IR 05000338/1987027

Insp Repts 50-338/87-27 & 50-339/87-26 on 870817-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Snubber Surveillance Program,Ieb 85-001,IEIN 85-045 & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings

ML20235C353
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	09/16/1987
From:	Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235C282	List: IR 05000338/1987027 ML20235C279
References
50-338-87-27, 50-339-87-26, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-85-45, NUDOCS 8709240426
Download: ML20235C353 (7)

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• ' R ftEC UNITED STATES c/ .,

o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Re'p ort Nos.: 50-338/87-27 and 50-339/87-26 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond,' VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7~

Facility Name:. North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 17-2 1987 Inspector: 4 9 3 7

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J.J.Lenahang Date Signed Approved by: M YO F. Jape, Chief V ' Date Signed Test Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas.of the snubber surveillance program, IE8 85-01, IEN 85-45, licensee action on previous inspection findings, and settlement of Category I structure Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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8709240426 870917 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G PD _ ._ _ - - - _ - . _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _

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kEPORT DETAILS- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees M. L.. Bowling, Assistant Station manager l

• G.'Harkness, Licensing Coordinator L. N. Hartz, ISI Engineer

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• E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager J. A. Stall, Superintendent Technical Services G. Swan, ISI Specialist NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Caldwell L. King

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August'21, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described:the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The following new item was identified during this inspection:

Unresolved Item - 338/87-27-01 - Review of Licensee's Engineering Evalua-tions' of Snubber' Visual Inspection and Functional Test Results The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this Mspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 339/85-33-01, In. adequate Justification for Rejecting Test Results. The licensee has established test acceptance criteria based in part on the agreement between successive test

. observ'ation The acceptable difference is based upon accumulated experience. The licensee's test method was reviewed and accepted by a Region II specialist inspector during an inspection conducted January 6-10, 198 (See Inspection Report 338, 339/86-01).

UNR 339/85-33-01 is close ________-_ - -

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4. Unresolved Items Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. One unresolved item identified during this inspection i discussed in paragraph . Snubber Surveillance Program Units 1 and 2 (70370)

The inspector reviewed procedures and quality records related to the snubber surveillance program, and inspected selected snubbers installed on various piping systems. Acceptance criteria examined by the inspector appear in Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.10.

' Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedures The inspector examined the following procedures which control the l

snubber surveillance program:

(1) Procedure 1-PT-79.0, Snubber Maintenance Tracking Procedure (2) Procedure numbers 1-PT-79.1 and 2-PT-79.1, Hydraulic Snubbers Accessible for Visual Inspection During Reactor Operation (3) Procedure numbers 1-PT-79.2 and 2-PT-79.2, Hydraulic Snubbers Not Accessible for Visual Inspection During Reactor Operation (4) Procedure numbers 1-PT-79.3 and 2-PT-79.3, Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing (5) North Anna Power Station Inservice Inspection Manual, Procedure ISI- (6) Inservice Inspection Snubber Listings, Procedure ISI- Inspection of Snubbers The inspector examined approximately 150 safety-related snubbers installed on various piping systems in the Unit I containment building. During the inspection, the inspector verified that the snubbers were not damaged, that attachments to the piping and supporting structure were secure, that fluid level in reservoirs was above target level, and that there was no leakage from fluid connections. The inspector and licensee representative noted that the snubber accumulator (reservoir) system for the "B" Loop large bore snubbers was reading empty. In order to investigate this problem, the licensee prepared special test procedure 1-ST-72, large Bore Snubber Accumulator System Trouble Shooting, and issued Work

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Order Number 5900064664 to perform the special test and make any necessary repairs to the snubber reservoir and fluid connection The licensee will determine operability of the snubbers based on evaluation of the completed ST-72 result Review of Quality Records The inspector examined the following quality records:

(1) Results of visual inspections performed on Unit 1 inaccessible snubbers in April - May 29, 198 (2) Deficiency Report Numbers87-377, 382, 387, 388, 389, 393, 394, and 39 (3) Results of Functional Tests performed on Unit 1 Snubber Numbers RC 105A, RC-863, SI 101A, SHP-462 RS 205B and SHP-20 (4) Engineering Work Request (EWR) 87-43 Review of the above records disclosed the following problems: During visual inspection of inaccessible snubbers, the valve block for large bore snubber Number 1-RC-005B was found to be empt In addition, the fluid port was exposed (i.e., the fluid reservoir was empty) for snubber Number 1-RS-205B and fluid was low in the reservoir for snubber Number 1-SHP-20 Per the requirements of TS 4.7.10.b, snubbers RS-205B and SHP-205 were functionally tested: " Lock-up" values were found to be outside the licensee's specified limit The functional test results for snubber Numbers RC-863 and RC-105A were also outside the specified limits. These problems were documented on Deficiency Reports and engineering evaluations were performed concerning the empty valve block in snubber 1-RC-005B and the functional test results outside the specified limits. The results of the evaluations were documented on EWR 87-434 for snubber 1-RC-005B and in various memos transmitted to the site ISI Engineer by the VEPC0 Engineering Mechanics Grou EWR 87-434 more or less stated that the problem with snubber 1-RC-005B was the result of an isolated event. The inspector questioned whether this was an " isolated event" since similar problems have occurred previousl The memos concerning the other apparent snubber functional test failure did not contain sufficient information to assess the validity of the licensee's engineering evaluations of the functional test failure Pending further review of the licensee's justifications for the above stated engineering evaluations, this item was identified to the licensee as Unresolved Item 338/87-27-01, Review of Licensee's Engineering Evaluations of Snubber Visual Inspection and Functional Test Result Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie .

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6. Settlement of Category I Structures (61701)

On June 1,1987, the licensee determined that differential settlement between the Service Building (Settlement Point 117) and the Unit 2 Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) (Settlement Point 113) exceeded 75 percent of the allowable value of 0.03 feet listed in TS Ta' ole 3.7-5. TS 3/4.7.12 requires that a special report be made to the NRC within 60 days when the measured differential settlement exceeds the 75 percent value. On July 30, the licensee contacted NRC Region II and requested an extension i until August 14, 1987 for submittal of the special report. The licensee '

I submitted the required special report to NRC in a letter dated August 14, 1987, Serial No.87-504, Subject: Differential Settlement Between the Service Building and Unit 2 MSV The inspector reviewed the report and the settlement data collected for Settlement points 113 and 117. Review of the data disclosed that since May 1,1978, the measured differential settlement between these points has ranged between .010 and .026 fee Review of the settlement data for Point 113 shows measured settlement of point 113 ranging from -0.010 to 0.008 fee The negative number indicates apparent upward movement of the MSV The measured settlement of point 117 ranges between 0.005 and 0.023 feet since May 1, 1978. The difference in measured settlement of each point is the differential settlement. In consideration of the accuracy of the survey methods, the measured elevation for each point is probably accurate to within plus or minus .005 feet, and it would be more realistic to round the measured elevations off to the closest .01 fee If this was done, the measured i settlement of the MSVH since July 7,1977, the baseline date, would be 0.000 while the measured settlement of the service building would be .020 )

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feet. The differential settlement would be .020 feet which is less then 75 percent of the allowable value. Review of the survey data shows that the settlement of both structures, and of other Category I structures on site has been essentially zero since May 1, 1978. The .020 settlement of Point 117 occurred between July 7, 1977 and May 1, 1978. Based on stress analyses conducted on the service water lines, the licensee has concluded that a differential settlement of .047 feet would result in stresses in the service water lines of 44,176 psi, which is below the code allowable value of 45,000 ps The current allowable settlement of 0.030 feet 4 results in stresses of 37,707 psi. Therefore, the licensee is considering requesting a change in the TS Table of the allowable settlement value of 0.030 to 0.047 feet. This is conservative since the code allowable stress values contain inherent safety factor The licensee has been conducting the settlement surveys on a monthly basis since June 1,1987, and will continue monthly monitoring for a period of six months to confirm that there has been no additional settlenent of the MSVH and Service Buildin The inspector has no further questions at this tim Within the area inspected, no deviations or violations were identifie )

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(Closed) IE Bulletin 85-01, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

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The licensee responded to this bulletin in a letter to NRC dated February 18,1986 (Serial Number 85-797) Subject: IEB 85-01. In order to detect a potential proble.m of steam binding of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps, the licensee monitors the temperature of the .AFW pump discharge lines once each shift to verify that the piping is not hot to the touch. Surveillance of the AFW discharge piping is recorded in Safeguards Logs 1-LOG-6F and 2-LOG-6F. If the temperature of the piping appears to be greater than ambient, a contact pyromoter is used to measure the pipe temperature. If the temperature is found to be greater than 150 F, the Shift Supervisor is notified and he takes the appropriate steps to determine if the AFW pump is steam bound. The shift supervisor determines if any corrective action is necessary to restore the AFW system to operable statu The inspector reviewed Abnormal Procedure Number AP-22.9, Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valve Leakage, which addresses steps to

'be taken to vent the AFW pumps to restore the AFW system to operable status and addresses additional periodic testing required to verify the AFW pumps are'not steamboun In addition, the licensee performs monthly monitoring of the AFW pump under Procedure Numbers PT-71.1, PT-71.2 and PT-7 The licensee's action in response to this bulletin was examined extensively by the resident inspecto The results of the resident inspector's inspections are documented in various monthly inspection reports under routine surveillance inspections. Specific inspection of IEB 85-01 is documented in Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/84-06 and 50-339/84-0 IEB 85-01 is close . IE Informaiton Notice (IEN) 85-45, Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable Incore Flux Mapping System used in Westinghouse Designed Plants IEN 85-45 provided information to licensees regarding possible interaction between the non safety-related portions of the flux mapping system and the seal table in Westinghouse designed plants during a seismic event. The possible interactions existed because portions of the flux mapping system that had not been seismically designed were located directly above the incore instrumentation tubing / seal table. The inspector examined the licensee's evaluation of IEN 84-45 documented in a memo dated June 26, 1985, Subject: IEN 85-45. The memo stated that the licensee had reviewed the calculations for the thimble guide and storage frame structure mounted over the seal table and determined that this structure had been analyzed for seismic loading and meets design criteria. The inspector examined the

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Stone and Webster Construction drawings which show the details of the thimble storage frame and guide structure. Drawings examined were as

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Drawing Number Title 11715-FV-78A-3 Unit 1 Thimble Guide and Storage Frame Assembly-Sheet 1 11715-FV-788-2 Unit 1 Thimble Guide and Storgae Frame Assembly-Sheet 2 12050-FV-78A-3 Unit 2 Thimble Guide and Storage Frame Assembly-Sheet-1 12050-FV-788-2 Unit 2 Thimble Guide and Storage Frame Assembly-Sheet-2 The inspector examined the Unit i seal table and verified that the thimble guide and storage frame was constructed in accordance with the drawing requirements ard verified that there was no other equipment installed in the proximity of the seal table which could interact with the seal table during a seismic event. IEN 85-45 is close . Previously Identified Inspector Follow-up Item (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 338, 339/85-07-01, Review Snubber Surveillance Procedure The inspector reviewed the snubber tables attached to procedures listed in Paragraph 5.a. above. Based on this review, the inspector determined that the listings appeared to be complete and accurate. Discussions with the ISI engineer disclosed that the Unit 1 snubber tables are currently being updated to account for snubbers changed, deleted, or added by design changes incorporated during the recently completed Unit I refueling cutage. IFI 338, 339/85-07-01 is close Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Temporary Instruction (TI) Closecut (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/69 - Inspection of Response to IEB 85-01. This TI was issued to define the inspection, reporting and evaluation responsibilities of NRC inspectors for IE Bulletin 85-01. The inspector completed the inspector requirements detailed in the TI during this inspection (See paragraph 7). (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/16 - Inspector to Determine if a Potential Seismic Interaction Exists Between Movable Incore Flux Mapping System and Seal Table at Westinghouse Designed Facilities of Facility of Similar Desig This TI defined the NRC inspector requirements for IE Information Notice 85-45. The inspector completed the requirements detailed in the TI during this inspection (See paragraph 8).

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