IR 05000373/1993008
| ML20034H573 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1993 |
| From: | Louden P, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034H571 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-08, 50-373-93-8, 50-374-93-08, 50-374-93-8, NUDOCS 9303190021 | |
| Download: ML20034H573 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-373/93008(DRSS); 50-374/93008(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle County Station, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
February 22 through 26, 1993 3//o/93 Inspector:
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>r P. L. Louden Date Radiation Specialist
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Accompanying personnel:
J. Cameron Approved By:
t n 00 n s at 2A,s2 WilliamSnell,CIief Date Radiological Controls Section 2
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on February 22 throuah 26. 1993 (Reports No. 50-373/93008(DRSS):
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50-374/93008(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection of the licensee's radiation protection (RP) program (Inspection Procedures (IP) 83750 & 84750)' including external exposure controls, internal exposure controls, contamination controls, process and effluent radiation monitor calibrations, maintaining
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occupational exposures as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA), general station tours, and a review of previously identified inspection findings.
Results:
No violations of NRC requirements were identified. The inspector followed the investigation of potential problems associated with electronic
dosimetry calibrations (Section 3), and discussed improvements to the
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station's Engineering and Construction ALARA staff. The station's source term
reduction program has improved through the installation of cobalt sampling
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ports on Unit 2 and the creation of a cobalt valve database (Section 7),
however, source term reduction remains a challenge for the station.
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9303190021 930311 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted I
Licensee staff
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- D. Carlson, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator
- M. Depuydt, LaSalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- K. Francis, RadWaste Coordinator
- M. Friedmann, Technical Lead Health Physicist
- D. Hieggelke, Health Physics Services Supervisor
- J. Kerin, Senior Radiation Protection Technician
- J. Lockwood, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance
- P. Nottingh a, Supervisor, Chemistry Services
- M. Reed, Superintendent, Technical Services
- J. Terrones, Quality Verification Inspector i
Nuclear Requiatory Commission
- D. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Phillips, Resident Inspector The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel in various
departments in the course of the inspection.
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- Indicates those present at the exit meeting on February 26, 1993.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (84750)
(Closed) Inspection Followun Item 50-373/92018-02: 50-374/92018-02:
Discrepancies in fractional elemental Iodine values as used in offsite i
dose calculations and as described in the Offsite Dose Calculation -
Manual (0DCM). The computer calculations used a value of "1" for the.
fractional value, whereas, the ODCH stated that a value of "l/2" would be used which is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.109. The licensee stated that for conservatism the value they will use is
"1" and this discrepancy will be formally documented as an ODCM modification in the
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next annual operating report. This item is closed.
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External Exposure Controls (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed selected standing and special Radiation Work j
Permits (RWPs) for appropriateness of the radiation protection (RP)
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requirements based on work scope, location, and radiological conditions.
All RWPs reviewed' conveyed accurate information regarding radiological
information based on recent survey results and had undergone appropriate supervisory review.
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The inspector also observed during plant-tours that individuals in the radiologically controlled area were properly wearing primary and secondary dosimetry.
During the course of the inspection, information was received at the.
station regarding a potential problem with calibration factors used to read out the dose recorded by digital alarming dosimeters (DADS). The problem was first discovered at the Quad Cities station and individuals i
from the vendor dosimeter company visited Quad Cities, LaSalle, and
Braidwood stations during the week.
Information was also received of
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evaluations of the potential problem that were ongoing at Byron Station.
LaSalle dosimetry and technical staff initiated an investigation to determine if a problem existed at the station. The problem as i
understood at the end of the inspection was a problem with a new
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software revision when the DADS were calibrated in the " automatic
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dosimeter setup" mode. Any calibration' factors less than "256" were read out with errors of up to 100 percent.
LaSalle checked a sample of 130 DADS and the resulting review identified one dosimeter with a calibration factor error greater than 3 percent.
For a detailed
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description of the investigation at Byron Station see Inspection Report
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50-454/93003; 50-455/93003 (DRSS).
It was determined that the. problem i
experienced at Quad Cities was limited to that station since they were the only Commonwealth Edison site which attempted to use the new l
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software with the " automatic dosimeter setup" feature.
LaSalle Station appeared to not have encountered any dose recording problems as a result of this problem.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
4.
Internal Exposure Controls (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed storage and maintenance areas for respirators
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ready for issuance to plant personnel.
Respirators were stored to
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prevent deformation of the face seal and radiation protection j
technicians (RPTs) assigned to the issue desk had received appropriate i
training on the repair and testing of respirators.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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5.
Control of Contamination. Surveys, and Monitorino (IP 83750)
l The inspector reviewed calibration and operating procedures for the whole body friskers used when exiting the radiologically controlled area and the gamma ray portal monitors used at the gatehouse. The inspector observed the actual cal _ibration of one of the whole body friskers during the course of the review. Sources' used to establish the alarm setpoint i
for the whole body friskers were adequate to ensure an equivalent i
sensitivity of at least 5,000 dpm/100cm. Operability checks are performed daily to ensure proper functioning of each of the detector i
areas. A 10 microcurie cesium-137 and a 0.1 microcurie cobalt-60 source were used to calibrate the gamma ray portal monitors. A portable l
computer is used to determine efficiencies for various energy levels l
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which automatically adjusts the discriminator levels to match the
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desired sensitivity based on these curves. All calibration procedures
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and quality controls check records were in order and personnel
performing the calibrations were sufficiently knowledgeable of the operation of the monitoring equipment.
Personnel contamination events (PCEs) recorded year to date were 30 compared to a projected goal of 10 for the same time frame. The PCE
station goal for 1993 is 150 with one refueling outage to begin in the
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fall of 1993. Contaminated area continued to be recovered from the Unit i
1 outage.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors (IP 84750)
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The inspector reviewed calibration and source response data for process radiation monitors including liquid effluent monitors, service water
monitors, residual heat removal monitors, radioactive waste discharge j
monitors, component cooling water monitors, wide range offgas and vent
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stack monitors, and general area reactor building area monitors. All calibration records were found to be in order and appropriate radioactive sources were used to establish the required alarm set points.
Currently, the responsibility for radiation monitor calibrating and response checking is divided between the chemistry and RP departments.
The station is in the process of transferring all radiation monitor
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responsibilities to the RP department as individual monitors become due for calibration.
Full turnover of the program will take about eighteen months as each monitor progresses through its calibration cycle.
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No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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Maintainino Occupational Exposures ALARA (IP 837501 a.
Cobalt Sampling and Cobalt Valve Database
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The licensee has installed five sampling points in the Unit 2 condensate and feedwater systems to attempt to quantify the amount
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of cobalt contribution at the various locations within these
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systems. The points are located at the following locations:
Condensate polishing inlet Condensate polishing outlet Heater drains Feedwater suction Feedwater line prior to entering the vessel
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-Collection of the samples was to commence in March and-are to be
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analyzed by a vendor laboratory. The plan is to use the resultant
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information in conjunction with the valve database to help identify the leading contributors to the overall cobalt inventory within the reactor coolant system.
Results of this effort will be monitored-in future inspections.
The inspector attended a cobalt reduction meeting which addressed
the recently created cobalt valve database. -Cobalt containing
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valves were prioritized into categories ranging from "P1"
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(replacement of internals during next planned maintenance) to a lower priority in which feasibility studies would be performed to determine the overall cobalt contribution compared to. cost and availability of non-cobalt replacement parts. Discussions included conducting a review of available parts already in stores,
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and valves for which non-cobalt parts could not be obtained or
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were not recommended by the manufacturer. The current database presents condensate booster and feedwater valves as being those
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with the highest priority. However, it was noted that results y
from the cobalt sampling program may change the priority list if significant cobalt contributors are identified elsewhere in the system.
An inspection-followup item (IFI) is currently open (IFI 50-373/92012-01; 50-374/92012-01) which was initiated to follow
source term reduction (STR) efforts by the station. The station
did not have an aggressive STR program in place' and yearly. station
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exposure totals while trending down were still in the 1,000 person-rem range. The inspector noted at the exit meeting (Section 11) that the efforts the station had taken with respect to the cobalt sample points and valve database were progressive steps in the overall STR program. However, the IFI will remain open to monitor results of this specific program and other STR initiatives implemented by the station.
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Engineering and Construction (ENC) ALARA Activities The inspector met with ENC ALARA representatives from LaSalle
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Station, Quad Cities Station, and the corporate office to discuss the overall effort by Commonwealth Edison to increase job j
monitoring and ALARA initiatives for contractor activities.
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LaSalle Station enhanced'its station ALARA program prior to the fall 1992 Unit 1 outage with ALARA personnel assigned to the ENC group to facilitate activities, monitor contractor job performance, and act as liaison to the RP ALARA staff. The station has maintained one individual to continue to provide ALARA support during non-outage times. The plan is to utilize this individual's skills during design reviews and perform system i
walkdowns with design ~ engineers to ensure ALARA considerations are included at the early stages of work planning.
Discussions also-included the overall corporate effort and plans of similar.
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positions at other Commonwealth Edison stations.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Tours During the course of the inspection the inspector made several tours of the radiologically controlled area. During one tour, the inspector came j
upon a door on the 663' elevation of the turbine building that was
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standing open. The door was posted " Danger: High Radiation Area",
" Potential Airborne Radioactivity ~ Area". The inspector immediately
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called the RP shift supervisor (RPSS) to dispatch a technician to evaluate the situation and verify if the door should be locked, and if I
so, was the high radiation area door key checked out. An RPT was immediately sent to the area. A review of the key logs revealed that the key was accounted for and had not been checked out for many weeks.
Latest survey information indicated that certain areas within the room were greater than 1 R/hr and the door should have been secured. An RPT entered the room to verify nobody was inside and the door was secured.
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Followup conversations with RPSSs from the day and afternoon shifts indicated that they had received many door alarm notifications
throughout the day from the security office. Many of the high radiation I
area doors are tied into the security system computer and when alarms are received RP is notified to verify that the door is secure.
I Approximately 15 alarm indications were reported by security during the day shift, and an RPT was dispatched to followup on the alarms.
Only one door was discovered open during the day.
The door discovered by the
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inspector was linked to the security computer however, the key card reader had been disabled so that positive control would be ensured
through the use of a high radiation area key which for this particular
door can only be issued by a RPSS and an RPT is required for entry.
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The following day the inspector and the resident inspector held a meeting with security staff to discuss the operation of the security
computer.
During the time of the multiple alarms the previous day, one of the multiplexer units blew a fuse and caused what appeared to be erroneous door alarm indications. The system.is setup for doors to automatically lock if power is lost (" fail secure") but the possibility
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did exist that during this power surge that some doors could have i
received a " strike" and doors could have come open.
This possibility I
appeared to apply to the door discovered by the inspector for it opened
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inward and an appreciable differential pressure existed into the room.
It was speculated that if a " strike" was sent to the door the inward pressure would cause the door to come open and with the key card reader r
disconnected no alarm would have been received by the security office.
Based on these reviews it appeared to the inspector and the resident
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inspectors that the cause of the open doors was due to equipment failure and the issue was communicated to the regional Safeguards Section for
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followup.
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General housekeeping in the reactor and turbine buildings had improved following the Unit 1 outage, however the inspector did indicate at the exit meeting that the hot machine shop in the old service building warranted some attention.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Meetina The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee-representatives (Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26, 1993.
Licensee representatives did not identify any documents or processes reviewed during the inspection as proprietary.
Specific items discussed at the meeting were as follows:
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Source Term Reduction initiatives with respect to the cobalt
sample point program and the cobalt valve database Planned developments of the ENC ALARA program
General housekeeping observations
Closure of the IFI associated with inconsistencies in the
documenting of the elemental Iodine fraction used for effluent
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dose calculations
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