IR 05000346/1977034
| ML19322C259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1977 |
| From: | Knop R, Tambling T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C252 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR 50-346-77-34-01, 50-346-77-34-1, NUDOCS 8001160706 | |
| Download: ML19322C259 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0'011SS10N OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/77-34 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
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Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Tacility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted:
November 16-18, 30, and December I and 2,1977 A c 4r P
_lE /b//77 Inspectors:
T. N. Tambling Other Accompanying Personnel:
K. Connaughton
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Ad a/o/77 Approved by:
R. C. Knop, Chi f
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Reactor Projects Section 1 Inspection Surimary_
Inspection on November l_6-18, 30, December I and 2, 1977 (R,eport No.
!50-346/77-34);
j Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of surveillance
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testing, investigation and folicwup associated with Icss of offsite power on November 29, 1977, followup on unresolved items and indepen-dent inspection effort. The inspection involved 52.5 inspection-hours by one NRC inspector.
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Resul t s_:_
Of the areas inspected, no apparent itens of noncompliance
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were identified; one deviation was identified in one area.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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- T. Murray, Station Superintendent d
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Stalter, Technical Engineer
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B. Beyer, ?biotenance Engineer
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- W. Green, Administrative Coordinator dj
- C. Domeck, Nuclear Project Manager
- J. Lenardson, Manager, Quality Assurance Department
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- J. Buck, Operations Quality Assurance Manager
- C. Daft, Quality Control Supervisor
- T. Hart, Quality Control Engineer
- F. M111er, Nuclear System Engineer
- J. Lingerfelter, Nuclear and Performance Engineer The inspector also talked with an interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical, engi.neering and operations staff.
- Denotes these attending exit interviews.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspe_c, tion Findings (Open) Unresolved Item (50-346/77-32):
Black oily material
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dripping from a cable penetration in the cable spreading room.
The inspector reviewed the IIcensee investigation performed to date.
Based upon this investigation it appears that this was an isolated case and that the integrity of the seal was intact and within the required design specifications.
Samples of the material had been submitted to Dew Chemical Company for analysis.
This item will remain open pending results of the analysis.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/77-32):
Failure to keep pressure boundary door between the two auxfif ary feedwater rooms closed.
The If censee was cited for a deviation of a FSAR commitment.
(Paragraph 3)
3.
Surveillance Testing The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance testing of components or equipment associated with safety related systems or components to determine if the surveillance program was
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in accordance with approved procedures. Within this review an
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selected surveillance procedures were examined for program
review and approval, technical content, acceptance criteria,
to service and operational checks prior to returning equipment f requency of perforr.ance. The performance of selected surveil-Iance tests were witnessed by the inspector.
The specific areas covered were:
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Incore Instrument Channel Calibration
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Channel Functional Test of the Reactor Trip Module Logic
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and Control Rod Drive Trip Breaker
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Reactor Coolant Syst em Leakage
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Containment Spray System
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Diesel Generator
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In a discussion with a representative of the If censee concerning calibration of the incore detector it was noted that the licensee was not using the background wire in a detector string to correct the reading of the individual detectors.
The description of the
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incore detectors referenced in the PSAR (B and W topical report BAW-1001) specifically references the use of the background wire to compensate detector readouts for load wire ef fects.
The licensee stcted that the design of detector strings used at Davis-Besse had been changed such that background compensation was no longer needed. Documentation and review of these design changes were not immediately available for review.
This item is consid-ered unresolved pending the review of the licensee's documentation.
On page 3-34r of the FSAR in the description of Rooms 237 and 238 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms).
The FSAR states in part, "In
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order to prevent loss of both auxiliary feed pump turbine units, a wall was constructed between the units with an interconnecting pressure door."
During the witnessing of the Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump (AFP) surveillance test, the inspector found on entrance to AFP 1-2 room that the interconnecting door was open. During a pre-vious tour of the facility on October 27, 1977, the door was found i n open also (Inspection Report 50-346/77-32).
Failure to keep this
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door closed is considered, to be a deviation from a commitment in the FSAR.
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Also as a result of witnessing AFP monthly surveillance t.ests, t
the inspector brought to the licensee's attention potential prob-lem areas. Tr. procedure called for a specific vibration mon-
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itoring inst rument.
Two types of instruments are currently used in the plant.
It was only after discussion with maintenance personnel that it was determined that both are calibrated to the same standard and are interchangeable.
It was also noted there were no base marks on the equipraent to insure that vibration measures are taken in the same point. These items were also dis-cussed during the exit in te rvi ew.
The licensee stated that the surveillance procedure would be revised to cover both types of
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vibration monitoring instrumentation.
4.
GrEanizational Changes _
The licensee informed the inspector that effective November 1, 1977, Mr. T. Murray had been appointed to the position of Station Superintendent.
Mr. Murray had served in the position as Assistant Station Superintendent.
The inspector verified that Mr. Murray meets the qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971.
5.
Reactor-lurbine Trip With Loss of offsite Power The inspector reviewed the circumstances,_ consequences.,and (.
corrective, action,taken for the reactorjand_turbinei.tripJthat
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occurrediNovember_29,1197.72at 2224 hours0.0257 days <br />0.618 hours <br />0.00368 weeks <br />8.46232e-4 months <br />.
Theilicensee; notified the inspector that the event was being reported under _the,re, quire--
.ments_of the Technical Specifications and a followup, report wouldj
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The reactor was at[45%[p[O prior to the ev,ent. _The first
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I indication of a problem was indication of a {dropirodjin group 7 wi th the[IfistTof "t1E' group"drNihEduT. The ihaAtor tripped on
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high nucl$af poGif'(Thi sef pois dAT it 50% power because the
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unit was in power ascension testing at the 40 power plateau).
j Following the emergencyiprocedures.for a reactor,and,. turbine
, trip,,theoperatormanuallytrippedJtheput}put; breakers}forthe
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[ main generatorjwhen they apparently did not automatic trip.
i This resulted in loss of AC pcuer to the 1.3.8 kv A_and B.. buses.
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,0n,1,oss,of_AC, power to A and B buses, the ifour reactoricoolant)
'pumpsltrippedjand the diesel generators start. After starting, one diesel generator tripped on overspeed.
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During the inspection, the licensee's investigation revealed
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,The powgr, spike that caused the reactor trip was,ge. tolaj a.
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[short;inithelpatch.paneljfor the reactimeter. The short
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fed _ajfalse: signs 1 1nto;the In _ _ _tegrated. Control;Syst_ ant.,
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p calling for increased ' power._ ;The; shortEsiso;gave indicap scion of.;a. dropped rod.j In the exit interview the Ifeensee stated that they were initiating action to check out all
future patch panels prior to insertion into logging system.
The If censee also confirmed that all safety related signals
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are buffered by isolation amplifiers.
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_TheklossTof offsite_pewerlvas.due in part to a(procedu'rej
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i Einadequacy_and operator; error l, A procedure modification to the emergency procedure has been made and operating personnel cade aware of the delay time in the main generator reverse power and antimotoring protective. circuits. lBadj
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,tbe1 operator 1' waited? there would have,been anlautomatic!
' switching ~of; AC p'ower; to.the;13.8, kv busesJ c.
The cause for the overspeed trip of the diesel generator could not be specifically identified by the ifcensee. However,
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several actions were taken to reduce the probability of recurrence. The trip set point was move to the top range of the scale.
The governor was turned to increase the response time to limit the speed overshoot on startup.
The Ifeensee stated that the same corrective active would be taken on the other diesel generator.
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The[tlieimilpressuretransient)associatedwiththeevent d.
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were" Feviewed.~
In th'e exit interview the inspector stated
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,that the, thermal-p ressure_t ransient mdsibe] reviewed } tol
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(show that it was, bounded.by a previou' sly ana.lyzed transientj
&before continuing operation!
On the inspector's refurn to
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Dlie~~of fiEe, ~the licensee called December 2,1977, to l
state that BW had completed their analysis of the transient
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and concluded that even though the actual transient varied j
some from the transients analyzed for loss of offsite power
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and/or Icss of reactor coolant pumps, it was adequately bounded by these transients., A review of the data also indicated that thekpressure-temperature coolde d limitsiof the Technical Specifications were notfexceeded" ~ '
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SFAS Analog Amplifier and Biatable Grounding Deficiency,
The inspector verified that final drawing revisions were received
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onsite to close out the licensee's 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) report g
along with previously reviewed corrective action. (Cicsed)
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Locked valves and_ Equipment f
The inspector informed the licensee of NRC's interpretation concerning locking devices required to meet Technical Specification
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The licensee currently,uses l
requirements or FSAR commitments.
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In the chain and padlocks and metal cables to lock valves.
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exit interview the inspector stated the metal cable locking
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device is not considered to be " tamper proof".
The licensee stated that they would provide a sealing device that would meet the interpretation.
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8.
Procedure Changes The Itcensee's administrative control for changes to facility 1805.00.
The inspector noted procedures is described in AD that this procedure does not specifically address the documentation required for change to procedures referenced in the FSAR as This was discussed required by Paragraph 50.59 of 10 CFR 50.
in the exit interview. The licensee stated that they would revise the procedure to clarify the intent.
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U_r. resolved Ite2n Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
One unresolved item discovered during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.
10.
Part 21 Report
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The licensee issued a Part 21 report on the cicsure of the
governor valve for the turbine to the auxiliary feedwater pump.-
The valve drifted closed due to vibration from the adjusting startup feedwater valve.
The inspector reviewed the modification made to the linkage between the turbine governor and the governor The licensee stated that a supple-recurrence.
valve to prevent mental Part 21 report was being written to describe this modifi-cation.
(Cicsed)
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Exit In t erviev
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inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Tha Paragraph 1) on November 18 and D.tcember 2,1977, to summarize i
the firidings of the inspection.
The licensee representatives
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made the following remarks in response to the items discussed
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by the inspector, d-November 18, 1977 i
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Acknowledged the statenent of the in.cr -c t ir with respect to tha apparent deviation of a FSAR c158 ccc
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(Paragraph 3)
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Stated that a sample of the oily material found in cable
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penetration load been sent to Dew Chemical Company.and that they re waitirg the results of the analysis.
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Acknowledge the inspector's observations during the witnessing
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of the AFP monthly surveillance test.
(Paragraph 3)
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Stated that they would provide the inspector with additional information on the incore detectors during a future inspec-tion.
(Paragraph 3)
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Acknowledged the inspector's comments concerning locked valves and equipment.
(Paragraph 7)
Acknowledged the inspector's comments concerning changes to procedures referenced in the FSAR.
(Paragraph 8)
December 2, 1977_
The inspector reviewed the events, evaluation and corrective actions taken by the licensee concerning the November 29, 1977 event.
The licensee acknowledged that the return to operation was predicated upon the bounding the associated pressure - temperature transient to previously analyzed transient.
(Paragraph 3)
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