IR 05000346/1977023
| ML19329B581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1977 |
| From: | Hayes D, Kohler J, Williams C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329B451 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-77-23, NUDOCS 8002050716 | |
| Download: ML19329B581 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAL'. REGill.ATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION Ill Report No. 50-346/77-23 Docket No. 50-346 Licen.se No. CPPR-80 Licensec:
Toledo Edison Company
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Edison Plaza
,'O Madison Avenue avledo, OH 43652 Facility Name:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted:
June 20-21 and 27-28, 1977 a
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7/dh/77 i
Inspectors:
C. C. W1'lliams /
J. E. Kohler
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D. W. H es (June 20-21, 1977, only)
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Approved by: D. Q. Hayes', C il$f 7 [2 P/?7 Projects Section Inspection Sum:urz Inspection on June 20-21 and 27-28, 1977 (Report No. 50-346/77-23)
Areas Inspected:
(1) corrective actions identified on Immediate Action Letter dated May 31, 1977, relative to penetration and blockout sealing in the plant; (') status of the emergency ventilation system turn-over package; (3) emetgency ventilation system (EVS) specification change; (4) EVS Inc.ci o:aet. r change ; (5) centrol room ventilation test; (5) con-figuration -(ctatus of. aals) of negati.ve pressure boundary; and (6)
installation ot' the redundant oxygen monitor.
This inspection involved a total of 66 inspector-hours onsite by 3 inspectors.
Results: No items of. noncompliance, deviations, nor unresolved matters were identified.
It was determined that all of the necessary QA/QC procedures and instructions needed to effect the corrective actions identified in the Immediate Action Letter (IAL) have been documented and approved. However, during the first two days of this inspection, June 20-21, 1977, the NRC inspectors determined that a number of the penetrations remained to be completed, inspected, and accepted by the site QA/QC 6rgani-zations and the inspection was terminated. The inspection was continued on June 27-28, 1977. At this time, 'it was found that all of the subject penetrations and blockouts relative to the negative pressure boundat, were
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completed or adequately controlled.
Each' item of the IAL (May 31, 1977)
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was confirmed.to have been successfully implemented.
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DETAILS s _s
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Section I Prepared by C. C. Williams Persons Contacted
Princiqal Licensco Emplovces
- L. E. * 4oe, Vice President
- J. D. Lcnardson, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. E. Blanchong, Construction Supervisor
- G. E. Eichenauer, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J.
Evans, Station Supervisor
- J. Buck, quality Control Engineer
- E.
R.
Michaud, Test Manager
- D. A. Poage, Quality Assurance Engineer
Other Personnel
- C. L. Houston, Field Construction Manager (Bechtel)
- W. C. Lowery, Quality Assurance Engineer (Bechtel)
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- J. D. Heaton, Quality Control Engineer (Bechtcl)
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- C. D. Miller, Engineer (Bechtel)
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- denotes those attending the exit interview (June 21 and 28,1977).
The-inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee, Bechtel, and contractor employees,-including members of the quality, technical, and engineering staff.
I Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Noncon fopcin1.l ockm t and Penetration Scali'r /wtivitv (50-3'(6/77-22)
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1.
As a result of substantiated allegations relative to nonconforming blockout and penetration scaling activity, the licensee was issued an Immediate Action Letter on May 31, 1976, which documented the
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necessary corrective actions needed to resolve the identified defi-ciencies concerning the control of penetration scaling activities and the establishment of a conforming negative pressure boundary configuration.
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tV During this inspection, the inspectors verified that each of the
provisions of the subject immediate Action Letter has been esta-blished and successfully impicmented.
This was accomplished through record review, observation of work, and examination of
selected blockouts and penetrations within the negative pressure
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boundary. During the first two days of this inspeccion, (June 20-21, 1977) the inspectorn determined, and the licennee's representa-
tive confirmed, that. the required cerrective actions for all of the subject penetrations were not complete and further inspec, tion acti-vities vere discentinued.
Subsequently, on June 27-28, 1977, it was d-rmined that:
(1) work on the remaining penetrations required
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for th-Negative Pressure Boundary Test had been completed, (2) all
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of the stipulated ecluirements of the IAL had been met, and (3) that
a conforming package of docementation had been released to and accepted by-TECo plant management.
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2.
Inspection Activit$es a.
The inspectors reviewed in detail the following documents and concluded that the corrective actions stipulated in the
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IAL had been implemented.
l (1) Document titled "Closcout of Emergency Ventilation Sys-
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tem Inspection Anomalies" (Field Inspection Manual No. G-8-Rev. 1).
f'~5g (2)
Document titled " Inspection of Emergency Ventilatien
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System Anomalies."
(3)- Document titled, "Startup Administrative Procedure No. 10-A", Rev. 1 (construction work permit procedure)
Rev. 1, dated June 14, 1977.
(4)
Document titled "Walkdown and Release of Negative Pressure Boundary," (Field Inspection Manual Procedure No. C-10 - startup administrative procedare 1-A and 9-A)
dated June 16, 19 77, 1:av.
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(a)
Document titled " Negative Pressure Boundary Walk
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Down Check List."
(b) Document titled " Negative Pressure Boundary Interim Release Sheet."
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(5) The inspectors reviewed the Negative Pressure Boundary Release package.
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The luspectors examined (ohnerved and compared to design re-
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N quirements) appror.imately 150 penetrations.
These were found to conform to the requirenents.
c.
In addition, all doors and floor drains within the EVS boundary were examined and found to meet the requirements.
d.
Each of the specific deficient penetrations identified by the alleger and those identified by the incpectors during the previous investigation were examined and found to meet the design requircrents, The inspector confirmed that both TECo and Bechtel QA/QC e.
organizations adequately participated in the reinspection and rework activities.
Bechtel Engineering was noted to be appropriately involved in this rework activity.
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The inspector verified through revice of documents, discussion and elservation that the licensee's contractor personnel (HISCO)
have been adequately instructed regarding their responsibili-ties relative to the control of process documentation and the
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installation of seals.
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The inspectors determined through review of documentation and examination of the as-built penetrations that the licensee
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j'~'N has accounted for all significant previously undocumented re-(
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pairs and modifications to plant penetrations and blockouts, (i.e., the " Smoke List" was complete).
3.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected No other items were inspected at this time.
4.
Exit Interview The inspectors reported that their revieu and examination of those corrective actions in.plemented pursunnt to the requirements of RIII Immediate Action Letter dated Stay 31, 1971, la ec:nplete.
The results of this inspection demonstrate that each of the noncom-
_pliance issues previously reported relative to the BISCO blockout and penetration sealant activity.has been resolved.
The licensee acknowledged these remarks.
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DETAILS
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m,Section II UL 7 C
Prepared by Joel E. Kohler
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R vleved by 6 S 1.ittle t
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Person-Contacted
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Evans, Station Superintendent T. Thiesing, Bechtel Gaithersberg C. Miller, Bechtel GPDE B. Alton, Toledo Edison Technical Staff Engineer
- denotes those present at c: cit irie view.
2.
Emergency Ventilation Svetem Status (EVS) (June 20-21, 1977)
As a result of an immediate action letter issued on May 31, 1977, an inspectiun was initiated on June 20-21, 1977, to determine whether items identified in the IAL had been cleared.
During this inspection it was determined that sealing of EVS boundaries was still in progress x
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in addition to the final QC inspectionc tahing place.
As a result of
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this activity, the inspectors determined that stipulations set forth in the letter had not been met, and that EVS testing for the record could not commence.
The inspectors requested the licensee to notify the RIII office when IAL stipulations had been met so that another inspection could be scheduled.
Final acceptance of the EVS preopera-tional test remains outstanding.
3.
EVS Technical Specification Change Prelimir.ary EVS testing performed by the licenr.ee to determine leak tighn. esc of the bound.ry showed the technical specification 4.6.5.1.d.4 could not be net.
This technical specification specified that
.25 inches wg differential pressure had to exist in the CVS houndary in no more than twelve seconds after signal start.
The inspentor was informed that a change to this technical specification had been applied for.
The proposed technica] specification states that the EVS system must be capable of achieving
.25 inches wg differential pressure within four seconds af ter the EVS fans have reached rated flow of 8000 cfm i 10%, assuming that the EVS line up is made md other associated dampers are closed.
In order to achieve the proposed technical specification conditions, the licensee stated that it would be necessary to wire the EVS discharge damper open and pull the circuit
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. breakers on the EVS recirculation damper to keep them closed.
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These.netLons would be necessary to complete the EVS line up at the time the EVS f anc reach full rated flow.
The inspector revieued the EVS system and questioned the licensee in an of fort to determine.how the above proposed technical npecifi-cation changc~related to the actual conditions existing at the time EV3 would be initiated.
Ender actual conditions, the EVS line up would not be made and circuit breakers and dampers would not be deactivated.
The licensec responded that the design basis accident analysis as stated in the SER supplement assumed a time period of 802 seconds following the loss of coolant accident to establish
.25 inches water gage. Thus, a tuelve second time limit from SFAS initiation for EVS. system operation (original technical specification require-ment) was much more restrictive then that which was analysed in the SER.
Tha licenste forther str.ted that tha EVS fan starting and i
dame ir positioning timca were accounted for in the 802 second time unvelope.
Theses times were analysed in other portions of the preoperational test program.
Thus after consideration, the EVS negative pressure test was modified to demonstrate only that the desired negative pressure was achievable within the 802 second time envelope.
In order to demonstrate this,
.25 inch wg differential pressure had to be achieved within four seconds from the time the-s s
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EVS fans reach full rated flow, assuming that the EVS line up was
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made. This necessitated wiring open the EVS discharge damper because it begins positiening itself when EVS fans are started.
A ls o, the circuit breakers for the EVS recirculation damper had to be dicabled so that the damper would not occi:'re around the setpoint of
.75 inchas wg.
4.
EVS Instrumentation Change The licensee has initiated a facility change relating to the EVS dif ferential pressure instrumente tien.
Redundant instrementation which rer.de out in a scale of zero to five iaches uarer gage is plan-ned to permanently replace the installed instrumentation which reads on a scale of zero to ten inches wg.
The inspectors informed the licensee that this facility change would have to be approved before the EVS preoperational test for record, if this modification to the EVS system was used during the formal test.
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Control Room ventilation Test The one cighth inch positive pressure test of the control room remains an open item pending the licensee's reinspection for the presence of temporary closure material.
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i DETAT1:s
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S ec t ion II-T '
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Prep. red P,v Joel E. !"ohIer I ( DI
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W. S. Little 7dM. 7 Revic.[edBy (
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Perso;e, Contactej
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Evans, Davis-Besse Station Superintendent B. Alton, Technical Staff Engineer
- J.
Buck, To] eda Edison QC
- denates those present at exit interview meeting 2.
Emer;'ency Ventilation Svstem Status June 27-28, 1977 The inspection on June 20-21, 1977, was continued on June 27-28, 1977, to deterrine whether ite :s identified in the immediate action (m)
letter of May 31, 1977, had been cleaced.
During this inspection,
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it was dt crr.incd that the EVS houndary was complete and no defici-encies relative to operations irsues e:isted that would preclude performance of the EVS negative pressure preoperational test for records.
This determination was basc d on:
(1) a walkdot:n of ran -
domly selected portions of the EVS boundary and inspection of the as found sealed penetrations against final Bechtel released wall diagrams; (2) a revicu of the construction deficiency list which existed at the tirae the system was turned over to Toledo Edison Operations.
Thn outstan-J: q.,astruction deficiencies that c>:isted at the time of EVS turnover consisted of wall drawings requiring updating, replacement of penetration scaling material with a material of a higher density for r;.diation protection purposes, and in one instance, removal of a temporary construction wire and repair of the penetra-tion.
The inspector determined that these deficiencies were itemized and controlled by Toledo Edison and would not preclude performance of the EVS test.
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- Floor Drainn Wi thin EVS Ikmndary
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.f The licensee has identified ten floor drains wLthin EVS.houndry that require loop seals in order to maintain the required negative pressure during EVS testing.
Ilecause the loop seals have not been escablished during preoperational tenting, flapper valves which seal off the drain and open under a pressure of approximately.35
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inchen of water hsve been fabriented and installed.
I!awever. during properational tect.i.ng, Tolido Edison discovered that the flapper valves were being removed by craft personnel when draining of equipr ut within the EVS boundary was required.
The valves were not he -.;; controlled and their installation was required for successful EVS testing.
To temporarily control these valves with the presence of large numbers of craft personnel, the valves were removed and controlled i
under lock and key.
Just prior to EVS testing, the flapper valves were reinstalled and the drain areas were controlled under locked doors eith guards posted in the ;caeval vicinity.
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The inspector determined that the station had no mechanism to control the drains located in 2VS regions from unauthoirzed removal
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of the flapper valves after the licensee had entered mode 4 of
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operation, when EVS operability is required. After considering several alternatives, the licensee issued a notice to all station j
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personnel indicating the significance of the placement of the EVS
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flapper valves.
The intent of the notice was to control the valves
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adninistratively.
I After reviewing the notice, the inspector determined that the measurcs taken by the licensee uould not control the valves from
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temporary craft personnel during the period of time when large j
numbers of construction personnel were present.
The inspector i
stated that control of the flapper valves in EVS drains must be g
resolved before entry into mode 4, and would remain outstanding awaiting licensee action.
As of July 22, 1977, the licensee has takua positive actior te
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control these valves.
This item is considered closed.
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EVS Doors i.
During walkdown of the EVS boundry, tape was found on the door j
latches of EVS boundary doors.
The tape prohibited the door from
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latching.
The tape was removed.
At the management exit the inspec-tor requested the licensee to develop a mechanisum to ensure that
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the doors would be controlled to prohibit their unauthorized open-ing.
The inspector stated that this item would be an outstanding
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item to IIe resolved prior to entry into mode 4.
As of July 22, 1977, the licensee han tak.n positive action to control these
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doors. This item is considered closed.
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5.
EVS Dr.wdown Test i.
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l The inspector vi t nessed the. EVS nes;ative pressure drawdown for train 1.
The technical specification staten that a negative i~
dif ferential pressore ut
.25 inches water gate shall bc, achieved within four-seconds af ter' the EVG fan has reached full rated flow.
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.The test witnesued by. the inspector bad the following resultc:
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After four seconds from the start of EVS fan number one the
i area within the EVS boundary was
.33 inches negative differential
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pressure.
This meets the Technical Specification requirements.
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Mode 4 Oneration fi The licent:ec tras instructed to notify the RIII of fice when all j_
prercquesites for entry mode 4 were completed, including telephone notification of the following outstanding items:
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flapper valves i
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doors j
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SRB review of completed EVS test package o
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Redundant Oxygen Monitor j
The inspector detcrained that the licensee has completed instal-lation of a second oxygen monitor in the gaseous waste system.
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