IR 05000358/1979012

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IE Insp Rept 50-358/79-12 on 790425-27.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Properly Document Welding Insp
ML19259C630
Person / Time
Site: Zimmer
Issue date: 05/30/1979
From: Julie Hughes, Knop R, Vandel T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19259C628 List:
References
50-358-79-12, NUDOCS 7908070210
Download: ML19259C630 (17)


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U.S.fNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND EhTORCEMEh7

REGION III

Report No. 50-358/79-12,

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Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88

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Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name:

Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station

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Inspection At:

Zimmer Site, Moscow, Ohio Inspection Conducte Apri 25-2', 1979

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Inspectors:

T. E. Vandel

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H. S." Phi 11 E

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K. R.

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Approved By:

R. C. Kn p Ch Projects Secti3n Inspection Summary Inspection on April 25-27, 1979 (Report No. 50-358/79-12)

Areas Inspected: Follow up of previously identified noncompliance and unresolved matters; review of licensee auditing system; review of electrical and instrumentation activities in progress and related records; review of suppression pool modifications; review of contain-ment liner attachments; review of circulars, bulletins, and Part 50, 2l00 259

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Section 50.55(e) reports. The inspection involved a tots 1 of 89 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the twelve areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (deficiency - failure to properly docu-ment welding inspections).

e 2100 260-2-

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DETAILS

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Persons contacted Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E)

E. A. Borgmann, Vice President Engineering and Production

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  • B. K. Culver, Project Manager
  • R. P. Ehas, QA&S Engineer
  • G. E. Bennett, Construction Engineer
  • J. W. Haff, QA&S Engineer
  • D. C. Kramer, QA&S Engineer
  • W. W. Schwiers, Principal QA&S Engineer
  • J. F. Weissenberg, QA&S Engineer
  • R. L. Wood, QA&S Engineer Other Contractor Personnel Del Martin, Project Manager, Waldinger, Young and Bertke R. Turner, QA Manager, Henry J. Kaiser Company Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (358/78-09-05):

Instrument cable No. VY-710 was not installed in accordance with instruction KEI QACMI No. E-7, Revision 7.

The inspector reviewed data sheets for the instrument cables in question (157). Twenty-five percent of these cables were tested in accordance with Samual Moore's letter of January 9,1979, and the rest were tested in accordance with CG&E's Megger/Hi Pot Testing Procedure EC-1, Revision 2, to verify the shield integrity of the cables.

(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-07-04): Unapproved instrument cali-bration procedure used to calibrate instrument IPT-CM010. The inspector reviewed several (12) I&C procedures in the Instrument Shop. Non-approved procedures have been withdrawn and discarded.

(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-07-05): Calibration due dates for test equipment (instruments) had expired. The inspector reviewed several (8) calibration data sheets for test equipment and found them current. The inspector also observed the I&C's shop's test equipment storage room and determined that out of calibration instruments were stored in a " hold" cabinet and locked until sent out for calibration.

2100 261-3-

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(Ciosed) Unresolved Itetn (358/79-07-03): Use of non calibrated test gauge TQA-024. The inspector reviewed the licensee's, review of insuring that the test gauge was not used to calibrate other instruments.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (358/79-08-01): Licensee's nonconformance reports (NR) disposition " rework" or " repair" did not have specific instructions in accordance with Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)

No. 16.

The inspector reviewed several NR's written since March 23,

1979, and determined that the NR's disposition were being completed in accordance with procedures.

(Open) Unresolved Item (358/79-03-03): The integrity of the attach-ments of conduits carrying safety related cables to vertical and horizontal Containment Liner Leak Test Channels (CLLTC) was questioned during a previous inspection and the licensee agreed to obtain addi-tional information from S&L. During the current inspection, the RIII inspector accompanied by S&L design engineers surveyed the accessible attachments to the CLLTC. The inspector observed that attachments to the vertical CLLTC have been removed; instead, vertical channels welded to the horizontal CLLTC are being used to anchor conduits and hangers. S&L has compiled the design calculations ia a document dated March 19, 1979, tilted " Assessment of Containment Leak Test Channels" and have identified no adverse findings. This item is open pending further review.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (358/79-03-04):

It was previously reported that an evaluation on the Seismic Category 1 hangers attached to the Cantainment Liner Leak Test Channels (CLLTC) was not available.

During this inspection, the RIII inspector accompanied by S&L structural engineers verified that the locations of the various safety related hangers and conduits attached to the CLLTC inside the containment have been identified on relevant drawings and have been ew!uated.

S&L compiled the design calculations in a document dated March 19, 1979, titled " Assessment of Containment Leak Test u.aannels." This matter is open pending further review.

Othte Inspection Areas 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55(e) Review 1.

Diesel Generator Control Relays Failure of Potter and Brumfield type MDR rotary relays was experienced during routine construction te:: ting for diesel generator IDG01KC. The failures, contact failure due to excessive heat from current in excess of design values, were 2100 262-4-

considered to be generic to all thirty-seven of this type relay on each ef the three diesel generator control panels. Circuit design uodifications and relay replacements have been completed by the supplier with as built drawings provided. This matter is considered to be adequately corrected, and the inspector stated that he had no further questions.

2.

Diesel Engine Turbocharger Failures

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Failure of Turbocharger serial No. 76L3-1144 was reported as a Section 50.55(e) deficiency on December 30, 1978. The final report stated that the charger failed due to lubricating oil starvation. The inspector determined that corrective action included replacement of the three 16 cylinder diesels turbo-chargers, in addition to control wiring changes for the soak-back pumps to assure an adequate supply of lubricating oil for both the 12 cylinder and 16 cylinder diesel engines. Even though the modifications to the lube oil system was not complete at the time of the inspection, the inspector considered the matter adequately corrected and indicated that he had no further questions.

IE Circulars Review The inspector reviewed the licensee's file regarding IE Circulars and determined the action taken by the licensee regarding the information only circulars. The inspector indicated that he had no questions concerning the following listed circulars.

78-02 Proper Lube Oil for Terry Turbines 78-03 Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport 78-04 Installation Errors on Fire Doors 78-06 Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities 78-07 Damaged Components of a Bergin-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand 78-09 f.rching of GE Company Size 2 Contractors 78-11 Recirculations M-G Set Overspeed Stops 78-12 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending 78-13 Inoperability of Service Water Pumps 78-14 HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Holddown Bolting 78-15 Tilting Disc Check Valves Fail to Close 78-16 Limitorque Valve Actuators 78-17 Inadequate Guard Training / Qualifications 78-18 Cable Tray Fire Test 2100 263-5-

78-i9 Manual Override (Bypass) of Safety System Actuation Signals 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power 79-04 Loose Locking Nut in Limitorque Valve Operator (Staking)

a 2100 264-6-

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Section I P epared by K. R. Naidu Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief Engineering Support Section 1

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1.

Scope of Downcomer Modification in Suppression Pool The inspector reviewed the activities relative to the dowe..omer modification in the suppression pool. This modification o -

initiated to satisfy the loading condition of the second r y of the safety relief valves, a generic inadequacy identified :or Mark II containments. The modification consists of the following:

Removal of 13 rectangular sections of the suppression pool floor liner including slight excavation of the concrete base mat under the rectangular section; core boring to install and

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grout foundation bolts for the replacement support plates; welding of the support plate to the floor liner. The "T" quenchers designed by Kraft Werke Union (West Germany) and fabricated by Sargent Industries, California, will be installed on these supports. Kaiser is the cognizant contractor for the civil and mechanical work.

No noncompliances were identified during these observations.

However, a comprehensive NRC audit of this activity will occur during a subsequent inspection.

2.

Observation of Base Plate Installation The inspector observed the work activities in progress relative to the installation of the "T" quencher's support base plates.

The requirements for the base plates are specified in Section 5-5.6.1 of S&L Specification H-2174 and include special testing requirements such as Charpy "V" notch and Ultrasonic testing (where the design stress is in short transverse direction across the thickness). A Design Document Change (DDC) No.

SLS-351 datet February 1,1979, was issued to confinn that the base plates mast meet these additional requirements.

To date, 11 of the 13 baseplates have been set in place.

Tensioning of the grouted foundation bolt.s after a 7 day curing 2100 265-7-

period was in progress. The cognizant licensee personnel informed the inspector that the results met the acceptance criteria.

No items of noncompliance were identified during these observations. However, a comprehensive h3C RIII inspection of this activity is plarned for a future inspection.

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Section II Prepared by H. S. Phillips Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Section

1.

Plant Tour The RIII inspector visually inspected the reactor building on April 24, 1979 during an off-shift inspection. All areas of the reactor building were inspected except for the drywell area where radiography was in progress. The drywell and essential service water pump house were inspected on April 25,1 '9 during the day shift. Housekeeping observed was considered satisfactory and no storage problems were noted. The fol-lowing area was inspected in detail since an unsatisfactory condition was identified.

The inspector observed welding of a main steam line flailic; restraint assembly at El 554' inside the drywell as shown on Sargent & Lundy Drawing No. S-430, Assembly Detail 11.

The assembly configuration had been changed as a result of the approval of Design Document Change SLS-358. Field welding parameters for weld Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 were docu-mented; however, inspections to verify prope welding proce-dure, welder qualification, filler material, joint design and cleanliness, fitup and tack welds had not been documented and welding had proceeded even though the inspection was not docu-mented.

(358/79-12-01)

The finding is a noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station FSAR Chapter 17.0, paragraph 17.1.9; QA Manual Section 9.0 and Kaiser QA Manual Section 10.

The portable welding rod oven at this same work location was unplugged; however, E 7018 filler material was still hot. The welder explained that he had just brought the oven up to the location. The licensee committed to increase surveillance of filler material control. Therefore, the inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

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The design specification describing the restraint assembly, Sargent & Lundy Specification H-2174, R7 page 5-5-22, was reviewed to determine the functional requirements of the aluminum honeycomb used in the restraint assembly. The design specification adequately described the functional and perfor-mance requirements of the honeycomb. This area was reviewed because a worker questioned the use of aluminum honeycomb. The inspector had no further questions regarding the use of aluminum

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honeycomb.

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During the overall plant tour the inspector observed an isolated instance where welding rod / stubs were not in a stub bucket.

The licensee committed to increase surveillance and emphasize to workman that all material shall be placed in stub buckets.

Therefore, the inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the areas described above except as noted in the second paragraph.

2.

Procedures Reviewed The RIII inspector reviewed the following procedures:

CG&E QA Manual Procedures Nos. I and 18

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KEI QA Manual Section 19.0

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KEI Process Procedure No. 8.0

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3.

Review and Evaluation of Licensee QA Audit System A comprehensive review of the licensee and the licensee's con-tractor audit system was initiated. The following was reviewed:

CG&E QA Section Site and Vendor Audits a.

Audit Schedule

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Audit Report Log

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Auditor Qualifications

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Site Audit Nos. 178, 179, 180, 186, 188, 192, 197,

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202, 203, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, and 228.

Vendor Audit No. 78-04

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b.

U.S. Test Lah Audit of Licensee Management Audits had been performed to assess the status and adequacy of the licensee's QA program.

More specifically, tb2 CG&E QA&S Section was audited by a consultant since Criterion XVIII does not allow a group to audit itself.

Such audits had been conducted in 1976 and e

1977. The 1978 audit showed audit findi'gs to be open n

dating back to the 1976 audit. The inspector was unable

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to determine why these matters are still open; however, proper personnel will be contacted during a subsequent inspection to determine why corrective action was incomplete.

c.

Kaiser Engineers, Inc. (KEI) Audits The inspector reviewed the KEI audit log and interviewed KEI personnel regarding audit schedule, auditor qualifi-cation and corrective action replies due. Records were not reviewed in detail but will be reviewed during a sub-sequent visit.

The matters discrssed above are considered as unresolved matters pending completion of the system revie+ and evalu-ation during a subsequent inspection.

(358/7:-12-02, No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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Section III

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Prepared by J. Hughes Aeviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief Engineering Support Section 1

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1.

Instrumentation - Observation of Work Activities a.

The RIII inspector observed work performed relative to General Electric modifications on the reactor protection system (RPS) as follows:

(1) Field Design Disposition Report (FDDR) No. KN-1-552, Revision 0, for the leak detection alarm system in control cabinets 1H13-632 and 1H13-P642.

(2) FDDR KN-1-500 and 1-503, Revision 0, installation of fire barriers in control cabinet 1H13-P608.

(3) Design Disposition Change (DDC) E-2840, installed conduit for the lighting circuits in RPS cabinets 1H13-P609 and 1H13-P611.

(4) DDC E-2583 separation criteria of channels A and B, rod block monitor bypass switch relative to cabinet 1H13-P603.

b.

During the inspector's review he requested documentation relative to re-inspection of modifications made as a result of design changes initiated by General Electric and the Architech Engineer. The licensee's representative was unable to provide records to establish that re-inspections had been conducted as required.

It could not be determined if the re-inspections had been conducted but no records generated or if no re-inspections had been conducted.

This matter is considered unresolved pending further review.

(358/79-12-03)

The RIII inspector selected cables associated with randomly c.

selected instruments in ioder to verify proper termination, cable routing, i.e., correct lugs used, minimum bending radius not exceeded, cable identification tags installed, 2100 270

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and separati6n criteria maintained. The following cables and instrument racks were inspected:

Instrument Panel Cable System From H22-P073 LC721/D MSIV Leakage Control System To H13-P655

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From H22-P002 LD713/D Leak Detection System To H13-P632 No items of noncompliance were identified.

2.

Instrumentation - Review of Quality Records for Cable Temination a.

The inspector reviewed cable termination records for the cables mentioned in Paragraph 1(b). The following was determined:

(1) Termination drawings were current revisions.

(2) Calibration records for crimping tools were up to date.

(3) Correct materials were being used.

b.

The termination inspection records (CIP) included the following provisions and verification of inspection was evidenced by the KEI QA stamp.

(1) Current drawing revisions are used.

(2) Component name and location.

(3) Cable number and number of conductors.

(4) Crimping tool calibrated and serial number of tool used.

(5) Stripping of cable and correct lugs being used.

(6) Cable bundles properly secured and ceparated.

(7) Cable color codes current.

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(8) Inspectqr stamp and date of inspection.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Instrumentation - Review of Hydrostatic and Pneumatic Test Records The inspector reviewed nine hydrostatic test data sheets and five pneumatic test data sheets for instrument sensing lines.

The inspector determined that hydrostatic test procedure, KEI

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10-101 and pneumatic test procedure, KEI 10-103 was being adhered to.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4.

Other Areas Inspected - RHR Pump Motors The following is a chronological listing of IE, Licensee and manufacturer's actions concerning seismic qualification of the RHR pump motors.

a.

This matter was first identified during an inspection conducted October 5-7, 1977, and doc:mented as an unresolved matter in IE Inspection Report No. 358/77-13 (Tracking No. 77-13-01)

Note: This unresolved matter (77-13-01) concerns qualifi-cation of other NSSS equipment in addition to the seismic qualification of the RHR pump motors. However, for the purpose of this report only the question of seismic qualifi-cation of the RHR pump motors will be addressed.

b.

During an inspection conducted March 8-10, 1978, further review of site documentation for the RHR pump motors indi-cated that certain information on the GE Product Quality Certification (PQC) was at variance with the purchase orders, manufacturing specifications and assembly drawings governing this equipment. Additionally, no records were made available to show that these variances had been evaluated to verify that the equipment still met require-ments. This condition was documented in IE Inspection Report No. 358/78-08 as an item of noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII.

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(Tracking No. 78-08-01)

This item of noncompliance (78-08-01) was later withdrawn based on:

(1) information provided by GE in their letter 2100 272

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TEBZ-100-78 to CG&E dated May 19, 1978, (2) information provided by the licensee in his letter of response (QA953)

to IE Region III dated May 23, 1978, and (3) a commitment by CG&E to audit the GE QA program and to further inves-tigate those areas of concern identified by the Region III inspector.

Documentation of this action is contained in the NRC

Region III letter to CG&E dated June 22, 1978, the IE Inspection Report No. 358/78-29, and the report trans-mittal letter dated December 20, 1978.

c.

During the licensee's audit of the GE Nuclear Energy Division conducted on June 5-7, 1978, (CG&E Audit report No. 78-04) the CG&E auditors noted that the test reports presented to them as establishing the seismic and environ-mental qualification of the Zimmer RHR pump motors were not for the same type of motor as supplied to Zimmer. The licensee then requested GE to perform an engineering evaluation to compare the Zimmer type RHR pump motors with the GE BWR/6 type motor actually tested.

d.

On April 25, 1979, the RIII inspector observed that the RHR pump motors were being removed.

In response to ques-ticning, the licensee informed the inspector that the motors (3) did not meet the 1.5 gH seismic loading require-ment and that GE had issued a Field Disposition Instruction No. 95/63000 dated April 12, 1979, to correct this deficiency.

The inspector stated that failure of the motors to meet seismic requirements appeared to be a reportable matter pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 or 10 CFR 50.55(e) and questioned the licensee on why the NRC had not been notified. The licensee stated that it was GE's position that the failure to meet seismic requirements would not adversly effect RHR pump motor operability or reactor safety. The licensee added that GE's evaluation as to reportability of this matter would be requested and made available for IE Region III review. Subsequently, the GE evaluation GE letter to CG&E (CGE-1108) dated April 27, 1979, was transmitted to the Region III offices.

This matter is considered unresolved pending review of reportability and pump motor repairs.

(358/79-12-04)

2100 273

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Section IV

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Prepared by T. E. Vandel Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Section

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1.

Site Tour During a tour of the teactor building, it was noticed that the control room airconditioning compressor No. IVC 02CB had loose or missing mounting bolts on all four of its anchor pads.

In response to questioning, the inspector learned that this com-pressor is a seismically installed unit that has been released for operations use.

The inspector was unable to determine the inspection status of the equipment and therefore considered this to be an unresolved matter requiring follow up during future inspections.

(358/79-12-05)

In addition, the inspector was also unable to determine the inspection criteria, or where inspections had been completed for instrument air tubing installations for secondary contain-ment isolation damper No. IVG03YB. This is also considered to be an unresolved matter requiring follow up.

(358/79-12-06)

l_'n-esolved Items Unresolved items are ratt-rs about which more information is required in. order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section II, Paragraph 3;Section III, Paragraphs 1.b and 4; and Section IV, Paragraph 1.

Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 27, 1979. The inspectors summarized the scope of the inspec-tion and the resulting findings and the licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance identified in Appendix A of the letter to the licensee.

2100 274

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The inspectors additionally discussed the extent of environmental qualification reco:ds considered appropriate and for what equipment it is necessary to be available at the site for review.

Construction Status Meeting The Project Inspector and the Project Section Chief met with W. W. Schwiers and E. A. Borgmann on April 26, 1979, to discuss (1)

the status of construction, (2) communication channels between the

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licensee and the NRC, and (3) the need for timely handling and close out of outstanding inspection items.

2100 275

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