IR 05000344/1981033
| ML20039F737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1981 |
| From: | Johnston G, Malmros M, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039F729 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-81-33, NUDOCS 8201130289 | |
| Download: ML20039F737 (6) | |
Text
I I
f U. S. ViUCLEAR REGUIATORY C0!StISSIOli
OFFICE OF I!!SPECTION AND ENFORCE!ENT
-
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/81-33 Docket No. 50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards Group Licensce:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
November 2-30, 1981 Inspectors:
A l-c,
/f, / f[/
M. GH. fOlmroO $enior Resident Inspector Date Sig6ed 0kW l$duralw /f /Wl
[G. M. Johhsto#,i Resident Inspector Date Sigried Date Signed Approved by:
/6,/9f/
G. S. ZWetzigd Chief, Reactor Operations Date Signe'd Projects Section 1, Reactor Operations Projects Branch Date Signed Summary:
Inspection on November 2-30, 1981 (Report 50-344/81-33)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations, surveillance testing, security activities, maintenance and followup on Licensee Event Reports. The inspection involved 147 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident
-
Inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
8201130209 811216
-
PDR ADOCK 05000344 G
_
.
f.
. s
,
.
-
>
P
.
DETAILS
_
1.
Persons Contacted
- C. P. Yundt, General Manager R. P. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services D. R. Keuter, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor.
R. P. Schmitt, Engineering Supervisor G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor P. A. Morton, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance and Construction The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During the month, the inspectors observed and examined activities-to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. The observations and examinations of those~ activities.were conducted on'
a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operations as prescribed in the facility technical specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On the occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on
'
plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent infor-mation was relayed to the oncoming shift.
-
f
-
,
,
r
.
_2_-
.
.
-
,
.
-
,
Duringeachweek,theinspectorstoured(heaccesslibleareasofthe facility to observe'the following; items:
,
+
a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and' repairs.
'
i c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting e_quipment.
d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control, e.
~ Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and appro'ved procedures, f.
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
i.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with tech-nical specification limiting conditions for operation, with respect to removal of equipment from service. Verification was achieved by selecting one safety-related system or component weekly and verify-ing proper breaker, switch, and valve positions, both for removing the system or component from service'and returning it to service.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved. Two groups were the subject of observation during shift turnover - the control room operators and security personnel at the main gate.
Tne inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective actio _
-
.
.-
-3-
'
,
.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and. test tags were examined by the inspectors. No jumpers or bypasses' appeared to have been
~
improperly installed or removed or:to have conflicted with the technical specifications.
Implementation of radiation ~ protection controls was verified by observing portions of; area' surveys; being performed, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments.were-also examined to verify operability and calibration' status.
Each week the inspectors verified the operability 'of a selected emergency safety features (ESF) train. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity, and general condition of the equipment.
ESF trains verified to be operable during the month included the hydrogen vent system and the emer-gency AC generation system.
.
The inspectors did an independent review of the reliability of operation of resilient seat valves as part of the containment I
isolation system.
Infonnation on resilient seat valves was dis-cussed with the NRR Licensing Project Manager, as an input into proposed changes to the technical specifications for the hydrogen vent system and containment purge / exhaust system valves.
During this examination, the inspector found that the licensee had limited the opening of the hydrogen vent system exhaust valves to 50 degrees in order to assure closure capability under design accident contain-ment isolation conditions.
The inspectors found that the. hydrogen vent system supply valves were not limited to the 50 degree opening restriction.
Communications with NRR and the licensee, corrected a misunderstanding of the 50 degree closure limitation as discussed in licensee correspondence with NRR dated January 14,1980, and October 2, 1981. The closure limitation was to be applied to the supply valves as well as the exhaust valves. The licensee immedia-tely instituted applicable administrative controls to preclude opening the hyorogen vent system supply valves pending physical changes to the valve operator which would limit the valve opening to 50 degrees.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintenance Maintenance activities involving preventive and corrective main-tenance were observed by the inspectors during the month.
Obser-vations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals, system clearances and test of redundant equipment were performed, as
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _
-4-
,.
.
appropriate, prior to maintenance of safety-related systems or components. The inspectors verified that qualified personnel perfortred the' maintenance using appropriate maintenance procedures.
Replacement parts were examined to determine the proper certifica-
~
tion of materials, workmanship and tests. During the actual per-formance of the maintenance activity, the inspectors checked for proper radiological controls and housekeeping, as appropriate.
Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspectors verified that the component or system was properly tested prior to returning the system or component to service.
During the month, maintenance activities observed were associated with the diesel air start system, waste gas compressors, instrument inverters, and portable radiation instruments.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifjed.
.
'
4.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related' systems was witnessed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors' included verifica-
~
-
tion that proper procedures were_used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure.
Following
~
completion of the surveillance ~ tests, the inspectors. verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of the technical
~
specifications and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel.
The inspectors also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for'any unacceptable test results and to restore the system 'or= component to an operable status consistent with the technical specification requirements.
Surveillance tests witnessed during the month were associated 'with the following systems: emergency diesels, hydrogen vent and contain-ment spray systems.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The circumstances and corrective actions described in LER Nos. 81-22, 81-23, 81-24, and 81-25 were examined by the inspectors. The inspectors found that each LER had been reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval.
The corrective actions for each event reported was as follows:
.
.
,
'
e
?
-5-
.
'
,.
LER 81-22 (Closed): Operations personnel have been instructed that during the performance of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Periodic Operating Test (P0T 20-1) to verify the actual position of the damper and not to use the handle position for indication of position. The setscrew holding the handle to the operator shaft had worked loose, the licensee determined that tightening of the setscrew was all that was required to correct the problem.
LER 81-23 (Closed): The licensee'has included the containment Atmosphere Sample Return Valve M0-5672 on the outage' list for inspection during the coming refueling outage.
Due to ALARA guidelines the valve cannot be inspected at present. After exer-cising the valve, it did close with a time of 8 seconds (Technical Specification requirement is 10 seconds). The problem is assumed to be binding between the valve stem and packing, the valve exer-cising appears to have alleviated the problem.
LER 81-24 (Closed): The broken light bulb socket was replaced which corrected the short circuit path which had caused a loss of DC control power to the emergency diesel generator. The 1.ight socket holder had broken, and when pressure was applied to replace a light bulb,'the socket was pushed into the panel and made contact with a circuit board behind the light socket. The emergency diesel was verified operable by applicable automatic start testing follow-ing completion of repairs.
LER 81-25 (0 pen): The failed current sensing relay was replaced and the inverter was returned to normal operation.
Relays in the other three inverters were examined and two were found in need of replacement. The specific cause of the relay failure has been tentatively identified as a capacitor and resistor failure which is being evaluated by a circuit and component service factor analysis by the licensee and the relay' supplier. The inspectors will examine
~
the results of the above analysis during subsequent inspections.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on November 17 and December 1, 1981.
During these meetings, the Senior Resident Inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
-
.
9 P
f (