IR 05000369/2015008

NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000369/2015008 and 05000370/2015008

ML16021A133
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	01/19/2016
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To:	Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2015008
Download: ML16021A133 (25)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 19, 2016

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2015008 AND 05000370/2015008

Dear Mr. Capps:

On December 10, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, public Inspections, Exemptions, Request for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Document Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov./reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000369/2015008, 05000370/2015008 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report Nos.: 05000369/2015008 and 05000370/2015008 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: November 16 - 20, 2015 (Week 1)

December 7 - 11, 2015 (Week 2)

Inspectors: P. Braaten, Reactor Inspector J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector R. Fanner, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000369/2015-008, 05000370/2015-008; 11/16/2015 - 11/20/2015 and 12/7/2015 -

12/11/2015; McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial).

This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of four regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,

Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP) dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,

Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8. This action was not translated to of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45. This item was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as action requests (ARs) 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee initiated a procedure change to incorporate the missing action.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event (Task 1.4.5-B).

No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding did not represent current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.01)

Licensee Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection

This report documents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection (TFPI) of the McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Units 1 and 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial),dated January 31, 2013. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of three risk-significant fire areas (FAs) to evaluate implementation of the McGuire Fire Protection Program (FPP). An additional objective was to review site specific implementation of one mitigating strategy from Section B.5.b of NRC Order EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures (commonly referred to as B.5.b), as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The sample FAs were chosen based on a review of available risk information as analyzed by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, a review of previous inspection results, plant walkdowns of FAs, consideration of relational characteristics of combustible material to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting a B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports (SERs), licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure by selecting a sample of four FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The FAs chosen were identified as follows:

1. FA 6 - Unit 1 B Emergency Diesel Generator RoomAB El. 736 2. FA 13 - Battery RoomAB El. 733 3. FA 15/17 - Unit 1 A Train Switchgear and Penetration RoomsAB El. 750 4. FA 21 - Aux Building El. 750 For each of the selected FAs, the team evaluated the licensees FPP against applicable NRC requirements and licensee design basis documents. Applicable licensing and design basis documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment to this report.

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees FPP referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 9; the licensees safe shutdown analysis (SSA); fire protection design basis document (DBD); plant procedures; piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs); electrical drawings; and other supporting documents. The team selected a sample of SSD systems to evaluate the licensees ability to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire. The team performed in-plant inspections to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the SSA. The team reviewed the licensees shutdown methodology to verify that it properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions for postulated fires resulting in shutdown from the main control room (MCR). The team focused their inspection activities on systems specified in the SSA for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, and decay heat removal; as well as process monitoring instrumentation and necessary support systems, such as the electrical power distribution system, service water and heating ventilation and air conditioning systems.

The team reviewed and walked down applicable sections of procedures AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire. The team reviewed and performed a walkthrough of procedure steps used for post-fire SSD to ensure the technical and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team verified the licensee personnel credited for performance of procedures were available in the event a fire occurred. The team also verified that the credited licensee personnel had procedures available, and were trained on implementation. The team reviewed operator actions to ensure these actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in a manner necessary to support the SSD method for the applicable fire zone.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in FA 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8, and this action was not translated to Enclosure 15 of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45, Plant Fire, Rev.

17.

Description:

McGuire calculation MCC-1435.00-00-0059, NFPA 805 - App R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis, Rev. 2, served as the current licensing basis for McGuire, and detailed the strategy and performance goals to achieve and maintain shutdown for each FA. Section 7.5.15 of this calculation summarized the shutdown analysis for FA 15/17. The calculation stated that reactor pressure control is achieved and maintained partially through a combination of both train A and B PORV and PORV block valves being in the closed position. PORV 1NC-34A and PORV isolation valve 1NC-33A are located in series, and if both of these valves are open, it would represent an open pressure relief path that could adversely affect operators ability to achieve and maintain SSD in the case of a fire.

11.7 of calculation MCC-1435.00-00-0059 indicated that, for a fire in FA 15/17, the A-train PORV and block valve were required to be closed to achieve hot standby. The attachment stated that cables 1NC522, 1NC525, and 1NC908 are located in FA 15/17 and a fire-induced short of these cables can cause a spurious opening of the 1NC-VA34A PORV.

Additionally, the attachment stated that cables 1NC520, 1NC537, and 1NC538 are also located in FA 15/17 and a fire-induced short of these cables can cause a spurious opening of the 1NC-33A PORV isolation valve. The assessment stated that this condition would be mitigated by removing DC power from PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, thereby failing the valve closed.

McGuire fire SSD procedure AP-45, Plant Fire, Rev. 17, is the governing procedure in effect during a plant fire. Enclosure 15 of AP-45, AB 750 1ETA/Electrical Pen Room Fire Unit 1 Actions, is the enclosure used for fire SSD due to a fire in FA 15/17. Step 3 of this enclosure directed operations personnel to close the pressurizer PORV isolation valves 1NC-33A and 1NC-31B from the control room. These steps are classified as time critical actions. No further actions are taken in this procedure to remove DC power from the PORV 1NC-34A to fail the valve closed. Additionally, the procedural step taken to close PORV isolation valve 1NC-33A is not adequate to ensure that the valve remains closed, because a fire induced short on cables 1NC520, 1NC537, and 1NC538 could cause the valve to spuriously re-open, as identified in 11.7 of calculation MCC-1435.00-00-0059.

Analysis:

The failure to completely and accurately translate the safe shutdown analysis to procedures was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

The finding was screened in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, which determined that an IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, review was required because the finding affected the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown conditions in case of a fire. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, the finding was assigned a moderate degradation rating because there were inconsistencies between the plants SSD analysis and SSD procedures. The team used step 1.4 Qualitative Screening Question Set for Seven Individual Categories, task 1.4.5 Post-fire safe-shutdown of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1 to determine the finding to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because operators would be able to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> based on an existing and bounding small-break loss of coolant accident analysis that showed adequate protection in the event of a spurious opening of a pressurizer PORV and associated PORV isolation valve.

The team determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement:

McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Unit 1 states that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities listed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Item 6.v of Appendix A lists Plant Fires as an activity that requires written procedures.

Contrary to the above, on November 16, 2015, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to provide adequate procedural guidance to ensure fire safe shutdown due to a fire in FA 15/17.

This violation has existed since December 2012. This item was entered into the CAP as ARs 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee planned to make necessary procedural changes to direct operators to fail PORV 1NC-34A closed. Because the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), and was entered into the licensees CAP, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000369/2015-008-01, Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures)

.02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs, the inspectors verified the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to observe material condition of the passive barriers and to identify degradation or nonconformances. The inspectors compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire endurance test data to assure that the respective fire barriers met the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G and Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensing bases documentation to verify that passive fire protection features met license commitments. A sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals were reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barriers were being properly inspected and maintained. Specific barriers reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs, the inspectors performed in-plant observations to verify the material condition and operational lineup of the fire water intake structure; the electric motor driven fire pumps; the fire protection water supply distribution piping including sprinklers, manual fire hose, and standpipe systems; and installed fire extinguishers. The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings and specifications to verify that the as-built configuration of fire suppression equipment was adequately maintained. Internal standpipe and hose stations, and heat and smoke detection systems were reviewed against specifications, drawings and engineering calculations to verify that the fire detection and suppression methods were appropriate for the types of fire hazards that existed in the FAs. The inspectors also verified that the suppression equipment met applicable NFPA standards. The inspectors reviewed completed surveillance testing and maintenance procedures to verify that the equipment was adequately maintained. The inspectors reviewed firefighting pre-plans to verify that the strategies were adequate. The inspectors observed the fire brigade staging and dress out areas to assess the condition of firefighting and smoke control equipment. In addition, the inspectors verified the capabilities of the fire brigade by reviewing staffing, qualification and training records. The Letters of Agreement and Memorandums of Understanding with off-site emergency responders were reviewed to verify the availability of additional resources to combat fires.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

04. Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated whether manual water-based firefighting activities or heat and smoke migration from fires within the selected FAs could adversely affect equipment credited for SSD, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, or adversely affect local operator actions required for SSD. Inspectors reviewed fire strategies (pre-fire plans); fire brigade training procedures; heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) drawings; and abnormal procedures for fires to verify that inter-area migration of water or the ventilation of heat and smoke were addressed and would not adversely affect SSD equipment or the performance of operator manual actions (OMAs).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

Methodology The licensee credited an alternative shutdown capability for a postulated fire in FA 13 (Battery Room) and FA 21 (Aux Building El. 750). The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 9.5.1, the McGuire FPP, and corresponding abnormal procedures to ensure that appropriate controls provided reasonable assurance that alternative shutdown equipment remained operable, available, and accessible when required. In cases where local OMAs were credited in lieu of cable protection of SSD components, the inspectors performed a walk-through of the procedures to verify that the OMAs were feasible. The inspectors reviewed applicable process and instrumentation diagrams to gain an understanding of credited equipments flow path and function. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee calculations to ensure the alternative shutdown methodology properly identified systems and components to achieve and maintain SSD for the FAs selected for review. Reviews also included verification that alternative shutdown could be accomplished with or without offsite power.

The team reviewed procedures, work orders and completed surveillances to verify that the alternative shutdown transfer capability was periodically tested. Additionally, the team reviewed electrical schematics and one line diagrams to ensure that the transfer of safe shutdown control functions to the alternate shutdown facility included sufficient instrumentation to safely shutdown the reactor.

Operational Implementation The inspectors reviewed procedure 1-AP-24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev. 33, to verify the adequacy of this procedure to mitigate a fire in the Battery Room or Aux Building El. 750. The inspectors reviewed selected training materials for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that training reinforced the shutdown methodology that is utilized in the FPP and abnormal procedures for FAs 13 and 21. The inspectors also reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.

The inspectors performed a walk-through of procedure steps with operations personnel to assess the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures and shutdown strategy to evaluate the ambient conditions, difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each OMA. The inspectors reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage. The inspectors reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.06 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees Appendix R design basis documentation, calculations, drawings, wiring diagrams, and applicable McGuire circuit breaker coordination curves for selected safe shutdown components to verify that fire damage to electrical circuits associated with the post-fire safe shutdown capability would not adversely affect achieving safe shutdown.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.07 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The team verified that portable radios and fixed emergency communications systems were available, adequate, and operable for the performance of the designated activities. The team reviewed that the electrical power supplies and cable routing for the wall mounted phone system would allow them to remain functional following a fire in the selected fire areas. Additionally the team verified that a fire would not affect communication equipment such as antennas, repeaters and transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.08 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed maintenance and design aspects of the fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting units (ELUs) required by the licensees approved FPP and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns of the post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs to observe the placement and coverage area of the ELUs throughout the selected FAs. The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of the ELUs to illuminate access and egress pathways, and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. The inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance procedures and completed surveillance tests to verify that adequate surveillance testing was in place. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed completed 8-hour discharge test records to verify the adequacy of the licensees three year battery replacement schedule.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the McGuire FPP and abnormal procedures to verify that the licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs after a fire event, assuming no offsite power was available. The inspectors verified that the fire damage repair procedures were current, adequate, and that repair parts and equipment were being stored and maintained onsite. The inspectors viewed the containers where cold shutdown fire damage repair equipment and tools were stored to examine the material condition of the tools and equipment.

The inspectors reviewed licensee inventory records to verify that repair parts and equipment were maintained in accordance with the applicable attachments in electrical preventive maintenance procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inventory inspection work order records and compared them to the equipment and tool lists to verify that all required replacement parts and equipment were being accounted for and were available for use.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g. detection and suppression systems and passive fire barriers) as well as hot work from cutting, welding and grinding activities. The team observed performance of a fire protection hot work activity in Fire Area 13 and compared it against the requirements posted on the hot work permit (MC-15-737 dated 11/17/2015). Fire watch personnel were interviewed for familiarity with job requirements and training records were verified as up to date and current with procedural requirements.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed eight modifications associated with the FPP to verify that changes were in accordance with the fire protection license condition and had no adverse effect on the ability to achieve SSD.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.12 Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of numerous plant areas that were important to reactor safety, including the selected FAs, to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in procedures AD-EG-ALL-1520, Control of Transient Fire Loads, AD-EG-ALL-1521, Hot Work Authorization and Portable Heater Control, and NSD-316, Fire Protection Impairment and Surveillance. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly evaluated transient fire hazards, controlled hot-work activities, and maintained general housekeeping consistent with administrative control procedures and the fire hazards analysis.

For the selected FAs, the inspectors evaluated the potential for fires and explosions, and potential fire severity.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed procedures to verify the adequacy of procedural guidance for the containment flooding with portable pump strategy. The team performed walkdowns to verify the feasibility of implementing the guidance provided in the procedures; and to verify that the apparatus required by the procedure, to include communication equipment, was adequately staged. The team reviewed records to verify that personnel were appropriately trained and to verify that appropriate preventive maintenance was performed on a recurring bases. The team reviewed a calculation to verify that the minimum required flow for the strategy was achievable.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed recent independent audits and evaluations to verify that the licensee was performing appropriate assessments of the FPP. In addition, a sample of fire protection nonconformances were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were identified, entered into, and resolved by the licensees corrective action program. The ARs were reviewed with regard to the adequacy of the evaluation, appropriateness of the proposed corrective actions, and the timeliness of implementing the corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On December 10, 2015, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. S. Capps and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the results. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Campellone, Appendix R/NFPA 805 Engineer

G. Carpenter, Fire Protection Engineer

J. Lukowski, Appendix R/NFPA 805 Engineer

B. Richards, Regulatory Affairs Lead

N. Sayles, Communications

P. Thompson, Operations

NRC Personnel

J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, DRS, Region II

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened and Closed

05000369, 370/2015-008-01 NCV Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures (Section 1R05.01)

LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer Report Section 1RO5.02- Passive Fire Barriers)

Fire Barriers Floors/Walls/Ceiling Description Identification Fire Wall DG1A to DG1B Floor Slab Auxiliary Bldg. El. 750 from Col 56 to 61 Fire Wall Electrical Pen. Room along Col. AA Floor Slab Electrical Pen. Room from Col. AA to DD Fire Wall Vital Battery Room along Col 53 and 59 Floor Slab Vital Battery Room from Col 53 to 59 Fire Door Identification Description 1XCDDF0704 Diesel Generator Room 1A 1XCDDF0701A Vital Battery Room 1XCDDF0603C Electrical Pen. Room 1XCDDF0801C Electrical Pen. Room 1XEXADF802 Electrical Pen. Room Fire Damper Identification Description 750-7.3.1 Electrical Pen Room 750-7.3.3 Electrical Pen. Room Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Description 736-5.1-1 Electrical Pen. Room (Wall)

750-13.1-1 Electrical Pen. Room (Wall)

750-15.0-2 Electrical Pen. Room (Floor)

750-26.1-2 Electrical Pen. Room (Wall)

LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED (Refer to Report Sections 1R05.01 / 1R05.03 / 1R05.05 / 1R05.06)

A, B, C Fire Pumps 2RN-174B 1NC-33A 1CA-18B 1NC-34A 1RN-162B 0RN-5B 0RN-148AC 1RN-70A 0RN-149A 1RN-69A 0RN-4AC 1RN-73A 0RN-5B 1RN-171B 1NC CR5900 1RN-174B 1NV-142B 2RN-162B 2RN-171B