IR 05000336/1988028
| ML20235P311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1989 |
| From: | Barber S, Peter Habighorst, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235P262 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-88-28, NUDOCS 8903020174 | |
| Download: ML20235P311 (77) | |
Text
_ _ _ _
._
. _ _ -.
IJ l'
,,
,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
i; l
'
Report No.
50-336/88-28 Docket No.
50-336 License No.
DPR-65 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Dates:
November 24, 1988 to January 10, 1989 Reporting-Inspector:
P. J. Habighorst, Resident Inspector Inspectors:
S. Barber, Resident In.spector, Millstone 3 P. J. Habighorst, Resident Inspector, Millstone 2 W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone T. A. Rebelowski, Senior Reactor Engineer, DRS Approved by:
& O & M.h 2.lfelP9 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary:
11/24/88 - 1/10/89 (Report 50-336/88-28)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (187 regular hours, 14 backshift hours)
of plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, previously identified items, review of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs), security events, allegations, periodic reports, and committee activities.
Results: No unsafe conditions, violations, or deviations were identified.
Further resident follow-up is warranted in commitments to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, 10 CFR 21 reporting, maintenance repairs on Auxiliary Feedwater Discharges valves, and Motor-0perated Valve Analysis and Test System (M0 VATS) program enhancements.
At-tached to this report.is the licensee's reference documentation for a November 19, 1988 presentation to the NRC on facility initiatives.
The presentation included Millstone 2 program enhancements, and results of the licensee's Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI).
!
8903020174 890213
+
,
{DR ADOCK 05000336
<
{
.
_. __
__--____ ___--_-__-_-_______ _ _______ _ _ - _ - _
i t.
i
,
.
i TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE i
1.0 Persons Contacted....................................................
I i
2.0 Summary of Facility Activities.......................................
I t
3.0 Previously Identified Items (92701)..................................
3.1 (0 pen) UNR 88-24-06 (Allegation RI-88-A-0040), Non-Conformance Report Timeliness (NCR).......................................
4.0 Facility Tours (71707)................
..............................
5.0 Plant Operational Status Reviews (71707).............................
5.1 Review of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs).........................
5.2 By-Pass Jumper to Remove Turbine Trip Input into #1 Steam Generator (S/G) Level Cont rol Ci rcui t.........................
5.3 Potential Use of Non-Code Ciass Fasteners in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class Applications........
5.4 10 CFR 21 Report, "Limitorque Melamine Torque Switches".........
5.5 NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal".....
6.0 Physical Security (81700)
.........................................
6.1 Safeguards Event Report 88-010-00........
.....................
7.0 Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)...........................
7.1 Problem Review of Reactor Vessel Flange Cleanliness............
7.2 Observation of Maintenance Activities......................
...
7.2.1 Re-tube the 'C' Reactor Building Component Cooling Water (RBCCW) Heat Exchanger.....................
.
7.2.2 Emergency Offsite Facility (E0F) Emergency Diesel.....
7.2.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Assembly.................
7.3 Tracking of Work Packages..........
..........................
7.4 Status of Work Backlog...
.....................................
7.5 Maintenance Procedure Upgrades..................................
7.6 Quality Services Department (QSD) Maintenance Interface.........
7.7 Training of Maintenance Personnel..............
................
7.8 Vendor Manuals.............................................
....
7.9 Conclusions.....................................................
i i
!
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _. - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ -
- _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
-
_
-
_.
_ _ _ _ -
. - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - -
t i
,
a Table of Contents PAGE l
8.0 Allegation Followup (92720/92701)....................................
8.1 RI-88-A-0124: Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (M0 VATS)......................................................
9.0 Fuel Receipt and Inspection (60710)..................................
10.0 Periodic Reports (90713).............................................
11.0 Committee Activities (40500)-........................................
12.0 Maintenance (62703).........................................
........
12.1 Steam Leak f rom Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Valve 2-FW-128....
13.0 Surveillance Testing (61726).........................................
14.0 Corrections to Previous Inspection Reports.........
...............
15.0 Management Meetings (30703)........................................
.
ii
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
_
_ _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _
--
- - _ _ -
-_
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _.
-_. _
_ _ _ _
p,,.
q..
,
<
DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Inspection findings were discussed with the supervisory and management per-sonnel identified below.
S. Scace, Millstone Station Superintendent J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintendent R. Place, NUSCO Nuclear Safety Engineering Supervisor J. Riley, Unit 2 Maintenance Supervisor
F. Dacimo, Unit 2 Engineering Supervisor
'
O. Kross, Unit 2 Instrument and Controls P. Blasioli, NUSCO, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing F. Sears, VP, Nuclear and Environmental Engineering M. Bain, NUSCO Safety Analysis The' inspector also contacted other members of the Operations, Radiation Pro-tection, Chemistry, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering-,
Station Services Engineering, and Security Departments.
2.0. Summary of Facility Activities The unit was at full power throughout the inspection period. The licensee i
completed re-tubing and restoration of the "C" Reactor Building Component Cooling Water (RBCCW) Heat Exchanger. This was a scheduled pre-outage main-tenance activity.
During the period, the licensee completed fuel receipt inspection and, at the close of the period, the new fuel was transferred to the spent fuel pool.
3.0 Previously Identified Items (92701)
3.1 (0 pen) UNR 88-24-06, Timeliness of Nonconformance Report (NCR) for Foxboro Pressure Limiters (Allegation RI-88-A-0040)
This item concerned the timeliness of a Non-Conformance Report (NCR)
concerning the Foxboro signal limiter described in routiae Inspection Report 50-336/88-24.
The alleger's concern was that no licensee action was taken to write an NCR at the time of discovery of the deficiencies.
The time intervals between the issuance of the authorized work order (AWO M2-88-09533) for inspection of the limiters and the disposition of the NCR are listed in the following.
AWD M2-88-09533, Department Head Approval Signature........ 9/1/88 l
AWO M2-88-09533, Quality Control Approval Signature........ 9/2/88 Warehouse delivery of Foxboro Limiters I&C Shop............ 9/2/88 J
._ _
_ __ _ _ _ _
tr
,
.
.
.
.
-
.
l I&C technician discovers fault.with Foxboro limiters........ Week of 9/5/88-
>
Foxboro Representative, at Unit 2 I&C' Shop for unrelated-Week of matter, recommended return of the limiters to Foxboro.... 9/5/88 Purchase Requisition No. 923894 returned the defective Foxboro Limiters to the Foxboro Company.................. 9/9/88 NCR 288-575, "Foxboro Signal Limiter," Originated.......... 9/28/88 Alleger discussions with NRC resident...................... 10/5/88 NCR 288-575, I&C Engineer Approval and Disposition of Foxboro Re p a i r o f. l i mi t e r s........................................ 10/19/83
.NCR.288-575 approved by I&C Supervisor...................... 10/19/88 Foxboro Failure Analysi s Report to NNECO................... 10/26/88 The inspector reviewed licensee administrative control procedure ACP 5.01, Rev. 21, " Nonconforming Materials and Parts." The review identified no specific time interval for initiation of an NCR.
Step 6.1.4 of ACP 5.01 directs the person identifying a non-conforming condition-(originator)
to complete section 1 of the NCR form.
The inspector asked the licensee about NCR timeliness. The licensee acknowledged that the NCR could have been generated sooner.
The inspector's review found no safety significance in this case because there was no danger of use of faulty components.
The components were found deficient upon inspection by the licensee, and wer~e returned to Foxboro Company for Failure Analysis and repair. A non-conformance re-port was generated to document the identified discrepancies with a recommendation.for resolution.
Because equipment control was appropriate, NCR timeliness was evaluated as sufficient for the need in this case. The specific allegation of untimeliness was therefore unsubstantiated and is closed.
However, un-resolved item 88-24-06 remains open pending further assessment of the adequacy of assuring timely NCR development from a programmatic viewpoint.
Also, correction of the root-cause of the shipping of defective parts by Foxboro will receive further review.
4.0 Facility Tours (71707)
The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours of the following areas:
.
,
4.
.
.
..
.
)
,
l i
!
Control Room Diesel Generator Room Vital Switchgear Room
' Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Intake Structure Enclosure Building ESF cubicles Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels, pro-per functioning, and conformance with Technical Specifications. Alarm condi-tions in effect and alarms received in the control: room were discussed with operators. The inspector periodically reviewed the night order log, tagout '
log, Plant Incident Report (PIR) log, key log, and bypass jumper log.
Each of the respective logs was discussed with the operations department staff.
No inadequacies were noted.
During plant tours,-logs and records were routinely reviewed for compliance with station procedures, to determine if entries were correctly made, and to verify correct communication of equipment status.
No inadequacies were noted.
5.0 Plant Operational Status Reviews (71707)
5.1 Review of Plant Incident Reports Selected plant incident reports (PIRs) were reviewed to: determine the significance of the events; (ii) review the licensee's evaluations; assess the licensee's response and corrective actions; and-verify that the licensee reported the events, if required.
The PIRs reviewed were:
88-80, 88-81, 88-82, 88-83, 88-84, 88-85, 88-86, and 88-87.
PIR 88-85,
" Spent Fuel Couplir.g Assembly," received further follow-up as documented in Report Detail 7.2.3.
Otherwise, the inspector had no further ques-tions.
5.2 By-Pass Jumper to Remove Turbine Trip Input into Steam Generator (SG-1)
On December 21, after performing a safety analysis, the licensee in-stalled a by pass jumper to prevent a turbine trip input from being sup-plied to the SG-1 level control system.
The purpose of the by pass jum-per was to prevent an inadvertent generation of this signal during power operation due to a suspected problem with the continuity of the cabling associated with this circuit.
Inadvertent generation of this signal during power operation occurred twice during the week of December 18.
As a result, the Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) ramped closed and the feedwater bypass valve-ramped to approximately 75%.
The control room operators mitigated the effects by shifting from automatic to manual to restore SG-1 level to the normal operating band.
The by pass jumper prevents automatic realignment of the FRV and by pass valve during a turbine trip. According to the licensee's safety assess-ment, with the bypass installed the controller response following a tur-bine trip would be as follows: the initial deviation between steam flow and feed flow would result in FRV closure to match steam flow. At 11%
SG 1evel, three element SG 1evel control would automatically shift to l
m..
L _ _ _-_ _ ____ _ _ _____-__ _ J -
_n _ ___ - _ __ _ _ _ _.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _-
- - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _
- _.
-
.-__
__.
+
+
V
,;
.
-
,
.
'
i,
-
.
'
i L
single element (level) control.
That would cause the main valve to open
'
and increase feedwater flow..This response would require the operator.
to. manually shift'the controller to manual, close the FRV, and open the bypass valve as needed.
The inspector reviewed.the the Final Safety. Analysis Report (FSAR) de--
j scriptions of excessive feedwater and loss of feedwater to one steam
generator..FSAR Section 14.8.1 describes the analyzed results of occur-rences resulting from a malfunction of.one steam generator.- Of the four'
events analyzed (loss of load, excess load, loss of feedwater, and excess.
feedwater), loss of load was the most limiting.
FSAR Section 14.11.2 describes a cool-down event based on a feedwater system malfunction.
,
That event is enveloped by the steam line break transient.
The inspector l
concluded that the installation of the bypass jumper did not create a condition outside the analyzed events referenced in the FSAR.
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 2525, " Standard Post Trip Actions,"
Step 3.14, describe operator verification of proper main feedwater con-figuration following a plant trip.
If the elements of automatic feed..
water configuration. cannot be satisfied, the operators manually establish'
conditions per. contingency step 3.14.
The inspector asked the licensee to run a plant trip with'the given con-ditions-(i.e., with the bypass installed) for the FRV on the Millstone 2 operator training simulator.
The response, after 30-minutes into the simulation with no operator action, showed acceptable results with SG
[
level'at 30% and slowly increasing.
The licensee approved the by pass jumper in a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting on December 21. The licensee installed a cau-tion tag for the FRV controller to alert operators of the present control'
system configuration.
In addition, information was disseminated to all operators in the Night Order Log Book. The inspector concluded that the licensee's evaluation in this matter was well done, with a good regard for safety. The licensee's planned actions are to repair the cable and return the system to normal operation during the refueling outage.
The inspector had no further questions.
5.3 Potential Use of Non-Code Class Fasteners in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class Applications The Millstone 3 resident inspector was notified by the NRC Licensing Project Manager at 11:00 a.m., November 4, that non-code class fasteners may have been installed in ASME Code Class Applications at Millstone.
The NRC Vendor Inspection Branch had recently performed an inspection at R.E.C. Corporation and found that R.E.C. had dropped its ASME certi-fication but continued to supply fasteners to the licensee.
Texas Bolt and B&G were the manufacturers who supplied the fasteners to R.E.C.
The fasteners ranged from 0.5 to 2.0 inches and were to be used in ASME Code
_-____________ _ ________ _ __
_
_.. _
_ _ _. _ _ -
_ - _
__
-_
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_______ - _ _ _ _ _.
t a
,
.
l
.
5 Class 2 and 3 applications.
R.E.C.'s ASME certification terminated in November 1985. The only Quality Assurance (QA) employee at R.E.C. left
- that employment early in-1987.
The licensee removed R.E.C..from their QA Category I list in November 1988. The inspector informed the licensee of the issues and identified an NRC generated listing of questionable purchase orders for fasteners for licensee follow-up.
The licensee's engineering department reviewed work performed on author-ized work orders (AW0s) involving R.E.C. Corporation fasteners. The'lic-ensee's quality services department (QSD) confirmed that the fasteners l '
met all the requirements of the American Society for Testing of Materials
-
(ASTM).
(NRC Inspection Report 50-423/88-18 (Detail 4.1) provides infor-mation on the identical ASTM and ASME specifications for the fasteners.)
The licensee's specification for fasteners requires only ASTM bolting material for applications at Millstone 2.
Licensee review of all known AW0s using R.E.C. corporation fasteners concluded that no components had unique purchase specifications requiring ASME material. The licensee concluded all material from R.E.C. Corporation is acceptable for use in Quality Assurance applications at Millstone 2.
The inspector had no further questiuns.
5.4 10 CFR 21 Report, "Limitorque Melamine Torque Switches" A November 3,198810 CFR 21 report from Limitorque Corporation to Bostons Edison Company documented an evaluation which' identified potential common mode failures due to post-mold shrinkage of melamine torque switches.
The particular motor-operator actuators and serial numbers affected were:
SMB-000 actuators with serial numbers lower than 354838; and SMB-00 I
actuators with serial numbers lower than 233218.
The 10 CFR 21 report describes a change in design and modification of torque switches in serial numbers greater than 354838 and 233218 for MB-000 and SMB-00 actuators, respectively.
Limitorque does not expect any detrimental effects from post-mold shrinkage on these switches.
The licensee identified six SMB-000 actuators and fifteen SMB-00 actu-ators affected by Limitorque's 10 CFR 21 report'.
The associated motor-operated valves (MOVs) are located in the charging, main steam, high pressure safety injection, and reactor building component cooling water systems.
Fourteen of these actuators passed surveillance (MOVATS) test-ing within the past six months; there is no history of MOV torque switch failure at Millstone 2.
On January 27, the licensee generated Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) Evaluation Form MP2-89-014. The evaluation and concurrence for implementation was approved in Plant Operations Re-view Committee (PORC) meeting 2-89-009 on January 27.
The inspector attended the PORC meeting.
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _______ - __-___ ____ - __ _ ___-_
_ -
- _ - - - - _ _
_ _ _
___
_
_
-
_
_ _ _ _ _ -
_
e
-
..,.
.
. *.
f
-
o
.
.
J g
An identified failure mode was failure of the cam lug associated with the torque switch shaft, resulting in an inoperable torque switch. An-other failure was binding of the cam, resulting in operation of the torque switch-in its No. I setting only. The inspector questioned the
' operability of the affected motor-operated valves with respect to the i
identified failure modes. The licensee replied that a justification for continued operation (JCO) is being prepared. The inspector will review that JCO.
Limitorque recommended that affected torque switches be. replaced with'
environmentally qualified fiberite torque switches.
Licensee PDCR MP2-89-014 initiated the removal of the melamine torque switches and a one-for-one~ replacement with the fiberite switches. The replacement effort is currently in progress.
In addition to reviewing the licensee's JCO, the inspector. asked why Limitorque did not. formally notify Northeast Utilities of. a suspected problem with melamine torque switches. The licensee was alerted to'this potential problem by the resident inspector and by a 10 CFR.21 Notifica-tion letter from Limitorque to another utility..This is an unresolved item (UNR 50-336/88-28-01).
5.5 NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal" On October 17, 1988, the NRC issued GL 88-17 asking licensees for infor-mation about actions,. schedules, and program enhancements for shutdown cooling operation when irradiated fuel is in the core.
Such actions should be implemented prior to the next entry.into reactor coolant system (RCS) mid-loop operation (i.e., before the next refueling). At Millstone 2, the next scheduled refueling outage begins on February 4,1988.
Loss of decay heat removal during non power operation and the consequences of such a loss have been addressed in numerous NRC and industry publica-tions. A Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station event of April 10, 1987 and en-suing work by the NRC staff and industry organizations have provided additional insights. There have been: inadequacies in response to GL 87-12; three known losses of decay heat removal at three nuclear facili-ties during mid-1988; and an apparent lack of industry understanding of the potential significance of such events.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's December 23, 1988 response to NRC GL 88-17.
The eight actions identified for expedited addressal, the licensee commitments, and on going licensee actions are described in the following.
5.5.1 Operator Training The first action was training on the Diablo Canyon event, re-lated events, lessons learned, and implications before entry l
into a reduced reactor coolant inventory condition. According
-
-
--
-
-
-
-
-
Y
~,
o'
,
,
n
.:
...
.
'
-
>.
,
y to the licensee response, classroom training lesson R0-2310 provides a review of shutdown cooling (SDC) system operation.
In addition, the lesson plan provides training on A0P-2572,
" Loss of SDC," Generic Letter. 88-17, Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INPO) SOER 88-3, and past industry experience.
In addition,.RQ2-572-1 is a plant-specific simulator lesson plan for A0P-2572 and was provided to license operators during
+
requalification training.
The inspector reviewed lesson plans R0-2310, RQ2-572-1, SOER
,
87-2, and SOER 87-1.
The last two lesson plans deal with in-dustry operating experience reviews and associated events con-cerning loss of SDC. The inspector reviewed records for lic-ensee operator requalification training and non-licensed' opera-tor continued training and verified that all licensed and non-
. licensed operators received the training on the four specific training plans between November 1988 and January 1989. The-inspector had no further questions on this matter.
5.5.2 Control Over Containment Closure The second action was the implementation of procedures and-administrative controls that reasonably assure containment-closure before core uncovering could result from a loss of SDC-
,
with no alternate cooling or inventory addition to the RCS.
Licensee response to previous NRC GL 87-12 on September' 18, 1987, " Loss of Shutdown Cooling while the RCS is partially-
Filled," documents licensee calculations that show core boiling no sooner than 13 minutes after and core uncovery 122 minutes af ter the loss of SDC with no alternate cooling or inventory addition to the RCS. The licensee's calculations assumed a decay time of seventy-two (72) hours; RCS liquid / metal masses based on NRC guidance in NUREG-1269,." Loss of Residual Heat j
Removal System - Diablo Canyon Unit 2," no steam condensation,
'
and the RCS at atmospheric pressure. The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculation and had no questions.
]
'
The licensee provided information to the control room operators to better define containment closure, the time requirement on setting containment integrity on loss of SDC, and additional control of obstructions of the containment equipment hatch.
The licensee considers containment closure as 1) one personnel airlock door closed, ii) and each penetration providing a direct path from containment atmosphere to the environment I
being closed by an isolation valve blank flange, or by a special device.
This definition of containment closure corresponds to Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4 requirements for core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel.
_
-
. _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
,.
p
.
Licensee Procedure A0P-2572 Steps 4.2 and 4.3 verify contain-ment closure on loss of SDC. A0P-2572 provides that contain-ment closure will occur within two hours or less. The licen-see's Engineering Department plans to modify the containment equipment hatch to enable closure from outside containment and-to maintain a working list of all obstructions in the hatch to facilitate quick disconnect and timely closure in the event of a loss of SDC.
In addition, the licensee plans to identify and control work-sctivities on containment penetrations to verify no two pene-trations are simultaneously being repaired. The inspector will verify commitments and actions on containment closure items during the refueling outage.
5.5.3 Core Temperature Measurement The third action was for licensees to provide two independent temperature indications representative of reactor core exit conditions. The temperature indicators should be either periodically checked and recorded by an operator or automatic and continuously monitored and alarmed 1) in the contral room or 11) at a location outside the containment building with a provision for immediately providing temperature values to the control room. Observations should be recorded at no greater than 15 minutes intervals during normal operation.
'
In response to GL 88-17, the licensee cummitted to maintain two channels of reactor vessel level monitor systems (RVLMS)
in operation during mid-loop operations. The RVLMS consists of heated and unheated d'
mocouples at eight specific levels.
Four unheated thermocoup s will monitor RCS temperature when inventory is at the centerline of the RCS hotleg. According to the licensee's response, the RVLMS thermocouple output in-dication will be continuously displayed and available in the control room for reactor temperature indication.
The licen-see's administrative controls for the February 1989 outage provide contingency actions if the control room display for reactor coolant temperature is lost. The operators are di-rected to monitor temperature at the Integrated Control Circuit (ICC) cabinets and log the indication every fifteen minutes.
The inspector will verify indication of core temperature, im-
plementation of two channels of RVLMS, and implementation of i
the instructions to the operators during the 1989 refueling i
i outage.
!
_ _
_ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _
_ - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
d.
.,
.
..
-
-
,
,
L
5.5.4-RCS Water Level Measurement The fourth action is to provide two independent, continuous RCS water level indications whenever the RCS is in a reduced-inventory condition. Water. level-indication should be peri-odically checked and recorded by an operator or automatically, and continuously monitored'and alarmed.
The licensee committed to maintain two independent, continuous RCS water level indications operable whenever the RCS is in a reduced inventory condition. The first level indication is a single channel of RVLMS providing the control room operator with a continuous display. The range'of the level indicator will be from 186.125" above the reactor vessel fuel alignment plate to the reference point (fuel alignment plate). The second indication. is a temporary system consisting of a tygon tube monitored from the control room by close circuit TV. The
,
inspector verified that this configuration is described in procedure OP-2301E,." Draining the Reactor Coolant System."
This temporary system has.been used during refueling outages.
The licensee's '" Reduced Inventory Operations" instruction describes contingency actions when one or both level indica-tions are lost, and allows temporary disconnection of the RVLMS for a short time duration (15 minutes) during reactor-disassembly. The inspector will verify commitments on reactor vessel level indication during the 1989 refueling.
5.5.5 Controls Over Level Perturbations The fifth action is to implement procedures and administrative controls that avoid operations that lead to RCS perturbations while the RCS is in a reduced inventory condition.
If such operations must be conducted, additional measures should be taken to assure that the RCS will remain in a stable and con-trolled condition.
Licensee procedures for operation in a reduced inventory con-dition are OP-2301E, " Draining the Reactor Coolant System,"
and OP-2310 " Shutdown Cooling System." These procedures con-tain guidance to minimize RCS perturbations. The guidance in-cludes: SDC flow limitation to minimize SDC suction vortexing; limitations on LPSI pump use; evacuation of non-condensable gases every four hours during drain-down of the RCS; and limit-ing the rate of drain down.
Inspector review of OP-2301E and OP-2310 confirmed the existence of precautionary guidance to the control room operator to prevent SDC perturbations.
Lic-ensee actions to provide additional measures to assure the RCS is in a stable and controlled condition during SD operation j
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ -. _ __ _ - _ -.
__
l
- - _ - - _ _ - _ - -
..
-_
_
._.
.. _.
._. _ _. _
__
_
,~
.
-l r
.:
.
g
-.t
-
t 10'
i
~
'
is in a temporary instruction to Unit 2 operations personnel.
That instruction provides' specific examples and guidance'on activities-that may' result in RCS perturbation. The inspector
- reviewed the guidance and had no further questions.
5.5.6 Assuring Adequate RCS Inventory The sixth action is to provide two operable means of adding inventory to the RCS in addition to the SC system pumps.
These:
should include at least one high pressure injection (HPSI) pump.
Procedures for use of these systems during loss.of events should be provided. The path of water addition should be specified to assure that flow does not bypass the reactor vessel and exit the RCS via any opening.
In response to GL 88-17, the licensee comnitted to revise pro-cedure OP-2301E to require a HPSI pump and sufficient charging pumps to be available to add inventory to the RCS, Northeast-Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) Engineering plans to provide the necessary inventory make-up curves to support a revision to procedure OP-2301E. The licensee's temporary instruction provides administrative commitments to maintain two charging pumps and one HPSI pump available to povide make-up during reduced RCS inventory conditions. The inspector will review the engineering calculation, effects.on low temperature over-
.
pressurization (LTOP) of injection source operation, and in-jection source line-up during the refueling outage.
5.5.7 Hot Leg Blocking The seventh action is implementation of procedures and controls to reasonably assure that all hot legs are not blocked simul-taneously by nozzle dams without provision of a vent path that prevents pressurization of the upper reactor vessel plenum.
Licensee maintenance procedure 2705G controls installation of steam generator nozzle dams.
The licensee has committed to revise the procedure to provide for a sufficient vent path prior to installation of the last " hot" leg nozzle dam. The licensee also has committed to remove the pressurizer manway prior to installation of the last hot leg nozzle. The NUSCO engineering calculation concludes that a time interval of 'five days, twelve hours between reactor suberiticality and pressuri-zer manway removal prevents RCS pressurization due to loss of RHR upon installation of the last hotleg nozzle.
The inspector
!
reviewed the 1988 refueling outage schedule and verified that l
the time between subcriticality and the last hot leg nozzle l
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
...
'0
...
.
k dam installation was in excess of 5 days, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The in-spector will review revisions to procedure 2705G and outage activities surrounding manway installation.
L 5.5.8 RCS Hot' Leg Blockage i
!
The desired action is implementation of procedures and admini-strative controls to assure that all RCS loops' hot legs are not blocked simultaneously by closed stop valves unless a vent _
path is provided.
Millstone 2 is not equipped with RCS loop stop valves. The controls to ensure a vent path exists prior to blocking the RCS hot legs is described in Detail 5.5.7, above. The inspec-tor had no further questions on this item.
<The licensee's:short-term actions in response to GL 88-17 were adequate; open' aspects and-long-term actions will be reviewed in future inspections.
'6.0 Physical Security (81700)
Selected aspects of site security were reviewed during inspection tours, in-cluding site access controls, personnel and vehicle searches, personnel moni-toring, placement of physical barriers, compensatory measures, guard force
~ staffing, and response to alarms and degraded conditions.
The following event warranted inspector followup:
6.1 Safeguards Event Report (SER) 88-010-00 On December 4, 1988 at approximately 11:30 p.m., a contract security employee at a facility access station discovered two.22 caliber "short" rounds. The licensee concluded, based on the location of the rounds, that the ammunition had been within the protected area. The licensee's immediate actions included interview of all station personnel who exited the access point within thirty minutes of discovery of.the rounds. The interviews did not identify the individual (s) responsible for the contra-band ammunition.
The inspector discussed the following with the licensee: detection cap-abilities; contraband location; security surveillance procedures; status of the contraband; and actions to prevent recurrence.
!
Inspector review noted that the licensee complies with NRC guidance for explosive and metal detection capability.
No inadequacies were noted in associated surveillance.
Licensee disassembly of one of the.22 caliber rounds identified no discrepant conditions.
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ -
g w s
.
.
,
.
.
On January 3,1989, the station superintendent promulgated information describing contraband and its prohibition from the site to all station personnel.
10 CFR 73.55(d)(3) requires that, at the point of personnel access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages shall be searched for fire-arms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The Millstone Physical Secur-ity Plan and Administrative Control Procedures provide for excluding weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices from the protected area This licensee-identified event had minor security significance, in that the.22 caliber rounds located were not a significant hazard of them-selves.
This event was reported to the NRC on the ENS system and by submission of SER 88-010-00.
The inspector's evaluation found no significant security threat and acceptable corrective actions.
Inspector review of Safeguard Event Reports at Millstone for the past year identified no previous violation corrective actions that would have prevented this event. The inspector had no further questions.
This is a licensee-
,
,
identified violation (NV5 88-28-01). No violation citation is being issued.
7.0 Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)
The maintenance program was inspected for quality and compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and American National Standard Institute (ANSI) Standard N-18.7.
'
The inspection included a review of the plant's operating history, interviews with maintenance management and technicians, and review of safety and non-safety maintenance, procedures, and maintenance packages. The inspector observed ongoing maintenance including AWO M288-12213, P13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling Pump Coupling inspection, and retubing of the "C" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchanger.
In addition, a review of the Reactor Vassel Head Leakage work packages was conducted.
7.1 Reactor _ Vessel Flange Cleanliness Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 88-08 and 88-09 reported a Reactor Vessel Head leak that required shutdown and head removal.
Review of vendor manuals and NRC reports indicated that the passages in the Reactor Vessel
.
Head were inadequately cleaned prior to placement of the head gasket dur-ing the 1988 refueling outage.
New information was identified concerning the hydraulic tensioner. The tensioner is serviced by mounted pumps that
>
apply the required pull. On the tension skid, a 0-15,000 psi gauge was mounted. A check of active pressures showed a tensioning range from 4,000 to 6,700 psi. An apparent difficulty in adjustment, due to range values on the (Heise) gauge, was discussed with the licensee. The licen-see has ordered two 0-10,000 psi Heise gauges to provide pressure read-ings closer to mid-range.
In addition, remote head cleaning equipment has been purchased to improve head cleanliness.
A reactor vessel bolt
'
.
V-%
._
_
._
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -
'
.
,
'
.
circle flange cleaning machine, a reactor vessel pit seal flange cleaning unit, and a spare parts package were purchased.
The inspector will review reactor head cleaning during routine review of the 1989 refuel outage.
7.2 Maintenance Activities 7.2.1 Retube the 'C' Reactor Building Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger The licensee decided to retube the RBCCW heat exchangers prior to the refueling outage.
Feasibility of retubing in place was verified during a previous heat exchanger outage. Maintenance procedure MP-2709E, "RBCCW Heat Exchanger Retube," was reviewed.
It was supported by a safety evaluation. The inspector viewed parts of the tube removal, cleaning, tube replacement, and rolling of tubes in place.
One concern of the inspector was that handling of stab tubes prior to flattening was not cd-dressed on the Radiation Work Permit (RWP).
The inspector later found that the tubes had been swiped and found free of contamination.
Replacement of tubes was still in progress at the conclusion of inspection.
No inadequacies were identified.
7.2.2 Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) Emergency Diesel (EDG)
The inspector witnessed the performance of preventive mainten-ance procedure 2701J-43, " EOF Emergency Diesel," used to check oil levels, engine coolant, drive belts and air cleaners prior to EDG start. The inspector concluded that additional atten-tion to cleanliness of the area was needed; this concern was addressed to management. The inspector concluded, at the end of the inspection, that the cleanliness of the area had been satisfactorily addressed by the licensee.
Performance of EPIP 4606 EOF, "EDG Operation Test", was observed during startup and electrical loading of the EDG, No deficiencies were identified.
7.2.3 Spent Fuel Pool (SFp) Cooling Pump Assembly The licensee had a previous problem with overgreasing of the Koppers coupling on the auxiliary feedwater pump.
That re-sulted in a " hydraulic lock" that prevented axial movement of the motor / pump shaft and resulted in overheating of bearing surfaces.
In response, the licensee conducted a Koppers Fast Coupling inspection program.
The inspector witnessed the associated inspection of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Assembly per PMMS M2-02BSFC PAM. The inspection plan calls for the identifying coupling axial movement with vent / drain plugs installed.
This action is repeated after lube plugs are removed. During performance of this procedure, one of the keyed and set screw locked hubs was disengaged for the SFP pump.
The keyway appeared loose and set screw marks were found on
__
.-. - --....
.
,
,
,
.
'
the keyway. The licensee concluded that a better method of securing the hub to the key was needed.
In the interim, the licensee used tighter keys and gave additional attention to set screw placement.
The inspector had no further questions.
The lubrication program for the couplings is being rewritten to upgrade lubricants and other methods of assuring component reliability.
This will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
Overall, licensee personnel were knowledgeable of maintenance activities, procedures were adequate to perform preventive and corrective maintenance, planning was excellent, vendors were used where necessary, and adequate supervision of work in progress was noted.
7.3 Tracking of Work Packages The licensee conducts maintenance through the Production Maintenance Management System (PMMS). A PMMS objective is to bring together all elements of maintenance including coordination with other departments, crafts necessary, control of spare parts, vendor manuals, trending, and reporting. A PMMS generated work package identifies the PMMS number and the system, building, room, elevation, and equipment description. A problem description is provided along with Quality Control and tagging requirements, radiation work permits, ALARA review, Electrical Equipment Qualification (EEQ), and parts and tools requirements. Approved proce-dures, test equipment, precautions and acceptable criteria for selected work orders are annotated.
Housekeeping and cleanliness levels, inspec-tion status evaluation, and methods for meeting industry reporting re-quirements are included.
No inadequacies were noted.
7.4 Status of Work Backlog The inspector reviewed the Unit 2 backlog of corrective and preventive maintenance. About 80 work packages remain outstanding, with a majority of these awaiting spare parts.
In the preventive maintenance area, eight items were not performed on schedule; these were reviewed and performed satisfactorily during the next window of opportunity.
Discussion with the licensee indicated that errors in programming failed to generate the associated preventive maintenance for these eight items.
These failures occurred in the first quarter of 1988.
Outage lists and job packages have been reduced by pre-outage work on the intake structure, RBCCW HX retubing, and internal examination of ten tanks. An inspector concern was approximately 80 I&C surveillance of Balance of Plant (BOP) equipment being removed from the schedule due to a lack of manpower. The I&C department roster is not fully manned due to personnel turnover.
Further review of surveillance of BOP equipment will be performed during a subsequent inspection.
_
_
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ -
.-
.
q
.
,
..
.'
l
'
'15.
Overall, the number and' age of corrective maintenance work orders have been reduced and the preventive maintenance program adequately maintains
.
equipment reliability. The program reduction in the I&C area was ad-
dressed to licensee management for evaluatior,.
'
7.5 Maintenance Procedure Upgrades
'The licensee has established a program of procedural upgrades.
That program includes technical reviews for procedure content'and correctness.
Reviews of test objectives., operations references (including vendor manuals where appropriate), drawings, precautions, limits, and restraints are included. The experience of personnel performing tasks is considered I
I as to the extent of procedural' detail needed.
Sampling review of the upgraded procedures identified illustrations that included three-dimensional component views to aid in proper installation.
The licensee had projected completion of one hundred procedures before 1989. About 60 procedures were completed.
Discussions.with licensee management indicated that the three year goal of completion of 309 pro-cedures will be met by 1990.
The inspector found the procedure upgrade program to be a significant aid to effective maintenance.
7.6 Quality Services Department'(QSD) Maintenance Interface
!
QSD Surveillance reports have identified areas requiring remedial man-agement actions.
Items identified have included the need for procedure revisions to address material substitutions (upgraded material not iden-tified) and failures to complete weld map symbols on non-category 1 com-ponents. Maintenance performed by the Production Test Department failed to identify retests performed and verification of reinstallation of wiring.
In addition, the Instrument and Controls Department was found'
to have failed to identify the frequency of calibration on test forms.
In one instance, at the spent fuel pool area, the material log of equip-ment within the exclusion areas did not reflect material present.
QSD findings were incorporated in the upgrading of maintenance procedures.
The QSD findings also indicated that additional attention to procedural requirements should be stressed to mechanics and first line supervision.
Overall, the QSD program was evaluated as good.
7.7 Training of Maintenance Personnel The licensee has a comprehensive program of formal classroom and shop training in addition to on-the-job training. This training is outlined in procedure MP2701R, " Maintenance Department Personnel Qualification Procedures." Individual tradesman training is planned after basic quali-fication is achieved, and after a review of the individuals previous experience.
In addition, contractor training and special training to address particular equipment is conducted by the Training Department.
I Licensee corporate involvement is identified in procedures ACP QA 8.27, I
t-
=
.
.
'
.
" Millstone Station Training and Qualification," and ACP QA 8.28, "Exemp-tions From On-The-Job Training Requirements for Job Qualification."
These directives credit skills attained by experience.
Training facilities at the Millstone Training Center were reviewed for initial and continuing training of Unit 2 maintenance mechanics and electrical personnel.
The program varies from introductory fundamental tool handling to specific technical areas such as snubber maintenance, which includes hydraulics, hydraulic system components, principles of snubber operation, and hangers.
Inspector review of Individual Qualification Matrices (IQMs) ascertained that the number of qualified personnel completing training courses and on-the-job training was minimal. Although interim training has been given in a number of areas, on-the-job training with the assistant super-visor's sign-off of acceptable in-field training was not in evidence.
This matter was referred to the licensee for consideration.
It was also noted that a few individuals did not obtain acceptable grades in the class examinations.
The inspector could not determine when re-training was to be scheduled. The inspector concluded that additional management emphasis on completion of qualification is needed.
7.8 Vendor Manuals A program for Vendor Manual control has been formulated in ACP QA 3.23,
" Control of Vendor Manuals." Review of manuals and controls found ac-ceptable conditions.
Updates of contents of manuals could not be deter-mined to be sufficient: many manuals appear to be those purchased with original equipment with no additional information. This item will be reexamined.
7.9 Conclusions Overall, the licensee's Maintenance Department is functional and effec-tive, with competent engineers and technicians who exhibit pride in workmanship.
Extensive licensee action was unaertaken to correct the causes of prob-lems such as the reactor vessel head leak.
Maintenance planners appear to have a very high workload in outage work packages and normal maintenance activities. The daily duties of planners include conferences with operations shift supervisors, the maintenance department staff, and daily job "lookaheads" for job planning.
The mechanical and electrical I&C preventive and corrective maintenance backlogs are maintained at better than industry standards (less backlog).
-
____- _ __- _
.
.
,
.
.
Pre-outage inaintenance such as tank inspection, pump overhaul, retubing of RBCCW heat exchangers should improve the outage maintenance workload.
The new maintenance facility has enhanced the Unit 2 program by providing increased space, new shop tools, snubber and storage areas.
8.0 Allegation Followup (92720/92701)
8.1 RI-88-A-0124: Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (MOVATS)
On December 6, an individual called the inspector's office to report the following:
1)
Procedural violation of SP 87-2-25, Procedure for Testing Limitorque
{
Motor-0perated Valves (MOVs) using MOVATS.
ii) Lack of radiation exposure control for numerous, repetitive MOVATS tests on MOVs.
iii) Potential repercussions from licensee management when information is brought to the NRC.
On the first concern, the alleger reportedly was told by his supervision to perform MOVATS testing on twelve MOVs in apparent non-compliance with SP 87-2-25 Step 5.3.
This step states that the required target thrust range must be obtained before testing (if applicable) and recorded.
The alleger reportedly was told by his supervision to test the MOVs without the target thrust range. The inspector reviewed SP 87-2-25 Section 6.10, which discusses initial thrust measuring device (TMD)/ load cell calibra-tion to obtain thrust at as-found torque switch settings.
Step 6.10.7 discusses the determination of the total thrust and the control switch trip thrust corresponding to the as-found open and close torque switch settings.
The inspector reviewed the safety significance of adherence to steps in SP 87-2-25.
In review of Production Management Maintenance System (PMMS)
under MOVATS, the alleged twelve affected MOVs were 2-SI-616, 2-SI-617, 2-SI-626, 2-SI-627, 2-S1-636, 2-SI-637, 2-SI-646, 2-SI-647, 2-SI-654, 2-SI-656 and 2-SI-655, all located in the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) discharge headers. The licensee's June 27, 1988 response to NRC Bulletin 85-03, " Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failure," stated that the twelve valves were tested under full differential pressure by strok-ing in the direction which represents the safety-related function against full pressure.
All the HPSI discharge valves operated successfully against full differ-ential pressure, except for 2-SI-655 (cross-tie valve between the " swing" HPSI "B" pump and the "A" header). The licensee's June 27, 1988 response
_
_. _ _ _. _ _ _.
_
_.
.
.
.
.
-
.
to NRC Bulletin 85-03 details the failure of 2-SI-655 to stroke and con-tains an operability justification.
The justification was based on:
i) the normal valve lineup position for 2-SI-655 is open; and 11) if 2-SI-655 had to be opened and failed to open, securing the "B" HPSI pump would remove the differential pressure and allow the valve to open. The full flow differential pressure tests were conducted per in-service test T-87-38, " Safety Injection Valve Stroke Test Under Accident Condition Pressure," during the February 1988 refuel outage.
'
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to NRC Bulletin 85-03.
In the response, the licensee described the program to determine and evaluate torque switch settings for motor-operated valves selected to be tested with MOVATS.
The program is as follows: (1) Vendor (Limitorque)
calculations provide theoretical stem thrust for maximum operating dif-ferential pressure; (2) calculated thrust is compared'with measured thrust to ensure valve operation against the design differential pressure; and (3) evaluation of torque switch accuracy regarding minimum delivered thrust vs. factory specified torque setpoint.
The inspector concluded that the twelve HPSI valves were tested per Bulletin 85-03, and deter-mination of "as-left" switch settings complied with the response to the bulletin. However, the licensee's controlling procedure SP-87-2-25 to determine "as-found" and "as-left" thrust values was not descriptive in regards to a required theoretical thrust value determination (Appendix K) prior to testing.
The inspector will follow licensee corrective actions.
The inspector reviewed revisions 7, 8, and 9 to SP 87-2-25 to determine the time interval for the inclusion of Appendix K sheets for the twelve HPSI valves. The PORC approvals for the respective revisions were on March 24, 1988, June 15, 1988 and November 23, 1988.
In all cases, the HPSI valves were repaired under a maintenance work order and/or MOVATS tested to detenr.ine "as-found" thrust values prior to application of the theoretical thrust value (Appendix K).
The inspector concluded that no theoretical thrust was calculated until "as-founds" values were deter-mined, and that the alleged failure to perform MOVATS testing in accord-ance with SP 87-2-25 was therefore substantiated. The inspector ques-tioned the alleger if the "as-found" thrust values were applied to de-termine a theoretical thrust.
The alleger did not believe this occurred because "as-found" thrust values by MOVATS differed from theoretical calculated values.
No inability of the valves to perform as required was identified, and the absence of safety significance resulted in no violation citation being issued by the NRC. The procedural non-adherence will be considered during the next Millstone 2 SALP (Systematic Assess-ment of Licensee Performance).
The alleger's second concern was poor control of radiation exposure when conducting repetitive M0 VATS testing.
The inspector contacted the Millstone 2 As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) radiation coordinator and reviewed exposure records for MOVATS testing in 1988.
The alleger appears on Radiation Work Permits on 19 out of 25 valves tested with l
- _ _ - _ _ _ _
- _ - _ -
<
..
,
.-
.
-MOVAT equipment, with an approximate exposure of 1.24 rem for the year.
Total man-rem for M0 VATS activities for Millstone 2 was 3.84 man-rem.
The inspector reviewed the ALARA tracking system for M0 VATS testing in response to NRC Bulletin 85-03 for the Millstone station. Millstone 1-accumulated 4.2 man-rem for testing and repair of 9 MOVs, and Millstone 3 accumulated 3.9 man-rem for 33 MOVs.
No conclusive evidence was.ob-tained from these results because of differences in plant life, design, types of motor-operator, and relative configuration. The inspector dis-cussed exposures with the Unit 2 ALARA coordinator, who acknowledged the need to consider prolonged single-worker activities in order to reduce individual risk. No above limit exposures were. identified, but the alleger's belief that better ALARA controls should be applied was con-firmed, substantiating this aspect of the allegation.
The ALARA control adequacy will.be considered by the NRC during'the next Millstone 2 SALP.
Also, licensee actions on this matter will be followed during future routine inspections.
The third item presented by the alleger was potential licensee management repercussions when information was provided to the NRC. The inspector discussed with the alleger if any activities were impacted by management repercussions. The alleger's. perception was that no management reper-cussion had taken' place.
No such repercussions have been identified by other NRC inspections and allegation review. No further NRC action on this item is planned.
In conclusion, the alleger's procedure adherence and ALARA concerns were substantiated, with no equipment performance or operability degradation identified.
The inspector's findings were discussed with the alleger No further concerns were identified. This allegation is closed, but will be considered during the next SALP and during routine review of facility activities.
9.0 Fuel Receipt and Inspection (60710)
On December 20, the inspector observed licensee fuel inspection and receipt of activities two fuel assemblies, M-18 and M-41, from container serial number 6134. Activities witnessed were: visual inspection; fuel movement from the shipping container to the new fuel inspection machine; movement from the inspection machine to the temporary new fuel vault; Quality Control (QC)
inspection; involvement of maintenance personnel; and health physics involve-ment. New fuel inspection is covered under AWO M2-88-12678 and licensee procedure OP-2210A, "New Fuel Assembly /CEA Receipt." The licensee, at the time of observation, was inspecting the last 12 of 60 fuel assemblies.
In i
'
discussions with the licensee, the inspector discovered that two fuel assem-blies, M-40 and M-60, had spacer grid discrepancies. The vendor will correct i
L the discrepancies on site using licensee AW0s.
The inspector will follow licensee actions on the spacer grid discrepancies.
[
l
_
..
- _.
_
_ _ -
- _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_-______ _____
_ _ _
_
.
.
,
.-
'
.
Prior to shipment of the fuel to the unit, the vendor (Advanced Nuclear Fuels)
notified the licensee about discrepancies noted on five fuel assemblies during final inspection prior to shipment. The fuel assemblies were M-27, M-37, M-25, M-39, and M-5.
For each of the assemblies the discrepancy was visual defects (dimples) on the backside of the plate.
The inspector reviewed the vendor's variance report (VR 3790, Rev. 1). The dimples on the backside of the spacer grid were a result of a set screw impression 'during fabrication. According to the VR, the vendor conducted a two-dimensional thermal analysis for the worst case deformation, which was a 0.061-inch dimple in contact with the fuel rod clad. The analysis concluded there could be a fuel rod outer surface temperature 100 degrees F in excess of the acceptance criterion.
No conse-quential metallurgical or structural detriment was identified.
The vendor prepared a repair procedure to return the contact surface to that allowed by manufacturing specification. A licensee representative visited the vendor to review the manufacturing process and repair program, and noted no inade-quacies.
The licensee informed the inspector all the deficiencies identified would be tracked by non-conformance report (NCR), and final disposition would be re-quired prior to movement of fuel from the new fuel storage vault to the spent fuel pool. The inspector will follow licensee NCR issuance and disposition during future inspections.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's program for fuel receipt is well established and well organized.
No inadequacies were noted.
10.0 Periodic Reports (90713)
Upon receipt, a periodic report submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data, and that test results and supporting in-formation were consistent with design predictions and performance specifica-tions. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following report was reviewed:
--
Monthly Operating Report for Millstone 2 for November 1988.
I No inadequacies were noted.
>
11.0 Committee Activities (40500)
The inspector attended PORC (Plant Operations Review Committee) meetings 2-88-169, 2-88-171, 2-88-173, 2-88-174, 2-88-175, 2-88-179, and 2-88-182 on
November 30, December 6, December 14, December 15, December 19, December 21, and January 3, 1989. The inspector noted, by observation, that committee administrative requirements were met for the meetings, and that the committees discharged their functions in accordance with regulatory requirements. The i
inspector observed a thorough discussion of matters before the PORC and a good regard for safety in the issues under consideration.
No inadequacies were identified.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.,
..
.
l'2.0 Maintenance (62703)
The inspector observed and reviewed selected parts of preventive and correc-tive maintenance to verify compliance with regulations, use of administrative and maintenance procedures, compliance with codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, use of bypass jumpers and safety tags, personnel protection, and'
equipment alignment and retest. The following activities were included:
--
M2-87-13733, " Semi-annual preventive maintenance of 'B' Auxiliary Feed-water Pump."
--
M2-88-12678, " Receipt Inspection of Advanced Nuclear Fuels."
SP87-2-5, " Procedure for Testing Limitorque MOV's using MOVATS."
--
No inadequacies were identified in the testing observed.
12.1 Steam Leak from Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Vaive 2-FW-128 On December 9, the licensee identified a body to bonnet steam leak on valve 2-FW-12B.
This valve is a six-inch, solenoid, air-operated auxili-ary feedwater check valve.
The valve is unisoluble during power opera-tion.
On December 12, authorized work order AWO M2-88-12978 was developed to repair 2-FW-12B. The AWO reference maintenance procedure is MP-2721M Rev. 4, " Leak Sealing Repair." The procedure explains the prerequisites and precautions for and method of sealing a component. On December 13, the licensee generated non-conformance report NCR 283-109 to identify the leak and the method of repair. On December 14, the licensee's Engi-neering Department evaluated the repair, the injection pressure for the compound (Furmanite), the injection volume, and the seismic and design loads added by the compound and repair method. The licensee selected a wire-wrap method between the body and bonnet.
The inspector reviewed the engineering calculations and had no further questions.
On December 14, the maintenance department wire-wrapped the valve and i
injected thru 7 out of 12 cap nuts.
During sealant injection, the evalu-
-
ated pressure of 5000 psi was exceeded momentarily by 300 psi. The lic-ensee's Engineering Department evaluated this condition as acceptable based on maximum allowable pressure of 5650 psi. Allowable bolt stress provided a safety factor of two from yield strength. The licensee con-
cluded the momentary overpressure condition did not compromise the physi-
cal integrity of the valve.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's docu-i
'
mentation of this conclusion and had no further questions. The licensee detected no leakage from the valve after the leak repair, and on December 15 restored the valve per inservice test (IST) SP-21135.
On December 27, the licensee generated a second work order to address recurrence of a body-bonnet steam leak on 2-FW-128.
NCR 2-88-144 and engineering calculations on leak sealant pressure and volume were
._.
._
_
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
---
-
_-
_
=
'
..
-
.
I prepared.
The leak was stopped by a Furmanite injection using a clamp i
around the flange between the body and bonnet; leakage then met the ac-I ceptance criterion of less than one drop per minute.
During this main-tenance, the sealant injection pressure was exceeded by approximately 1,000 psi.
Licensee engineering dispositioned this overpressure as not compromising the yield strength of the fasteners. At the close of the inspection period, valve 2-FW-128 developed a steam leak for the third time.
Leak seal repair-methods and sealant injection overpressurizations will be reviewed further during routine inspection.
13.0 Observation of Surveillance Testing (61726)
The inspector observed portions of surveillance tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and Limiting Conditions of Operation, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
The following tests were reviewed:
--
SP 21193 " Quarterly Testing of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Air Valves" No inadequacies were noted.
14.0 Corrections to Previous Inspection Reports Region I Inspection Report 50-336/88-22, Detail 3.2 (Pg. 3) should read,
" licensee has committed to test the WRNI cables in the upcoming refuel outage in February,1989," vice " licensee has committed to replace the WRNI in the upcoming refuel outage in February,1989." This commitment was accurately documented in Region I Inspection Report 50-336/88-13, Detail 4.6 (Pg, 9).
Region I Inspection Report 50-336/88-22, Detail 3.1 (Pg. 2) should read, "into E0P 2532 in August,1988." vice "into E0P 2532 in July,1988."
15.0 Management Meetings (30703)
On November 29, the licensee made a presentation to NRC regional management on Northeast Utilities (NU) initiatives, and on results of the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) at Millstone 2.
Attached to this inspection report is *.he licensee's presentation handout.
Periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection findings auring the inspection period. A summary of findings was also dis-cussed ' the conclusion of the inspection.
No proprietary information was coverec 'a the inspection.
No written material was given to the licensee during the inspection period.
l l
l
_
_ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ - - - _ -
-_-__ _----- __ --- - _ _ _ - _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _- _
- - _ - - - - - - -
_ - _ -
--.
- _ - - - - - - - - _ - _ _
.
,. -
.
,
,
f
-
,
.
ATTACHMENT 1*TO NRC INSPECTION REPORT-
'
50-336/88-28 MEETING WITH NRC NOVEMBER 29, 1988
'
PRESENTATION ON NU INITIATIVES
-
KING 0F PRUSSIA, PA I
- - - -
L
J
..,
,.
.
-
.
.
NORTHEAST UTILITIES ATTENDEES C. F. SEARS VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR & ENVIRON-MENTAL ENGINEERING S. E. SCACE STATION SUPERINTENDENT, MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION J. S. KEENAN SUPERINTENDENT, MILLSTONE UNIT 2 M. P. BAIN MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI TEAM MEMBER R. A. PLACE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SSFI TEAM LEADER P. A. BLASIOLI SUPERVISOR, GENERATION FACILITIES LICENSING
_ - _ _ _ _ _
_ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
_
.e
.,,
.
.
.
AGENDA I.
INTRODUCTION C. F. SEARS (APPROX. 10 MINUTES)
A.
AGENDA / PURPOSE OF MEETING B.
ROLE OF SELF-ASSESSMENT WITHIN NU C.
BACKGROUND ON SSFI INITIATION D.
SIGNIFICANCE OF SSFI RESULTS II.
SUMMARY OF MILLSTONE UNIT 2 M. P. BAIN SSFI (APPR0X. 30 MINUTES)
R. A. PLACE A.
OVERVIEW OF SSFI PROGRAM B.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS C.
LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SSFI III. PLANT PERSPECTIVE ON SSFI J. S. KEENAN (APPROX. 20 MINUTES)
A.
RESPONSES TO FINDINGS B.
OVERALL PLANT PERSPECTIVE l
ON SSFI l
'
l
- - - - - _ _
s
-
.
.
IV.
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INITIATIVES J. S. KEENAN (APPROX. 40 MINUTES)
A.
PLANT OPERATIONS B.
MAINTENANCE C.
ENGINEERING SUPPORT D.
RADIATION PROTECTION /ALARA E.
REFUELING OUTAGES V.
CONCLUSION (APPROX.15 MINUTES)
C. F. SEARS A.
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES B.
SUMARY
)
r
\\
..
..
.
-
.
.
-
.
.
SELFASSNSSMENTATNU
<
,
NUCLEAR REVIEW BOARDS, QA, ISEG
SPECIAL REVIEWS - CY PLANT DESIGN CHANGE TASK FORCE O
SAFETY ANALYSIS /PRA
OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING FEEDBACK
,
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT
ISAP
COMPARIS0N WITH ASSESSMENTS OF OTHERS
)
\\
_1_
-
_ - - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - _
-
D E
Y U
-
E L
_
D
-
T R I
A A D
_
L E O
_
S S S
_
R R R E E E
_
T T T
_
T T T
_
E E E
_
.
L L L
% % %
EBO A
~
~
T
[
~
'
A g
TC D
ly te O
e a
r t.
7 a n d O
S i
4 e o
e T
g
u Q
d Y
S A
M EN IL
,
,"
.L E
C E
M ly t
D e
a n
nd O
I
o 2 e e
T
T 7 u 1 d L
g
U
J
.
O
-
"
M ".
'
N N
e U
T I
ly ta J
d N
a n
O r
u T
2 e o
e
9 d
N
U
A
$
J EN
.
.
'
O
.
L C
T te ED S
y a
l
" d O
r
"
L 3ea e
4 u T
L I d N 68 U
1 I
J M
f
/
-
-
-
-
' -
-
0
0
0
2
8
4
1
,-h>OghWg,
ma
l
- !
j!
l
e
..;
a
,
-
.
.
SSFI INITIATIVE
'
O MANY IMPROVEMENTS MADE l
PLANT DESIGN CHANGES
-
SAFETY EVALUATIONS
-
UFSARS
-
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTRUCTION
-
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
-
TESTING l
-
SSFI APPROACH:
UNIFIED ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT STATUS
,
O SSFI FOR EACH PLANT i
INTERNAL - IMPROVEMENT FEEDBACK, ENHANCE TEAMWORK
INDEPENDENCE, NO LIMITS ON INSPECTION, NO DIRECT OVERSIGHT l
'
l-2-
_
_-__-_ ______ - _ _ _ - _ -
_
- - - - - - - - - _ - - _ - - -
.
.
.
.
,
-
.
.
SSFI EXECUTION PROBLEMS
ISSUES MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE INTERNALLY
PRIORITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION - RESOLUTION O
PERSONALITIES
LESS SCREENING / MANAGEMENT REVIEW - INDEPENDENCE
MULTIPLE SSFIs IMPACT
,
i l
l l-3-l
_ _ - _ _ - - _ _ - - -
..
.,
-
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI INSPECTION METHODOLOGY
,
VERTICAL SLICE INSPECTION TECHNIQUE.
O PATTERNED AFTER NRC SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTIONS.
O CHOSE RBCCW DUE TO ITS IMPORTANCE IN REMOVING HEAT LOADS DURING NORMAL AND EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.
O REVIEWED ALL FACETS OF MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL AND I&C DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE AS WELL AS SURVEIL-LANCE / TESTING; OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.
'
ALSO REVIEWED RBCCW SUPPORTING AND INTERFACING SYSTEMS - E.G., DIESELS, BATTERIES AND SERVICE WATER.
O INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY A WELL QUALIFIED, INDEPEN-DENT IN-HOUSE TEAM OF ENGINEERS AND ANALYSTS.
,
O CONTINUED SENIOR MANAGEMENT SUPPORT.
I i-4-
- ,
-
.
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI TEAM COMPOSITION MECHANICAL
MANAGER, GENERATION PROJECTS, I
DESIGN 15 YRS EXPERIENCE IN
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND STRESS ANALYSIS
ENGINEER, SAFETY ANALYSIS, 8 YRS EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR LICENSING AND TRANSIENT ANALY-SIS ELECTRICAL AND
SUPERVISOR, ELECTRICAL I&C DESIGN /
ENGINEERING, 15 YRS MAINTENANCE EXPERIENCE INCLUDING EQ AND DIESEL GENERATORS
MP3 PROJECT MANAGER, 20 YRS EXPERIENCE IN ELECTRICAL DESIGN AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
STAFF ENGINEER, 20 YRS EXPER-IENCE INCLUDING 15 YRS AS I&C
!
SUPERVISOR AT CY
,
MECHANICAL
MP3 MAINTENANCE ENGINEER, l
MAINTENANCE 15 YRS EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE O
SENIOR QA ENGINEER, 17 YRS EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR AND f
AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING-5-
_ _ _ _ _
_
..
-
u
,
.
-
.
.
SURVEILLANCE /
SENIOR ANALYST, 30 YRS UTILITY S
R R
ND b
]
LICENSE J
SENIOR ENGINEER, 12 YRS START-UP AND CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE, PE OPERATIONS
MP1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR, SRO
LICENSE, 25. YRS UTILITY AND NAVY EXPERIENCE MILLSTONE 2
ASST. ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR, LIAISON 11 YRS VENDOR AND UTILITY EXPERIENCE, SRO LICENSE l
TEAM LEADER
SUPERVISOR, NUCLEAR FUELS, l
12 YRS PLANT AND FUELS EXPER-IENCE l
!
l l
<
l-6-
_ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - -
.
,..
,
,
.
.
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI CHRONOLOGY
!
TEAM FINALIZED JUNE 10, 1988 PROCEDURE AND WORK PLAN APPROVED JUNE 22,1988 BEGAN INSPECTION JUNE 24, 1988 MET WITH MP2 RESIDENT INSPECTOR JULY 7, 1988 COMPLETED SITE WORK AUGUST 12, 1988 l
BRIEFED MP2 NRB AUGUST 23, 1988 ISSUED REPORT SEPTEMBER 29, 1988 PRESENTATION TO NE0 MANAGEMENT OCTOBER 5, 1988 PRESENTATION TO NUCLEAR OCTOBER 19, 1988 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION OF FINAL REPORT OCTOBER 20, 1988 TO NRB MEETING WITH NRC NOVEMBER 29, 1988-7-
_ _ _ _ _ - _
- _ _-_
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - -.
_
_______
-
.
,
'
.
\\
-
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI SIM4ARY OF RESULTS
,
RBCCW IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ALL SAFETY FUNC-TIONS IN ITS NORMAL OPERATING MODE
- 7 T' ~ l.Oj
TEAM UNABLE TO CONCLUDE AT THE TIME REPORT WAS
'
ISSUED THAT RBCCW WOULD MEET ALL THE' REQUIREMENTS OF ITS DESIGN BASIS IN AN EMERGENCY CONDITION DUE TO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF CONCERN:
,
v.;
'
y INADEQUATE FLOW TO SbC HX AND CAR FAN COOLERSS Q
-
,j,& w t
RBCCW PUMP MOTORS NOT ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALI-
-
- [FIED FOR POSTU MTED LOSS OF VENTILATION f ; C,i:';':2
'/y CONDITIONS" !?" ~ y* "'""
,u w.~, y,u
'x #
/0UESTION OF AVAIMBILITY OF AC POWER DUE TO ["'%f I
-
,
f'
g,wp (A) OVERCURRENT RELAY ON CABLE FEEDER FROM "Q RSST SET TOO LOW AND (B)LPT FUSESJASSOCIATED-r'i-WITH DG'S MAY NOT BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED P' (#
l LACK 0F SAFETY REVIEW ON ES COMPONENTS WHEN
,z
'
RBCCW SURGE TANK WAS MOVED {' ROM 38' TO 76'
'"
,
LEVEL
- ^'"' " 1 " " " ' " " '
' "
's
'
LACK OF DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT SEISMIC c,.,
-
QUALIFICATION FOR REl.AYS ASSOCIATED WITH DIESELAND4.16KVBUqES CAR FAN MOTOR OVERLOAD PROTECTIVE DEVICES 1'
-
- "
HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED SINCE INITIAL START-UP!
/
O ALL OF THE AB0VE ITEMS ARE RESOLVED OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RESOLVED
,
-8-l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
o A.
e MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SSFI SlH4ARY OF RESULTS (CONT.)
TEAM ALSO IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS WHICH MAY BE GENERIC POOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN CONTROL
-
POOR COMPONENT LABELING PRACTICES
-
POOR HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES
-
[.LACKOFIMPLEMENTATIONOFFSARCOW4
-
LACK OF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
-
POOR ELECTRICAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT
-
TEAM NOTED THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF STRENGTH AT MP2 MP2 ASME SECTION XI REPAIR AND REPLACE PRO-
-
GRAM IS COMPREHENSIVE AND FUNCTIONAL MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE WORK IS GENERALLY OF
-
HIGH QUALITY I&C SURVEILLANCE DOCUMENTATION IS OF HIGH
-
QUALITY OPERATOR AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING SUPPORT
-
OPERATION
'
-9-
---,_,
, - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -, _ _ _ - - -
A
e g
MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SSFI PRESENT STATUS
MP1 SSFI PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED ON THE CONDENSATE /FEEDWATER/FWCI SYSTEM i
INVESTIGATIVE PHASE IS COMPLETE O
REPORT IS IN THE REVIEW PROCESS
0 OBSERVATIONS ARE ACTIVELY BEING RESOLVED
>
- 10 -
, ' '
-
.
,
-
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SSFI LESSONS LEARNED FROM MP2 SSFI
0
" LESSONS LEARNED" FROM THE MP2 SSFI APPLIED TO THE MP1 SSFI ARE AS FOLLOWS:
CLEAR DEFINITION OF SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS
-
- CATEGORY A, B, C COINITMENT TO RESOLVING OBSERVATIONS
-
PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO OBSERVATION
-
RESPONSES - REVISED PROCEDURE
,
- 11 -
_ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _
-_-_
_ -_
_---__ -----_ -_-_----
.-
,
-
.
.
MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SSFI TEAM COMPOSITION ENGINEERING / DESIGN O
MP3 START-UP ENGINEER AND
'
PROJECT MANAGER, 6 YRS EXPERIENCE IN THE START-UP OF UNIT 3, 11 YRS EXPERIENCE IN THE U.S.
C0AST GUARD AS AN OFFICER INCLUDING 4 YRS AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY
ENGINEER, REACTOR ENGI-NEERING BRANCH, 7 YRS EXPERIENCE IN THERMAL HYDRAULIC AND REACTOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
ENGINEER - INSTRUMENTS-TION AND CONTROLS, 7 YRS EXPERIENCE IN DESIGN, ENGINEERING, INSTALLATION OF INSTRUMENTATION l
SYSTEMS
MP3 INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SUPERVISOR, 10 YRS EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR PLANT INSTRUMEN-TATION ON MP2 AND 3, 6 YRS NAVY NUCLEAR EXPER-IENCE IN ELECTRONICS l
- 12 -
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - - - - - - - -
.;,
.
-
.
.
MAINTENANCE O
SENIOR ENGINEER, 6 YRS EXPERIENCE IN MECHANICAL
,
ENGINEERING PHASES OF CY
'
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, 7 YRS EXPERIENCE MERCHANT MARINE O
ENGINEER, GENERATION CONSTRUCTION 6 YRS EXPER-IENCE IN MANAGING SYSTEM UPGRADES AND CONSTRUCTION SURVEILLANCE / TESTING
SENIOR ENGINEER, 7 YRS EXPERIENCE IN SYSTEM DESIGN RETROFITS, 7 YRS
!
EXPERIENCE IN PERFORMING OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT, ISEA
SENIOR ENGINEER, 13 YRS EXPERIENCE IN PROCURE-MENT, CONSTRUCTION, ASSESSMENT FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD OPERATIONS
MP2 SHIFT SUPERVISOR, SR0 LICENSE, 27 YRS EXPER-IENCE IN POWER PLANT OPERATION INCLUDING 18 YRS IN NUCLEAR
- 13 -
_ - _ _ _ _
- - - _ _ - _ _
~
- - - - - - - - - _
_ _
.
.
.
..
'
..
.
.
.
TEAM LEADER
SUPERVISOR NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEERING, 25 YRS EXPERIENCE IN POWER PLANT OPERATION WITH 21 YRS IN NUCLEAR INCLUDING MP2 MAINTENANCE & ENGINEERING SUPERVISORS, FORMER SR0 LICENSES MP1 AND MP2 i
!
l
- 14 -
_
_ - -
-- -- -- -- --------- - -- - - - --------- --- ---- - -- -------- -- - - ---- - - --- --- - -- --- - - - -
-
-
,
-
,
,
SSFI OVERVIEW I
I.
INDEPENDENCE O
NRC INSPECTION TEAM l
UNLIMITED SCOPE O
UNRESTRICTED ACCESS
NRC RESIDENT PARTICIPATION O
PLANT LIAISON II.
COMMUNICATION / NOTIFICATION
UNIT SUPERINTENDENT BRIEFINGS
TEAM LEADER - SIGNIFICANT ITEMS
PLANT INCIDENT REPORTS /NUSCO ASSISTANCE III. GENERIC ISSUES
SIX IDENTIFIED
'
DESIGN CONTROL
-
COMPONENT LABELING
-
HOUSEKEEPING
-
IMPLEMENTATION OF FSAR COM4ITHENTS
-
LACK OF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
-
POOR ELECTRICAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT
-
NU PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN ALL 6 AREAS
CONFIRMATION OF OTHER SELF ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ONG0ING
- 15 -
_ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _
f
-
..
..,
..
-
.
.
i SSFI OVERVIEW (CON'T.)
,
'
IV.
SUPERINTENDENT VIEWPOINT
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
SIGNIFICANT CONCERNS
REASSURANCE O
IMPROVEMENTS IN SAFETY
MANPOWER INTENSIVE O
LESSONS LEARNED O
- 16 -
- - - _ - _ _ _ _
..
.,,
.
-
.
.
OPERATIONS i
I.
STAFF
6 SHIFTS
NEW ROTATING SCHEDULE
!
O 5-6 NRC LICENSES PER SHIFT
ALL MEMBERS TRAINED TO ACCREDITED PROGRAM
PROCEDURE WRITERS & OPERATION SUPPORT GROUP II.
NEW INITIATIVES
DEDICATED SRO O
OPERATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM MANUAL OPERATION OF TERRY TURBINE
-
LOCAL RUNNING OF EMERGENCY D/G
-
EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT ENTRY
-
SIMULATOR OBSERVATION PROGRAM III. REDUCTION OF REACTOR TRIPS
HISTORY
PROGRAM
RESULTS
- 17 -
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
d
..
.,.
~
- ~-
.
.
'
.
,
,
'
.-
,
TO:
JS KEENAN MILLSTONE UNIT 2 DAILY STATUS REPORT (CS32468)
FROM: JD STANSBURY (EXT 4759)
STATUS AS OF: 0730 TUESDAY 11/22/88 MEMMMAMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1. PLANT STATUS:
ALARA FOR 1988:
MAN-REM MAN-REM
% POWER==========> 100 DATA DATE IS 11/19/88 GOAL ACTUAL
'
MEGANATTS ELEC===> 888
======================================
DAYS ON LINE=====> 27 TOTAL -----------------------> 679.000 773.206 TURBINE ON LINE==> 10/26/88 3 1825 P0HER OPERATIONS ------------>
69.025 38.536 i
MONTH / MONTH TO DATA DATE -->
7.800 2.287
'l LAST DAY'S TOTAL ------------>
N/A 0.080 2. DUTY OFFICER SCHEDULE:
==============================================================================
11/21/88==> 11/27/88 DC KROSS 11/28/88==> 12/04/88 12/05/8G 4;>
12/11/88 ~JF SMITH. _.
-
---
-
-
+ - - ~~-
JG RESETAR 12/12/88==> 12/18/88 FR DACIMO 12/19/88==> 12/26/88 JD BECKER 12/27/88==> 01/02/89 RH BATES 3. DUTY OFFICER REPORT TO BERLIN 3 0745:
==============================================================================
PIR ON FIRE BARRIER OUT FOR OVER 30 DAYS.
QUIET NIGHT.
PAGE 2 4. TECH SPEC LCO'S
==============================================================================
SPEC NO.
DESCRIPTION LEAD TIME AND DATE ENTERED ACTION DEPT
__________________________________________________________________________________________
3.7.10.A.3 C03,C05,C06,C21 1325 11 21 88 30 DAYS BC 5. MAJOR EQUIPMENT DUT OF SERVICE:
==============================================================================
LOCAL ID DESCRIPTION REASON OUT OF SERVICE
__________________________________________________________________________________________
F10C
"A" D/G DC AIR COMPRESSOR MONTHLY PM"S OF INTEREST BUT NOT 005 LEAK FROM SERVICE HATER FLANGE TO
"B" DIESEL P11C
"C" RBCCW PUMP COUPLING INSPECT PUMP COUPLING HITH ENGINEERING i
i
!
!Lu
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
__
.__ __
_-____-_____________
-
.
..
.
,
-
- PAGE 3
,
6. WORK PLANNED FOR TUESDAY 11 22 88:
.
==============================================================================
A. OPERATIONS:
l 1.
OPS ASSISTANT ON VACATION t
2.
ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 3.
OPS SUPERVISOR MIDSHIFT MEETING
!
B. MAINTENANCE:
==============================================================================
DEPT /AWO/ DEVICE EQUIPMENT PROCEDURE WORK TO BE PERFORMED
_______________________..______________________ _____________...______..___________._____
1.
M REPLACE LEAKING DIAPHRAGM ON 2-CND-V351 (CPF)
2.
M REPAIR REGULATOR FOR 2-CND-FN1 (CPF)
3.
M MOVE MT BARRELS TD -25 AB FOR TUBE REMOVAL 4.
M REPLACE IDLER PULLY ON SHOP AIR COMPRESSOR 5.
M ATTEMPT TO STOP LEAK ON 2-SW-231B FLANGE D/G HX SERVICE WATER _ ISO. VAL _VE..___._,_.
_ _. __ _.. _ _ _ _. _.. _ _ _ _ _.
_
_. _
-
__.g..g. MOVE ~SFP SKID BUCKET TO SFP AREA
.
,
7.
E INVESTIGATE LOST OF ELEC TO MACHINE SHOP EQUIP 8.
E REPAIR TB LIGHTING
'
9.
E REPAIR VPI ON'2-ES-1.2B 10.
M F10C
'A'
D/G DC AIR COMPRESSOR J-28'
MONTHLY PM (GIONET)
.
11.
M P11C
'C'
RBCCW PUMP CDUPLING INSPECT PUMP COUPLING WITH ENGINEERING (JORDAN)
.
12.
M INSTALL AIR LINES TO WORK TABLES IN HELD SHOP 13.
M CONTINUE AUX BUILDING DRAIN LINE PDCR 14.
M 88-11959 2304C BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION REDUCTION ASSIST ENGINEERING TO PERFORM TEST T-88-42 (HEINONEN)
15.
M CONTINUE WORK ON SEC CHEM ADD WORK PLATFORM C.
18C:
1.
BOP CALS 2.
MEPL EVALS PROJECT 3.
PROCEDURE REVIEWS / REWRITE PROJECT 4.
CRDR PROJECT 5.
2427A RECORDER PM'S 6.
DUTAGE PREPS.
7, 2401J: TM/LP FUNC TEST
~
8.
METRASCOPE: ROD 63 READING LOW 9.
PZR PRESS (P-103/103-1) LIMITER PDCE 10.
2406As WQM FUNC TEST 11.
2439: FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS TEST D. ENGINEERING:
1.
XMMEMMMMMM ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING NMMMxxMxNM
_
- SSFI MEETING' BERLIN 0900 IN S105
- PDCR EVALUATION & REVIEWS
- STATION BLACKOUT PROCEDURE PREPARATIONS 2.
XMMMMMMMMM IN SERVICE INSPECTIONS NMMMMMMMMM
,
- AUX BLDG FLOOR DRAIN HYDROLAZING
- WEEKLY VLV TESTING - CVCS SYSTEM VALVES
- WEEKLY VLV TESTING - LPSI SYS. FAC 2 VALVES
- NEEKLY VLV TESTING - CTMT SPRAY FAC 2 VALVES
- BORIC ACID VENTILATION REDUCTION
- _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ -
_ - - - - - _ - - _ - _ - - - - _ - - _
-
..
.
,
..
-9
,
MAINTENANCE I.
NEW FACILITIES
MAINTENANCE SHOP O
I&C SHOP
,_.._ _ _ __ g ;--- cc;g;;; ; p-,;;;g-
PLANNER / SHIFT SUPERVISOR
MAINTENANCE DAILY MEETING
UNIT DAILY MEETING
MORNING REPORT
CONTROL OF BACKLOG
PREVENTATIVE VS. CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE RATIO III. REWORK
,
O PROGRAM TO CONTROL / IDENTIFY
IMPROVE PLANT RELIABILITY IV.
SAFETY
0
> 1 MILLION MANHOURS V.
'
REDUCTION OF OPERATING CYCLE EXPOSURE O
REDUCTION OF OUTAGE EXPOSURE
- 18 -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - -
)
36 Q
01 8 3 0 O0 4
N W.01 101 A
O G_ RS V
D V
.
N E I
NE E T O R T
IB T
.E CL TA B S RS L
I A
U RGT T S T I
U A
N ANELIN O O WSPERPFL T B
IR
T
41 3
1
.
S
.
s DT 0 0 8 6
LS I
O'
I
-
2 21 2
.
K G W
H D
A R O T
N LD M D A B_
I
-
KBL 1 /
B L
> SL O B B B C
A S
A T
TI ORXP E W_ T A B E O
M' O C UUOL L B T
PHI K 9 Ct
. a t
A
-[f
. e B-
. 4 O
6
1 s
VW C
-
e A
.
-
s LL T
. a A
t K
-
N
.
E eE
M t
.
W
1
. 2 A'
G l
N o
I
_
O K
.
t R
-
T-
-
. 1 W
-
I
. e N
-
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
-
_
0
o
o U
0 s
2
i
O l
NU J e D
o E
s N
E C
,
R N
T A
B M
E P
N F
C EU I
L o
o E
. ;
.
E
NH S
'
=
.
I o
H
A T T
<
-
o
,
C T
M7 n.
-
"#o O
N
.
D O
N EL VE E
M R
U I
.
r T
T Ne F
U M
N E
_g o J
P E R H
V C
o E
E M
R m
o
B P
E
,
.
,
F
.,
,
,
..
,
.
%
.
,
.
I
.,
,
a
,
,
-
,
M
]r o
,
o, s
,
T
,
P
,
t i
CI
,
<
,
s o
s 0O
,
s a
,
,
.
..
.,
.
.
.
MAINTENANCE (CONT'D)
VI.
PROCEDURE UPGRADE VII. HOUSEKEEPING
'
INCREASE AWARENESS
TARGET AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
NEW UNIT PROGRAM
- 19 -
_
_--
-_-
,- _,
.
-,
ENGINEERING SUPPORT I.
STAFF
0 QUALIFICATIONS
DIVERSITY i
II.
TESTING & MONITORING l
VIBRATION TESTING PROGRAM
ULTRASONIC TESTING PROGRAM
SECONDARY PERFORMANCE MONITORING
CONTAINMENT MONITORING III. MODIFICATIONS
FUEL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM
BORIC ACID REDUCTION
RCP INSTRUMENTATION
RCP SEAL REPLACEMENT
CHARGING PUMP UPGRADES
SERVICE WATER PIPE REPLACEMENT
INSTRUMENT AIR UPGRADES IV.
CHEMISTRY i
WATER QUALITY
COPPER REPLACEMENT
BORIC ACID TREATHENT V.
POTENTIAL STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT IN 1990s l
f
- 20 -
l
)
\\
l
-
_
-
. *
8 _y
_
e
.
!
.
g'
e
.
-
-
-
.
.
,
_
-
j S B i
E
_
A I P&
r-T A tu Sl R
S
C
N R E
uf O lI i
,. '
f R e
l i
nI l
s F
z
t wO u
I s
N U
aT D
_
T E
IO s
sE S
N 50 T S T A
O 72 C
o
.
P t
t P A I s.
T E
E 0. E M
C S
f & P t
S t
.
i
t N
_ S G W R
Y uN 9.999 _.
N E S E
T C
o
9999 _
R I
-
- J A
I A
T T
.
E V
349.
T 1 R 7.O 0000.
M 1 E [;J
T
_
- -.
E
.
K vS e
N02345 f N n
F N M I
/
R
_
s o
0.MMCS55 I
M r v A
t E32 M F a e u
SE8 n r
--
c L
==
_
_
i
_
_
.
.i3 Gl
6 Vl i
_
DS f
N0
.
O5
._
0 D2 AmMC T -
N3 O0
._
.
.
.
&
_
q
_
'
l
._
/
I
/
_
_
.
.
D i
/
k l
n
_
i
-
'
H
'!>
[\\
_
C t-P l
._
f l
I
~_
I g
_
II
%
R
-
s g'
_
CJl L
1Sl
[
-
PP g/
P
.
'V.
g I
d
.
_
,0
.
.
.
.
.
_
V+
_
_.
_
_
_
_
.
.
.
.
_
.
_
_
_
_
-
.
V N
Y I
R M O
..
TS E I
T
-
H A 5 5 9 0 5 5 2 7 3 0 5 D
9 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 4 3 3
T 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
N
-
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N L
-
L2 O
A2 P
2 5 3 3 8 3 9 3 7 7 9 M V5 9 6 6 5 3 4 4 6 5 4 O
0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
N C N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I
O M
-
'
8 8 8 7 3 9 6 6 3
C
6 5 6 5 4 2 2 3 3 2 T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 5 5 E
/
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 P
E6 0 0
-
S A/
.
8 6 3 0 4 5 0 N
D1
=
I
3
.
6 5 6 7 7 6 5 5 7 T
C E 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 I
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
-
O H S S 0 9 0 5 7 6 0 3 4 6 4 7 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 A
0_0_
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
_
T R L
.
L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 T
T C
L U
U V
A L
S E
W N
S O
8 7 0 5 5 9 6 9 3 7 U
S R
iL 0 0
E I
7 7 0
1
P
.A T
U nM S
5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 R
M oN I
I
7 wO
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P T
T
H 2 P
o I
S m
-
n "0
7 9 2 4 9 9
W H
N F S
E 0 0
1 t
U T D
5 9 7 9 0 2 3 4 3
E
c
.
5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
E 0 0
.
-
-
E
9 O O
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F
N I
- u N
A
- To N 5 9 5 9 8
Nm
O M
1
E 0 E s 7 5 7 8 0 2 2
1 T
S
5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
N S
N
-
I
S M A
O x L T
-
P-0 0 0 D 0 0 0 0
E P L
I S
Y G M 0 E L
0 P B WO 2 6
Y M
S 0 C P
9 9 7 2 3
I
5 4 4 5 6 9 0 9
5 5 5 5 5 5 6. 5
3 0 0 0
0 0 0
0_
"
'
l hV
"
I f
K 8 3 8 0 2 4 8 0
"
4 4 2 3 2 5 5 6
W 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 h
G
ii g
. 0 0 0 0 0
'0 0 0 0 W
(
(
O f'
L
L 7 9 4 6 7 4 4
F 7 4 4 3 2 3 6 5 4
&
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
0 0 O O 0 0 0 0~ O MA A B C D E F G H I
IU
I
.
-
-
.
RADJATION PROTECTION I.
ORGANIZATION
REORGANIZED IN 1988
OPERATIONS GROUP O
SERVICES GROUP
0 SELF ASSESSMENT & QUALITY CIRCLE PROGRAMS II.
PROGRAMS
CONTAMINATED AREA REDUCTION
CORPORATE APPRAISAL
HOT PARTICLE CONTROL
TRAINING
PLANT TOURS
RADI0 ACTIVE PACKAGING & SHIPPING
POSTINGS III. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
TLD SYSTEM AND LAB UPGRADE O
EXPOSURE TRACKING SYSTEM
HP FACILITY UPGRADE
REDESIGN RCA
- 21 -
SU
T
A
T
S AE LA R
C I
A
R
O
T D
S E
R H
I T
A E
A E
N Y
I M
L
A A
O T
G
N O
M C
T
8 IN
1 U
6
5
2
E
RFE S
AOT D
AN U
N ENI Q
A GI A S 8 AM E U L TA R O A OT A TON H
OFO T
T C
w
.
-
- .
>
.
,
.
.
I.
GOALS l
ANNUAL ALARA GOALS - CORPORATE /NNECO
!
O 3-YEAR AVERAGE GOALS PROGRAM II.
PROGRAMS
INCREASE ALARA AWARENESS
WORKER / MANAGEMENT INTERACTION
'
O POSTINGS / STATUS BOARDS
DAILY EXPOSURE TRACKING III. METHODS
OUTAGE ESTIMATES & GOALS
PHOTO-LIBRARY
CE-VUE
COMPUTER UTILIZATION
NEW EQUIPMENT
LONGER FUEL CYCLES IV.
REFUELINGS/ FUEL CYCLES
.
l
,
- 22 -
_ _ _ _ _
...
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
. _ - - - _ _. _
b e
's.
..t-.,ki l
,
.
-
(,,J.
E $,8;N N E E E D2 4^$ $;$N $:N,7A$ D E NE N $ df.f.dhkhs b b h p
g
,
,
-
,
.
. ha
!
.
..-
O
.
..
Cp
- '
C li$$Nin%12!!5$f38MMONI@M@3@NMEMO$$U
~
-
--.
-
. C (Tj.
P
'
e
!
- _)
i E
C
.e L
r....,..*,.... = =....7.% % *2,7;,-- b......# '*:,%.~ 9
..;.......-
t/.",..*
/.1','l,T,.7,'l2/,; *
iD
@g,,, Tdis,&d... k..,.d._ W..,.4,,_ m.,...,...,i..,,
.,
G
_..,..
TMdm @........ M&. E....,Wh s
G; ;$ftwn :
t~
e
&
.
w.
C l
v.
y b
$
.g s
.---:*.
.~4..
Q_
.. ~.r==.~. u &~ + !.m-w..
t w.a
.. >.......
(1
_r. r..:r.:.:..w.x.....
If'l
.......... :. px -.....
Ul
- " '-
u
- ,'M'.Wr -- -
.g.
'
a v.m:Mu:k. g..., )d.s-:K
.
+"
... M:2 M...mm:W:
- ,a.w.m.ww.-s #;.m:Gt:m..:.w.. w.:. *h'::m,;i e.rI c-w du m Y u..
.
u
.
au.
,i no.
,,,
,,,,,
.
p
._..
.
g,
_ _LL c.
.._
1,0
!
-
>
.
n.
.
1. f. t.cr n..
..._..t,1.i t r :
".,
- - _,
.;
.-
de p
~ w.
. ~. w m....
,
- f,, un:86:y:@8::4..kl@8488#:q::w8s2N.w;st@,w.?,,4 g'
iTI l
maa-uuuu u,uuwmuuuuu au-
..... u ua O
E
!
-
.n i.
l.
- ~,x
-
j__m#....
-
-
- ~.7 T.~~. :................. =.
C,-.
-
......
..
-
rrj 9 n";ra:Mh$mf5de;ggp
C g;
^1'
t i g,':L p DminLc.b.mm:.ys:*nse
- -
c-,
L.
l lg
'-
l f.
O _,
c;;
!
L o,
_,
F". ".'. 7....CE.*C.~ .:.
...-
n I
-,0 'i.
LO I.i.d w as 4 L..t h c; c
- '
'I'
g*.
?, '
"
'- J (I"6;M.T'FX""CM** bp b"m%n..w.%.!,,,,
y4mx cogQ"'"'
L.u 5*
.
.
p-.'
G
" " " *
' " * * ' " " * * '
--, :.
Oi g,
,p
,: #
CJ q-P p*;p J
- '
.
-
y-
@
~4
.....
g
.
g-iI Q
>
- .
_
m,
- -. -
ee
.
.
"',.
QI m
. ; ~~,,
:3:.Y:5. *. ::- 3
.,
--
C hkb m
,
..
I.LJ
'
C
-
i e
iTi s'"
.P
t_
-
[ C
.C
.
p L
g.
- 4.1
. =. - -.. - - -.....- '-
G Ot
-. +.
,,
..r
---
t ei G
a.a-u w.a,aw a.
c
>
rT).
- T*j i-
,ma
,
'.
O to Mb; :M:M. m
',
Q.
O m
-
QI c.
l];
.
n. g g-3 3--
s.-
u.
.
,
c-C.
~
y,
,
!
._ -
ci cn o ai s
._,
.
O
. 1, b
i. b;..,.,-
i_
e
.
c
, ;,
p.
ci j *. m.s-
@
!
.
.),,
-
P-
- T,i C C
?','..
-
f *j,1
<
i.
r-
,
.;
- -., -
-.:
-
.
M M;M*N
.
- ~
2,,s
n,.. -
<-
r-g.
~
o.u >a w Q
O
.
O*
d e-
,
.} s qN
d O O'
2.,
b g,q f,E D'
C'
!
D.: 6 rf,i
l
,g g iTj t
O'
'
.
.
ai CO C
c 3 c' r-
!
g
'
O i~.~
CO c) o >
i
.C
-
- i'~ ( t. q
..
C")
.g l
i F
I
--'
$'
C CJ lQ T I
L
.'6.*
p.,
)
).
o
__
a.s C
o in y.
.._ <
e, I
r,
.3-l l r r i, T'FF ' ~ r F n, rp r r i T vr rrg,,, r T ' '~rT ~ r i r c.
O o
a o
o a
n o
er I-
.n fri
.t t.i r. e
I,ll 3,:].. l..' h j
_ _ _ _
_ _ - _ _
_
C
_
Y
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I
-
-
-
-
-
-
Y
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
R
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0_
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
R
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I
~
A
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
-
-
-
-
-
-
R P
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E R___
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E_t
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
i C E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Y#
N
-
-
-
-
-
-
B
-
-
-
-
-
-
C E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E U
-
-
-
-
-
-
G Nl
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
L
-
-
-
-
-
-
T
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Y
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
v
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
N.
-
-
A L
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5 U
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
F
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C T
-
-
-
S_
-
-
-
-
-
-
I
-
-
-
-
-
-
Y C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_
E 2 _J
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
S
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Js,
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
iC
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Y
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
/b
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
"
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
,k
-
-
-
-
-
-
L
-
-
C
O
0
0
0 QY
0
0
0
C
6
A
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
fr
'
'
..
.
-
-
.
!
REFUEL OUTAGES
I.
SCHEDULING
UNIT SCHEDULE VS. OUTAGE SCHEDULE O
SCHEDULING PROCESS
SCHEDULE FREEZE - 90 DAYS PRIOR
PDCR PACKAGE COMPLETION - 90 DAYS PRIOR
TEAMWORK II.
ACTIVE MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION & CONTROL
MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVE O
CONTAINMENT COORDINATOR
SHIFT ENGINEER
SUPERINTENDENT ACTIVITIES
STATl!S MEETINGS III. PRE 0VTAGE WORK VS. OUTAGE WORK
SCREENHOUSE WORK
TANK INSPECTIONS
HEAT EXCHANGER WORK
PUMP OVERHAULS
VALVE WORK
NO LC0 UTILIZATION IV.
1989 MODIFICATIONS
O ATWS
CRDR - PART 2
RCP SEAL INSTRUMENTATION
SAFETY VALVE POSITION
SERVICE WATER PIPING UPGRADE
TRANSFER CANAL QUICK OPEN FLANGE
,
- 23 -
6CU E
F 1ED F
LJE
8
OH
8
.,
Jt RC R'
S l
8I 8i I$
l
E E
F
.
F
g
2
.
0
I$I 8I
[
l
8
'
.
.
E
I E
l g
L
2 F
U
8
.
D Y
E
E S R I
H R
l 8I I
F B
f l
C U U l
E l
E S
S O R F
F R
H B 4
U
8
.
Y E
O R
F
8
.
H
.
i E
I E
.
8
l
.
l
S t
.
M Y
.
l U
A F
I F
E S
D
3
S F
.
8
.
I I
Y E
3
0
.
A G
S
D E
- 8 R
.
-
FI I 8 l i 8 I
0 E
E
.
.
U
.
S
.
F O
R F
.
.
6 E
6
.
.
g
.
-
G K
l I
.
N
.
.
N A
%
.
E A
I
i J i I
.
L R
E
B i
.
.
8
.
.
U
8
.
..
8
.
F O
O
N N
.
.
N
.g R
8 2 A
A
.
.
l
E T 8 T
..
.
R 9
?
K t
J J
.
A
%
.
E
.
.
.
8i 1 J
.
S
8 1 i.i I 7 1 2
.
.
.
4
.
.
I I
2 I
1 E R
R Y
.
N
.
.
M
.
N
.
E R 0 7 N
.
.
E -
4
A A
.
.
A l
g
.
.
.
J N
f 9 1
-
I 8 I 8
.
.
I 2I
.
J J
.
t
.
J
.
LP2
81 N
1 FL l
0
.
t
.
.
8 l
N
.
.
A
.
.
.
/A o
N N
A
.
J N
g
.
.
0V t
.
R
.
.
.
A
.
A A
J
.
.
J E E_
J J
.
.
.
.
.
.
I
l 1 1 I[
.
.
[1 I 1[
04!
N I_
_
l l
l I
.
[
.
S l
.
.
.
.
E l
.
.
J
_
-
8 i
-
-
N Z
N A
N
.
C
.
.
A J
G
.
J
_
.
J
A
.
..
N S
)
I E
H
.
I
.
I E
0E
.
.
A
.
.
.
I20L
.
.
R
.
.
.
.
=0O
.
.
.
.
_
.
.
.
.
D 1D
.
I 7H P
.
.
.
I
.
.
.
.
_
.
.
i T 0'C (
.
.
.
.
.
/S
.
..
.
.
.
..
R LI0 t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
I I
.
-
.
IN/O S
..
.
.
.
R R
.
.
U tN E
M
.
.
.
.
.
TU1 i
.
_
.
.
.
.
.
.
G
.
E E
.
L EI A
.
_
.
.
T T
.
EDO.
T
.
.
.
A A
.
.
.
.
U
.
.
A~
O G
.
.
H H
.
..
.
.
NI N
.
.
T U
/
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
_.
E E
.
.
.
0OT S
.
.
.
._
.
C C
i0E
.
.
.
.
.
I I
.
.
.
.
O 0 T
.
.
.
.
.
.
35P S
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
V V
.
T E
.
.
.
R R
.
E
.
.
f E
f T
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
N
.
.
L G
.
S S
.
.
.
.
.
E E
.
M
.
H
.T
.
N t
LmR N
.
.
.
.
O
.
.
.
.
sm (
/
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
T
.
C I
.
.
Il
.
T
.
.
N N
C
.
R On f
.
.
.
S
.
.
.
t
.
NIU
.
0 RS E N
Y
.
Y
.
E
.
O A
.
R N
R R
L N
N L
O
.
B P
T G
T T
M
.
m_
l K
K R
R
3
O B
L
.
T I
(
.
t M
E
..
.
R
.
.
.
L A
A E
.
M E
N
.
Al R
R O
n;
R R
S
.
E
.
_.
.
.
N
w
.
.
H O
O H
R
E E
S S
I
.
L
.
L
R H
H O
S C
N N
A
.
S
.
..
.
N E
E T
E E
S A
.
N E
R V
I E
S O
/
G G
.
I
_7 9 7 O
G R
C E
O U
N
.
1e 0_ C N
M H
N
.
P S
H Y
Y O
.
i t
I R
I 0 Y Ei J D
E E
O L
O
.
U C
A O
E T
T H
P TNUE H
A R
R R.
r
-
N P
N I
I N
C 0REe20 R
L L
E R
0nHt13
T T
T E
T T
i I
2uS T
S S
C U
C T
R
E
B I
I E
HS E
U A
F A
R.
A R
W
R C
C R
"
t T
l O
l i
i t
t l
l C
U R
H
2 E
E E
t l
S T
P I
T F
F S
"
HO S
=
=
R R
R C
S EJTEWIA
3
S
7
9
I
3
S
OOGTN)
T
REATt3
0
0 O
0
0
I
1
I
F G P S (7 tL l
'
iC y
E t.E 0_
-
E H
jtJ1 R
H O
.
sf'Q R
R
-
G
A N
I
>
t
-
e
<
.
jl
M G
l
-
GI I
.
.
H
_
_
I
_
H T
T
$I
l
-
9 I
R R
R
-
E
.
R N
L R
.
U l
I O
RI 9
_
l
-
A
-
N O
'F. b G
H H
LH T
C UI E
I S
R t
r
H H
k S S 0 i
l l
T I
l E
Y 0 I
t I
R 0 S
.
H I
..
l R
R
I S
nI n I
.
!
.
tnS Y M
M R
U
O U
R S S 0 N
Y E n 0 S
E E
G O 4 T
6 -
l H
H n
l U
T 0 4 I
R I
I U Ili i
- E
.
G K
E
..
O B
.
N % n F
0 E
E E
I 0 R
F F
L
B U
B
F O O
'
T
2
-
E E
'
U
7 F
l j
U
.
.
_
O O
.
E T
T
.
f E
.
I
R
i
I i NI N
.
.
.
Bl D R
Y R 9
.
.
9 0 E F
.
.
E E
F
8 0 K
.
F F
l
.
n Y
.
9
1
_
R A
T
.
U E
.
E R U
.
7
.
D
-
O U
.
H.
U
.
S R
l
-
.
.
T
.
I
B
~
.
.
.
E K
l'
E I
I l
D
.
.
.
iFI i
Et F
.
.
D E
.
.
B
E B
B F
.
.
.
E
.
.
4 E
E E
.
.
.
.
.
F E
F l
F F
.
.
.
S
.
.
E S
H a
S S
.
.
.
F
.
U
.
U ]
DL U
. @
.
.
.
t
/ d S
.
.
Cy l
1@U1 0T
.
.
Q
. @i l[
.
.
l S
.
R
-
1[
.
f l
.
EE
.
.
.
.
.
.
B B
0N l
.
.
E NI
.
.
.
.
E F
.
.
F G
.
_
G B
.
S
..
E E
.
O t
F
.
.
.
O s
4
.
N
.
N
.
.
.
.
.
T2 8 P
.
.
.
_
.
.
.
9E A
.
.
E
.
.
T=3L R
S
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
J
.
s P P
.
-
0L
.
.
.
T 3L
.
.
t
-
i
.
IT5C E
J_,
U R
R
.
I I
L LI
-
.
N O,
D
.
.
T T
.
E E
I E
.
e H
N
.
I11eN
.
.
C H
S
_
.
A H
_.
O oI
.
.
.
H H
.
.
.
.
t T
.
.
EtN I
.
.
_
.
.
.
.
E E
.
.
.
.
.
.
C C
N
.
.
.
.
NiN U
N
.
.
.
.
I t
0-A I
.
.
.
.
.
.
I I
.
2
.
.
.
-
..
R R
N
.
F R
.
.
V V
T FeYEL
.
N R
.
.
.
.
.
L
.
.
E E
S gr N D
.
..
.
.
G
.
S S
.
E
.
.
.Q
.
.
E
.
.
O
.
N M
t K_ I
/
.
.
Y I
.
.
.
(
K
.
.
.
.
M
.
E
.
A L
Y
.
T
.
N N
.
C
.
.
.
S O
O L
I E
N U
L
.
.
.
EI R
.
M B
E N
N
.
A H
Q
.
.
N tl
_
=
=
E
.
E
.
T (
(
P
.
M
.
.
O t4
.
U
S L
K E
N f1
.
-
p R
R S
S E
N U
K K
R R
t N
.
.
t
U O
A e
T T
S
.
S N
O
.
A R
R O
.
n H
O O
H R
I I
it _
'
S.
C A
R
.
.
E L
S P
H H
O R
R
R N
E E
T
.
/
E E
.
N E
R V
I
_
S O
.
@00 N
N
-
G MEQ t
E E
-
D C
E O
U M
I
'
P S
H Y
Y O
I 1 t
I W
G G
R R
U E
R O
E T
T H
P T
I y E,.i S N O
i t
T E
T T
I R
.t O
L O
-
N P
N I
I N
C r 6 5 O.
t f
D i
a
l_.
L L
E R
2nt1 t
WuS__
H T
T E
E E
T U
0 U
i i
S
"
T n
n C
U C
R D
E
- /.
B I
I E
fS C
U E
E A
F A
n R
H
R C
C R
"
T V
l l
C H
I tr SH(
S S
S R
R R
S T
P C
I F
F 7t 5 O OVe I TC n
l f Ni
2
4 S
0
0
3
5
1 T(P P3 F g
-
.
.
i L R1 I
1 I
1
1
0 O
0
0
Lil
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
4
2
a M
-
-
-
-
-
-
,
E
.
R
.
E
-
2 E N
/
3 A
2
.
M A
i
.
E JE I
i 2
V
./
S T
i A
l
ES U
L
/
I/
O M
3J 8 C
U
Y
\\ X8 i /
L I
A L_= 7
.
D
8 f
m EE
2
/
V/
m
/
~
=
~A_0 0E E
E
'
3 T V
/A I
R m~
D T
A V 7
L B
B
U
/
[3 M
1 E C U
C
_J/
YA'
l
-
/
N
1
,
C
/
Y_
l
2L M
i A
E J1/
J R
T
-
l l~
j N
L l!
L
!
l A
/
\\!
M
.
,
l b p3.
'
' #)i m
Y l
-
-
-
-
-
_
t
5
5
5
5 o1
3
2
1
.l
'
l
'a
- q
.
.
.
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AT NU
INTEGRAL TO NU SAFETY ETHIC
0 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY EFFORTS
'
STRONG ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND STAFF
ASSUME ACCIDENTS CAN HAPPEN - PREVENTION O
PREPARE FOR THE UNEXPECTED - MITIGATION
O MODIFICATIONS
TRAINING
EXERCISES
- 24 -
_
..
,
',
..
,
.
l MAINTENANCE
The discussion below highlights a few areas under Maintenance where signifi-cant work is ongoing to enhance Millstone Unit No. 2 Maintenance activities.
The areas of focus today include:
l Control of Maintenance Work l
l To ensure maintenance work is conducted in a smooth, efficient, and well thought out manner, meetings are held at many levels to discuss jobs prior to
'
their being released for work.
-
The Maintenance Planner first meets with the on-duty Shift Super-visor to review the work for the next day.
They then agree on what work will be released by Operations the next day.
-
The Maintenance Department staff meets every morning to review jobs scheduled for that day, jobs in progress, and preps for jobs that are planned for the future.
-
The unit, as a whole, meets daily to discuss work for that day and the next.
Unit management works very closely to stay on top of routine maintenance activities as well as significant plant maintenance repairs.
Mechanical and electrical preventative maintenance (PM) work is combined along with any corrective maintenance (CM) work to minimize the amount of time equipment is out of service. This minimizes the number of separate tagouts on equipment and maintains plant equipment available as much as possible.
The maintenance backlog (Mechanical / Electrical) is maintained extremely low.
On an average, we have approximately 75 AW0s that can be worked immediately (plant conditions permit) and approximately 150 AW0s total (an additional 75 AW0s on hold due to engineering required, parts unavailable, or plant condi-tions). The backlog is updated weekly and is sorted by building and foreman.
Priority 1 and 2 jobs are worked immediately.
Rework Maintenance takes a very proactive approach to rework.
Maintenance publishes reports to identifv wnich pieces of equipment are worked on most frequently and have the most' mar. hours associated with repairs.
From this list, the
!
Maintenance Supervi:;or prioritizes rework items by importance to plant safety, i
reliability, and resources expended on past repairs.
The Maintenance Super-
'
visor then assigns a technical individual to work with Mechanics and/or Electricians to resolve causes of rework.
Examples of rework equipment include:
pressurizer spray valves, heater drains pump teals, EHC pumps, and hotwell samp?e pumps.
.].
_ _ _ - _ _ - -
- _ - _
_
- _ _ _ _
_-_______ _ _ ___ _ -
,
..
.,
%
Preoutaae Work Maintenance has always had the goal of performing smooth refuel outages. With this in mind, along with reducing the length of refuel outages, Maintenance began investigating ways to reduce the amount of work done during refuel outages. We looked at three areas to reduce work during outages that could be done outside the refuel outage window without entering any Technical Specifi-cation Action Statements.
We came up with a significant amount of work that had little risk associated and have completed this work preoutage, e.g.,
screenhouse PMs and cms, tank inspections, heat exchanger retubes, pump overhauls, and heat exchanger cleaning and ECT.
This effort frees up more experienced in-house personnel during refuels allowing maintenance activities to be better controlled.
l Industrial Safety Maintenance, like all Unit 2 departments, is taking an active approach to enhancing personal safety.
The company has come out with a new Safety Manual and has begun implementing the Dupont Safety Program.
Maintenance has reviewed accidents back seven years to determine causes and has taken action to attempt to prevent the most common type of accidents.
Work has been geared towards making individuals more aware of hazards and taking action to eliminate or lessen possible impact of hazards.
ALARA Maintenance's nonoutage exposure reduction program has shown significant success in 1987 and 1988.
In 1987, during operational periods (from March through December) the Department received 13.37 REM, for an average of 1.337 REM per month.
The exposure during operational periods in 1988 is approxi-mately the same as in 1987.
Maintenance controls their operational exposure by requiring Maintenance Department Head approval for all jobs that will expend greater than 100 MREM.
One of the more significant engineering projects that was undertaken to reduce exposure in the maintenance area was boric concentration reduction.
This Technical Specification Change Request will allow the deactivation of the Boric Acid Heat Trace System.
This will alleviate a great deal of high exposure work Maintenance performed to n>aintain this system operable.
Conser-
)
vatively, Maintenance could expend 2 REM less per year by not having to repair Boric Acid Heat Tracing.
Maintenance's outage exposure has been significant but special tooling har been purchased and more is being bought to reduce exposure.
Examples of equipment purchased include a reactor vessel study cleaner and reacter vessel flange o-ring surface cleaner.
Additional items to be purchased prior to the next refuel include tools to clean the reactor vessel and head closure sur-faces.
Exposure reduction associated with these cleaning evolutions is
!
expected to be at least 50%.
_-
- - _
_-- - - - -
J
.
. _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
.
- ,-
- ,,
n a
a Reliability Improvements In conjunctic.;i with its review of rework, Maintenance is working to increase the reliability of plant equipmtent to increase the reliability and capacity
,
'
factor of the plant.
It is currently working on individual reliability problems identified by the rework indicator as well as by cbserving overall
!
trends of groups of equipment.
Under the equipment group category, small and medium size motors were identified as failing more than would be expected. As a result of this, Maintenance is establishing a motor inspection, testing and overhaul program for small and medium sized motors, and has purchased test equipment, an oven and dip tank, as well as other equipment to better predict motor conditions and repair motors.
Procedures Maintenance is engaged in a significant procedure upgrade process.
It is rewriting all its Maintenance Procedures, as well as adding procedures they believe will enhance equipment maintenance.
All procedures are being rewritten to meet the INPO procedure writer's guide. We intend to complete in the neighborhood of 80 procedures in 1988 and be completed with the rewrite of all procedures by 1991.
Housekeeping The unit has increased its awareness and attention to housekeeping over the last year.
The unit is beginning to implement a program to have weekly reviews of areas by Supervisors to enhance housekeeping.
This program was designed around INP0's guido on this subject.
Currently, the unit is walked down by Maintenance supervision daily, informally, and by unit ;nanagement monthly, formally.
In conjunction with the unit's effort toward housekeeping, Maintenance contin-ues to select specific plant areas to improve.
These areas are cleaned, all material not specifically needed in the area is removed, and the area is painted.
Some areas that have been ampleted in the last year include the Auxiliary Feedpump Rooms, Turbine Deck, and Containment Fersonnel Airlock area.
Overall, we believe housekeepag on the unit is good, while some room for improvement exists, and we are working to make improveu nts.
Facilities Unit 2 Maintenance has greatly enhanced its maintenance facilities over the past few years.
It has more than doubled its facilities and has set up dedicated weld, machine, electrical, and snubber areas and has greatly improved its basic shop, tool crib and offices.
Currently, we are engaged in constructing and outfitting a new hot weld shop, hot machine shop and RCP seal rebuild area.
The addition of new facilities has significantly improved maintenance on the unit.
!
-3-
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'
,
,,
,
.
<
,
,
ENGINEERING SUPPORT ITEMS Vibration testing is being conducted for safety and nonsafety-related pumps.
This testing uses state of the art equipment to track and analyze the vibra-tion signature.
Signatures are obtained using a computer-based system which stores pump and motor information as well as previous signatures used for comparison.
This method allows the signatures to be obtained faster, thus reducing technician exposure in radiation areas.
Innovative approach to containment monitoring by installing a camera in the loop area for monitoring at power.
In-service test was used to evaluate camera performance for future applications. During the present cycle, a steam leak developed in containment. A review of the loop. cameras revealed the leak to be ra a steam generator blowdown valve.
The camera showed that no safety equipment was being impinged and no operations were hampered.
Additionally, the camera provided a means to monitor the leak to ensure that it was not getting worse.
The Unit 2 NRC Project Manager had also witnessed the leak and was impressed with the camera operation.
,
Steam Generator ECT program development advanced to the point that with the use of computer programming, the tracking and monitoring of tube defects help to reduce outage time.
Improvements included (1) development of detailed component specific data analysis guidelines, (2) use of computer screening for
!
defect identification on a trial bases (the test given to the examiners was also given to the computer with comparable results), (3) qualified ultrasonic examination techniques for tube cracks, (4) identified indications of poten-tial cracks in tubes then performed rotating pancake coil examinations on all suspect tubes, and (5) developed and presented a five-day component specific training and examination for all eddy current data analysts.
The Unit 2 program has been described by some to be an industry standard.
Recently, TVA spent two days at Millstone 2 obtaining information on the ECT program in order to develop the TVA program in a similar way.
Balance-of-plant testing program was established before the Surry event.
During the 1988 refueling outage, a new computer program was generated which tracks ultrasonic testing of piping runs and joints.
Recently, a steam leak developed in the main feedwater line in a location similar to the Surry failure.
The location of the leak was in an area tested during the outage.
Upon reviewing the data, it was determined that there was no apparent wall thinning.
When the laqging was removed, the leak was found to be a pinhole leak in a vent line weld.
(See attached sample printouts.)
The balance of-plant testing also includes an extensive eddy current test program for plant heat exchangers and condensers.
In addition to the plant process computers monitoring of secondary side heat exchanger performance, the RBCCW heat exchangers are monitored on a daily bases to determine cleanliness and, hence, optimize preventative maintenance cleaning versus component availability.
Engineering supervision (Department Head and four Assistant Supervisors) all hcid and maintain Senior Reactor Operator licenses.
All five are Emergency Duty 0fficers and have previous operational and plant experience due to previous positions held in other departments (Maintenance, Operations and
.}.
_-_ - -__- _ _
___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,e'
.-
.
4 3 i
4 g
Instrumentation & Controls), fossil plants, the navy and in previous work experience.
Very good interface with the unit chemistry group as evidenced by the state of the art chemistry monitoring instrumentation - and controls.
Unit 2 steam I
generator chemistry meets or exceeds all EPRI chemistry guidelines and con-I l
trols.
Unit 2 Engineering has incorporated the use of computers for all of its engineers.
The computers allow the engineers to produce more professional documents, able to be clearly read and modified.
Additionally, Unit 2 Engi.
neering is involved in a pilot program to network its computers with selected Millstone departments and the corporate office.
Networking to the corporate Engineering offices allow for quick review of memos, design changes, licensing documents, and various plant technical and safety evaluations.
Unit 2 has installed a pedestal crane in containment to reduce the usage of the polar crane.
There has been some start-up problems with the crane, however, it is expected that it will prove to be an extremely useful tool in the future.
Over the years, Unit 2 has made considerable improvements in the Instrument Air system for reliability purposes.
Improvements have included cross-ties to station air, alarms, flow restrictors, redundant air supplies, and backup air supplies to critical components.
Additionally, Unit 2 has three compressors (two 100% and one 250% capacity) for Instrument Air and one Station Air compressor. The redundancy of the three units and the cross-tie capabilities with station air and Millstone Unit 1 establishes the instrument air system as an extremely reliable system.
The ability to use outside air supplies during times when breathing air is in use is also in progress.
The numerous improve-ments in the instrument air system was cited as a Unit 2 strength during its last INP0 evaluation.
Unit 2 has recently implemented a Boric Acid Reduction program associated with a Technical Specification Change Request.
This change request reduces the weight percent of boric acid required to be maintained in its boric acid storage tanks.
This modification eliminates the need for heat tracing.
This in turn reduces the maintenance time and exposure associated with the heat tracing upkeep.
The Unit 2 participation in the pilot Fuel Consolidation Project has been successful. Recent compaction of grid cage skeletons has also proved to be a successful operation. The results of this project will have a major impact on the nuclear industry.
Secondary performance accountability continues to use the latest in tech-nology.
Infrared equipment is used on a quarterly basis to detect leaking valves and traps.
Ultrasonic main feedwater flow instrumentation is presently being evaluated.
Installation of a new plant process computer, including SPDS, ICC and archival capabilities, has proved to be a useful plant tool.
Unit 2 has been so successful with its' system that other utilities have come to the plant to review it.
-2-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
__- _________ _ _ _ _.
_-_ _
>.'
y..
%
t
RCP pump and motor vibration monitoring equipment upgrades have facilitated reliable pump operation.
Additional modifications are scheduled for the upcoming refueling outage.
The modifications will enhance monitoring capabil-ities and reduce maintenance exposure.
Other reliability items presently under review include (1) the evaluation of a new Byron Jackson Reactor Coolant Pump seal assembly which will increase reliability and reduce maintenance personnel exposure, (2) replacement of the Unit's Moisture Separator Reheaters and the Unit's drains coolers in an effort to increase performance and reliability as well as eliminate copper in the feedwater system.
Based on industry experience and problems associated with cracks in charging pump blocks, Milistone has worked with corporate engineering to evaluate alternate material as well as manufacturing techniques.
Unit 2 presently is evaluating a " shot peened" block which to date has increased the blocks longevity and prevented block cracking.
A new PVC coating is presently under in-situ evaluation for the service water system.
Preliminary results indicate very good performance with the potential for significant long-term systemwide benefit.
Secondary side boric acid addition was implemented during the early part of Cycle 9.
This feedwater treatment method should complete our solution to steam generator tube denting as well as lowering the tube sheet under sludge pH, thereby reducing the potential for caustic inducted stress corrosion cracking, i
i-3-
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _
__-_____-_ __ _ _ - _- _ _- -
' *
.
,.
- ,
,
4.
RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENTS Millstone Unit No. 2 has a great number of programs on-going to improve equipment / plant reliability.
A partial list, as given below, identifies some of the significant programs we have implemented at present.
1.
Snubber Service Life Proaram Action:
100% of all Hydraulic Snubbers were rebuilt in 1985.
All snubbers are now rebuilt on a 20%/ refueling program.
State of the art rebuild techniques with vendor assistance in a dedicated area now occurs.
Where possible, snubbers have been replaced by sway struts, minimizing maintenance.
ITT Grinnel has been contracted to assist in snubber failure analysis on a per snubber basis.
Result:
1986 Tech. Spec, sample size significantly reduced.
2.
Valve Overhaul Proaram Action:
Primary and Secondary Valves are repacked on a specified fre-quency. All Primary and Secondary (Cat 1 & Non Cat 1) relief valves are tested and overhauled on a not to exceed once/five refuels.
Result:
Fewer valve / leak related downtime problems.
Very tight RCS in 1984 and 1985 (with the exception of the Pressurizer and Reactor Vent Valves and Charging Check Valve).
3.
ISI Testina Action: Application of ISI techniques to secondary side systems - ECT of TBCCW heat exchangers, condensers, feedwater heaters, MSR's, UT of extraction steam piping and application of pump and vaive testing tech-niques to secondary side equipment.
Result:
Improved reliability of equipment.
Operated for a very long time without any condenser tube leaks, feedwater hetter leaks or extraction steam leaks.
4.
livdrolazina Action:
Routine outage Hydrolazing of feedwater heaters, RBCCW & TBCCW heat exchangers, main condenser, feedwater heaters, and feedwater venturis is performed.
Result:
Increased thermal efficiency and significant removal of copper resulted in less steam generator tube damage.
1-1-
)
--
-_ -
--
-__ __ _ __ - ____ -
-
.. e
.
-
.
,
5.
Diesel Generators Action:
Increased the interval between diesel generator starts for Tech.
Spec. surveillance runs.
Removed the SIAS start signal.
Installed a larger clearance roots blower on tne
"A" diesel generator to remove concern of blower overheating at low loads.
Dumped the diesel generator day tanks for tank inspection and are actively investigating fuel addi-tives.
Result: This effort resulted in increased diesel generator reliability.
6.
ILRT Valve Proaram Action:
Completed a failure frequency / analysis of all containment isolation valves.
A modified PM Program was initiated to prevent future ILRT valve problems.
Result: This effort was started this outage, hence it is not possible to evaluate the results.
7.
Reactor Coolant Pumo Motor and Seal Reliability Action:
Built a dedicated RCP seal rebuild facility.
Current utilizing a vendor technical representative during seal rebuilds and removal /
installations. Procured a full sized seal mock-up for training purposes.
We are currently analyzing all current state of the art seal improvement possibilities to increase seal life with resultant reduction of radiation exposure.
We have procured two new reactor coolant pump motors.
The Preventative Maintenance Program has been revised to change out one motor per refuel-ing outage and perform PM's on it during the operating cycle.
A motor will now be rebuilt once every 4th refueling.
Result: Of utilities with similar seal configurations, Millstone Unit 2 is one of the utilities that have better seal life.
It is too early to evaluate the result of the RCP Motor Preventative Maintenance Program.
8.
480 Volt load Center Breakers Action:
Presently we are installing solid state overcurrent trip devices (Micro Versa Trip) on all 480V load center breakers to replace old style EC (011 Dash Pot) devices.
This has the affect of upgrading old equip-ment to the latest models.
Result:
Breaker overcurrent trip reliability is increased on a repeat-able basis and is now fully adjustable.
9.
Secondary Side Cooper Removal Prooram Action:
The feedwater heaters have all been changed to have stainless steel tubes to minimize copper problems on the secondary side and increase feedwater heater reliability.
The main condenser has been h
replaced with titatium tubes and tube sheets to ' remove copper from the
'
secondary side and decrease salt water in leakage.
'
-
- - _ _ _
_.
_
'
.:*.
- .
.
,
,.
-
i Result:
There have been no leaks in the stainless steel feedwater heaters to date.
10. Service Vater System Action:
Replaced the service water pump columns with stainless steel.
Additionally, high erosion / corrosion areas of the pump columns have been coated with Belzona under an in-service test.
We are actively changing high erosion / corrosion areas out to stainless steel.
Result:
Last cycle, we had the fewest number of required on-line repairs.
11.
Eauipment/ Instrument Voorade Action:
Unit departments are actively pursuing new instrumentation and equipment based partly on regulatory requirements, but also for reliabil-ity concerns.
Result:
Providing state-of-the-art equipment has reduced equipment failures and minimized any effects of electro-magnetic interferc.nce (electronic noise).
New equipment has also provided some operational flexibility through new equipment options.
12. Remote Response Time Testina Action:
Worked with research group to implement remote response time testing of resistance temperature detectors (RTD's) and Foxboro Force Balance Transmitters.
Result: Millstone 2 has been an industry leader in the development and support of this type of testing. As the first plant required to perform response time testing as a part of its license, MP2 performed the first loop current step response RTD test and has this year performed remote testing of Foxboro Pressure Transmitter.
This testing has reduced the effort involved (8 man-hrs. vs. 340 man-hrs.)
Switched the work from during shutdown to on-line, and eliminated any radiation exposure received from the task.
<
l l
13. Nuclear Detector (Excore) Voorade Action:
Boron 10 detector burn-up each year caused critical path time and radiation exposure.
The detectors were replaced with state-of-the-art fission chambers.
Result:
The new detectors only require replacement every ten years, satisfy the EEQ and Reg. Guide 1.97 criteria, reduce critical path activities and significantly reduce radiation exposure.
14.
Intake Structure Eauipment Uoarade Action: Chlorine, salt water and high humidity had significant detrimen-tal effects on tubing, instruments and electrical contacts.
Cabinets 3-
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_
,
= ; i,.,1
.
<.
.
<
,*
were installed, instruments were relocated to within the cabinets, cabinet heat was provided, and poly tubing was employed.
l-Result: Very few failures have occurred in the past ten years, improving plant operation.
15. Turbine Buildina Improvement Proaram i
Action:
The following programs were instituted to improve reliability i
and plant performance in the secondary plant.
A)
Critical equipment was painted international orange when located in high traffic areas and was protected against damage.
B)
Valves, positioners and controllers were retubed with flexible Armor tubing instead of rigid copper tubing to minimize leakage and breakage caused by vibration.
-
C)
Color coding of valve / positioner hose connections minimizing errors and possible rework.
D)
Addition of manual loading stations on feedwater heater control valves to stabilize heaters and provide local control upon automatic controller failure.
)
Result: This effort resulted in increased equipment reliability.
16. Deviation Warnina Alarms
'
k: tion:
Added deviation from setpoint alarm on steam generator level control and this year adding it to pressure-fed pressure control.
'
Result:
The deviation from setpoint alarm has warned the operators on numerous occasions prior to the " Point-of-no-return" such that operator
,
ir.tervention has prevented a plant trip and reduced challenges on safety i
systems.
17. Knife Switch and Terminal Block Uoorade Action:
The above mentioned devices were replaced with Weidmuller terminal blocks (pull pin) to enhance plant reliability.
Two unit power reductions were required due to dirty knife switches.
Result:
This modification prevents technician error during testing in that no wires are lifted and therefore cannot be reterminated incorrect-ly.
18.
Instrument Stoo Valve Color Codina Action:
Safety-related transmitter instrument stop valves were color coded to minimize technician error during valving operations.
Result: No valving errors have occurred on Millstone 2 safety instrumen-tation.
-4-
_,v.
og
.
, ' '
.>
,
Conclusion The above list represents only a sample number of modifications, the purpose of which is to illustrate the aggressive approach Northeast Utilities takes to improve unit reliability.
Philosophically, safety and reliability go hand in hand. One of the best ways to insure the unit operates in a safe manner is to minimize challenges to the plant protection systems.
Reliable equipment helps to ensure this.
The beneficial offshoot of this philosophy is a higher capacity factor with resultant utility economic operational and maintenance benefits.
,
-5-