IR 05000338/1987006

Insp Repts 50-338/87-06 & 50-339/87-06 on 870318-0416.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Ler, Review of Inspector Followup Items & ESF Walkdown

ML20209F260
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	04/23/1987
From:	Caldwell J, Cantrell F, King L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209F248	List: IR 05000338/1987006 ML20209F244
References
50-338-87-06, 50-338-87-6, 50-339-87-06, 50-339-87-6, NUDOCS 8704300246
Download: ML20209F260 (9)

Text

km ra!g UNITED STATES

'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d

[" o RE GION 11 g j l'J1 MARIETTA STREET. *,

2 ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 s.,..../

Report Nos.: 50-338/87-06 and 50-339/87-06 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 18 - April 16, 1987 Inspectors: h/)2 J. L. CaldWeI~l, SRI E# / [23[8 7 Date Signed L. P. King, RI 22 WM/D Date Signed Approved by: 5 /

F. 5. Cantrell, Section Chief Yk3/C

/ Date Signed DivisionofReactofProjects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved the following areas: plant status, licensee action on previous enforcement matters, licensee event report (LER followup), review of inspector follow-up items, monthly maintenance observation, mont'ly surveillance observation, ESF walkdown, and operator safety verification. During the performance of this insaection, inspectors conducted reviews of the licensee's backshift and weekend operations on the following days - April 3, 4, 8, 9 and 13,198 Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000338 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted

• E. W. Harrell, Station Manager R. C. Driscoll, Quality Control (QC) Manager

• G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

• E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

• M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics

• J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services J. L. Downs, Superintendent, Administrative Services J. R. Ilayes, Operations Coordinator D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor G. D. Gordon Electrical Supervisor R.A.BergquIst,InstrumentSupervisor F. T. Terminella, QA Supervisor J. P. Smith, Superintendent, Engineering D. B. Roth, Nuclear Specialist J. H. Leberstein, Engineer

• G. Harkness, Licensing Coordinator

• P. E. Quarles, Quality Assurance Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview NRC Regional Management Site Visit: F. S. Cantrell and V. Panciera visited the North Anna Power Station on flarch 11, 198 . ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 14, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Plant Status Unitj Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at approximately 100% power and maintained that power level until approximately March 28, 1987, when the unit began a coastdown to the refueling outage. The unit is presently operating at 86% power and the shutdown for the refueling outage is u

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scheduled to begin April 19, 1987. As of the completion of this inspection period, Unit I has been operating on line continuously for 167 days.

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i Unit 2 Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at approximately 100% power and maintained that power level throughout the inspection period. As of the completion of this inspection period, Unit 2 has been operating on l line continuously for 180 days.

l l Common to Both Units The licensee has completed the connection of the new service water return headers number 3 and number 4 and the associated spray arrays. These headers have been hydrostatically tested, flow checked and are now operationa The station manager completed a tour and inspection of plants in both Switzerland and Spain during the week of March 23-30, 198 The purpose of these visits was to review each of the countries' method of nuclear operatio . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 339/81-26-01: Main Steam Line Snubber 2-SHP-HSS-219A Was not Functionally Tested Prior to Returning to Service. The snubber was removed after being returned to service and sent to ITT for functional testing. The snubber satisfactorily passed the functional test in an "as installed" condition. This item was closed based on licensee response to '

notice of violatio (Closed) Part 21 338,339/83-01: Circuit Breaker Failures. The licensee informed the inspectors that this Part 21 does not apply since they do not

! use the circuit breakers in questio . License Event Report (LER) Follow-up (90712 & 92700)

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identifie ,

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(Closed) LER 338/86-03 (Rev. 0 & 1): Failure of Radiation Monitors Oue to Software Design and Other Problems. The software problems that were being experienced have been corrected by the latest revision of software from Kama (Closed) LER 339/86-04 (Rev. 0 & 1): Loss of Administrative Control. A program change has been completed by engineering to eliminate this problem from the computer program. The problem was caused by a failure to inspect the required number of snubber . Review of Inspector Follow-up Items (92701)

(Closed) IFI 338,339/86-13-01: QA Item The inspectors discussed the differences with the manager of quality assurance and are aware of the reason for the discrepancie (Closed) IFI 338,339/85-27-02: Diesel Generator Reliability Improvement Progra The original commitments made to replace the oil with Chevron Dello 6000 have been completed. The licensee will continue to monitor bushing gap measurements. This will be routinaly reviewed by the inspector (0 pen) URI 338,339/87-01-05: Raychem Splice Problem The licensee has completed the inspection of all the Raychem splices outside of Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments with the exception of a few splices located in high radiation areas. The results of this inspection are as follows; Unit 1 Unit 2 731 720 Total number of splices inspecte Number of splices which failed relaxed Raychem criteria, but passed the operability criteri These splices will be repaire Number of splices which failed all the latest available operability test criteria. These splices were provided with JCOs and are being repaire Of the splices which failed the operability criteria, none were determined by the licensee to be reportable based on their Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) evaluatio The licensee plans to inspect all of the Raychem splices located inside containment during the upcoming refuelingoutages. This item will remain open pending the findings of the licensee s inside containment inspection . Monthly Maintenance (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were

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conducted in accordance with aporoved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification On March 23, 1987, the licensee experienced a loss of charging flow to the Unit 2 vessel and reactor coolant pump seals. This loss of flow occurred following the securing of the C charging pump. At the time of the event the A charging pump was operating in parallel with the C charging pump in preparation for securing the C pump. Upon securing the C pump the operators noticed a loss of charging flow to the vessel and the reactor coolant pumps. The operators then restarted the C pump which reestablished normal charging flo Following the event the licensee determined the apparent cause of the loss of charging was the failure of the C charging pump discharge check valve to close. This allowed charging flow to bypass the normal flow path through the secured C charging pump. The operators cycled the C pump discharge check valve several times and were unable to repeat the failur After discussions with the licensee the inspector discovered that this check valve appeared to have failed in March of 1986. Following the first apparent failure the licensee cycled the check valve several times and could not repeat the failure. Based on this testing the licensee declared the valve operable without further inspection. The check valve has operated satisfactorily during numerous surveillance tests and charging pump manipulations since the first failure. However, since the same valve appears to have failed twice the licensee agreed with the inspector that the check valve and the associated charging pump should be declared inoperable until an inspection could be performed on the valv On March 27, 1987, the licensee disassembled and inspected the internals of the C pump discharge check valve. This maintenance was performed under maintenance work order number 5900055183 and the engineering evaluations associated with this maintenance were documented under engineering work request number 87-278. The inspection did not identify any damage to the valve body or disc. However the inspection did discover a grit like substance inside the valve hinge pin bushings located between the pin and bushing Since no other problems were identified with check valve the licensee concluded that the debris found inside the pin bushings was the cause of the check valve sticking open. The licensee removed the debris from the valve internals and replaced the scratched valve hinge pin and bushings. The valve was reassembled, tested and on April 7, 1987, declared operational. The licensee has agreed to submit a voluntary LER documenting this event and their corrective actions. The inspector will continue to monitor the charging pump discharge check valve operation On March 30, 1987, the licensee conducted piston pin bushing gap inspections of the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) under Maintenance Work Order (MW0) 5900053396 and Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MMP-P-EG-1.5, Mechanical EDG Piston Pin Bushing Clearances. This inspection was being conducted based on a previous licensee commitment to

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measure the piston pin bushing gaps every six months or every 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of {

EDG operation, whichever came first. Prior to this inspection none of the !

piston pin bushing gap measurements had shown any elongation of the '

bushings. However this inspection of the 1H EDG , its third six month inspection, revealed extrusion of the number 9 and the number 12 position pin bushings. The number 9 bushing gap de creased from the previous measurement of 0.033 to a measurement of .019 and the number 12 bushing gap measurement decreased from .028 to no gap at al The licensee removed the connecting rods, bushings and piston inserts from the number 9 and 12 upper cylinders and replaced them with new ones. The 1H EDG was then reassembled and tested per an abbreviated run in schedule of MMP-C-EG-1,1-M0P-6.90 and the surveillance test 1-PT-82A. Based on the replacement of the defective components, performance of satisfactory testing and an in house Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) the licensee declared the 1H EDG operationa The JC0 was based on the operating history of the 1H EDG since the last overhaul in 1985. Of the total run time of 74.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> since the last overhaul, approximately 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> were performed with the oil which was

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previously determined to be the wrong type. The licensee also felt the 31 l fast starts, 30 of which occurred proir to the technical specification l change which greatly reduced the number of required fast starts, also contributed to the piston pin bushing extrusio Since the exact cause of the piston pin failures is not understood, the licensee has developed an extensive testing and inspection program. This program will involve full dimensional inspection, various surface l examinations, and destructive and non-destructive testing of the piston

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pins and floating bushings removed from the 1H EDG number 9 and 12 upper cylinders. The licensee expects to issue a report of their findings and determination of the root cause by the third quarter of 1987. The licensee has also informed the NRC that they will overhaul both the 1H and 1J EDGs during the up coming refueling outage, commencing April 19, 198 During this overhaul the licensee has committed to replacing all of the floating bushings and piston pins in the upper and lower cylinders. The cylinder liners, insert bushings and bearings will also be inspected and replaced as necessar To ensure the 1H and 1J EDGs come out of the outage with a new base line, the oil will be replaced and dimensional checks will be performed and recorded on all new components.

l On March 26, 1987, the inspectors observed unloading of new 17x17 fuel j elements.

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Minor Maintenance Procedure ADM 16.15 was reviewed by the inspectors. The minor maintenance log book was reviewed for adherence to the procedur :

No items were identified in the log book.which would be classified outside ,

of the items allowed to be worked under ADM 16.15, Minor Maintenance Procedure. The inspectors have requested that the licensee provide a list of open safety related work requests that are designated as outage relate _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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On April 14, 1987, the inspectors observed removal of new fuel from dry storage racks and placement in the spent fuel pool, No problems were note On April 15, 1987, the inspectors attended the briefing prior to the hydrostatic and flow test of #1 and #3 service water header No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance (61726)

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The inspectors observed / reviewed Technical Specification required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve The inspectors witnessed portions of 2-PT-213.1, Valve Inservice

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Inspection Blowdown System on April 16, 1987. No problems were I

identifie On April 4,1987, the inspectors observed the hydrostatic testing of the new service water (SW) header number 4 connection to the SW system and the supply header number 2 per generic hydrostatic procedure AT-TMD-4. This hydrostatic test was being performed to test the modifications performed l by Design Change Packages (OCPs) 84-43, 84-99 and 85-4 During the performance of the test, the boundaries were changed due to the inability to obtain test pressure. The inspector discussed this situation with the

! Quality Control (QC) inspectcrs who performed the leakage inspections and l determined that they were aware of the change in test boundaries and knew when their specific inspection points were pressurized. The inspector also discussed this change in the test boundaries with tne test director and was informed that the procedure test boundaries would be modified to l reflect the actual test configuration and that for the next header l hydrostatic test, contingency boundaries would be established )rior to the 3erformance of the test. On April 15, 1987, the inspectors caserved the l

lydrostatic test of new SW return header number 3 and supply header number

. This test was conducted without requiring changes to the test boundarie Following the performance of the hydrostatic test on April 4,1987, the licensee conducted flow testing of the new number 4 return header and associated spray arrays. This flow testing was performed to confirm that the new spray arrays would meet the design criteria of the service water syste This flow testing was being conducted in accordance with DCP 84-43, Service Water Reservoir Improvements Final System Tie-In and Start-Up/ North Anna 1 and 2. While observing the performance of the flow testing the inspector became aware of discrepancies between the actual performance of the test and the description of the sequence and test performance in DCP 84-4 The DCP required a SNSOC (Safety Committee)

review of the hydrostatic test results prior to the performance of the

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flow test and did not describe the type of tests that were actually being conducte Discussions with personnel associated with the test led the inspector to believe that they also did not understand why SNSOC approval had not been obtained. During the performance of the flow test, data was being informally taken on blank sheets of paper by several different personnel associated with the test. This data was not being taken in accordance with the DCP. Following the flow tests, the inspector discussed his concerns with the test director. The inspector was informed '

that a change to the DCP had been made a day earlier which allowed the performance of the flow tests to be conducted on a SW supply and return header which was not being used by the operating units. Therefore, the flow tests would not affect the operating units and did not need SNSOC approval for performance. The test director also informed the inspector i that since the operation of the SW headers did not affect the plant, he i was performing additional testing to further verify the compliance of the

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new return header with design requirements. The DCP had not betn changed

properly to reflect this new method of testing, but the inspector was l satisfied that the approach was sound and that the test director

! understood what was go'ing o The test director committed to documenting this problem, correcting the DCP and modifying the flow test for the number 3 return header to reflect the testing being performed. The licensee also compiled all of the informal data from the first test, formalized it and presented it to SNSOC for their review prior to the i number 4 header being declared operational. On April 15, 1987, the <

l inspectors observed the flow tests of the number 3 SW return header and determined the tests were performed in accordance with procedures and had l no additional comments. It should also be noted that the test director conducted test briefings prior to the performance of the hydrostatic test and flow test of the number 3 return header. These briefings were being conducted to ensure that all persons associated with the tests understood l

what was being performe As of the evening of April 15, 1987, the new return headers and spray 1 arrays for the SW system were fully operational at the North Anna Power

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Station. This basically completes a long-term design modification to the SW system to improve its performanc No violations or deviations were identifie j 1 ESF System Walkdown (71710) i The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a I

.walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on April 16, 1987:

Unit 1 1-0P-7.8A - Na0H Chemical Addition System 1-0P-7.10A - Casing Cooling System No violations or deviations were identified.

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11. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with selected Technical Specification (TS) and Limiting Conditions for Operation i In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the resident inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organization and operations or maintenanc On a regular basis, Radiation Work Permits (RWP) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being 1 conducted aer the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodical'y checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was verifie The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both I units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in l progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and l'

equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annuciator alarms, and housekeepin The following comments were noted:

The inspectors are reviewing calculations provided at their request by the licensee to ensure that the auxiliary feedwater system will meet its design flow requirements without experiencing NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) problem The inspectors are also reviewing three deviations identified by the licensee in their review of the auxiliary feedwater syste No violations or deviations were identifie __ _ _ _ _____