IR 05000346/1975015
| ML19317F615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1975 |
| From: | Erb C, Ledoux J, Naidu K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317F596 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-75-15, NUDOCS 8001150934 | |
| Download: ML19317F615 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ~
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REGION III
Report of Construction Inspection
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IE Inspection Report No. 050-346/75-15 Licensee:
Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License No. CPPR-80
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Unit 1 Category:
B Oak Harbor, Ohio
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Type of Licensee:
B&W PWR 871 MWe Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced O
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Dates of Inspection:
July 29 - 31, 1975
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K. R. Naidu (Date)
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AccompanyingInspectorsj.C.M. Erb
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J. C. LeDoux t
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Other Accompanying Personnel: None l
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J. C. Le ux
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Senior Inspector
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Construction and Engineering
Support Branch i
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SIMfARY OF FINDINGS
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Inspection Summary Inspection of July 29 - 31, (75-15):
Special piping.
Selectively reviewed piping installed relative to the decay heat removal system and the let-down system, equipment spec'ifications, and documentation.
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Review included selective examination of QA documentation for scismic Class 1 piping installed by Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell), observa-tion of welding operations, selective review of hanger installation, and examination of discrepancy reports and corrective action taken on them. One (1) item of noncompliance was identified relative to the protection of installed safety related items.
Enforcement Action A.
Items of Noncomoliance
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Violations
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None.
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Infractions
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Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 3, Criterion XIII, construction scaffolding was found resting on the stem of decay heat removal pump discharge valve No. DH44, and the bonnqte of bypass line valves B59-4 and B59-5 were being supported by wire fastened to line 10BHCC-50.
(Report Details,Section I, Paragraph 2)
This infraction was identified by the IE inspectors and had the potential for causing, or centributing to, an occurrence with safety significance.
Licensee Action on Previousiv Identified Enforcement Matters Not applicable for this inspection.
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Other Significant Findings A.
Systems and Components Unresolved Items
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1.
Documentation is required which will verify that motor operators for valves purchased by either Ecchtel Corporation
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(Bcchtel) c'
Ssbcock 6 Wilcox Cct.peny (EtJ:) will meet the V-2-
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specified containment radiation levels.
(Report Details, ('"')%
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Section I, Paragraphs 3.b and 4.b)
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Verification is required that the valves supplied ~to Bechtel 2.
Specifications No. 7749-V-213A and No. 7749-V-213B were indeed designed and manufactured for 129 C temperature and 45 psig.
(Report Details,Section I, Paragraph 3.a)
3.
A procedure to identify and document the installation of temp orary pipe hangers is required in order to:
(a)
distinguish them from permanent hangers, and (b) to verify that they have been removed after the cocpletion of con-struction activities.
B.
Facility Items Not applicable for this inspection.
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C.
Managerial Items Not applicable for this inspection.
D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee Not applicable for this inspection.
E.
Deviations None.
F.
Status of Previously Report Unresolved Items Not applicabic for.this inspection.
Management Interview A.
The following persons attended the management interview at the conclusion of the inspection.
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Toledo Edison Comnany (TECO)
L. E. Roe, Vice. Preside.it - Facilities Devel'opment E. G. Novak, General Superintendent - Power Engineering f
and Construction
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J. D. Lenardson, Quality Assurance Manager E. A. Wilcox, Field Quality Assurance Specialist C. T. Daft, Quality Assurance Engineer-t
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'Bechtel Corporation (Bechtcl)
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~T C. L. Huston, Field Construction Manager
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J. D. Heaton, Project Quality Control Engineer P. R. Britnell, Project Quality Assurance Engineer-P. P. Anas, Proj ect. Engineer - Gaithersburg Project Operations (Gaithersburg).
C. E. Bald, Manager
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Matters discussed and co=ments, on the part of management personnel B.
were as follows:
1.
The inspector stated that con'ditions noted during the
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inspection indicated that adequate precautions to protect installed safety related items had not been taken.
This was considered an apparent item of noncompliance of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, requirements.
(Report Details,Section I, Paragraph 2)
2.
The inspector stated, and the licensee agreed, that there was no documentation that the electric motor operators used on valves installed inside the containment were certified
'to meet specified radiation and high temperature environment as specified in the FSAR. The licensee stated that corree-tive action has been initiated.
Results of the corrective action will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(Report Details, Sectier. I, Paragraphs 3.b and 4.b)
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3.
Relative to the subject of verifying that the necessary correct
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documentation is being received onsite for materials purchased,
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the inspector discussed apparent lack of guidance to the field QC personnel. The licensee stated that he will review this matter and arrange to provide necessary training to the construction fiell QC personnel.
4.
The inspecto'r stated that specifications for valves 213A and 213B appeared to 'contain a discrepancy in the temperature and pressure values.
The A-E's representative, handed the inspector copics of tuo letters critten on the scre day, addressed to the respective manufactures, informing them of the corrections and further stated that necessary verifications would be made, to ascertain from the vendors, that the valves vould meet the revised criteria.
The inspectors stated that the verifica-tons would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (Report Details, Section 1, Paragraph 3.a)
5.
The inspector stated that, on July 30, 1975, and again on July 31, he observed two welders who were working on a 36" steam penetration weld discarding electrode stubs on the l
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floor of the scaffold. The licensee representative stated
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that such practice did not conform.to their procedures.
He said that further effort would be made to enforce segrega-tion and retrieval of welding electrode stubs.
6.
The inspector noted that a nu=ber of temporary supports and hangers had been installed.
The temporary hangers could not be identified, except by the fact that documentation was not found in the files.
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The inspector stated that a positive means of identifying temporary supports or hangers requiring revision should be implemented. Metal tags could be used in this area.
The licensee stated that a revised procedure for installation and inspection of hangers was in process.
He stated that tagging of temporary hangers appeared to be desirable.
The inspector stated that this item would be examined during a subsequent inspection.
7.
The inspector asked whether unsage of a.005" lead screen between the films, when using radiographic double film technique, had been approved by Ecchtel.
The usual.010" lead screens were being used on the front and back of the films. The licensee stated that this practice had been (a)
approved by Bechtel.
8.
The inspector stated that in at least two instances holes of hanger support plates appeared to have been enlarged by the use of flame cutting and inquired uhether any directive was issued to the contractor since the previous inspection forbidding the use of flame cutting. The licensee's repre-sentative replied that a new procedure for hanger installa-tion was under preparation and that this item would be addressed.
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mO REPORT DETAILS
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Section I Prepared By:
K. R. Naidu
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Persons Contacted The following persons, in addition to those listed in the Management Interview Section of this report, were contacted during this inspection.
Babcock and Wilcox Compan'f (B&W)
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W. R. Klingler, Project Manager J. W. Marshall, Quality Control Supervisor Results of Inspection
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1.
General The inspection covered the piping and welding procedures, practices, Q
and requirements of two randomly selected systems, i.e.,
decay heat
removal and let-down systems.
Neither of the systems were con-sidered to be complete. Some of the piping spool pieces had not
been installed. The majority of supporting equipment appears to have been installed.
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2.
Protection of Safety Related Items
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During the inspection, the inspectors observed and brought to the licensee's attention the follouing conditions, that were noted
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in the auxilic.y building, where some of the emergency core cooling
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system pumps were installed:
Construction scaffolding was found resting on the stem of a.
decay heat removal pump discharge line valve No. DH44.
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In the adjacent room, the bonnets of bypass line valves B59-4
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and B59-5 were being supported by wire fastened to line i
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A section of a 12" pipe was inadequatcly supported, due to c.
the incomplete installation of scismic hanger 33C-GCB-7-H8.
The bottom channel appeared to be in place, but the hanger rod support was not installed, am
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d.
At the time of inspection, the coupling flanges between decay heat removal pump 1B and the motor were not adequately covered to prevent damage.
Prompt, corrective action was taken on this item, and the assemblies were adequately covered the ne.xt day.
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A section of hanger 40-HCC-34-H2 had been cut and left
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unrestrained.
Though the hanger itself was not a safety related item, the free, unrestrained ends appeared to cause a potential hazard to other safety installed piping in the vicinity.
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A set of stainless steel studs were found without proper identification lying on the floor of the pipe tunnel carrying the core flooding pipe to the reactor pressure vessel.
g.
Holes of the support plate of hanger 33B-GC-B10-H15
'(E61151) appeared to have been enlarged by the use of flame cutting.
The inspectors stated that these conditions were considered as unacceptable and appeared to be in noncompliance of the require-ments of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi:: B, Criterion XIII.
In this connection, the inspector stated that the site inspection p}
personnel appeared to be inadequately trained to identify such (v deviations. Training uould be useful because many fic2d engineers have been recently transferred to the QC Department.
The licensca's representative stated that he would review this with the contractor's management personnel.
3.
Review of Valve Specifications The following specifications were reviewed relative to the technical
requirements as required in the Davis-Ecsse Unit 1 FSAR and for testing, and QA documentation.
M304
- Technical Specification Main Steam isolation Valve Assembl'f M213A - Technical Specification for Nuclear Gate Globe and Check Valves 2" and smaller.
MD213B - Design Specification for Nucle'ar Globe and Check Valves 1500 psi, 2" and smaller.
Technical Specification for Small Electric Motors E11
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Technical Specification for Electric Wiring D36
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and Control.
y,j Technical Speai!1 cation for Nuclear Butterfly Valves.
M215
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Technical Specification for Ball and Butterfly Valves.
M319
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Design Specification for Containment Vacuum Relief M222
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Valves.
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Design Specification Miscellaneous Nuclear Control M314
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Valves, a.
Incorrect Temperature and Pressure Valves
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The inspector noted that in paragraph 7.4.1 line 4, of Bechtel Specifications 213A and 213B, the valves were required to be designed for 65.5 C temperature and + 3 psig, and'these appeared to be contrary to the values stated in table 7-4, page 7-87
~ f the D-B FSAR.
The Bechtel project engineer (uho was onsite o
during the inspection) verified this matter with his staff in Gaithersburg and informed the inspector that the specification was in error and issued letters to the vendors, I. C. Vclan Montreal, Canada, and Leatherman and Company; Detroit, Michigan, informing then of the correct values which are 129 C temperature
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and 45 psig. The inspector expressed concern whether the (,)
valves which were already installed in the plant vere, in fact, designed from the corrected temperature and pressure.
The Bechtel project engineer stated be would obtain such verification from the vendors.
b.
Documentation on Electric Motor Operators (Bechtel Purchase)
The inspector stated that, though Specification Ell for small
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electric motors was attached to Specificatien MD213B, the individuni volve spncification sheets did not appear to indicate the special requirements for electrical motor operators (F.M3's)
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which would withstand high radiation and temperature without deleterious effects and opercte under those conditions.
Purchase orders for the valve operators uere not availabic at the site, since the valve manufacturer purchased the EM0's directly from Limitorque.
The inspection was unable to find document-
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ation that the EM0's supplied were designed and manufactured with the same type of components used on those which suc-cessfully withstood high radiation and temperature conditions.
The Bechtel representative stated that he would discuss this matter with the valve manufacturer to obtain verification and necessary documentation on the EMO's.
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Review of Documentation on Equipment (B&W Purchase)
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The inspector selectively reviewed the documentation on decay heat injection isolation valve HV IB, PO item 14 of PO 0226141, decay
\\~rs heat pump and the motor.
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a.
Stem Material Soecifications The specification for the valves appeared to contain applicable criteria relative to materials and testing.
Material, chemical, and physical certifications a'ppeared to meet the applicable ASTM standards specified in the FSAR. The inspector noted that the stem conformed to ASTM A-461, Type 630, material instead of ASTM A-461, Type 460, as stated in table 5-19 on page 5-88 of the FSAR.
The Bechtel representative stated that this was a typographical error, and the material should have been specified as ASTM A-461, Type 630, and that this item will be corrected in the next revision.
The inspector determine from the ASTM Standards that specification for ASTM A-461 type 460 does not exist.
b.
Documentation on EM0's The inspector determined that certifications on the EMOs that
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it will uithstand specified radiation levels without deleterious effects were not obtained.
The Quality Assurance Data Sheet, which provides guidance on the certifications to be subultted s
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by the vendor, did not mention such a certification requirene.pt.
The inspector revieued the standard specification for remotely
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operated valves for auxiliary systems and determined that the data sheet for electric motor operators for valves in paragraph 1.2 stated that:
"IEEE INSG/TCS SC-2, Equipment Qualification Testing Report Proposed Gaide for Qualification Testing of Motors for Service in Nuclear Pouer Plant Engineering Features" was not applicable.
However, on the same page, below the radiation level and life cu=ulative dosage, valves were furnished.
The licencee stated that he will investigate this matter, to verify uhather the E:D's supplied could meet the environmental conditions and, if affirmative, will obtain necessary documentation.
This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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Documentation on Residual Heat Removal Puno and Motor The inspector selectively reviewed the documentation on the pump and motor and determined that the material, physical, and chemical certifications met the applicable ASTM standards.
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However, the inspector noted that the specification indicated
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that the ambient temperture for the pump motor was 40 C, which appeared to be lower than the design temperature.staten in table 7 4 on page 7-87, Revision 6, dated 1974, of the FSAR, Environmental Conditions for Instrumentation and Controls.
The Bechtel representative referred the inspector to page 9-101, Revision 1, of the FSAR, which indicates the maximum design temperature in the emergency core cooling system rooms to be 104 F which appe,ared to comply with the 40 C ambient temperature.
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REPORT DETAILS Section II
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Prepared By:
C' M. Erb
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Persons Contacted The following persons, in addition to individuals listed under the Management Intervicw Section of this report, were contacted during the inspection ITT-Grinnel Company (Crinnell)
D. Giguerc, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Manager T. Martin, Welding Engineer W. Swift, Quality Control Engineer H. Kindt, Piping Superintendent P. Norman, Supervisor - Nondestructive Examination Results of Insnection (a)
1.
Qualifications for Fabricationa and Installation of Piping Grinnell, who has contracted to manufacture and install most of the piping at the Davis-Besse site, has been issued the following ASME Code stamps for work onsite:
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- January 7, 1974 - January 7, 1977
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January 7, 1974 - January 7, 1977 b.
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- Marc'h 4, 1974 - March 4, 1977 2.
McIn Steam System i
The installation welds in the nain steam system are nuclear Class 2 and were made by B&W from the generator to the first isolation valve.
Grinnell performed the welding from this point to the turbine and also welded the safety valves into their header.
The main steam piping is made to the followin3 specifications and and sizes.
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Specifications Size
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ASTM A155, Gradd KS-70 36' x 1.055 A-106-B 24" x Schedule 60 (.968)
ASTM A155, Grade KC-7 26" x.798 ninimum wall ASTM A155, Grade KC-70 33-5/8 x 2-3/8, safety valve header The following welding procedures were used in installing the main steam and feedwater system.
These procedures were qualified'and properly signed off.,
-Procedure Process Remarks 1-04-2 Tungsten Insert Gas (TIG) Open butt, 37h; level 1-41-2 TIG and Shield Metal Arc J-prep with insert
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1-01-1 Shield Metal Arc (SMA)
Fillets The inspector examined one 36-inch ucid in process, and found the welding was being performed in accordance with cpecification require-ments.
Since these welds are over 3/4" in thickness, they are pre-heated and stress relieved.
The preheat is 200 F minimum, and the stress relief specified is 1100 -1250 F.
The inspector nxanined the
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stress relief records for tuo ucids and found then to meet specificatien requircr.ents.
The Hartford Stean noiler Insurance Company is the 3rd Party inspector f
for B&W, Grinnell, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company and Johnson.
'V The authorized inspector for TECO on piping is the Home Insurance Company.
3.
Essential Service Systems,- Piping and Valves The inspector examined documentation and welds for the following stainless steel systems.
Identification
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33D-6 Three ground uc3ds, Class 1 33B-19A one weld unground 33C-HCD-2 Repaired'and approved B23-2 Velan Check valve V20-4 Velan gate valve 33-C-13, Weld C-142 Three-inchHPdI TE-33A-60 Ucid SWE Radiographs of several welds vera examined, and the quality appeared to meet ASME Section III requirements.
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Qualification of Welders and NDE Personnel xv The inspector examined the welder performance qualifica~tions and found them to be in order. There were three Level II radiographic inspectors and one Level III.
The welding engineer is responsible for fit-up, alignment, and visual inspection of the weld.
The NDE supervisor is responsible for radiography and penetrant test of the welds.
-The inspector examined calibration' records and found that the thermo-meters for the weld rod ovens were checked every six months, and stichers on the equipment verified this.
The stress relief temper-ature recording devices were checked every six nonths using an L & N potentiometer.
A Sturdevant torque wrench, Model S1200-1, Serial No. 7084462, had been checked by TECO, and a tabulation of readings against the master wrench was available.
5.
Hangers The inspector noted an Audit Finding Report (AFR) made by the licensee in Grinnell.
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QC-FF-109-St is the control document, but a revised procedure is in Hangers are not always available uhen pipe uust be hung, ('~'g
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which necessitates making and installing a temporary hanger.
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hangers which require revision must be redesigned or reanalyzed, and this can result in considerable loss of tima in making the
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revised installation.
It was recommended that temporary hangers be tagged as such and that every effort be made to minimize time loss between design (Bechtel and Grinnell) and availability of hanger hardware.
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