IR 05000344/1981007
| ML20037D127 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1981 |
| From: | Book H, Cillis M, Fish R, Mckenna T, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037D126 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-81-07, 50-344-81-7, TAC-46275, NUDOCS 8105220033 | |
| Download: ML20037D127 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-344/81-07 Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards Group l
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
March 3-6, 1981 Inspectors:
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Thomas McKenna,' Team Leader Sate' Signed a645%L
&la R. F. Fish, Radiation Specialist
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M. Cillis, Radiation Specialist D/teSigned Approved by:
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f. A. Wens'lawski, Chief, Reactor Radiation Safety Dat'e Signed 4 ~2. k ection YM/n S k Approved by:
H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch 0 ate Signed
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Summary:
Inspection on March 3-6,1980 (Report No. 50-344/81-07)
Areas Inspected:
Announced inspection of the emergency plan exercise and associated licensee critique. The inspection involved 122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br /> onsite by nine (9) NRC inspectors and observers.
Results:
No items of noncomp?iance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
8105220033
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted C. Yundt, General Manager T. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor V. Parola, Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor L. Larson, Supervisor, Radioactive Material Control T. Walt, Supervisor, Radiological Engineering Section S. Gillespie, Radiological Engineer G. Zimmerman, Manager, Licensing Branch Other licensee personnel participating in the emergency plan exercise were also interviewed.
2.
Emergency Scenario Licensee personnel in Generation Licensing and Analysis developed an accident scenario to be used during the emergency plan exercise that took place on March 4,1981.
The scenario document provided information on the purposes, objectives and participating parties in addition io a description of the scenario and necessary data.
The data covered the period from 15 minutes before the initial event to 4.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after the initial event.
The initiating event was a loss of offsite power; however, it later developed into a total loss of a-c power with resultant loss of reactor coolant flow and a 20 per cent degradation of the core. The scenario included a contaminated and injured licensee employee as well as an employee who was contaminated but not injured.
Offsite releases of activity were incorporated into the scenario to provide for participation of offsite organizations (federal, state and local governments).
The emergency plan exercise using this scenario was intended to comply with the requirement for an exercise to be conducted within the first year of emergency plan implementation as required by Section III.F, Appendix E,10 CFR Part 50.
3.
Observers Three groups of observers were involved in the exercise evaluation.
The licensee provided observers (controllers) for those areas where Portland General Electric (PGE) personnel were participating in the exercise.
During the morning of March 3,1981, the licensee held an observer briefing that provided an opportunity for discussion on the scenario and recent modifications, conduct of the exercise and responses to questions raised by the observers.
The second group of observers were those associated with the NRC's evaluation of the exercise. A team of observers under the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X were present to evaluate the portions of the exercise that involved the local, state and
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4.
Exercise The exercise was initiated about 9:00 a.m. on March 4 and continued until about 1:30 p.m.
The exercise involved the following locations described in the frojan Radiological Emergency Plan:
control room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Centers (Hagan Rack area and Access Control area), Emergency Control Center (Emergency Operations Facility), Company Support Center and Unified Dose Assessment Center. Transport of an injured contaminated employee to Good Samaritan Hospital and the subsequent treatment at that hospital as well as St. Vircent Hospital, which is the backup medical facility, were included in the exercise.
Trojan personnel were also required to make offsite surveys in connection with that portion of the exercise involving the release of activity to the environment.
A second phase of the exercise was intended to provide for testing of the ingestion pathway portions of the Trojan Radiological Emergency Plan.
This phase was initiated following a period of time after the conclusion of the first phase at 1:30 p.m.
Only the FEMA observers were involved in the second phase of the exercise and the FEMA report (to be issued at a later date) will address pertinent information relative to this part of the exercise.
5.
Critique During the morning of March 5, the licensee held a critique of their portions of the exercise.
Controllers and participants, including the Emergency Response Manager (Vice President Nuclear),
were present and given an opportunity to present his/her observations and comments.
Less significant items were not presented, but were to be provided in writing to the appropriate personnel at a later time. The following summarizes the more important items identified during the critique as needing corrective action.
(a) Communications - Several problems involving the communications were identified.
The Control Room had some difficulty contacting the Access Control area.
The Coast Guard was not kept fully informed of the changing conditions, including event escalation, at the facility.
The two telephone circuits (an automatic ringing and a selective station signaling) that tie the two States, two Counties and Trojan together were not used to the intended effectiveness.
There appears to be a need for additional telephone circuits in the Emergency Operations Facility and r
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-3-the Unified Dose Assessment Center.
The operation of the two phone circuits connecting Trojan to the NRC was discussed and a lack of understanding regarding who was responsible for operating the Trojan portion of the lines was expressed.
(b) Technical Support Center (TSC) - There is a need to more clearly identify the transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator, located in the TSC, to the Emergency Response Manager who is located in the Emergency Operations Facility. Also the TSC may have been responsible for dose assessment longer than intended by the emergency plan.
(c) Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - Spacing and the locations of assigned functions and personnel in the EOF need to be re-evaluated. There is a need for a status board and a large display of information so that all personnel in the E0F have easy access to this data. The functions, duties and contact relationships of State representatives assigned to the EOF need to be better defined so that relations with licensee personnel at the EOF can be improved.
(d) Decontamination area at the E0F - There is a need for edditional spacing, particularly if a number of persons need to be decontaminated.
Additional survey instrumer.ts should be stored in this area.
There were insufficient technicians to process and control a large group of persons.
(e) Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC) - The transfer of directorship of UDAC from the Trojan Radiation Protection Supervisor to the State personnel was not satisfactory.
There is a need for periodically updating the UDAC on the status of the plant which didn't take place during the exercise.
The exchange of information between the UDAC and EOF needs to be improved.
The timeliness of dose assessments by the UDAC was questioned.
The UDAC needs to be assigned more space in order to function properly. The UDAC needs improved input from the State offsite monitoring teams. The offsite monitoring teams did not appear to receive information on wind direction and the lack of UDAC instructions to them was mentioned.
(f) Operational Support Center - Contamination control in connection with the technician's handling of the simulated injured employee and the contaminated employee needs to be improved.
Surveys by the technicians should be improved by using specific and repeated locations as well as providing a consistency in the survey instruments used. Also, records of the survey results should be made.
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-4-(g) Company Support Center (CSC) - The CSC should be supplied with a copy of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
preassigned individuals or positions should be designated for the communicator positions in the CSC.
The CSC does not appear to provide adequate spacing for the activities taking place there.
During the March 5 " Exit Interview" (See paragraph 7), the licensee described their method for assuring that appropriate corrective actions were taken with respect to the exercise findings.
The problems and deficiencies identified duiing the critique were recorded by an assigned individual.
The items discussed during the critique will be expanded by those lesser items provided in writing by observers and participants.
The exercise findings will be documented.
The responsibility for providing corrective actions relative to all the exercise findings,or assuring such actions are taken, belongs to Generation Licensing and Analysis.
Tne corrective actions may require modification (s) to the emergency plan, changes to implementing or operating procedures or provisions for additional training.
6.
General Information (a) On Friday morning, March 6, a summary of the exercise results was presented at the Longview, Washington City Hall Public Hearing Room.
This presentation was open to the public and media.
The Chairman of the Regional Advisory Committee, FEMA, chaired this session.
Representatives of the following organizations summarized the exercise findings from their standpoint:
FEMA Regional Advisory Committee, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, States of Oregon and Washington, Columbia County and Cowlitz County.
(b) The Regional Advisory Committee, FEMA Region X, observed the response of the Counties (Columbia and Cowlitz) and the States (Oregon and Washington) as well as the involvement of certain Federal agencies during this exercise.
The interface between the licensee and the various governmental groups was also evaluated. The Committee's observations and comments will be provided in writing to the. States and Counties so that corrective actions may be taken to improve their responses to emergencies at the Trojan plant.
7.
Exit Interview On March 5,1981, following the licensee's critique, an exit interview was held with the licensee to discuss the NRC findings.
Attachment A is a list of those attending this meeting.
The licensee was informed that there were no items of noncompliance or deviations.
Most of the items described in paragraph 5 above were also identified by the NRC observers and were referred to during this exit interview.
The following items were also discussed.
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-5-(a) Periodic updates on the status of the plant should be provided to the Radiation Safety personnel at the Access Control area so they could better perform their duties. Also, Radiation Safety Technicians should accompany operations and maintenance personnel while visiting involved areas of the plant during the emergency.
(b) Personnel monitoring devices should be issued to personnel at the EOF. According to the licensee, area eevices or devices issued to a limited number of persons are used to evaluate the exposures received by personnel working in the E0F. This position is based upon the EOF not being an area where significant radiation exposure would be received. Other action would be taken to evaluate personnel exposure at the E0F.if significant radiation levels were detected.
The licensee's position was considered to be reasonable.
(c) There should be protective action criteria established for the TSC.
The licensee stated that they intended to establish such criteria and, during the exercise, management was inquiring about exposures being received by TSC personnel with the intent of requiring protective action if it became excessive.
(d) The intended use of the two NRC telephone systems and the expected manning was also discussed.
The licensee was informed that there appeared to be a need for additional clarification on this matter.
The licensee had been informed that if significant deficie.ocies preventing appropriate protective measures are identified during the emergency plan exercise, they would be notified in writing and-given an opportunity to correct them within a four (4) month perk d.
None of the items needing corrective action were considered by the NRC to be significant because they did not prevent appropriate protective measures from being taken. With respect to those areas being evaluated by FEMA, the NRC would also notify the licensee in writing of those matters that needed to be corrected within a succeeding four month period. Separate correspondence may be used for the area under the jurisdiction of FEMA from that used for areas under jurisdiction of the NRC.
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Attaghment A Portland General Electric Company B. Withers, Vice P csident Nuclear J. Lentsch, Manager, Generation Licensing and Analysis T. Walt, Supervisor, Radiological Engineering Section R. Berkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance C. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services D. Keuter Operations Supervisor T. Meex, Radiation Protection Supervisor B. Susee, Training Supervisor H. Sager, Plant Quality Assurance Supervisor M. Bell, Chemistry Supervisor H. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor G. Zimmerman, Manager, Licensing Branch S. Gillespie, Radiological Engineer K. Murakami, Licensing Engineer M. Unger, QA Engineer'
J. Dunlop, QA Engineer NRC F.' Pagano, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch T. McKena. Team Leader R. Fish, Radiation Specialist, Region V M. Cillis, Radiation Specialist, Region V G. Johnston, Resident Inspector J. Sears, Senior Nuclear Engineer State of Oregon H. Moomey, Resident Engineer
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