IR 05000354/1980016

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IE Insp Repts 50-354/80-16 & 50-355/80-16 on 801006-1102. Noncompliance Noted:Safety Relief Valve Piping Supports Improperly Installed on Unit 1.No Noncompliance Identified During Unit 2 Insp
ML19350D489
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1980
From: Bateman W, Mattia J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19350D484 List:
References
50-354-80-16, 50-355-80-16, NUDOCS 8104160011
Download: ML19350D489 (9)


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O U.S. N'JCLEAR REGULATORY CO.vMISSICN

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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AliD ENFORCEMENT Region I

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50-354/80-16 Report No. 50-355/80-16 50-354 Docket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 License No. CPPR-121 Priority Category A

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Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Coc:cany 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hoce Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted: October 6 - November 2,1980

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W. H. Bateman, Resident Inspector

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M. C. Mattia, Chief, Projects Section (Acting)

/ca:e/signec Insoection Su=ary:

Unit.1 Inscection of October 6 - November 2 1930 (Recort No. 50-354/8_0-16):

y Areas __Insoected: Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector of work in progress including PDM vent line bellows repair, icwer biological shield sole plate welding, structural steel installation, backfill operations, pipe welding, equipment storage, equi; rent lifting and handling operations, rebar installati:n, concrete placement operations, upper biological shield inspection and painting activities, reactor vessel storage, preliminary preparations for reactor vessel placement, piping support installation, magnetic particle and ultrasonic testing

l activities on biological shield, and mechancial splicing of rebar. The inspector also made tours of the site on a regular basis, took physical ceasurements using

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vernier calipers, a UT thickness instrument, and fillet weld gauges, and reviewed

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l licensee action on previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> l

onsite by the resident inspector, 1 of which was spent offshift.

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Region I Form 12

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(Rev. April 77)

810.41600//

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Inspection Sumary

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Results: Of the seventeen areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identi-fied in sixteen areas and three items of noncompliance were identified in one area.

(Infractions - failure to correctly install safety relief valve piping supports as discussed in paragraph 3; failure to follow requirements to maintain cleanliness of safety related piping in the suppression chamber as discussed in paragraph 4; failure of the surveillance inspection program to identify and correct piping installation and cleanliness problems as described in paragraph 5.)

Unit 2 Inspection _of October 6 - November 2 1980 (Report No. 50-355/80-16):

Areas _ Inspected:

Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector of work in progress including rebar rebending activities, provisions being taken for long term storage, equipment maintenance, pre-concrete placement activities, and back-fill operations. The inspector also made site tours on a regular basis. The inspection involved 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> onsite by the resident inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)

A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer R. Bravo, Senior Construction Engineer D. Constantine, Construction Engineer R. Donges, Site QA Engineer A. E. Giardino, Project QA Engineer P. Kudless, Principal Construction Engineer A. Myer, Site QA Engineer R. Robinson, Site QA Engineer D. Skibinski, Site QA Engineer A. Smith, Project Construction Manager Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

E. Applegate, QC Engineer B. Bain, Lead Field Welding Engineer

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J. Gatewood, Lead Site QA Engineer T. Gohde, Field Civil Engineer R. Hanks, Civil Field Engineer R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer R. Hanselman, Field Welding Engineer C. Holod, Project QC Engineer M. Hopfenspirger, Civil QC Engineer D. Long, Project Superintendent R. Mackey, Resident Engineer

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M. Macondray, Assistant Project Field Engineer R. McCoy, Lead QC Engineer G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer D. Reel, QC Engineer R. Seraiva, Field Superintendent H. I. Valentine, Contract Administration S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer S. L. Wehn, Contract Administration P. Willis, Civil QC Engineer J. Windsor, Field Superintendent Pittsburgh -Des Moines Steel _ Company (PDM)

F. Annessi, Field Engineer D. Davis, Eastern Division QA Manager J. Mercuri, Project Engineer M. Stiger, Site QA Manager

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General Electric Insta_11ation and_Servig_es Engineering (GEI&SE)

R. Burke, Profedt Manager F. Hatmaker, Site QC Supervisor General Electric Nuclear Engineering Division (GENED)

J. Cockraft, Site Engineer C. Brinson, Site QA Manager Schneider, Inc.

W. Goebel, Site QA Manager G. Heinrichs. Corporate QA Supervisor J. Rush, Corporate QA Manager Briggs Engineering and Testing Co.

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G. Sharples, NDE Technician

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2.

SJteTour Daily tours of the site were made to observe the status of work and construction activities in progress. Work activity remains minimal on Unit 2.

The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel. Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliances with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Areas observed included:

Unit 1: Vent line bellows repair, backfill operations, rebar installation, storage and handling of equipment, structural steel installation, lower biological shield inspection and painting, concrete placement, and preparations for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) placement.

Unit 2: Storage of equipment, rebar bending, backfill operations, and preservation activities.

3.

Safety Related Pipe and Pine S_upport and Restraint Systems - Unit 1 Schneider, Inc. (SI) as a subcontractor to PDM, has the responsibility to install the safety related piping and supports inside the suppression chamber.

In NRC Inspection Report 80-10 the inspector asked the question in the form of an un-resolved item, whether the function of the vertical portion of the safety relief valve (SRV) piping support assemblies being installed by SI was to help carry the dead weight load of the SRV piping and act as a dynamic restraint or to simply act as a dynamic restraint and not support any dead weight load. (See 354/80-10-01; 355/80-10-01) From a subsequent telephone conversation and followup letter (PDM Letter No. CLB-152-2429 dated 10/3/80), the inspector was informed l

that the vertical portion of the SRV piping support should carry some dead weight

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l load. The inspector made a tour of the suppression chamber subsequent to receipt

of this information to verify that SI was installing the SRV piping supports such l

that the vertical support was functioning to carry some dead weight load.

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The inspector found that SI was incorrectly installing the SRV pipe supports:

the SRV piping was being uncontrollably cold sprung in the downward direction to establish a slope requirement stated on PDM erection drawings. This action resulted in the vertical support acting as a permanent rigid support to hold the SRV piping in a downward cold sprung condition rather than as a pemanent rigid support to support SRV piping dead weight load as was the original intention. The inspector notified licensee QA personnel of this problem and the licensee issued a Stop Work Order directing SI to cease activities on SRV piping installation until a thorough evaluation of the cold springing was completed and step-by-step in-stallation procedures for SRV piping and supports were established. Additionally, the inspector noted in two locations that the 10" SRV piping was rigged into place using a 6" spray header pipe as the support point for the rigging operation. The inspector stated that this type of rigging practice, i.e., rigging larger pipes from smaller pipes is not acceptable without prior evaluation and approval of the action by experienced personnel.

The failure to install SRV piping supports in accordance with approved drawings

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and correspondence generated to clarify drawing intent and use of rigging practices l

that demonstrate lack of good engineering practice is an item of noncompliance l

relative to Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.

(354/80-16-01)

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4.

Safety Related Piping _- Obs_ervation o_f Work _ and Work Activities - Unit 1 The inspector observed the condition of the s fety related piping stored and -

partially installed in the suppression chamber.

Schneider, Inc. (SI), a sub-contractor to PDM, is responsible for care during stcrage and installation of this pipe in accordance with their construct'..n procedure SICP 14.1, Rev. O, " House-keeping." This procedure was written as a result of a noncompliance identified in the February 1980 inspection report (80-02) and its intent was to specify particular actions to be taken by SI to ensure that pipe caps would remain in place on piping and that work areas would be kept clean. Contrary to the re-quirements in this procedure, the inspector observed that several stored and partially installed pipe spools were not capped, several support components were not properly resting on aunnage but were laying in water, a large suction pene-tration located at the bottom of the suppression chamber was uncovered, and an excessive amount of trash had accumulated on the bottom of the suppression chamber, the same area where some of the uncapped pipe spools and the open suction pene-tration are located. The licensee stated in ensuing discussions regarding this matter that the reason for the excessive trash buildup should be attributed to tne falling of trash from wood scaffolding during removal of the scaffolding tuo days prior to the inspector's identification of the problem and, therefore, did not represent an unnoticed gradual accumulation of trash on the bottom of the suppression chamber.

The failure to comply with the housekeeping requirements as stated in SICP 14.1, Rev. O is an item of noncompliance relative to Criterion XIII of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.

(354/80-16-02)

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Safety Related Pipe and Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Unit 1 Paragraphs 3 and 4 above discuss problems identified by the inspector that indicate a weakness in the SI QA/QC program which will be addressed in the Licensee's re-sponse to the NRC. However, the failure of the SI QA/QC program in these pro-blem areas should have been identified by the PDM and Bechtel QC surveillance

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inspection programs.

Paragraph 3.6.1 of Section IX, Rev. 1 of the Bechtel Construction Quality Control Manual states "Each contractor and subcontractor is responsible for controlling the quality of work perfomed by his subtier con-tractors." Paragraph 3.3.1 of this same document goes on to explain that Bechtel has a surveillance inspection requirement to ensure contractor and subcontractor activity is in accordance with contract documents.

Based on completed incorrect installation and continuing incorrect installation by SI of the SRV piping supports approximately 2h weeks after discussions be-tween the NRC, PDM, Bechtel, and the licensee to clarify the correct installation requirements and the recurrent lack of confomance by SI to contract requirements to cap piping spools, it is apparent that the QC surveillance programs of both PDM and Bechtel are not functioning to serve their purpose.

Failure of the Bechtel and PDM surveillance programs to identify serious installation errors and recurrent lack of protective covers on pipe spools is an item of noncompliance relative to Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.

(354/80-16-03)

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6.

Safety Rel_at_ed Components - Observation of Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 The' inspector identified a discrepancy involving the flow direction symbol and the valve internal construction symbol on 3" globe valve 1-BE-V031 in the Core Spray system. The valve internal construction symbol, which appears on the valve body casting, indicates that the valve is incorrectly installed, i.e., that the stem packing is on the high pressure side of the valve. Conversely, the flow direction arrow which also appears on the valve body casting under the internal construction symbol, indicates that the valve is correctly installed, i.e.,

the direction of flow through the valve is consistent with the direction of the arrow. This discrepancy is unresolved pending licensee disassembly of the valve to determine the actual installed condition.

(354/80-16-04)

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Licen_see Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (354/80-07-01): Failure to store the RHR and Core Spray pumps in accordance with technical manual instructions. GENED issued FDDR KT1-039 which addressed the discrepancies identified by the inspector. The re-sponse to the FDDR approved or modified the existing storage conditions.

Bechtel complied with the requirements of the FDDR.

Subsequent inspection of the pumps by the inspector verified that approved storage conditions are now in effect.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/80-07-07):

The use of prequalified AWS D1.1 weld procedure for a full penetration weld made at an angle less than 45 degrees. The licensee submitted Levinson Steel Company procedure "TCU48-GF Modified" to the inspector. This procedure was qualified in accordance with AWS D1.1 and, there-fere, the welding performed to this procedure, which qualifies full penetration welds of skewed T-joints from 35 degrees to 45 degrees, is acceptable.

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(Closed) Unresolved item (354/80-03-01): Resolution of NCR #664 to correct discrepancies between the as-built condition and DCN-4 regarding a column support for unit cooler 1AVH210. The inspector reviewed the closed NCR #664 to verify that all of the problems had been identified, dispositioned, and corrected. Additionally, the inspector observed the completed work for correctness and conformance to the as-built drawing.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/79-09-03; 355/79-08-03):

revision of storage and

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maintenance program so that routine maintenance activities are not inadvertently I

missed.

Bechtel revised paragraph 7.9.3 of SWP/P-14, Rev. 9, " Material Receipt,

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Storage, and Handling" to require that a " Maintenance Action Card" be issued manually to continue routine maintenance activities should the previous cycle's activities not be completed by the due date. This procedure also requires that a routine review of the " Maintenance Action Required List" be performed to identify potential problem areas.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/80-10-01; 355/80-10-01):

load carrying require-ments for SRV piping supports.

Based on a telephone call and followup letter from PDM (PDM Letter No. CLB-152-2429 dated 10/3/80) the inspector was informed of the load carrying requirements of the SRV piping supports.

See paragraph 3 of this inspection report for noncompliance relating to this subject.

8.

Reactor Vessel Installation - Observation of Work and Work Activites - Unit 1 The following drawings were used to inspect the Control Rod Drive Housing Restraint Beams:

GE Dwg.10505163, Rev. 8, " Bracket-CRD Housing Restraint Beam"

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GE Dwg.105D5204, Rev.1, " Beam-CRD Housing Restraint Beam"

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GE Dwg. 10505203, Rev. 1, " Seam-CRD Housing Restraint Beam"

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In particular the inspector confirmed that actual dimensions c9nformed to drawing dimensions and that welds were correct in size and shape and were free of defects.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

9.

Structural Concrete - Observation of Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 The inspector observed portions of the following concrete pours:

9F-F-S009,10,905, and 906 Diesel Generator Slabs at elevation 102' South

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Radwaste Walls from elev.102' to various elevations up to elev.132'.

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9D-I-W021,022,023

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90-I-W003/009

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The inspector verified that preplacement activities were completed prior to re-lease of the placement, adequate QC personnel were present, adequate craft per-sonnel were present with sufficient equipment to properly place the concrete,

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and that curing of the concrete was performed. Additionally, the inspector ob-served concrete test lab and batch plant operations to ensure that the required tests were performed including determination of air content, temperature, and slump of concrete, that concrete test cylinders were taken and stored in the proper location, and that batch plant tickets were accurately issued with each truck load of concrete. Field engineering personnel were also interviewed to determine their understanding of the pre-planned methods to avoid problems in areas of dense rebar and areas of difficult accessibility.

Ne items of noncanpliance were identified.

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10. Structural Concrete - Rebar Activities - Units 1 and 2 The inspector witnessed various rebar activities including installation, mechanical splicing, and rebending. The rebending activities involved #9 rebar in the Unit 2 southeast reactor building rectangular wall at elevation 102 that was accidently cold bent when an attached curtain of rebar for the next elevation was blown over during a storm. The inspector reviewed rebar rebending requirements in Bechtel Specification C-112(Q), Rev. 4, " Placing Reinforcing Steel" to determine whether the rebending was in compliance with the specification requirements.

C-112(Q),

stated in paragraph 8.2 that bars #6 to #9 may be bent once and subsequently straightened provided bar is initially heated to between 1100 degrees F and 1200 degrees F.

Because the bars were initially bent cold the inspector questioned the validity of the rebending operation. The licensee informed the inspector that NCR #671 had been written and dispositioned to address this concern. The inspector reviewed NCR #671, which stated that the bars could be rebent but NDE of the bars in the area of the bend would have to be performed after the bending operation to ensure no defects. The inspector observed the straightening operation to verify that personnel were heating the bars within the required temperature range before rebending.

Mechanical splicing (cadwelding) of rebar was also observed for conformance to specification requirements.

In particular the cleanup, centering, drying, heating, firing, and identification of the completed splice were all verified to have been satisfactorily performed.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

11. Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance. An unresolved item identified during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.

12. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel on each Friday of +.his inspection report period. At these times the inspector summarized the scope and findings of that week's inspection activities.

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