IR 05000338/1981027

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IE Insp Repts 50-338/81-27 & 50-339/81-24 on 811006-1105.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previous Insp Findings,Maint Outage Activities,Lers & Operational Safety
ML20039B648
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/27/1981
From: Dance H, Shymlock M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20039B643 List:
References
50-338-81-27, 50-339-81-24, NUDOCS 8112230341
Download: ML20039B648 (7)


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o, UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

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E REGION 11

o 101 MARIETTA ST N.W SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o

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Report flo. 50-338/81-27 and 50-339/81-24 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility llame:

florth Anna Units 1 and 2 i

Docket flos. 50-338 and 50-339 License fios. fiPF-4 and f4PF-7 Inspection at florth Anna site near Mineral, Virginia Inspector:

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fi. B. Shymlock

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Date Signed Approved by:

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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUl111ARY Inspection on October 6 - flovember 5,1981

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Unit 1 Findings This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 90 inspector-hours on

site in the areas of followup of previous inspection findings, licensee event reports, previously identified items, maintenance outage activities, operational sa fety, plant operations, and surveillar.ce and maintenance activities.

Unit 1 Findings Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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Unit 2 Areas Inspected

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This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 65 inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup of previous inspection findings, previously identified items, maintenance and surveillance activities, operational safety, and plant operations.

Unit 2 Findings

Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

i 8112230341 811127 PDR ADOCK 05000338

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. R. Cartwright, Station fianager E. W.Harrell, Assistant Station flanager J. A. Hanson, Superintendent - Technical Services J. R. Harper, Superintendent - !!aintenance S. L. Harvey, Superintendent - Operations
  • T. R. Johnson, QC Engineer J. ti, llosticone, Operations Coordinator F. Terminella, Engineering Supervisor H. L. Travis, flPE Engineering Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Electrical Supervisor J. R. Stratton, Supervisor flechanical liaintenance
  • fi. E. Fellows, Staff Assistant Other licensee employees contacted included six technicians, six operators, three mechanics, and four office personnel.
  • Attended one or more exit interviews 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 5,1981, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violations (338/81-05-06 and 339/81-03-05), Failure to take corrective action and to institute measures to assure adequacy of corrective action.

These violations are closed based on issuoiice of administrative procedure ADM-29.17, Incore flovable Detector Background Characterization dated April 24, 1981 and its implementation.

This procedure identifies a required review of flux traces at least once per shift. The commitment Tracking Program issued *as ADM-48.0 dated September 16, 1981, and its subsequent implementation addresses tracking corrective actions. This procedure identifies the method by which commitments and completion of corrective actions will be tracked.

(Closed) Violations (338/81-05-08 and 339/81-03-07), Failue to follow setpoint change procedure.

These violations are closed based on the licensee's review of all completed setpoint changes and the issuance of administrative procedure Adit-10.7, Setpoint Changes, and its implementation.

The inspector reviewed ADft-107.7 in detail, and it appears to provide an adequate procedure for processing of setpoint changes.

The licensee has also submitted a request to change Section 6 of the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance llanual (NPSQAtl).

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(Closed) Violation (338/81-02-01), Failure to conduct eighteen month calibration-on Radiation lionitoring Instruments RftS-159 and Rf1S-160. These calibration requirements have been identified as Periodic Test 1-PT-38.2.1.5 for.RitS-159 and 1-PT-38.2.1.6 for RftS-160.

These periodic tests have been

placed on the periodic test schedule program.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Plant Status j

Unit 1 j

The unit operated until October 7 at which time it was removed for the fall maintenance outage. Several of the major work items were:

Ultrasonic test

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of loop flow splitters, replacement of C reactor coolant pump seal, reactor coolant pump bolt corrosion inspection, and Tl1I modifications.

The unit was returned to service November 1.

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'Jnit 2 The unit operated at or near capacity load except for the following: unit trip October 3 due to an electrohydraulic control oil line rupture on #4 governor, and a unit trip (October 4) due to loss of generator field.

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6.

Followup of Previuasly Identified Items i

i (Closed) IFI 338/79-33-01 and 339/79-43-01, Certain types of 11 7300 series process cards are subject to failure due to heat sink shorting.

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licensee has changed out all applicable type cards on Unit 1 and 2.

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performed a verification of the above actions on a sampling basis by selected cards and review of records.

(Closed) IFI 339/80-17-03,-Interim sampling system pressure indicator PI-SS-126 partially blocked from viewing by existing shielding. _The licensee has relocated the above gage for better visibility in accordance with f1R N2-81-03171430.

(Closed) IFI 338/80-19-04 and 339/80-20-04, Centrifugal charging pump flow I

may be inadequate for cooling following a secondary side high energy breik.

Plant modification DC 80-563 was completed on December 2, ~1980, it removed the automatic closure feature on the charging pump recirculation valves initiated by a safety injection signal.

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(Closed) IFI 338/81-13-01, Promulgation and scheduling of 1-PT-61.4.

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licensee has promulgated periodic test 61.4 for Unit 1 and its scheduling has been implemented on the periodic test schedule program.

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~(Closed) IFI 338/81-02-02, Verification-that diesel would not trip upon

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siiedding a 610 kW load.

Periodic test 1-PT-83.1 verifies this requirement.

This periodic test is on the periodic test schedule program.

-(Closed)IFI 339/81-01-01, Verification of diesel operation under test condition. Periodic test 2-PT-83.1 test that on a load rejection greater than or equal to 610 kW the voltage and frequency are maintained within 4160

+ 1.2 Hz. This periodic test is on the periodic test schedule program.

(Closed)IFI 338/79-35-01, status of Design Change (DC) relative to installation of permanent piping inlieu of rubber hoses for processing

liquid waste.

DC-78-67 was completed on July 3,1980, that resulted in completion of the above item.

(Closed) IFI 338/81-04-04, Identification of welds and welders on weldments.

The licensee has issued itaintenan:e Department Administrative Procedure 2.2

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" Welder Training Program" that addresses requirements for the c.ontrol, storage and use of welder stamps.

(Closed) LII 338/79-20-02, Capacity of spent fuel pool cooling system could

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be impaired during certain accident conditions. An engineering study and analysis was performed to determine maximum fuel pool temperatures during the worst accident conditions including calculated maximum component cooling i

and service water temperatures.

In all analyzed conditions the temperature profiles were within the structural capabilities of the spent fuel pool.

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IE Circulars

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The following IE Circulars were reviewed to detervue whether they had been received by. station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate

action had been taken or planned.

These circulars are closed:

IEC 79-04 Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators

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IEC 79-11 Design / Construction Interface Problem

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IEC 79-12 Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem IEC 79-19 Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pump

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Impellers IEC 79-22 Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valve j

IEC 79-23 flotor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate IEC 79-24 Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray

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Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWR's.

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i IEC 79-25 Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference.

IEC 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours.

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i IEC 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards IEC 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment IEC 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating 011 Addition and Onsite Supply IEC 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures IEC 80-12 Vaive-Shaft-To-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When liounted Below Horizontal Axis IEC 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies IEC 80-14 Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water Systen and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel IEC 80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldowq IEC 80-16 Rosemount Ibdel 510D0 Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters IEC 80-17 Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet from Baffle Plate Corner IEC 80-18 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatnent Systems IEC 80-21 Regulation of Refueling Crews IEC 80-22 Confirmation of Dnployee Qualifications IFC 80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators IEC 81-01 Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated IEC 81-02 Performance of HRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty IEC 81-04 The Role of Shif t Technical Advisors and Importance of Reporting Operational Events IEC 81-05 Self-Aligning Red Ind Bushings for Pipe Supports IEC 81-06 Potential Deficiency lifacting Certain Foxboro 20 to 50 Milliampere Transmitters

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IEC 81-08 Foundation 11aterials IEC 81-09 Containment Effluent Water That Bypasses Radioactivity lionitor 8.

Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by asterick, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technicci Specification conditions had been identified.

338/81-61 Post accident H2 recombiner would not heat up during surveillance tests 338/81-66 Feedwater flow indication on C steam generator began spiking high 338/81-67 Individual rod position indication for rod D-10 deviated greater than 12 steps from group demand 338/81-70 Axial flux difference dfviated greater 9sn 5% from target 9.

Unit 1 Maintenance Outage On October 7 the unit was shutdown for several weeks of maintenance activities.

The following paragraphs pertain to specific inspection activities conducted during this outage.

a.

Flow Splitter Inspection Amendment 10 to license NPF-4 issued April 27, 1979 requires examination of the Unit 1 flow splitter plates every 18 months (not to exceed 22.5 months).

These inspections were first conducted on February 17 and 18,1981 using ultrasonic tests.

Several indications were noted and the test were reconducted on February 23 and 24,1981 to confim these indications.

The flow splitter plates were reinspected during this outage.

Item 338/81-05-02 is closed based on completion of this reinspection. The ultrasonic inspections conducted during this outage showed increased growth over the previous (February) inspection indications.

These inspection were reviewed and addition information is available in IE Inspection Report 338/81-26 and 339/81-2.

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Amendment 1D requires that a report of the examination results will be submitted to the NRC for review.

This report should contain a determination regarding the growth of any existing flaws in the structure and identification of any new flaws. that might have occurred in the interim service period.

Timely issuance if this report will be

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identified as inspector followup item 338/81-27-01.

b.

Reactor Coolant Pump Bolt Corrosion Inspection All three reactor coolant pump closure studs were inspected per Westinghouse Technical Bulletin number NSD-TB-81-8 and IE Notice 80-27.

The reactor coolant pump flange area is not insulated as the Byron Jackson pump were at Fort Calhoun.

Followup on inspection findings are identified as inspector followup item 338/81-27-02.

c.

Outage Activities Numerous (18) !!aintenance reports (MR's) were reviewed or followed.

The review included assuring properly filled out, activities specified, etc following included observation of work performed proper procedures in place and being followed etc.

No violations or deviations were identified.

d.

Sealing Leaks in Primary System using Furmanite Process There were three flow elements FE-1480, FE-1481, and FE-1482 on the primary loop isolation ulve bypass lines which were leaking.

There flow elements were repaired by building a clamp that would fit between the orifice plate flanges and the the area between the clamp 'and the orifice plant would be filled with a sealant compound.

This work was accomplished by Furmanite Employees. The acceptability and compat-ability of this process on primary systems are identified as inspector followup item 338/81-27-03.

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Use of Alternate Insulation Prior to returning the plant to service, operations personnel noted many sections of the stainless steel mirror insulation missing from the B loop RTD bypass flow loops. The plant was cooled down to fccilitate repairs.

However, some of the stainless steel mirror insulation could not be located.

Therefore fiberglass mat material was used in the interim.

Review of the Safety Evaluation did not have adequate information to assure material had acceptable material certification in chlorine and other chemical levels. Also the concern for changing the seismic characteristics of this pipe section were not addressed.

These concerns are identified as inspector followup item 338/81-27-04.

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Loop Isolation Valve Stud Corrosion Prior to returning the unit to service water was noted dripping from j

the insulation on B loop return (TC) isolation valve.

The insulation

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was removed and boric acid crystals chunks were noted built up around the flange between the valve bonnet and body.

Corrosion was noted on 6 of the 24 carbon steel studs in the valve body.

One stud had. wastage approximately "1/4 to 3/8" belors the thread root area. These six studs were replaced. Additional information on this proi,lem can be found in IE Inspection. Report 338/81-26 and 339/81-23.

Followup of loop isolation valve studs inspection on Unit 2 are identified as inspector followup item 339/81-24-01.

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Containment Fours Five containment enteries were made during the maintenance outage.

Thase enteries were to review work in progress, overall housekeeping and safety during work activities, assure adherence to licensee Health Physics policies, review of radiation work procedures (RWP's) and

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assuring work was being conducted per RWP's. Numerous radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were assured.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of overall status of the plants and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.

Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during this report period.

The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observation included: witnessing work activities in progress, status cf operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings, and recordings, annunciator alarms, house-keeping and vital area controls.

Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities in progress and the status of safety-related equipment or systems.

No violations or deviations were identified.