IR 05000344/1981027
| ML20038B791 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1981 |
| From: | Book H, Cillis M, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038B775 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-81-27, IEB-80-10, NUDOCS 8112090104 | |
| Download: ML20038B791 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEtR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
0FFICE OF~ INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT f
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Region V I.
Report No. 50-344/81-27 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street'
Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan
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Inspectici, at:
Ranier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
October 5-9, 1981
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Inspectors:
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Dete' Signed M. Cillis, Radiation Specialist
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Approved by:
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F. A. Wenslawski, Chief, Reactor Radiation Dafe Signed-Protec n Secti Approved by:
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H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch Ddte Signed Summary:
Insoection on October 5-9, 1981 Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced' inspection by a regional based inspector of radioactive waste systems, gaseous effluent monitoring systems, testing and calibrations, gaseous radioactive effluent releases, meteorological-
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monitoring system functional checks and calibrations, spent resin solidification processes, review of abnormal / unplanned effluent release, licensee actions on previous inspection findings, review of primary coolant radioactivity levels, and licensee actions on IE Bulletins, Circulars and Notices. The inspection involved 37 inspector-hours on site by one inspector.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation
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8112090104 811120 DR ADOCK 05000
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t-DETAILS 1.
Persons-Contacted Portland General Electric (PGE) Personnel
- R. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services
- T. D. Walt, Manager,' Radiological Engineering T. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor G. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor G. Zielinski, Effluent Analyst
- G. C. Kernion, Plant Chemist
- P. A. Morton, Q. A. Supervisor
- D. L. Bennett, C&E Supervisor
- R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor for Manager of Technical Services M. Huey, Radiation Protection Engineer V. Parola, Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor D. Flahardy, Training Assistant L. L. Nofziger, I&C Technician T. Gray, I&C Technician J. Collins, Analytical Environmental Technician R. Russell, Shift Supervisor J. Perry, I&C Supervisor-F. Wallace, Supervisor, Analytical Lab Services D. Kenter, Operations Supervisor D. T.'Cottingham, Shift Supervisor
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview on October 9, 1981.
In addition to the individuals noted above, the inspector met with and interviewed other members of the' licensee staff.
2.
Radioactive Waste Systems - Primary Specific Activity The status of the primary coolant specific activity levels discussed in Region V, IE Inspection Report 50-344/81-25, was examined during the inspection.
Inspection. Report 81-25 identified that the licensee had experienced an increase in the dose equivalent Iodine-131 and gross gamma specific activity levels due to possible fuel cladding failures involving a small number of rod.
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-2-A. review of the data collected since the previous fRC inspection did not reveal any significant increases in the specific activity levels. The average dose equivalent I-131 and gross gamma specific activity levels are at 20-22% and 18% respectively of the limits identified in paragraph 4.4.8 of Appendix "A" to the Technical Specifications (T.S.).
The licensee was in the process of analyzing for strontiums at the time of the. inspection. 'An analysis to determine levels of transuranics had not been performed at the time of this inspection.
The importance for determining the strontium and transuranic levels was discussed with the licensee staff and at the exit interview.
For example, it was emphasized this information would be useful for preplanning purposes for the refueling outage scheduled to start in May of 1982, and for determining the disposition of spent resins in the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) demineralizers.
Discussions with the licensee staff revealed that equipment has been ordered for transuranic analysis and determinations. The equipment is expected to arrive and be in operation shortly after January,1982.
No items of noncompliance or' deviations were identified.
3.
Radioactive Waste Systems - Solidification of Spent Resins The status of the CVCS spent resin solidifications currently in progress at the licensee's facility was examined and discussed with the licensee staff and Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. representative during the inspection. The solidification process, which utilizes a method developed and contracted from Chem-Nuclear Systems is discussed in Region V IE Inspection Report 50-344/81-25.
The discussions reiterated an incident that recently occurred at the Crystal River Nuclear Facility while solidifying resins using the Chem-Nuclear Systems process. The Crystal River incident involved a spent resin liner " cover"' that blew off due to excessive heat buildup, also resulting in the spread of' radioactive contamination -
cver an area of 150 square feet.
An investigation of the Crystal River incident was conducted by the Chem-Nuclear representative during this inspection period and
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revealed that the Crystal River incident occurred because the spent resin liner " cover" was installed before the heat buildup created by the solidification process had an opportunity to dissipate.
In essence,'the cover had been installed too soon. The
apparent cause was the failure to follow the temperature control requirements specified in the solidification procedure prior to installing the liner cover. The inspector verified that the temperature control requirements at the Trojan facility were being followed or exceeded.
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-3-The above concerns were discussed at the exit interview.
ensee indicated.there are two to three more batches The lig/ batch)' of spent resins in the speng resin storage tanks (25 ft to be process for shipment. Another 60 ft of. spent CVCS demineralizer resins will be discharged to the. storage tanks upon completion of processing the remaining' two to three batches. A licensee staff member stated that a. sample of the additional spent resins will-be obtained after-the' discharge and analyzed for radionuclides and their concentrations;-including the transuranic levels.
It is anticipated that this ' sample would identify any problem associated with the fuel cladding failure discussed in Section 2 of this report.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Radioactive Waste Systems: Unplanned Gaseous Release.
a.
Unplanned Release of 29-30 September 1981 The inspector examined gaseous discharge permit records and data associated with an unplanned noble gas release between the hours 3:00 p.m. on 29 September 1981 and 11:00 a.m. on 30 September 1981. The release was 0.2 percent and 6.68%
of the T.S. instantaneous release limit for radiciodines and.
noble gases respectively. A total.of 11.5 curies of gaseous activity was released during the peri'od. The licensee reported the unplanned release pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(8).
The data reviewed revealed no obvious mistakes or anomalous measurement results.
An investigation conducted by the licensee revealed that the release occurred as a result of a suction line leak on the east waste gas compressor moisture separator which had been put in service at approximately 3:00 p.m. on 29 September 1981.
Shortly thereafter, a containment pressure equalization was initiated through the hydrogen purge system.
Detection.of the release was not noted until approximately midnight of 29 September 1981, at which time it was identified by a chemistry technician checking PERM readings and the PERM chart read out. The. PERM checks are normally conducted at midnight of each day. The reading obtained represented approximately.40%
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of the PERM's low set point alarm. The licensee-initially attributed the release to the containment pressure equalization operation which was secured at 3:00 a.m. on' 30 September 1981. A drop in the PERM's count rate was noted after securing the containment
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-4-pressure equalization operation. At'9:00 a.m. on 30 September 1981, a chemistry technician noted the PERM chart readout was still reading 200 to 260 cpm above background. A subsequent investigation identified the leak was coming.from the suction line gasket flange of the east waste gas compressor. The discharge was secured by tightening and tapi.ng over the flange.
In addition, the east waste gas compressor was isolated from service.
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It appeared that the discharge may have been minimized by performing more frequent checks of the PERM readouts. These concerns were discussed with the licensee's staff during the inspection.
A Plant Review Board (PRB) meeting conducted during the inspection initiated action to require PERM checks twice daily and to lower the PERM's low set alarm point to 1-1/2 times background.
The licensee is currently preparing a written report of the occurrence as required by paragraph 3.5.2a(3) of Appendix B to the T.S.
Further licensee action with respect to this item will be examined during a future inspection (81-27-01).
b.
Other Unpinnr.ed/ Abnormal ' Releases A review of gaseous discharge permits for the periods 1979, 1980 and 1981 to date was conducted during the inspection.
The review identified the occurrence of 7 unplanned releases in 1979, 11 unplanned releases in 1980 and approximately 16 unplanned releases to date in 1981. Although all of the releases were well below T.S. and 10 CFR 20 reportable limits,
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the inspector discussed the trend of the increasing releases with the licensee staff and at the exit interview. The
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inspector emphasized the concerns of IE Circular 79-21,
" Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity" also
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indicating that the increasing numbers of unplanned releases were symptoms that were worthy; to investigate. The licensee PRB assigned a committee consisting of the Radiation Protection i
Supervisor.and Chemistry _ Supervisor to investigate the unplanned /
abnormal releases.
Further action by the licensee with respect
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to this problem.will be examined during a future inspection (81-27-02).
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No items of noncompliance of deviations were identified.
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Radioactive Waste Systems - Gaseous Technical Specification,
-Records and Reports
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Paragraphs 1.1.5 and 1.1.6.of Appendix B to the T.S. identify the
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specifications for gaseous waste effluents and for gaseous waste sampling and mointoring. The inspector discussed and examined records concerning the licensees procedures, practices and implementation of the requirements relating to sampling, analysis-and release rates, concentrations, limitation on tank contents, calibration and functional checks of gaseous process monitors and monitoring of release pathways for gaseous wa'stes. Also
reviewed was the licensee's semi-annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report recently submitted to Region V NRC office pursuant to paragraph. 3.5.l(b) of Appendix B to the T.S.
Additionally, licensee procedures entitled, " Administrative Order-A0-ll-3" and " Waste Gas Decay Tank Discharge Permit Procedure" were reviewed during the inspection.
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The Gaseous Discharge Permits contain-the following information:
discharge type, maximum and actual discharge rate (uCi/cc),
operational status of process and effluent monitors (PERM) and
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meterological sensing and recording system, meterological parameters, (wind speed and direction, hourly during release), average PERM reading during discharge, ventilation exhaust fan operating status, total volume discharged, discharge rate, hold times, tank activity and total activity discharged. All gaseous rieases are approved by the shift supervisor. Any Waste Gas Decay Tank discha_rges of
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greater than 50 curies requires input'from the. Chemistry Supervisor and the approval of the Operational Supervisor.
Section-C of procedure A0-ll-3 recommends that the WGDT's not be discharged until: a) the tank has been isolat d for 45 days or b) the Xenon-133 activity is less than 3 x 10'9 uCi/cc.
Added to A0-ll-3 is: "If either of these conditions are not met, a note justifying the discharge is added to the discharge permit."
During the review of discharges from the WGDT's during 1980 and 1981, it was noted that' the average hold up time wgs less jhan 2
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days and Xenon-133 activity levels ranged from 10
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On one occasion a hold up time of 31 days was achieved during
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this period. Additionally, during the most recent refueling outage,
i a planned discharge in excess of 45 curies was approved for venting of the Volume ControlsTank (VCT) via the WGDT for the purpose of performing scheduled work ~on the VCT. This was accomplished i
early in the outage.
It appeared that the VCT' work could have been delayed, thereby minimizing the' release. The' licensee agreed in hind sight that better preplanning could have delayed t4..
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work. The licensee staff also stated that it is difficult to achieve a 45 day hold up time with only 4 WGDT's which normally have a heavy nitrogen blanket. Also presenting a problem are degassing operations which require from 2 to 6 WGDT to complete.
Methods to improve the degassing operation are still under evaluation by the licensee. The concerns of the short hold up times was discussed et the exit interview. Further action or findings by the licensee with= respect.to this problem will be inspected during a future inspection.
(81-27-03)
The inspector noted that a method for determining the amount of activity contained in one WGDT to ensure it does not exceed the 1.5E5 curie limit requirement of paragraph 1.1.5.e of Appendix "B" to the T.S.~had not been developed by the licensee. Discharge permits of WGDT discharges during the past two years revealed the maximum single discharge was only a minute fraction of this limit; however, the licensee had no method of ensuring the limit
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was not exceeded. This concern was also discussed at the exit l
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Further action by the licensee with. respect to this l
problem will be examined during a future inspection.
(81-27-04)
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The inspector noted that the Gaseous Discharge Permit did not provide a means for recording the total radioactivity discharged from previous discharges.
It was discussed with the licensee that such information would be useful for individuals responsible for approving discharges' to ensure that 10 CFR 20 and T.S. limits are not exceeded. The licensee had noted the permits had not included this information and was considering changing the
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discharge permits.
The inspector noted that the process monitoring instrumentation channel checks, channel calibration and channel functional tests were being performed at the frequencies identified in Table 4.3-3 of Appendix "A" to the T.S.
Additionally, it was noted the effluent process monitor calibrations by means of a known radioactive source traceable to a National Bureau of Standards are being performed at a frequency that exceeds the requirements of paragraph 1.1.6.c of Appendix "B" to the T.S.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Radioactive Waste Systems -Meteorological Instrumentation The inspector reviewed records and procedures associated with the meteorological monitoring instrumentation operational checks.,
The review revealed the surveillance frequency requirements of paragraph 4.3.3.4 of Appendix "A" to the T.S. were. met. The inspector observed the surveillance checks of meteorological instrumentation which was in progress at the time of the inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Followup (50-344/81-02): The licensee's actions a.
concerning contamination of the normally uncontaminated steam generator blowdown heat exchanger identified in IE Inspection Report 50-344/81-02 was. reviewed. The review revealed that the licensee's actions taken as a resul.t of the evaluation of.
IE Bulletin 80-10_ satisfactorily address this problem. This matter is considered closed (81-02-03).
b.
(Closed) Sign'ificant Appraisal Finding,' Item 2 of the HPA Inspection Report (50-344/81-16): The HPA inspection report identified.the licensee's air sampling equipment and methods did not provide for breathing zone sampling or for continuous sampling in a radioactive airborne environme'it. The inspector
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reviewed the licensee's timely response to this item of concern dated November 26, 1981. The~reviewfincluded an examination of procedures, two memorandums and training records which addressed the concern'of the HPA inspection report. The review revealed that the licensee's actions appeared to thoroughly address-the concerns of the HPA inspection report. This matter is considered closed.
(Item 2 of Significant Appraisal Findings).
(Closed) Significant Appraisal Finding, Item-3B of the HPA c.
Inspection Report (50-344/80-16): The licensee's response to this item concerning the assurance that shipments of radioactive materials are accomplished in accordance with the receiver's license and the transportation regulations was reviewed. The review revealed that the licensee's actions resulting from this item of concern were adequate. This matter is considered closed.
(Item 3B of Significant Appraisal Findings).
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(closed) sianificant Appraisal Finding, Item 3C of HPA Inspection Report (50-344/80-16):
The licensee's actions to this item which identified that the waste handling program failed to ensure that errors and inconsistencies in documentation of effluent releases were identified ~and corrected, were reviewed during the inspection. This item is also discussed in paragraph 8 of IE Inspection Report 50-344/81-25 which identified that the licensee had assigned an individual designated as an Effluent Analyst to address the concerns of the HPA inspection report.
The review revealed ' vast improvement in the documentation of a
effluent releases and radioactive waste system records has occurred as a result of the efforts and dedication of the Effluent Analyst. Release records and reports were will organized and well documented.
The inspector commended the Effluent Analyst's. efforts at the exit interview. This matter is considered closed.
(Item 3C of Significant Appraisal Findings.)
Considerations f ar Imorovements Identified in HPA Inspection e.
Report (50-344/80-16): The inspector examined a portion of.
the licensee's evaluation and actions taken in response to items identified in the HPA inspection report as " considerations for improvement." The actions taken by the licensee appeared to be appropriate for those areas examined during the inspection. A list of the areas inspected was provided to the
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licensee at the exit interview. Remaining items identified in the HPA. inspection report as " considerations for improvements" will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
8.
IE Bulletin / Circular Followup (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-10:
" Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to the Environment".
The inspector reviewed the evaluation and actions taken as discussed in the licensee's response, dated July 6,1980, to IE Bulletin 80-10.
Discussions were held with the licensee staff at the plant and corporate office during the inspection. The evaluation and actions taken by the licensee appeared to adequately address all of the concerns addressed in the Bulletin. This matter is considered closed.
(IB-80-10).
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Exit Interview The. inspector met with the licensee representatives devoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 9,1981.
The scope of the inspection and findings were summarized. The following items were discussed and agreed to by the licensee during the exit interview:
a.
The need to develop a method for determining the radioactivity-of gaseous effluents stored in any one WGDT to ensure the 1.5ES curie limit specified in the T.S. is.not exceeded.
(81-27-04).
b.
The need to investigate and evaluate the' trends / symptoms for unplanned /abnonnal gaseous releases for the purpose of determining their4causes and possible corrective actions to minimize their recurrence.
(.81-27-02)
c.
The need to investigate and evaluate the short hold up times for WGDT gaseous releases for the p.urposes of determining methods and ways for increasing. the' hold up times, thereby minimizing gaseous waste discharges.
(81-27-03)