IR 05000344/1981023
| ML20031F814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1981 |
| From: | Johnston G, Malmros M, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031F813 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-81-23, NUDOCS 8110200451 | |
| Download: ML20031F814 (5) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEfiT
REGION V
Report No.
50-344/81-23 Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPP-1 Safeguards Group _
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S.
W.
Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
August 3-31, 1981 Inspectors:
- M S. NN M 4 ficMalm(fop, Senior Resident Inspector
'Date Sigtied bb
.MS. / W G(,
W.UJ ohn(ftfIf, hesident inspector fate Sign 6d Date Signed Approved By:
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. M E. / N U. b O4wett41f;, Chlei, neactor Operations
~ Dhte Sigad'
Projects Section 1, Reactor Operations Projects Branch Stsnmary:
Inspection on August 3-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-344/81-23)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations, surveillance, security activities and followup on Licensee Event Reports and TMI modifications.
The inspection involved,90 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspectors.
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i Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were Jentified.
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^ '8110200451 810929
,PDR ADOCK 05000344 i
PDR l
RV' Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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P. Yundt, General Manager
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P. Barkhurst, Managcr, Operations S Maintenance C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services D. R. Keuter, Operations Supervisor D. W.
Swan, Maintenance Supervisor R. P.
Schmitt, Engineering Supervison G. L. Rich. Chemistry Supe.avisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor D.
L. Bennett, Control S Electical Supervisor P. A. Morton, Quality Assurance Supervisor T.
F.
Bracy, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance S Construction The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During the month, the inspectors' observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operations as~ prescribed in the facility technical specifications.
Logs, instrumentation,' recorder traces, and other operations records were examined to obtain information,on' plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On'the occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed.to' determine'that all pertinent information
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was relayed to the' oncoming 'shif t.
During each week, the inspectors tbured the accessible areas of the facility to observe ~the'following items:
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General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repairs.
Fire hazards'and fire fighting equipment.
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Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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-2-Conduct of activities as per the licensee's administrative e.
controls and approved procedures.
f.
Interlars of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical secarity plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation, with respect to removal of equipment from service.
Verification was achieved by selecting one safety-related system or component weekly and verifying proper breaker, switch, and valve positions, both for removing the system or-components from service and return-ing it to service.
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During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics celatinF, to general plant conditions, pro-cedures, security, caining, and other topica aligned with the work activities. involved.
Two groups were the subject of obser-vation during shift turnover - the control room operators and security personnel at the main ~ gate.
The inspectors examined the licen'see's nonconformance reports to-confirm the. deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances wereibeing tracked and followed to the completion of corrc~cive action.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors.
No-jumpers or bypasses appeared to have been improperly installed or removed or to have conflicted with the technical specifications.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified'by observing portions of area surveys being performed, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration statuc.
The procedures used by the licensee to measure thc radioactivi+y.
levels of the reactor coolant system were examined by their spectors.
Analytical results demonstrate that the radioactivity levels of the reactor coolant system are less than twenty percent of the maximum values permitted by the technical specifications.
On August 9, 1981, the plant tripped due to a loss of a main circulating water pump which tripped on apparent low lube oil J
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-3-pressure.
The plant response to the decrease in vacuum caused by the loss of this pump was the normal sequence of events con-sisting of a turbine trip followed by a reactor trip.
All systems functioned normally.
The cause of low lube oil pressure was an increase in lube oil temperature which occurred during a period of extremely hot weather (air temperature greater than 100or).
By using an additional lube oil pump under these con-ditions, lube oil pressure was properly maintained and the plant returned to normal power operation.
On August 10, 1981, while verifying the calibration of the lube oil pressure switch on the pump which had caused the plant trip described above, a technician inadvertently caused a trip of the pump.
This resulted in a plant trip and subsequent recovery identical to the situation which occurred on August 9, 1981.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identfied.
3.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of_ safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors.
Observations by the' inspectors included veri-fication that proper procedures were'used, test instrumentation
was calibrated and the system.or component being tested was properly removed from service if' required by'the test procedure.
Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of the technical specifications and were~re' viewed by' cognizant licensee personnel.
s The inspectors also verified that corrective' action was initiated, if required, to. determine'th,e cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status consistent with the' technical specification requirements.
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Surveillance t,ests witned. sed during'the month were associated with the foll6 wing systems:
residu'al heat removal, and area radiation monitoring.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The circumstances and corrective action described in LER No. 81-13 were examined by the inspectors.
The inspectors found that the LER had been reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval.
Corrective action taken by the licensee has included instructing operators in the precauti;ns associated with opening and closing valves associated with high pressure systems and revising as i
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appropriate ONI 6," Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage," and POT l-1,
" Reactor Coolant System Integrity Test."
This item will remain open pending the completion of a procedure which prescribes the torquing method and proper torque values for shutting reactor coolant isolation vavles under various hot or cold conditions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
TMI Modifications Followup The inspectors evaluated the status of the licensee's schedule for the completion of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan com-mitments.
Items completed by the liccasee since the last inspec-tion of TMI comnitments include the following:
Item II.E.1.1 Auxiliary feedwater System The inspectors verified that the licensee had completed the short tera modifications as described in their correspondence to NRR regarding the auxiliary feedwater system.
Fiscussions with the NRR Licensing Project Manager reveal that all licensee submittals regarding the AFW system evaluation have been re-viewed and accepted with no additional work identified at the present time.
This item is considered closed.
Item II.E.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors verified that Design Change Nos. EDC 79-099 and 80-024 have been completed which provide the basis for the safety grade classification of the flow indication system.
The work under the above design changes involved the separa-tion of power supplies and the a'dition of redundant flow d
meters in the control' room.
No additional work has been identified which is required'to provide for the safety grade classification'of the aux'iliaryffeedwater system flow indication system.
This item'is closed.
Item II.E.4.2 Containment Isol't' ion Dependability a
The inspectors verifie2 'that thel pressure set point for containment pressure had b'een reduced to 3.5 psig as indi-cated as-acceptable in the,NRR letter of July 28, 1981.
The isolation of the hydrogen Nent valves upon detection of a high' radioactivity condition inside containment has been installed under Design Change RDC No.80-118 and satisfactorily tested.
No further action is required by the licensee under this item.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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-5-6.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on August 14 and September 1, 1981.
During these meetings, the Senior Kasident Inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee commited to have the procedure for the reactor coolant isolation valves, discussed in Paragraph 4, completed,byf0ctober 31, 1981..
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