
determined that the-loss of these instrumentation and alarms i
would not affect safe shutdown during an accident.. This item.is considered closed.
l 3.5 (Closed) Deviation (373/91019-05A; 374/91019-05A)
LaSalle purchased motors with starting capabilities that were limited to 80% of their nominal voltage value.
UFSAR section 8.2.3.2.2 stated, in part, that all motors were capable of i
starting with voltages at their terminals equal to 75% of the nominal values.
The licensee determined that the 75% starting voltage requirement contained in the UFSAR was incorrectly derived from the architect engineer's standard specifications.
UFSAR Section 8.2.3.2.2 will" be revised to read, "The minimum acceptable level (i.e.,
starting voltage) for safety-related motors and contactors is based on the minimum equipment terminal voltage postulated at the. lower analytical limit or design basis of the second level undervoltage protection setpoint."
Based on the proposed UFSAR change, this item is considered closed.
3.6 (Closed) Deviation (373/91019-05B; 374/91019-05B)
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The continuous loading on EDG 2A was 2727kW while the UFSAR
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identified the loading as 2627kW.
The licensee determined that
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the UFSAR did not reflect the actual loading.
Electrical load monitoring system (ELMS) data was utilized to obtain more accurate values.
A revision to UFSAR Table 8.3-1 will be incorporated into the annual UFSAR update.
Based on this
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proposed UFSAR change, this item is considered closed.
3.7 (Closed) Deviation (373/91019-05C; 374/91019-05C)
The diesel fuel oil storage and transfer _ systems did not conform to the safety requirements of ANSI N-195.
Specifically, the three areas of nonconformance were: a permanent interconnection between division 3 storage tanks and diesel driven fire pump day tanks; seven day storage tanks did not have high level alarms; and Division 3 EDG had 1000 gallon margin instead of the required
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10% margin (approximately 2975 gallon).
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The licensee concluded that the permanent interconnection was not safety significant since there were two fail close isolation
valves and a delay in transferring until the diesel fire pump day tank low level was reached.
The licensee determined lack of high level alarm was not safety significant since the storage tank
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overflowed to the sump, which does have an alarm that would eventually notify the operators of an overflow condition.
The diesel fuel storage requirement was calculated assuming 100%
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continuous load, which had sufficient conservatisms.
The licensee will revise UFSAR, Section 9.5.4.2 to list these deviations from ANSI N-195.
Based on'the licensee's evaluation and proposed UFSAR change, this item is considered closed.
3.8 (Ocen) Deviation (373/91019-05D; 374/91019-05D)
There was a lack of degraded voltage setpoint methodology.
In
response to the deviation, the licensee took immediate
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compensatory actions in October 1991, to ensure adequate voltages for the motors.
The licensee performed the system calculations,
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based on the existing conditions, and identified several 460V motors, motor operated valves (MOVs), heaters, and battery
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chargers with potential starting or running voltage concerns.
l The licensee stated that detailed analyses would be performed using the established setpoint methodology that would include all known instrument errors.
Necessary plant modifications would be l
initiated to correct the degraded voltage conditions.
The licensee was contemplating a Technical Specification (TS) change
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after completing the necessary plant changes.
Pending completion
of these actions, this item remains open.
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3.9 (Open) Unresolved Item (373/91019-06; 374/91019-06)
Degraded voltage setpoints and adequacy of voltage for the j
operation of ac equipment.
The licensee took immediate
compensatory measures in October 1991, to ensure adequate
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voltages for the equipment.
The licensee performed the system calculations, based on the existing conditions, and identified
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several 460V motors, MOVs, heaters, and battery chargers with potential starting or running voltage concerns.
To date, the licensee identified 18 motor control centers (MCCs) in Divisions i
2 and 3 on both units with inadequate voltages for their i
Several 120Vac distribution circuits (167 out of i
185) do have potential voltage concerns.
The licensee indicated i
that the problems would be resolved by detailed analysis and by completing the necessary plant modifications.
As a part of the
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corrective action, the licensee implemented a minor plant change j
to ensure that adequate voltage was available to the auxiliary j
relay coil of the starter circuit for HPCS valve 1E22-F004.
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team examined this change and had no concerns.
Pending'further corrective actions such as additional design changes and a
potential TS change, this_ item _ remains open.
3.10 (Closed) Violation (373/91019-07; 374/91019-07)
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The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the de-energization
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of the emergency busses in response to a loss of offsite power.
l Two contacts in the undervoltage trip logic (which automatically
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de-energize the emergency busses for each unit) had not been-terted since the first refueling outage.
These contacts are required to close in order to initiate the trip logic.
The relay coils and all other relay contacts had been tested every-18 months.
The licensee promptly tested these two contacts and verified the contacts functioned properly.
The licensee incorporated a test for these contacts to be performed at regular intervals.
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licensee also initiated a contact testing assurance program that will review system drawings and correlate each contact to a test to assure all contacts are tested.
This item is considered closed.
3.11 (Closed) Open Item (373/91019-08; 374/91019-08)
The licensee did not include the temperature, design and aging margins in battery sizing.
Particularly, the battery sizing calculation for the Unit 2, Division 2, 125Vdc battery _did not include a temperature margin of 19% for a battery room temperature of 50*F.
l During February 1992, the licensee replaced the Unit 2 battery with a larger sized battery.
The new battery sizing calculation
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included margins for temperature, design, and aging.
The team determined that adequate temperature margin was available for
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this battery for a temperature of 50*F.
This item is considered closed.
3.12 (Closed) Open Item (50-374/92008-04)
Excessive number of long standing temporary system changes I
(TSCs).
As a result of NRC concerns, the licensee created a TSC task force to reduce the number of TSCs.
The licensee made some progress in reducing the total number of TSCs for both units from
over 110 to 88 at the time of this inspection.
In addition, the
licensee developed plans for closure of each of the TSCs older
than 30 days.
Many of the older TSCs were in the process of being made permanent by the modification process.
Although the
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number of TSCs remained high, the tean concluded that further reduction would be achieved under the licensee program with continued management attention.
This item is considered closed.
3.13 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-373/91010-01; 50-374/91009-01)
l Offgas (OG) function deviated from UFSAR requirement without 10 j
CFR 50.59 evaluation.
The team determined that no safety
significance was associated with the omission to perform a 10 CFR
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50.59 safety evaluation for. establishing the limiting OG process j
flow.
The licensee selected 250 scfm as the highest OG process flow because the OG charcoal filter was designed for 300 scfm.
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l At high OG process flows, OG charcoal filter inoperability caused by moisture carryover would be detected immediately.
Radiation
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detection continuously monitored the OG system charcoal filter effectiveness.
To ensure OG detector operability, TS imposed strict administrative controls.
During this inspection, the team found no other instances where 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations were not performed when required.
This item is considered closed.
4.0 Introduction The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness of the engineering and technical support (E&TS) organization in the performance of routine and reactive site activities, including the identification and resolution of technical issues and problems.
This inspection focused on system engineering functions, modifications, temporary design change activitics, operability evaluations, equipment trending, technical problem resolution, and engineering support to other plant organizations for the following categories:
- Extent and quality of E&TS involvement in site activities.
- Self assessment and improvement initiatives.
- Extent and effectiveness of site E&TS communications.
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- Engineering's involvement in the corrective actions to the items identified during the EDSFI.
The criteria used to assess the E&TS performance was quality of
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technical work produced, understanding of plant design, and proactive involvement.
4.1 Extent and Ouality of E&TS Involvement in Site i
Activities 4.1.1 Modification Packaces The team concluded that the modification process was effective.
Design controls were adequate, safety evaluations per 10 CFR I
50.59 were complete and well documented, and post-modification (
testing was effective in testing the design of modifications.
With the exception of minor deficiencies listed below, no significant concerns were identified with the modification packages reviewed.
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Modification M-1-2-86-049:
The team determined that the l
licensee performed ineffective operator training on this modification.
This modification abandoned the high pressure core spray (HPCS) suction and return piping to/from the
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condensate storage tank (CST).
The full flow test valves in
the return line were disconnected electrically and the valve
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handwheels were removed from the valve operators and chained t
to their respective valve bodies.
The HPCS pump suction check valve from the CST was replaced by a spool piece and a blank
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i flange.
With some exceptions, operators believed they would be able to l
recover the HPCS suction to the CST during emergency operating.
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procedure (EOP) conditions.
This concept was reinforced because EOP-08, " Containment Flood," implied operators have
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permission to restore the CST suction to HPCS to allow for i
containment flooding.
The licensee had no procedure for restoring this suction path to operation.
Also the control room panel mimic line showing the CST suction to the HPCS pump on the control room panels was still in place, giving the
impression that the suction may still be available.
The team's review of the other modifications determined this particular training deficiency to be an isolated case.
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training department was able to demonstrate the mechanism by
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which modification material was incorporated into the lesson
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plans, which was viewed as effective.
The training material for this modification was in a lesson plan that had been
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presented to licensed operators and although the operators were not familiar with this modification, they were familiar with other modifications taught from the same lesson plan.
The licensee indicated that the reference to restore the CST suction to HPCS would be deleted in EOP-08 and additional training on this modification would be performed during the
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next requalification training.
The licensee would also consider-removing the control room panel mimic.
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licensee's proposed corrective actions, the team had no further concerns.
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Modification M01-0-90-001A:
The licensee performed an
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inadequate technical review of the modification's effect on DG instrumentation.
The modification replaced copper instrument i
tubing on the common
"0" DG with thicker walled stainless
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steel tubing and provided additional tubing support.
The thicker walled instrument tubing prevented an oil pressure
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switch from sensing the actual oil pressure within sufficient
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time to-prevent the EDG from tripping on low oil pressure.
The design error was disclosed during post-modification
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testing.
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As a result of the low oil pressure trip, the licensee I
replaced the thicker walled tubing with tubing of the original size on the
"O" DG and other DGs that had been'similarly
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modified.
However, before the tubing was changed on the "2B" DG, the DG tripped for the same reason.
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modification had been performed on the "2B" DG during the spring 1992 unit 2 outage and the DG had successfully passed surveillance tests until the trip.
The team determined that the trips were not safety significant l
because the low oil pressure trip is bypassed under accident i
conditions.
The team concurred with the licensee's corrective-l action and considered this example of a design error to be isolated.
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Modification M-1-1-87-095:
The team identified an installation weakness in that sufficient clearance was not maintained around installed piping and floor grating.
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modification added piping to the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system to allow the water leg pump to take a suction from the suppression pool and also added a test flow return line to the suppression pool.
Although the installed clearance was contrary to an installation drawing, the i
discrepancy had not been identified during quality control
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(QC) inspections or the post-modification walkdown.
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the clearance criteria was not associated with seismic or
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thermal expansion requirements, the team considered the installation discrepancy to be minor.
A work request was
generated to cut the grating to obtain the clearance required in the modification package.
The team had no further Concerns.
4.1.2 Temporary System Chances (TSCs)
I Licensee oversight in controlling the number of TSCs improved since previous NRC inspections and is discussed in Section 3.12.
CECO's corporate quality _ verification organization reviewed LAP 240-6, " Temporary System Changes," Pad determined that the existing documentation requirements coupled with the safety
evaluation screenings, were acceptable and sufficient to meet the QA program.
However, the team reviewed the same procedure and
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noted that design control documentation was not specified for
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required design input, design analyses, and design verification.
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Because little documentation was generated regarding the basis
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of engineering review was not readily apparent.
The following i
examples of documentation weaknesses were identified by the team:
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TSC 2-528-92:
This TSC revised an orifice for injection flow
to a recirculation pump seal without documenting a design
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basis for the flow change, the expected result, or the impact
of the change on the other flows in the system.
Post-l modification testing was also considered inadequate because of l
the lack of specific test requirements, acceptance criteria for flows, and documented results.
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TSC 2-651-92:
This TSC reset the recirculation pump tachometer controller for K2 relay actuation without documenting a basis for the new rpm setpoint or an assessment of the impact on the operation of the pump and low frequency motor generator set.
Post-modification testing was also considered inadequate because it did not verify the new setpoints.
By research and interviews, the team determined that the lack of documentation or post-modification testing did not result in any degradation of component or system.
This may have been due to the limited scope of the design changes involved, which the licensee's staff informally controlled, and/or undocumented engineering reviews.
The lack of documentation was also a-handicap to new system engineers.
The team noted an improvement in safety evaluation documentation in recent TSCs.
The improvement was a result of a July 1992 revision of procedure LAP 1200-13, " Safety Evaluations."
The revision required engineers to describe the effects and potential failures of a change.
4.2 Self-Assessment and Improvement Initiatives 4.2.1 Self-Assessment The team concluded that self-assessment of engineering activities
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was effective, performance based, and identified potential problem areas to management.
Self-assessment activities included i
quarterly plant monitor reports, also known as the " Windows" program, annual audits of technical services, and surveillances of contract engineering activities.
4.2.1.1 Windows Procram The " Windows" program provided a quarterly summary and trending of performance indicators.
The team concluded that the reports
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provided overall indication of performance and highlighted
changes in performance.
However, the-reports provided insufficient information to address specific problems because i
only limited analysis of the performance indicators was provided.
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The report identified some areas of concern that were also of concern to the team, such as the high number of TSCs.
The team considered the reports useful as a upper and mid-level management tool for detecting problem areas.
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4.2.1.2 Audits and Surveillances Annual audits cf technical services appeared to be adequate in scope and depth.
Improvement was noted in the 1992 audit from that of 1991 in terms of being more performance based and
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provided useful information-for licensee management.
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Licensee surveillances of contractor activities were also performed.
The effectiveness of the surveillances was demonstrated by a 1992 surveillance of architect engineer activities in which significant problems were identified with a
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contractor's work updating the instrument database.
The licensee's most significant finding concerned the lack of verification and inspection activities for collected data that
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resulted in inaccurate data.
Commitments for corrective action were required and follow-up surveillances of the contractor's work were planned.
The team concluded that the licensee's follow-up activities by the time of the inspection were appropriate.
l 4.2.2 Initiatives 4.2.2.1 Technical Review Committee
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The Technical Review Committee (TRC) meeting provided a forum for system engineers to brainstorm their projects.
For example, continuation of a project by an in-service inspection engineer to
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upgrade valves in the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leakage detection system was stopped, because the system was being considered for abandonment.
The TRC explored various problem solutions.
This process lent senior engineering experience to less experienced engineers and also provided a forum for
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l engineers to practice their presentation before the management's i
formal Station Review Committee (SMRC).
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4.2.2.2 Re-Evaluation of the Modification Process
A current major management effort to evaluate the_ modification
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process was in progress during this team inspection.
Senior
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licensee management directly tasked themselves to provide a l
critical review of the entire modification process.
For example, j
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modification process feedback forms.
Revision of the modification feedback process was within the planned modification task force scope.
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4.2.2.3 Exempt Chances i
In October 1992, the licensee introduced a new modification a
mechanism called an exempt change.
Exempt changes were used for modifications that did not change a system function.
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was to minimize the requirements for implementing these minor changes.
The team reviewed the controlling procedure and one exempt change package and determined that the package met
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regulatory requirements and was technically adequate.
Since few L
exempt changes had been performed, the team could not assess the
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program's impact on the modification or TSC backlog.
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System Encineer Mentor The system engineer mentor concept was an initiative LaSalle implemented to upgrade the experience and capability of system engineers.
Although no formal responsibilities had been assigned, management's perceived role of this position will be one of "model system engineer", an assistant in developing qualification criteria, and one-on-one mentor of newer system engineers.
The engineer selected for the position had 26 years of experience that included Dresden system engineering, training, and CECO corporate management.
The team considered the mentor concept a positive step in developing system engineers.
4.3 E&TS Oraanizational Structure and Responsibilities During this inspection, CECO implemented a site reorganization that focused on the physical addition of the corporate engineers to the LaSalle site.
Engineering groups at the site consisted of systems engineering, which was under the station manager; and modification design and station support engineering, which was under the site engineering and construction manager.
4.3.1 Systems Engineerina Responsibilities of the systems engineering section included providing day-to-day technical assistance to the station.
Responsibility for system modifications were eliminated, which allowed system engineers to focus on daily operations and maintenance priorities of the systems.
Based on the proposed systems engineering section responsibilities, management wanted more responsibility, accountability, and system ownership placed on the system engineer.
In order for this to happen, LaSalle had many challenges ahead in eliminating previous negatives such as: the perception that the position was for entry level engineers; assurance to operations and maintenance that the engineers were knowledgeable, capable, and responsible; and showing positive career paths within the section.
LaSalle management was developing action plans to address each of these challenges.
Experienced system engineers provided oversight to less experienced engineers for determining corrective actions in engineering investigation teams.
For example, in response to spurious initiations of the control room emergency makeup system, the experienced team lead engineer recognized that modification of the radiation detector on the component level coula affect control room habitability and sought corporate engineering support.
With a less experienced-group, the potential problem may not have been recognized.
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4,3.2 Site Enaineerina and Construction Site engineering and construction, using the modification design and the station support engineering sections was responsible and accountable for all design support engineering, modification engineering, and construction services to the station'. To the-
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extent possible, all plant specific design engineering for LaSalle station was performed on site.
Because the site E&TS reorganization was implemented during this inspection, the assessment of its effectiveness could not be determined.
The-team did, however, conclude that the addition of the corporate engineers to the site organization placed the management of station engineering on site and closer to.the staff-conducting the activities.
The organization changes were' viewed as a positive initiative.
4.4 Extent and Effectiveness of Site E&TS Communications 4.4.1 Site and Corporate Encineerina During the current engineering reorganization, the engineering staff consistently emphasized the-need to support plant operations.
To achieve this goal, corporate engineering staff provided generic and specialized support to the station..
For example, to satisfy a corporate criterion to monitor equipment performance, the LaSalle Station placed the thermography group into the systems engineering organization.
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The team noted many examples where corporate engineering applied s
their' specialized knowledge.at LaSalle.
System Material and Diagnostic (SMAD) personnel provided the expertise to install strain gauges to measure residual heat removal (RHR) valve hydraulic locking.
In another case, a SMAD fire protection engineer worked two days per week at the station with the fire protection system engineer.
Also, the System Operational Analysis Department (SOAD) supported computer hardware changes with the permanent presence of one of its staff at the station.
4.4.2 Enaineerina Support to Maintenance Both site and corporate engineering were actively establishing performance criteria to support maintenance activities to optimize engineering resources.
Corporate engineering specialists typically interacted with performance monitoring section personnel four or five times monthly at the station.
Examples where the performance monitoring group supported maintenance activities included:
the identification of a defective feedwater heater drain motor bearing; a nisaligned control rod drive (CRD) following an outage rebuild; and mounting damage to a motor driven reactor feedpump.
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Also, technical services initiated revising maintenance procedure LMP-GM-46, " Mechanical Equipment Alignment,"' Revision 2, to
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provide an option to use a laser to align pumps with pump motors
after maintenance.
-4.4.3 Encineerina Support to Operations
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The team determined that the engineering support to operations
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was good.
Interviews with operators indicated that engineering was supportive in solving system problems within a reasonable
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amount of time.
Engineers indicated that they were included in.
many operability determinations.
.5.0 Exit Meeting
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The team conducted an exit meeting on February 11, 1993, at the LaSalle County Station to discuss the major areas reviewed during.
,
the inspection, the strengths and weaknesses observed, and the
<
inspection results.
Licensee representatives and NRC personnel in attendance at this exit meeting are documented in Section 1.0 i
of this report.
The team also discussed the likely informational ~
content of the inspection report with regard to documents f
reviewed by the team during the inspection.
The liccnsee did not identify any documents or processes as proprietary.
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