IR 05000344/1981009
| ML19350E182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1981 |
| From: | Johnston G, Malmros M, Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E181 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-81-09, 50-344-81-9, NUDOCS 8106170115 | |
| Download: ML19350E182 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT O"
REGION V
Report No.
50-344/81-09 Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Portland General Electric Comoany 121 9. 'J. Salmen Stveet Pnctland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Tro_ian Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
April 1-30, 1981 d_
Mgh Inspectors e
M.H.Malros,SeniorReiden[ Inspector Da'te' Signed
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G.W.Johnston,ResidentInspe6 tor Date Signed
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Date Signed Approved By:
k 6 13 / S
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C.M.Sternberg, Chief,Reac3rProject
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Date Signed Section 1, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on April 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-344/81-09)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations, surveillance testing, physical security, maintenance, environmental protection, pro-curement, followup on Licensee Event Reports, an unusual event, an allega-tion, a plant trip and TMI Action Plan Requirements. The inspection involved
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237 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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810617 0 N RV Fom 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
persons Contacted
- C. P.-Yundt, General Manager
- R. P. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations & Maintenance C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services D. R. Keuter, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor R. P. Schmitt, Engineering Supervisor M. A. Bell, Chemistry Supervisor T. 0. Meek,_ Radiation Protection Supervisor
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R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control & Electrical Supervisor H. R. Sager, Quality Assurance Supervisor T. F. Bracy, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance & Construction The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
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- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During the month, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. The observa-tions and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operations as prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs, instru-mentation, recorder traces, and other operation records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On the occasions when a shift turnover was in progress,
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the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repairs.
c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
e.
Conduct of activities as per the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
f.
Interiors of electrical and control panels, g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
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Radiation protection controls, i.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
The inspectors toured the areas in the Control Building that are affected by construction modifications. The tours were conducted to determine that constructic noise was not interfering with normal communications, and that excessive dust, dirt, or debris would not affect operations of essential electrical equipment.
Each week, the inspectors verified the operability of a selected emergency safety features.(ESF) train. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity, and general condition of the equipment.
ESF trains verified to be operable during the month included containment spray, service water, safety injection system, and auxiliary feedwater systems.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical speci-fication limiting conditions for operation, with respect to removal of
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equipment from service. Verification was achieved by selecting one safety-related system or component weekly and verifying proper breaker, switch, and valve positions, both for removing the system or components from service and returning it to service.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, train-ing, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved. Two groups were the subject of observation during shift turnover - the control room operators and security personnel at the main gate.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports to confirm the deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors. No jumpers or bypasses appeared to have been improperly installed or removed or to have conflicted with the technical specifica-tions.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used. Radiation protection instru-ments were also examined to verify operability and calibratMn status.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance,
Maintenance activities including both preventive and corrective main-tenance were observed by the inspectors during the month. Observations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals, system clearances and tests of redundant equipment were performed, as appropriate, prior to maintenance of safety-related systems or components. The inspectors verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance using appro-priate maintenance procedures. Replacement parts were examined to determine the proper certification of materials, workmanship and tests.
During the actual performance of the maintenance activity, the inspectors checked for proper radiological controls and. housekeeping, as appropriate.
Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspectors verified that '.he component or system was properly tesced prior to returning the system or component to service. During the month, maintenance activities associated with 480-volt circuit breakers, explosives detectors, seismic monitoring system, and the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of the technical specifications and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel.
The inspectors also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status consistent with the technical specification requirements.
Surveillance tests witnessed during the month were associated with the following systems:
turbine first stage pressure tran mitter, Reactor Protection Set II, control rods, and reactor coolant system chemistry.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Environmental Protection The inspector accompanied the licensee's Environmental Monitoring Technician during the sampling of the envirc; ient surrounding the facility. Water samples were taken from the Lulumbia River and the site Recreation Lake. Air monitoring stations were examined and found to be operating satisfactorily. Calibration checks of the air flow meters were witnessed by the inspector.
The environmental report for 1980 was examined by the inspector.
The report indicated that the
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-4-environmental monitoring requirements of the environmental technical specifications were being met and no adverse environmental trends were indicated.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Procurement and Storage The inspectors toured the licensee's warehouse facility to verify that safety-related material and spare parts were being handled, stored, and identified in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's quality assurance procedures. The inspectors verified the folicwir g:
Safety related material and spare parts received on site had been a.
inspected by qualified personnel.
b.
Records of receipt inspections were examined and found to be com-plete.
Storage and packaging requirements were defined in the purchase c.
requisition and were being met during the storage of the applicable items.
d.
Preventive maintenance of stored items as applicable, was being performed by warehouse personnel.
e.
Material was identified to permit traceability to on-file quality certification documents.
f.
Limited shelf life items were identified and controlled.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Followup on TMI Commitments Based on discussions with licensee representatives and the examination
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of facility equipment and records, the inspectors verified that the
implementation status of the following TMI. Action Plan requirements was
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i-as described in correspondence between the licensee and the NRC. The items are identified by the item numbers as assigned in NUREG-0737.
I.A.I.3 Shift Manning (Closer ): The licensee issued Revision No. 6 to Administrative Order No. ( AC-3-1), "Shif t Complement and Work Time,"
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on October 22, 1980. This revision was found in good agreement with the l
overtime limits specified in the July 31, 1980, letter from NRR (Eisenhut)
6v all Licensees. NUREG 0737, published in November, 1980, changed one
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of the criteria as previously stated in the July 31, 1980, letter. The criteria which stated, "An individual shall not be permitted to work more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period," was replaced by the statement that
"There shall be a break of at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (which can include shif t turnover time) between all work periods." The licensee does not intend
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to revise A0-3-1 te reflect the change in criteria as stated in NUREG 0737 and will remain consistent with the criteria specified in the July 31, 1980,
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letter. Reasons-given by the licensee for not revising A0-3-1 included the following:
(1) The change results in an unnecessary increase in administrative work to authorize and document the call back of day shift personnel for assistance in trouble shooting plant problems which occur in the back shifts (2) The current union agreement contains a requirement for an P hour break between work periods.
(3) The 12-hour break between work periods vice the 24-hour sork limit in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period seriously limits the flexibilit' '. using key per-sonnel to resolve and correct plant problems in a prompt manner.
The inspectors had discussed the licensee's overtime criteria with the staff of the Region V Office of Inspection & Enforcement and with their agreement finds the licensee's overtime criteria acceptable and well with-in the intent of the requirements to limit excessive overtime which might jeopardize the workers ability to safely perform his/her duties.
I ? 2.1 Modify Training (Closed): The licensee's training program has been modified,as necessary,to provide:
(1) Training in heat transfer, fluid flow 'nd thermodynamics; (2) Training in the use of plant systems to con-trol and mitigate an accident in which the core is severely damaged;and (3) Increased emphasis on reactor and plant transients.
A description of the modified training program, Training Procedure (TP-2-2/
Rev. 8) " Retraining Program," was submitted to NRR for review on July 25, 1980. Training consistent with TP 2-2/Rev. 8 has beem implemented.since April of 1980.
II.E.4.2 Containment Isolation Dependability (Closed): The containment purge / exhaust valves are administratively required to be closed in Modes 1, 2, 3,and 4.
The valves are verified closed daily by observations of the position lights on the control board. The daily verification is doc-umented in Data Sheet No. P0T-24-2-D as required by Periodic Operating Test (P0T-24-2), " Daily Operating Routines." This verif. cation require-ment was implemented in Revision No. 14 to POT 24-2, ef)ective December 29,
1980.
II.B.4 Training for Mitigating Core Damage (Closed): The licensee's training organization has developed a lesson plan / lecture covering the
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use of installed plant equipment ar.d systems to control and mitigate
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accidents in which the core is severely damaged. The licensee has pro-
vided training on this subject to all licensed operators, license candi-dates and shift technical advisors.
II.E.4.2 Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations (Closed): The facility utilizes
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electric hydrogen recombiners which are permanently installed inside the
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-6-containment structure. These hydrogen recombiners do not require any
. dedicated penetrations for proper operation other than the existing electrical penetrations. Facility Procedure (P0T No. 3-1) provides for the appropriate periodic testing of the hydrogen recombiners as required by the facility technical specific 1tions. facility emergency procedures require the operation of the hydrogea recombiners when containment con-ditions indicate their operation is required.
II.K.3.9 Proportional Integral Deri_/ative Controller Modification (Closed):
The licensee issued design change No. RDC-79-042 and resultant detailed
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construction packages (DCP) 'nd wcr4 plans in 1979. The modifications accomplished under the above RDC/CCP included the readjustment of the power or2 rated relief valves (PORV) interlock set point to 2335 psig. This change in set point was based on a Westinghouse recommendation which ef-fectiveiy removes the proportional integral derivative controller from
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effecting the acuration of the P0RVs below the interlock set point. The
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modificatiw was completed and tested satisfactorily in luly,1979.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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- Event Report (LER) Followup
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int...-cumstances and corrective action described in LER No,. 81-05,
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81-06, 80-28, and 80-29 were examined by -the inspectors. The inspectors
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found that each LER had been reviewed by the licendec and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval. Corrective action for each
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event reported was as follows:
LER 81-05 (Closed): The licensee revised Administrative Order (AO-3-13/
Rev. 15), " Locked Valve List," to include the independent verification of the position of valves whose power. supplies are deenergized following valve operation. Revision 15 was issued on Arril 23, 1981.
LER 81-06 (Closed):
During routine calibration, steamline pressure channel 516 was found to have an erratic trip set point.
The subsequent trouble-
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shooting identified a capacitor as having failed. After replacement of the capacitor, the channel was recalibrated and tested satisf actorily. No
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previous failures of this capacitor type have occurred, and the licensee ascribed the failure as being random.
__ The licensee completed an engineering evaluation of LER 80-28 (Closed):
the circumstances and corrective action taken regarding the breaker fire in Motor Control Center B22. The evaluation concludes that the switchgear is properly sized and should safely handle the currents associated with operation of connected plant loads. The study recommends that preventive maintenance procedures be examined to provide for the inspection of the bus' wark in the vicinity of the stab connection when breaker maintenance
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-7-is performed. Should the bus work tin plating be worn off, the resulting contact between the aluminum base metal and the stab connector would pro-vide a higher than normal resistance contact. This condition in conjunc-tion with the rapid cycling of the load such as repeated starting of a large electrical motor, could result in contact overheating. The study also recommends that 0:erating procedures be reviewed to verify that they contain appropriate limitations on the number of starts large electrical motors are permitted in specified time intervals. This limitation is primarily for motor protection, but should also minimize the potential for bus work heating during starting current transients. The procedure reviews and any additional testing of the switchgear (if required) will be completed during the 1981 refueling outage.
LER 80-29 (Closed): During routine surveillance testing valve CV-5075 failed to close on receipt of a safety injection signal. This valve separates the Refueling Water Storage Tank from thr: Spent Fuel Puri-fication System and is in series with another valve (CV-5076). An in-vestigation by the licensee revealed that the solenoid valve in the con-trol air system was not consistent with the design. The solenoid install-ed was an AC housing, with a DC slug and coil installed in a DC control circuit.
Subsequent to this discovery, the licensee placed the two valves
.in the line (CV-5075 and its companion CV-5076) in the closed position by removing DC power to the solenoids.
The two solenoid valves have now been replaced by appropriately qualified DC solenoid valves and returned to service after testing, tlo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on Previous Inspection Finding / Allegation / Unusual Event a.
Allegation (Closed): At the request of the Region V Senior Inves-tigator, the inspectors contacted the licensee regarding an allega-tion that rock pockets existed in the base slab of the tendon gal-lery. Pictures provided by the anonymous alleger were also shown to the licensee. The licensee produced records form the construc-tion record files which demonstrated that the rock pockets were l
identified and appropriate corrective action ta!.en.
In er.ch case, high pressure grouting and reforming of the chipped out rock pocket areas resulted in correcting the deficiencies. The inspectors
toured the tendon gallery and found each of the identified areas properly repaired and showing no sign of deterioration since the completion of repairs in November of 1971.
b.
79-10-01 (Closed): The inspectors verified that the design changt flo, RDC-79-043 had been installed to correct the leakage problems associated with the fuel oil lines attached to the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pum _
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Unusual Event The inspectors examined the licensee action: taken as a result of the control board annunciators failing to reset af ter testing on Thursday, February 26, 1981. The circumstances were in!tially classified as an unusual event as described in the licensee's eme gency response plan.
Testing. performed by the licensee since the event has indicated that
'the alarm features of the control board annunciators were still func-tional-and alarms would have been indicated in the control room even though the reset feature following a system test was not functional.
The reset feature failed to function as a result of a blown fuse in
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the test / reset button circuit. The fuse was rated at 4 amps. Mea-surements of the test current made by the licensee indicate that under normal test conditions the annunciator test / reset circuit draws approx-imately 4 amps.
This situation was discussed with the manufacturer and a recommendation was made to install a 5-amp fuse.
The 5-amp fuse was installed and no problems have occurred as a result of periodic annunciator testing since the February 26, 1981, incident. The li-censee has initiated facility design change, RDC 81-042, which when completed will reorganize the annunciators into five separate zones, each zone having its own test / reset button circuit. This design will significantly reduce the current through the test / reset circuit and at the same time prevent a single fuse failure from affecting all annunciator test / reset circuits.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10. Review of Plant Trip On April 20, 1981, while troubleshooting starting problems of Service
Water Booster Pump C, a plant electrician inadvertently shorted over the phases of the breaker associated with the pump.
The worker was attempt-
ing to measure the voltage between the B phase and ground with a digital
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multimeter.
The worker apparently had used the milliampere jack which would have caused a direct short through the meter. The arc drawn on the B phase stab of the breaker caused a flashover to the other phases, and thereby shorted the breaker out. The flash caused superficial 1st and
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2nd degree burns on the workman's left hand and chest.
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The shorting out of the breaker caused a feeder breaker to Motor Control Center B 25 to open. The loss of power to B 25 interrupted power to in-strument busses Y01 and YO3 which provide control power to nonvital loads.
This caused the recirculation valves on the condensate pumps whose con-trol power is supplied by Y01 and Y03 to open, this subsequen' tty lowered flow of feedwater to the steam generators and the reactor tripped on re-ceipt of a low low level signal in a C steam generator.
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Power was subsequer tly restored'to Y01 -and Y03, meanwhile the plant re-I sponded normally to the trip with all safety related equipment available.
The licensee after determining the cause of the trip, and placing affect-ed equipment back in service, brought the plant back to power operation approximately_seven hours after the plant trip.
No items'of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3<it Interview
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The-inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on April 16 and May 1, 1981.
During these meetings, the Senior Residen'.
Inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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