IR 05000358/1979036
| ML19309F550 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1980 |
| From: | Maura F, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F547 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-79-36, NUDOCS 8004300022 | |
| Download: ML19309F550 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/79-36 Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee:
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 E. 4th Street Cincinnati, OH Facility Name: William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: William H. Simmer Site, Moscow, OH.
Inspection Conducted: November 14, 16, 1979, January 28-31, and February 1, 1980.
Inspector:
YM9C>
ApprovedBy:qJ.F.Streeter, Chief YE/b s,mw- -
Nuclear Support Section 1
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Inspection Summary Inspection on November 14, 15, 1979, January 28-31, and February 1,1980 (Report No. 50-356/79-36)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of Preoperational Test Pro-gram; previous unresolved items; preoperational test procedure review; licensee audits of the preoperational test program; and fuel inspection.
The inspection involved 47 inspector-hours on site and 7 inspector-hours at a licensee's consultant office by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted J. Schott, Station Superintendent P. King, Assistant Station Superintendent
- P. Hoffmeier, Technical Engineer
- S. Martin, Test Coordinator R. Link, Operations Supervisor J. Wald, Station Quality Engineer
- W. Craig, Assistant Station Quality Engineer
- M. May, General Electric Operation Manager T. Brown, Project Engineer, Wiss, Janney, Elstner and i
Associates, Inc.
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P. Linehan, Engineer, Wiss, Janney, Elstner and Associates, Inc.
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The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the administrative, operating, technical, and QA and S staff; and employees of the General Eiectric Company.
- Denotes those attending exit interview on February 1, 1980.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Unresolved item (358/78-05-01): Bent core support plate pins. The inspector reviewed the documentation relating to the replacement of core support pins in location #37, #91 and #92 per-formed during December 1979 and has determined that the new pins are acceptable.
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(Closed) Unresolved item (358/78-05-02): CRD housing alignment to core support plate. As a result of:
,a.
the results of the thin control rod qualification tests per-formed by the General Electric Company and b.
the licensee's commitment to perform CRD friction tests as noted in Paragraph 6 of this report.
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The inspector has determined that if any significant misalignment
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exists it will be noticed during the startup testing program.
3.
Preoperational Test Program
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l Startup Administra'tive Control Procedure Changes a.
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The inspector revipwed all changes to the startup Administrative Control Proceduresiapproved as of September 30, 1979, to ensure
the charges are in accordance with FSAR commitments.
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Changes to Startup Form 7.3, " Procedure Evaluation," increased t
the possibility that required changes to plant procedures, as a l
result of preoperational testing, will not be initiated. The licensee has agreed to deveJop a tracking system to ensure all recommended changes to plant procedures are properly disposi-tioned. This item remains open.
(378/79-36-01).
b.
Stop Work Order i
The inspector was informed that on January 7,1980, Stop Work Order #79-15 was issued halting all testing of essential systems turned over for preoperational testing and the turnover of essential systems to the Electric Production Department for preoperational testing. The basis for the Stop Work Order was the results of a QA and S audit of Henry J. Kaiser Company documentation regarding some systems which had been turned over. The audit showed that certifications provided by the Kaiser QA organization were not supported by a procedure which, when followed, would assure that construction inspection docu-mentation is complete, has been reviewed, is acceptable and is retrievable.
The inspector reviewed audit report #296 covering the area of electrical documentation on the DC distribution, low pressure and high pressure core spray systems, and the RCIC system.
The report noted that:
(1) none of the 48 construction inspection procedures (CIP's)
audited had been reviewed by the Kaiser QA Engineer.
(2) of the 116 cable pull cards audited (a) 86 were missing the Kaiser QA/QC signature.
(b) 78 did not have the electrical contractor's superin-tendent signature required to signify the pull is complete.
(c) 30 pull cards were missing from the QC file.
(d) 6 cards had a date which conflicted with the CIP.
The licensee stated a response from Kaiser is expected by February 27, 1980, at which time the Stop Work Order may be lifted.
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The inspector expressed concern regarding the status of the documentation of other safety-related systems and stated that the licensee should consider more in-depth audits to provide l
confidence in the condition of turned-over systems.
l This item remains open (378/79-36-02).
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4.
Review of Preoperational Test Procedures
The review of preoperational test procedure PO-PC-1C was incorrectly stated in Report No. 50-358/79-20 as having been satisfactorily completed. The following items remain to be resolved by the licensee before our review can be completed:
a.
in some cases it is impossible to determine the test boundaries and follow the test procedure with the drawings supplied.
b.
eliminate duplicate valve numbers.
c.
be able to demonstrate that for each valve to be water tested the water seal can be maintained for 30 days.
(Consider the loss of power to any of the 4.16 KV switchgear buses, the elevation of the penetration with respect to the source of water, and the allowable leakage rate through the penetrations).
d.
determine if the containment isolation valves meet the require-ment of FSAR paragraph 6.2.1.4.2.1.c.
The review of preoperational test procedure PO-PC-02, " Primary Con-tainment Integrated Leak Rate Test" is not complete, however initial comments given to the licensee included:
a.
ensure procedure includes all FSAR commitments (i.e. test ob-jectives, include addition of RBCCW and Cont. Vent. Chill Water penetration to Data Sheet 9.2)
b.
Specify in the verification test how the air mass is to be added and at what rate c.
specify in Section 5.10 the actcal nusy_t of sensors to be used and change the minimum from zero to three.
d.
clarify it. Section 6.2 the criteria for implementation of valve checks correct valve errors (i.e. step 7.5.3.1)
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f.
specify how MSIV's are to be eliminated from test and show whether MS drain penetration is affected.
g.
correct confusion on weighting factors used to calculate weighted containment temperature.
h.
include weighting factors in the calculation of the " average containment vapor pressure."
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e.
The inspector determined that the licensee's review (SRB) of preoper-
ational test procedure P0-PC-02 was superficial and failed to uncover any significant deficiencies in the procedure. The licensee was en-couraged to improve the review process.
The inspector met with representatives of Wiss, Janney, Elstner and Associates, Inc. to discuss their plans for the acquisition and reduction of data during the ILRT.
Present plans for instrument selection, calibration, data acquisition and reduction meet the requirements of ANS-N-274.
Final installation and calibration of sensors will be reviewed by the inspector prior to the performance of the ILRT.
5.
Fuel Inspection On November 16, 1979 the inspector verified that all 560 fuel ele-ments, received by the licensee during August and September 1979 had been inspected, channeled and were in storage.
No apparent damage to any of the fuel elements was observed.
6.
Startup Program Test Procedures As a result of the review of draft procedure EX.05.3, "CRD Friction Testing," and discussions held with the licensee during a previous inspection (Rpt. No. 50-358/79-20) the licensee has commited to do the following:
establish a new level 1 acceptance criteria requiring the dif-a.
ferential pressure during friction testing to be ff 115 psid.
b.
change the existing friction testing level 2 criteria to a level I criteria and add a requirement for a settling test if the differential pressure exceeds 85 psid.
modify the procedure to require friction testing at temperature c.
and pressure of all drives which exceed a differential pressure of 80 psid during cold testing.
7.
Relief Valves The licensee documented in Nonconformance Reports 80-2-E and 80-3-E the fact that a number of relief valves in ECCS systems have no seals and may have had their set pressure altered. During a recent hydro the licensee's Electric Production Department personnel were informed by a contractor foreman that the standard practice during hydros was not to gag the relief valves but to tighten the spring nut so the valve would not lift. During discussions with members of the licensee's Construction Department the inspector was informed they are initiating an investigation of this matter. The licensee stated that while it is true that no gags were received with the-5-
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relief valves the standard practice was to remove the relief valves (most of which are flanged) from the system during hydros.
The' inspector stated it is the licensee's responsibility to prove the valve settings have not been disturbed and that all safety / relief valves (with or without seals) will be considered suspect until proven otherwise.
This item remains open (378/79-36-03).
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on February 1, 1980. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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