IR 05000370/1981017
| ML20032B433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1981 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B431 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-370-81-17, NUDOCS 8111050542 | |
| Download: ML20032B433 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
E REGION 11
o 131 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
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Report No. 50-370/81-17 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Docket No. 50-370 License No. CPPR-84 Inspection at McGu e site _near ChQtte, North Carolina
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Inspector:
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Approved by-J -- :^1
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Date Signed Enginee ing Inspect a Branch Engineering and Te nnical Inspection Division SUM, VARY Inspection on September 15-18, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 39 inspector-hours on s1te in the areas of reactor coolant pressure boundary piping: work activities observation, QA record review reactor coolant pressure pipe welding; Reactor vessel internals
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l work observation, QA record review; Safety related components - observation of
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work activities, QA record review; and folloup on licensee identified items.
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Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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f REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. T. Moore, Asst. project Manager
- J. W. Willis, Project QA Engineer
- E. B. Miller, Sr., QA Engineer M. S. Starnes, Sr., Construction Engineer G. B. Robinson, QA Engineer Mechanical / Welding W. M. Newton, Sr., QA Tech. Mechanical Jerry Goodman, QC Engineer Mechanical K. Davis, QC Technician Supervisor Mechanical
- W. R. Gillespie, Sr. QA Technician Welding Other licensee employees contacted included four craf tsmen.
- Attended exit in+.erview 2.
Exit Interview i
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 18, 1981, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-i tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.
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5.
Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e)
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(0 pen) Item 370/81-17-01: Rejectable Surface Indications on Personnel Airlocks On September 11, 1981 the licensee informed RII that certain unaccept-
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ablo linear indications (3/4" long) had been identified in vendor welds of the upper personnel airlocks.
The airlocks were manufactured by l
W. J. Wooley Company. The inspector observed subject airlocks and the
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indications in question.
Nonconformance reports (NCIR(s)) 13075 and 13084 have been issued and repair work was expected to begin shortly.
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In discussing this matter with the licensee's QA representatives the inspector noted that while both NCIR's were issued early in April of this year, the engineering evaluation and subsequent' notification as a possible 50.55(e) item did not materialize until early September or five months _ later.
In response.to this observation, the licensee stated that a recent revision in the procedure for handling such items had created a backlog of unprocessed NCIR's and it was believed these may have been a part of that backlog. Moreover the licensee stated this backlog has'now been cleared and assured the inspector that their investigation showed this matter was an isolated case.
The inspector stated that RII supervision would be briefed on the delay and failure to report within the specified time limit. Accordingly, this matter was identified as an unresolved item pending review of the licensee's evaluation report and review of field repair records. Unresolved item 370/81-17-01, "PT Indications on Personnel Airlock Welds."
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Plant Tour The-inspector conducted a general inspection of the auxiliary and reactor building to interview craft and QC personnel and observe pipe handling, storage, installation and weld consumable control. General housekeeping and cleanliness in and around work / storage areas were observed.
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Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping II - Observation of Work an'd Work Activities Piping activities are controlled by ASME Section III 1971 including Summer and Winter 1971 addenda together with applicable standards and QA approved procedures.
Several piping activities were selected, in order to test by direct observa-tion, evaluation of work performance, and record auditing whether work accomplishment was in accordance with Code requirements and SAR commitments.
Activities selected inci 'ded receipt inspection, storage, installation, identification and gene ; tion of pertinent quality records.,The systems /
components selected for this work effort were as follows:
Decay Heat (ND), (ISO-2ND-24)
Valve: #2ND57 __ 3/4" Kerotest Globe S/N AEX1-10 FLANGES: #2NDFE-Ht #HJ399 2ND24FL-1-Ht #B1476 90 Ell:
80" sch.20-Ht #RW-941835 on Weld # ND2FW24-2 Spools:
2NDP134-1-8"sch 40, Ht #8040849 2NDP135-1-8"sch 40, Ht #8040849
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Safety Injection (NI) (ISO-2NI-7,-12 and -181 Valves:
- 2NI658-10" Walworth Gate,1500#, S/N C55198
- 2NI173A-8" Walworth Gate,1500#, S/N C-55560 Reducer: #NI2F457-SN JBJZ 8" X 6" i-f
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For the above items, within these systems and the indicated activities, the inspector verified that the followinhg requirements, as applicable had been met:
QC inspections, record keeping, construction / installation testing, material issuance, utilization of qualified personnel.
In addition the inspector selected at random four pipe runs between major components /loca-tions within the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and by observation and drawing review ascertained whether field installation was consistent with applicable drawing / specification requirements.
The selected runs were as follows:
Safety Injection (NI)
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Elevation 732'-6", weld (Dwgs MC-244-09.21-00 Rev. 7)
- NI2F422 to Crane Wall penetration at 153 MC-244-09.21-01 Rev. 6)
Elevation 734, ISO NI-12
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Elevation 732.0" Weld
- NI2FW57-2 to 90 Elbow to Pipe weld #NI2FW52-12 Chemical Volume Control (NV) (NV)
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Fron penetration M347, (Dwg. #MC2414-22.43-00 Rev.14)
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761'-6" to Elevation 755'-10 ".
Decay Heat (ND)
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From weld 2NI173A at elevation (Dwg #MC-2414-04-4200)
736'1C" to Flange 2NDFE5180 elevation 741'-0" Also from the aforementioned system the inspector picked at, random NDE records (RT reader sheets and PT reports) related to pipe spools and com-ponents (valves) and radiographs of welds and reviewed them in order to ascertain whether the following requirements had been met.
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performance of prescribed NDE b.
calibration and use of proper measuring and test equipment c.
qualification of NDE personnel Selected components were identified earlier in this paragraph. Radiographs selected for review were as follows:
i WELD #
SIZE SYSTEM NI2F-418 8" X.906" Safety Injection NI2F-420 8" X.906" Safety Injection ND2FW24-5 8" X.250" Decay Heat ND2FW24-15 8" X.250" Decay Heat Within the areas inspected no violation or deviations were identified.
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8.
Safety Related Piping - Review of Quality Records Records of QA/QC activities are controlled by requirements / codes identified in paragraph 7 above.
Hydrostatic testing of the safety injection system was performed under requirements of the applicable code and procedures H-1 Revision 12 " Pressure Testing" and CP-715 " Hydrostatic Test Procedure for Unit-2 Safety Injection System," Section 6.16 Elevation 732'.
The boundary of the tested pipe system appeared on flow diagram #2562-2.0, Rev. 5.
The inspector reviewed related records to ascertain whether pressures, temperature and time were consistant with code / specifications requirements. The test was conducted on March 6,1981 and the results accepted by the cognizant engineer on April 7, 1981.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Welding) - Work Observation At the time of this inspection, welding activity involvinc pressure boundary piping included weld repair (s) and modifications. The latter involved 14" isolation valve No. 2ND1 which was being cut out and respositioned (turned 90 ).
In addition certain pipe T(s) in the safety injection system were being cut out and repositicned. Welds invovled in this me>dification were as follows:
WELD #
150 SIZE ND2F-1 2ND1 14" schedule 140 NC2FW22-17 2NC22 14" schedule 140
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NI2F533 2NI-17 10" dia. X 1" th.'ck NI2F534 2NI-17 10" dia. X 1" thick NI2F-477 2NI-15 6" dia X.719" thick NI2F-867 2NI-15 6" dia X.719" thick NI2F-2747 2NI-17 6" dia X.719 thick
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For these cuts, the inspector observed the cutting operation and reviewed related QC records / forms used to document the cutting, weld preparation, cleanliness and fabrication. The repair activity involved the BIT nozzle on the cold leg of the reactor coolant (NC) loop C(3-5). At the time of this inspection the joint had been cut, weld built-up and was undergoing grinding to remove a surface defect from the build-up weld metal prior to weld prepping.
The inspector reviewed nonconformance item report (NCI) 13646 Westinghouse (W) repair procedure FDR-DBPM which had been approved by DPC on September 8,1981, liquid penetrant inspection reports, welder qualification records and the applicable field weld data sh:et (L-231 Rev. 7).
Filier metal quality records, as well as weld cards (M-4A) and detail procedure control sheet (F-9B) were reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Reactor Vessel Internals - Observation of Work Activities At the time of this inspection the reactor vessel internals were assembled and stored inside the refueling canal area elevation 736', which has been designated storage level zone IV.
Zone IV prohibits food, drink, etc.
Inspection and storage requirements are etablished by DPC's-Storage Inspection Procedure P-3 Rev. 12. The inspector observed stcrage condition and reviewed storage inspection records.
Within the areas inspected no violation or deviations were identified.
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Reactor Vessel Internals - Review of Quality Records Reactor vessel internals quality records selected at random and other-
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records including receipt inspection and storage records were reviewed to ascertain conformance with established procedures and to determine whether work accomplishment was consistent with applicable procedural requirements.
Applicable procedures irmlude P-1, " Receipt Inspection" and P-3, " Storage".
Receipt inspection was documented on form P-1A.
Quality records revicwed included (W) quv11ty releases SQR-21631, 21033 and 21621.
Within the areas inspected no violation or deviations were identified.
12.
Safety Related Components I-Review of Quality Records Quality related work and inspection (QC) records of selected components within and outside the pressure boundary were reviewed to ascertain whether these records were in conformance with established procedures and reflected work accomplishment consistent with applicable NRC and code requirements.
The components selected were as follows:
COMPONENT SERIAL _ NUMBER Safety Injection Tank 2B 41618-72-2 Boron Injection Tank #2 B01 Baron Injection 21411-4 Recirculating Pump 2A Valve (RC pump seal 5895260 return isolation valve)-
2/NV/66A For these components areas of specific interest included storage inspec-tions, installation inspections, material and fabrication certifications /
test results. Nonconforming item reports 13248 and 12345 were reviewed for completeness, timeliness of disposition, accuracy and compliance with
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procedural requirements. Records of audits performed during the first and second quarters of 1981 and implemented under the requirements of p ocedure M-9 " Mechanical Installation Alignment", were reviewed to ascertain whether they reflected specified scope and frequency, thoroughness, timeliness of corrective action and ideatified deficiencies, followup on corrective action, repetitiveness of deficiencies and qualification of auditors.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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