IR 05000354/1980008
| ML19330B095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1980 |
| From: | Reynolds S, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330B094 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-80-08, 50-354-80-8, 50-355-80-08, 50-355-80-8, NUDOCS 8007300321 | |
| Download: ML19330B095 (8) | |
Text
___
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Regicn I
50-354/80-08 Report No.
50-355/80-08 50-354 Docket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 License No. CPPR-121 Priority Category A
--
Licensee:
Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted:
May 12-16, 1980 Inspectors: hbW _
Mgo S. D. Reyn&lds, Jr., Reactor Inspector date signed date signed date signed
- -
h/fk/fC Approved by:
-
4.. E. Tr#fpp, Chief, Engineering Support date signed Section #1, RC&ES Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 12-16, 1980 (Combined Report Nos. 50-354/80-08; 50-355/80-08)
Areas Inspected: Unannounced inspection by a regional based insnector to review welding material control, witness reactor vessel nozzle / safe end field change welding, and inspect and review safety related pipe welding.
The inspection involved 32 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results: No areas of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
800730037/
-
__
.-
._
-
.
.
DETAILS
,
1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric & Gas'(PSE&G)
- A. Barnabei, QA Engineer
- A. Giardino, Project QA Engineer
- M. LaVecchia, QA Coordinator Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- R. Hanks, Project Construction QC Engineer N. Wypych, Lead Piping QC Engineer D. Schell, Welding QC Engineer
'
A. Bryan, Assistant Project QC Engineer J. Viduras, Piping QC Engineer B. Bain, Field Welding Engineer C. Berner, Piping QC Engineer J. McFadden, QC Engineer L. Inabinette, Welding QC Engineer R. Iwanowski, Field Assistant (Weld Rod Attendant)
General Electric, Installation and Service Engineering Division (GEI&SE)
- C. Brinson, QA Engineer
- F. Eaton, QA Manager
- R. Winters, QA Specialist R. Burke, Site Project Manager D. George, Welding Engineer C. Clarke, Field Engineer J. Roberts, Welding Engineer V. Kenney, QA Supervisor (Acting)
GAPC0
,
,
R. James,. Welding Operator N. Nelson, Welding Operator
'
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
!
t
!
I
.
.
-
. -.
_
-
.,
_
_.
.
,
,
2.
Plant Tour (Units 1 & 2)
A general tour of Units 1 and 2 was made to observe the general house cleani.ng and operations underway to secure and maintain the erection site during the current labor problems and major layoff due to rescheduling.
Work in process to remove the damaged ventline bellows (between the drywell and supression chamber of Unit 1) was observed. The work in progress on the Unit 1 reactor vessel nozzle / safe end field modification was observed.
No areas of noncompliance were identified.
Other Safety-Related' Piping-Visual Examination of Welds The following completed field welds in piping outside the reactor coolant pressure boundry were visually examined and the quality records reviewed for conformance to the applicable codes, standards, specifications and licensee / contractor welding procedure requirements:
1-P-BD-003, FW4 (6"-RCIC)
1-P-BD-003,FW5(6"-RCIC)
1-P-BC-026,FW12(4"-RHR)
1-P-BC-023,FW2(18"-RHR)
1-P-BC-023,FW3(18"-RHR)
,
l l-P-BE-012, FW3 (16"-core spray)
1-P-BE-006, FW18 (14"-core spray)
1-P-BE-004, FW17 (16"-core spray)
The weld surface finish and appearance, transition between wall thickness variations (where applicable), weld reinforcement, finish grinding, surface irregularities, and welder stencil numbers were observed on the welds noted above. Weld buildup on the pipe by the piping spool piece vendor (Dravo)
was noted on the end of 1-P-BC-066-S13 on joint 1-P-BC-023, FW2.
Super-ficial wet corrosion on the bottom half of 1-P-BE-012 due to atmospheric condensation was noted and pointed out to the licensee.
l The quality records of the welds visually examinated were reviewed for
-
required inspections, records of weld quality, records of repair weld i
cycles (where applicable) and adequacy of the weld history packages. The welder stencil identification observed for the finish portion of the welds
-
!..
-
.
was compared with the welder identification in the weld history packages.
The Dravo weld history records were reviewed to correlate visually observed weld joint buildup with the records of the spool pieces.
No areas of noncompliance were noted.
4.
Reactor Coolant Loop Piping and Other Safety Related Piping - Welding Material Control Review A review was made of the Bechtel welding filler metal control system from initial purchase order, through receipt, inspection, warehouse storage, issuance to field welding filler metal issuance areas, color marking by issuance area, even storage at issuance area, and issuance of. filler metal requested on WR-6 form.
Bechtel filler metal procurement document WFMP-1, Rev.1, dated February 17, 1976 was reviewed for conformance to the ASME Code. Sample purchase orders for Arcos 3/32" E308L, Chemetron (Atom Arc) 5/32" E7018, and Sandvik 1/8" ER308L filler metals were reviewed for confomance to WFMP-1 and the ASME Code requirements. The storage area and security of warehouse TB2 was inspected.
(It was noted that the filler metals are temporarily not in a fenced-in area of the warehouse due to construction of a fire wall, but entrance to the warehouse and issuance of filler metals is adequately controlled. ) Bechtel filler metal control document WFMC-1 Rev. 4, dated February 17, 1976 was reviewed. The QC hold precedure, certification review, and visual inspection methods were reviewed. The FWE authorized MCR fcnn for withdrawal of filler metal from the warehouse and shipment to the issuance area was reviewed. The warehouse QC system where the heat numbers of filler metal issued to the issuance area are recorded was reviewed.
The Bechtel system for filler metal control assumes that all filler metals issued from the warehouse are certified and require no further recording of the heat numbers.
No heat number identification is indicated on the WR-6 form.
The GTAW end tag requirenents for 18" long filler metals was reviewed and observed as being acceptable.
The Wire Rod Issue Room on the turbine floor was inspected.
Currently Bechtel limits access to this area to those who obtain an approved issue slip signed by the FWE-All storage ovens inspected were over 250F. The Weld Rod Attendant receives signed and authorized WR-6 forms in the after-
'
noon and prepares for issuance the following morning.
No areas of noncompliance were identifie.
.
5.
Special Welding Applications - Review and Observation _of Reactor Veysel Nozzle / Safe End Field Modifications The automatic GTAW' procedures for the replacement of the safe ends on the recirculation nozzles was observed.
The nozzle replacement is in accord-ance with GE NED drawing 795E272/ECNNH05908 with the welding in accordance with HSCE 79-1-70. A tabulation of the work observed is as shown in the Table at the end of this portion of the report.
Discussions with GEI&SE and GE NED personnel indicated that the primary function of the F43 buttering and buttering thickness is to force the as welded HAZ sensitization to occur in the nickel rich area rather tha,n the austenitic material to mitigate IGSSC. The thickness of buttering in the root portion of the P8 safe end is the controlling factor for sensitization control.
GEI&SE has no effective control over this factor as they receive an " acceptable" buttered and finished machined safe end from Bechtel who received the safe end from GE NED. The thickness of the buttering on the remainder of the joint face on the P8 safe end has negligible effects on the sensitization /IGSCC problem and has no direct effect on the requirements for PWHT, but does have an effect on the weldability of the joint using automatic techniques. The NRC has requested the licensee to obtain weld history and QC documents on the buttere'd safe ends for review.
The inspector conducted surveillance inspection of the work in progress on the recirculation safe end to nozzle joints during the week indicated.
Joint fitup, consumable insert size and shape, consumable insert dimensional orientation with reference to the ID of the mating parts, tack welding of the safe end/ consumable insert / nozzle conjunction, and cleanliness of the joint were observed.
Discussions with the welding personnel indicated that autogenous GTA root pass welding that commenced after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of tack welding was less successful (more difficult) than welding conducted shortly after tack welding. The inspector noted that, when a joint was tacked welded near the end of the work day, the root pass was conducted on overtime to minimize root pass welding problems.
The inspector witnessed root pass autogenous welding of three joints. The oxygen content of the backing was checked by GAPC0 immediately prior to the start of the root-pass welding and during root pass welding. On the welds observed, the root pass welding commenced at the 6 o' clock position and stopped approximately at 12 o' clock.
Prior to completion of the second portion of the weld the start and stop of the first half root bead were l
~
l
.
.
.
wire brushed prior to starting the second half.
Two welding operator:: were One welder required to complete the root pass and subsequent second pass.
visually observed the ID weld bead characteristics and one welder visually observed the molten pool under the arc. The two welders orally communicated.
The welder observing the ID made minor electrical variable changes on the pendant and the welder on the 00 made minor adjustments to the tungsten location with reference to the center of the joint and to the oscillation A third operator checked the oxygen content of the backing gas.
width.
The weld joint dimensional characteristics required a compromise between the electrode stickout and gas cup size. Shorter electrode stickout to improve gas coverage would require a smaller cup size which would descrease gas shielding efficiency.
It was observed that minor incomplete consumption (melting and wetting of the ID) of the cunsumable insert at the beginning of the weld pass required localized autogenous rewelding of these portions of the weld bead in some joints.
Visual observation was made by ore welder of the ID of the root bead thermal effects during welding of the first filler pass to prevent overheating and burn through.
Backing gas is maintained until completion of the second filler pass.
Upon completion of the second filler pass a special weld joint axial alignment double dial gauge device is installed to control alignment within the 15 mil tolerance established by GE NED. Axial misalignment caused by differential shrinkage stress gradient effects is being rectified by controlling the starting position and the overlap on stop position parameters. The stop position orientation " pulls" (closes) the joint at this location.
It was observed that the weld joint (nozzle) axial location with respect to the reactor vessel creates differential gravity effects in the molten pool and consequently creates difficulty obtaining uniform control of the bead edge tie-in (wetting) characteristics.
In some cases an irregular bead edge is produced which requires localized blending.
Failure to remove the irregularities increases the possibility of linear indications on NDE examination of the first few weld beads.
The. inspector witnessed that solvent removal dye penetrant inspection is conducted on the OD and ID upon completion of the second filler pass.
Radiographic examination for information purposes is conducted following the PT of the second filler pass.
In the first few joints an additional RT examination is performed for information purposes when the joint is half completed.
It was noted that the weldability (or ease of welding) increases with succeeding beads due to the ability to decrease electrode stickout and improve gas coverage, and where the wider joint provides more tolerance for variations in welding parameter ~
.
.
As previously reported in 50-354/80-05, the detailed welding, parameters utilized are within the ranges pemitted in DWP 79-1-7W, but require con-tinuous monitoring and adjustment. Those parameters most normally adjusted are oscillation width, AVC arc length, anc: background current.
Trogd rate is not normally adjusted.
TABLE 5.1 PORTIONORN0ZZLEWELDSCOMPLETED(5/16/80)
Nozzle Tack Welded 2nd Ident Fitup Root Filler Pass Remainder of Joint N2A-30 5/8 5/8 C
Observed 3 passes, joint 40% complete N2D-120 5/7 5/7 C
N2E-150 5/15-O'
5/15-0
N2F-210 5/13-0 5/13-0 C
N2G-240 5/12 5/12-0
N2K-330 5/9 5/9 C
N2J-300 Setting up joint on 5/16 Code:
0 - observed operation c - operation complete No areas of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (80-05-01)" No welding information in HSCE 79-1-70 indicating technique and qualification of personnel conducting tack welding of the consumable insert."
The GEI&SE traveler document has been changed to indicate the tack welding operation.
GEI&SE Record of Welding Performance Test SS-1073-0035 (Rev 1) File #11.5.4 and 11.5.7 indicates that welders with the assigned numbers J0456 and N9027 performed the manual GTA tack welding of the consumable insert for the automatic perfomance test File #11.5.5 and 11.5.6.
The performance test met radiographic and dye penetrant requirements.
The first field weld joint completed (and all additional joints) will be radiographed and dye penetrant tested and accepted to ASME Code requirements.
This resolves Unresolved Item (80-05-01) by meeting the requirements of the Code (NB-4231.1) requiring qualified procedures and welders for tack weldin __
_
..
_
-
..
.
.
--
.
.
.
.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on May 16, 1980. The inspector sunrnarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
ef d fon, the NRC Resident Inspector, Mr. W. H. Bateman, attended the n
.
I r
,
$
)
-
-
- - - - - -
- -,
.. ~.
, _..,.
-..
-,c
- - -. -..