IR 05000358/1979023
| ML19208B352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1979 |
| From: | Knop R, Vandel T, Wescott H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B348 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-79-23, NUDOCS 7909200064 | |
| Download: ML19208B352 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/79-23
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Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name: W H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Zimmer Site, Moscow, Ohio Inspection Conducted: July-20 nd 24-25, 1979
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Inspectors:
T. E. Vandel
[-2 N
S cp e H. M. Wescott b.2 -7 i Rc&>
Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Chief 7-1 ~7 7 Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection conducted on July 17-20 and 24-25, 1979 (Report No. 50-358/79-23)
Areas Inspected: Follow up of previously identified noncompliance and unresolved matters; perform reviews and witness testing regarding matters and concerns presented to the ASLB bearing board by affidavits from concerned citizens. The inspection involved a total of 54 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E)
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C. A. Burgess, QA Electrical Engineer B. K. Culver, Project Manager R. P. Ehas, QA&S Engineer D. C. Kramer, QA&S Engineer J. R. Schott, Plant Superintendent W. W. Schwiers, Principal QA&S Engineer J. F. Weissenberg, QA&S Engineer Other Contractor Personnel E. V. Knox, Corporate QA Manager, Henry J. Kaiser Company (HJK)
R. Marshall, Project Manager, HJK R. E. Turner, Site QA Manager J. Sandlin, Assistant General Superintendent Construction, HJK F. Dewar, General Foreman, HJK Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (358/78-31-01): Aluminum plates coated with corrosion. The inspector reviewed QA Surveillance Report (QSAR) No. 553Q, dated February 2, 1978. These plates are identified as SFSR's 186, 188, 192, 198, 202, 205 and two racks not numbered. Also, the size of welds on the bottom of the racks could not be verified. Through discussion the inspector learned that the GE drawing 762E210, Rev. 4, called for the base casting to be welded with intermittent welds 3/8 inch by 4 inches long located top and bottom. Weld cracking was experienced. The require-ments were changed to 1/4 inch welds 25 inches long. This eliminated the cracking problem. ECN NE-44567 called for the weld symbol to be changed.
This was changed on drawing 762E210, Rev. 5.
Review of Rev. 5 established that the pictorial representation was not correct. A new Rev. 6 to drawing 762E210 for this correction and was accepted by the licensee as being the as welded condition. Reference Field Audit Report No. 221, dated July 17, 1979.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (358/79-07-01): The inspector observed X-ray film packages on the floor of the storage vault.
Inspection of the storage vault verified that X-ray film is being placed on a pallet.
In addition, X-ray film packages are being wrapped and secured.
(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-07-02): Welding electrodes and stubs found through-out the plant. The inspector reviewed the letter from H. J. Kaiser Company dated March 30, 1979, subject, NRC Inspection Report 79-07 discussing the search conducted through-out the site to locate and-2-zqh O (f
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retrieve all unused electrode and stubs. Review of records that indicated
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that twenty-two (22) welders had received training on May 14, 1979, and thirty-two (32) on May 17, 1979, in accordance with Kaiser Engineer Field Construction Procedure No. 1-19, Rev. O, dated May 17, 1979, " Nuclear Indoctrination and Training." Review of the above established that the licensee had taken the corrective action as stated in their response letter dated April 11, 1979 (QA-1122).
(Open) Noncompliance (358/79-12-01):
Inspections to verify correct weld procedure, welder qualification, filler material, joint design, cleanliness, fit-up, and tack welds not documented. The inspector reviewed documentation and found that corrective actions had not been completed, in that pipe whip restraint records had not been reviewed and a cepted by July 13, 1979, as stated in the licensee's response letter dated July 10, 1979 (QA-1161), to inspection report 50-358/79-12.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (358/79-14-04): Documentation did not certify that charcoal filters met the requirements of Specification H-2817, Paragraph 203.6.b.
The inspector reviewed CVI Penwalt Report No. CVI-TR-7301, Amendment 1, " Design and Development of the High Efficiency Charcoal Absorber and Its Application in ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems."
This Topical Report was accepted by Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, NRC Division of Technical Review on April 1, 1975.
The regulatory position was that the Topical Report is acceptable as a reference in license applications and meets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (358/79-14-20):
Incomplete documentation for solution annealing of material used in the recirculating loop piping.
This item remains open pending the licensee's retrieval of heat treatment records. Note: Report No. 50-358/79-14-20 was in error in that this report states that ".
. material was held in the oven for four and one
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half (4.5) hours." This should read one and one half (1.5) hours.
(Open) Unresolved Item (358/79-14-21): Definition of "Lof" in question.
Therefore, test samples not representative of materials used in the recirculating loop. This item remains unresolved pending resolution by the licensee.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (358/79-14-22): Documentation not available to establish that ring headers in the recirculating loop met the eight (8)
percent ovality requirements of Specification 21A9318, Revision 3, Paragraph 4.4.7.e.
This item remains open pending the licensee's retrieval of the documentation or taking the required measurements to verify compliance with the specification.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (358/79-14-23): Certification for veld filler material did not have results of physical tests. The inspector reviewed SA-358 which does not require physical tests when the weld material is not coated.
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.. Review of 50.55e Reports
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(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55e Report: Failure of an Anchor / Darling tilting disc check valve to close by gravity when installed in a veritcal line. The inspector reviewed Kaiser Nonconformance Report E-996 dated July 29, 1978, Kaiser weld data sheet line No. IE21F003. The check valve " dog" was tuilt-up with weld filler material (buttered) to prevent the disc from going beyond top dead center allowing the valve to close by gravity alone. This valve is mounted in line IE21F003 LPCI system pump discharge.
(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55e Report: HPCS minimum flow bypass valve failure.
The inspector review of the following correspondence:
1.
Review of GE letter dated October 16, 1978, (GEM-207) confirming GE's acceptance of repairs made to the subject minimum flow valve.
2.
Review of GE letter dated October 6, 1978, (CGE-1022) evaluation of the safety aspects of the HPCS minimum flow gate valve E22-F012 abnormally.
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Review GE letter dated February 7, 1979, (CGE-1071) followup of safety aspects of the HKS minimum flow gate valve abnormally.
(Open) 10 CFR 50.55e Report:
Overpressurization of the steam jet air ejector heat exchanger (tube side). The inspector established that a check valve has been installed as stated in the licensee's report dated March 2, 1979 (QA-1106). This item remains open pending further review by NRC RIII Operations Branch.
Functional Areas Inspected Rotating Screen At the request of the ASLB hearing board, the affidavit of William Gabriel, submitted to the board during the Zimmer hearings, was invest' gated.
Mr. James Sandlin, Assistant General Superintendent of Construccion, and Mr. Frank Dewar, General Forman, both of HJK, were contacted in this matter.
It was learned that Mr. Gabriel, badge number 59-0020, had worked as the millwright tool crib attendent for approximately two years and that Mr. Fred Imhoff was made a Temporary Forman for a'short period of time, however, neither are currently employed at the Zimmer site.
In response to questioning regarding the " drag line" identified in the affidavit, it was learned that it is the traveling screen installed in the intake structure at the Zimmer site. This screen is specified in Sargent and Lundy specification H-2237 (nonsafety related) and was supplied by Rexnard Envirex Incorporated, supplier of water screening equipment.
On page three of the Rexnard catalog and material parts lists it was found that 3/4" x 1 1/2" stainless cap screws are spelled out, 2 cap screws, with stainless lock washers, are used for mounting of each basket to the traveling chains. No other stainless material was listed. The-4-U 6C)
inspector understood that there is wear on the baskets from the catching g
of trash in the water on the bottom end of the rotating cycle and dumping the trash into a trash chute at the top of the cycle, and therefore the baskets have to be replaced after a period of time. The stainless cap screws are intended to facilitate this maintenance operation. With the aide of the General Foreman, a search was conducted of the millwright tool crib and storage areas for such cap screws. No screws were found, but several of the locking washers were found that the foreman said were left over from the installation. The traveling screens were observed by the inspector and the cap screws installed were checked. Four different cap screws at random were checked with a magnet and it was determined that they were stainless material. The inspector concluded that the correct cap screws had been used in the installation of the buckets.
Water Tight Doors The affidavit of Robert Anderson, presented to the ASLB hearing board during the prehearing conferences, regarding testing of water tight doors and frames was investigated during this inspection. This was reviewed during a previous inspection and was identified as an unresolved item requiring further review (50-358/79-14-24). Sargent and Lundy specification H-2174 requires in Section 8-1 E 7.lc the leak rate of the water tight doors shall not exceed two gallons / hour per foot of door periphery while the door is loaded with either the seating or unseating pressure, and that the test load applied over the entire door shall be 54.6 psi seating and 11.0 psi unseating.
The test report of a shop test on door No. 80 was reviewed.
The report recommended the following tests be done for all the installed doors at the site:
(1) Door closed seal leak test at 10 psi with no pressure drop in 10 minutes, (2) with seal volume pressure of 17 psi (1.5 times the unseating pressure of 11 psi) pressure decrease not to exceed 0.5 psi in ten minutes. A third test for the door frame was described but was not intended to be included in the tests for the door seal. The test is to apply 82 psi to the door frame (1.5 times the 54.6 psi seating pressure)
with no pressure loss in 15 minutes. Other documentation reviewed was as follows:
1.
Engineering field memo stating that the doors Mr. Anderson worked on were Nos. 80, 107, 116, 138, 146, 189, 236, 237, and 268 (a total of nine doors).
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NR No. E-7137 listing the original leaking condition of the embedded frames.
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DDC-1606 prescribing the repair action to be taken.
The inspector witnessed the final testing of doors with the following results.
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Doors tested are located in the lowest level of the Service Water Pump
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Door No.
Press.
Time at Press.
Leak Rate 234 10 psi 10 min.
O psi
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17 psi 12 min.
less than 0.25 psi 82 psi 15 min.
O psi 235 10 psi 10 min.
O psi 17 psi 12 min.
less than 0.25 psi 82 psi 15 min.
O psi 237 10 psi 10 min.
O psi 17 psi 10 min.
less than 0.25 psi 82 psi 15 min.
O psi Door number 236 was tested at 82 psi and found unacceptable. One pinhole leak was found between the angle iron door frame and epoxy sealer. Also one pinhole leak was found in a weldment. A nonconformance report will be issued and necessary repairs are to be made with follow-up leak testing to verify adequate repairs.
Note: The pressure gauge used for the 10 and 17 psi tests was a Trerice (RUH-26) 0-30 psi gauge 0.5 psi increment calibrations.
The gauge used for the 82 psi test was a Duragauge (TMT-018) 0-100 psi gauge 1.0 psi increment calibrations. Both gauges were calibrated on July 25, 1979, using an Ameter dead weight tester that had been certified by Ameter/
Mansfield and Green Laboratory to a maximum error of 0.03% of indicated reading in January 1978.
These pressure tests were conducted by the R. V. Harty Company division of Door-Man Manufacturing Company in accordance with their procedures 76H03-BM103, Field Final Acceptance Tests and 76H03-BM12A-BM12B-BM12C Field Scope Sheets.
The NRC inspector has concluded that these final tests are acceptable and no further action is contemplated.
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