IR 05000245/1988011
| ML20207B425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1988 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207B391 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-88-11, NUDOCS 8808020334 | |
| Download: ML20207B425 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-245/88-11 Docket No.
50-245 License No.
DPR-21 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Facility:
Mi.11 stone Nuclear power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Dates:
June 7 - July 18, 1998 Inspectors:
William Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector Lynn Kolonauski, Resident Inspector, MP-1 Peter Habighorst, Resident Inspector, MP-2 Scott Carber, Resident Inspector, MP-3 Approved by:
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7/7886 E. C. McCabe, Chidf, Reactor Projects Section 18 Date Inspection Summary: Inspection from June 7 - July 18,1988 (Report No. 50-245/88-11)
Areas Inspected: This inspection included routine NRC resident inspection of pre-viously identified items, plant operations, physical security, actions resulting from the Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) team inspection, the spent fuel pool rerack project, NRC Bulletin 88-05, "Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Piping Supplies Inc. (PSI) and West Jersey Manuf acturing Company (WJM)," surveillance, maintenance, licensee event reports, and committee activities.
Results: One violation concerned nonadherence to ACP 4.03B, "MEPL for Inservice Nuclear Generating Facilities" (Section 3.1).
In addition to the unresolved items from previous inspection reports that remain open, further licensee and/or inspec-tor followup is warranted on: (1) short and long term resolutions of the E0P in-spection findings (Section 6.0), (ii) continuing ef forts for the spent fuel pool rerack project (Section 7.0), and (iii) final resolution of NRC Bulletin 88-05 con-cerns (Section 8.0),
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 Persons Contacted....................................................
2.0 Summary of Facility Activities.......................................
3.0 Status of Previous Inspection Fi nding s...............................
3.1 (Closed) UNR 88-07-01, "NEPL Verifications Not Perf' aed In Accordance With the ACP"..........................
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3.2 (0 pen) UNR 87-21-02, "Followup Actions to Correct Items Identi fied Ouring Regional Admini strator Tour"................
3.3 (0 pen) UNR 87-33-03, "Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
Surveillance".................................................
4.0 Facility Tours and Operational Status Reviews........................
4.1 Safety System Operability.......................................
t 4.2 Review of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs).........................
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4.3 Power Reduction to Repair Leaking Steam Extraction Line to the
"B" Intermediate Pressure Feedwater Heater....................
5.0 Physical Security....................................................
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6.0 Emergency Operating Procedures Team Inspection.......................
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7.0 Refuel Pool Rerack Project...........................................
8.0 NRC Bulletin 83-05, "Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Piping Supplies Inc. (PSI) and West Jersey Manufacturing Company (WJM)"...
9.0 Survet11ance.........................................................
10.0 Maintenance..........................................................
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10.1 Service Water Header Leak.......................................
10.2 Emergency Gas Turbine Generator 0utage..........................
l 11.0 Licensee Event Reports...............................................
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12.0 Plant Operations Review Committee....................................
13.0 Management Meetings..................................................
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DETAILS 1.0 persons Contacted J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent R. Palmieri, Operations Supervisor P. Przekop, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor C. Wargo, Acting Maintenance Supervisor W. Vogel, Engineering Supervisor N. Bergh, Assistant Operations Supervisor B. Roy, Generation Mechanical Engineering N. Jain, Safety Analysis Branch The inspectors also contacted other members of the Operations, Radiation Pro-tection, Instrumentation and Control, Production Test, Maintenance, and Engi-neering departments.
2.0 Summary of Facility Activities Millstone 1 operated at full power throughout the inspection period, with the exception of power reductions for routine surveillances and corrective main-tenance, as described: on June 11, power was reduced to 30% to allow a drywell entry for repair of two inoperable drywell cooling units and throttling and repair of the leaking steam extraction line to the "B" intermediate feedwater pressure heater (see Detail 4.3).
Full power operations resumed on June 12 and continued until June 17 when power was reduced to 80% to back wash the main condenser and perform a rod pattern adjustment.
Short duration power reductions to 80% were conducted on June 20, 27, 28, and July 6 to back wash the main condenser and repair leaking condenser tubes. On June 21, power was reduced to 58% in order to reduce service water system pressure to allow re-pair of a leaking pressure instrument line on the service water header.
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3.0 Status of Previous Inspection Findings (93702 & 92702)
3.1 (Closed) UNR 88-07-01, "MEpl Verifications Not Performed in Accordance
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with the ACp" ACP-QA-4.038, "Material Equipment Parts List for Inservice Nuclear Gene-ration Facilities," requires that MEPL determinations be verified within sixty days and prior to their incorporation into the MEPL.
Nonetheless, the inspector identified that an emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch, erroneously classified as a non-QA part in October 1986, was not verified until May 1983.
Enforcement action was deferred pending further investigation to determine the problem's extent.
Unresolved item (UNR)
88-07-01 has been closed; this issue will now be tracked under VIO 88-11-01.
The licensee identified 23 additional past-due MEPL evaluations; three were dated from October 1985. As July 18, 1988, the licensee has veri-fled all 23 overdue MEPL deterninations and discovered three mist 4kenly
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classified as non-QA. The inspector reviewed the associated nonconform-ance reports generated to disposition the errors and found no inade-quacies.
The licensee continues to investigate whether any of these items have been installed in plant equipment, as in the case of the EDG sp.-d switch (see NRC report 50-245/88-07); the inspector will continue to follow this issue.
Millstone 1 Engineering has had a computerized MEPL tracking system since 1985; approximately 2800 MEPL evaluations have been initiated in that time.
In response to the inspectcr's finding, the licensee has initiated a weekly status sheet for overdue MEPL evaluations for distribution to the assigned verification engineers.
Prior to this method, the onsite MEPL engineer performed a periodic manual listing of overdue MEPL evalu-ations for discussion with engineering management and action by the engineering department.
This indicates a programmatic weakness in that the engineering personnel were aware of the procedural nonadherences and the installation of a non-QA part in a QA Category 1 application (the EDG speed switch), and yet no action was taken to resolve the problem until the inspector raised the concern.
Failure to adhere to station procedures for suitability reviews of the application of material, parts, equipment, and processes essential to safety-related systems violates 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III (VIO 88-11-01).
3.2 (0 pen) UNR 87-21-02, "Followup Actions from Regional Administrator Tour" On August 19, 1987, the Regional Administrator toured all three Millstone units to review their material conditions. A partial listing of his specific findings and the associated licensee responses are summarized below.
In addition to the comments listed below, the Regional Administrator had specific findings relating to the EDG.
The inspector has not reviewed the licensee's actions pertaining to the EDG findings, but will do so during a future routine inspection, Although some small valve packing leaks were noted, the general a.
state of valve maintenance appeared to be very good.
Packing leaks were evident on some control rod drive hydraulic units (CR0 HCV)
103 valves, on isolation condenser valves IC-6, 7, and 10, and on the feedwater regulating blocking valves.
Some of these par. king lesks may be attributed to the "break-in" period following exposure to high temperature / pressure fluids following the outage.
. Licensee Response The valves identified as having packing leaks were checked; other than the HCU valves, no leaks were found.
The leaks were minor in nature and were trouble reported to maintenance for repair.
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The program for lubricating rotating equipment should be reviewed and revised as necessary to assure that excess grease does not con-taminate electric motors.
It appeared that on motors where the grease drain plug was easily removed or opened, greasing had been accomplished correctly (e.g., vital AC MG set, RPS MG sets). Where the task of plug removal was more difficult, greasing was apparently excessive and caused dirt buildup on motor air intakes (e.g., shut-down cooling pumps).
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Licensee Response This subject has previously been addressed, and action taken to prevent overgreasing. Maintenance is unique to each motor and standardized maintenance programs can have adverse effects. On motors with injection ports and dra.in plugs, electricians grease the motors and are instructed to use very little grease.
On motors with sealed bearings, grease fittings and drain plugs have been removed to prevent overgreasing and bearing failure; the bearings will be greased in accordance with the equipment overhaul schedule.
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Most motors are inspected on an annual basis and overhauled on a scheduled refueling outage basis; the importance of the equipment and maintenance history dictate the frequency of overhaul.
While the current program was designed to prevent excess grease application, it will be reviewed to ensure that all notors either have sealed bearings or grease drain plugs that are easily removed.
Additionally, grease relief extensions will be installed where deemed necessary.
The SDC pumps in particular will be trouble re-ported to remove dirt buildup on the motor air intakes and to rework l
the drain plug to facilitate easy removal.
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Dirt buildup on motor air intakes was noted (: ore spray, feedwater, recirc MG sets).
A preventative maintenance program is needed to include periodic cleaning of motor air intakes.
Licensee Response j
Small amounts of oil and dirt on intake screens are more of a housekeeping concern than a n,eter cencern. A program to periodic-ally clean intake screens by vacuum og or wiping already exists.
The frequency of run time and work in the general area can make a situation look worse than it is.
The core spray pumps, feedpumps and recirc MG sets will be trouble
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l reported to clean the air intake / screens.
Furthermore, these areas l
will be scrutinized during routine housekeeping inspection.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and has noted good housekeeping during routine inspections.
Motors for various rotat-ing equipment were spot checked for grease contamination, and none was
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found.
The inspector discussed the motor greasing initiatives with the Acting Maintenance Supervisor who noted that the improvement process was ongoing.
Tours of the reactor and turbine buildings identified no ab-normal packing leakage. Air intakes / screens for various rotating ma-chinery were found free of detrimental amounts of dust and debris.
No further inadequacies were noted.
3.3 (0 pen) UNR 87-33-03, "Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Surveillance" On October 27, 1987, the licensee discovered that le kage tests of the liquid PASS lines had not been performed as required 3y Technical Spect-fication (TS) 6.13.
TS 6.13 requires integrated leak rate tests, at frequencies not to exceed refueling cycle intervals, for any aystem which could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.
LER 87-42 stated that an update would be provided prior to
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May 1988, and that surveillance procedures would be revised to ensure that testing is done at the required intervals.
LER 87-42-01 (dated May 9,1988) states that the unit's surveillance proced.:res have been updated to reflect the necessary testing requirements; the inwector found this statement to be incomplete for SP 8008, as described alow.
Using P&IO 25202-26009 Sheet 5, the inspector reviewed surveillance pro-cedure SP 623.148, "H2/02 PASS Leak Rate Test," which covers the gaseous portion of the PASS.
The inspector identified no procedural inadequacies except for the illegibility of Figure 10.2, a hand drawn sketch of the PASS.
The inspector presented this finding to the Operations Supervisor, who committed to reissuing the prowedure with a new drawing during its next revision, scheduled prior to the 1989 refueling outage.
The proce-
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dure will not be used until the outage.
The inspector also reviewed SP 8008, "PASS Reactor Coolant Operability Test," a chemistry procedure covering the acquisition of liquid PASS samples.
The inspector found that while the procedure places the PASS in a configuration that allows the performance of an integrated leak rate test, the procedure does not actually direct personnel to inspect the system for leakage.
The inspector has discussed this matter with the Operations Supervisor who committed to an appropriate procedure revision.
During a future inspection, the inspector will verify the adequacy of the revised procedures and assess the licensee's method for ensuring that the PASS leak rate surveillances are completed during the required in-terval>.
This iten remains open.
4.0 Facility Tours _and_ Operational Status Reviews (71707)
Control instrumentation was inspected for correlation between channels, proper functioning, and conformance with Technical Specifications (Ts). Ala m con-ditions in effect and alarms received were reviewed and discussed with the operators. Operator awareness and response to offnormal conditions were re-viewed; operators were found to be cognizant of plant conditions and indica-tions. Operating legs and Plant incident Reports (PIRs) were reviewed for j
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accuracy and adherence to station procedures.
Posting, control, and tni use of personnel monitoring devices for radiation, contamination, and high radi-ation areas were inspected.
Plant housekeeping controls were observed, in-cluding control of flammable and other hazardous materials.
Backshift in-spections of the control room were conducted on June 12 at 3:00 p.m. and July 14 at 8:30 p.m.; all shif t personnel were found to be alert and attentive to their duties. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
The following activities were also addressed.
4.1 Safety S,vstem Operability (71707)
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Standby emergency systems were reviewed to determine system operability and readiness for automatic initiation.
The following systems were re-viewed: feedwater coolant injection, automatic pressure relief, low pressure coolant injection, core spray, and standby gas treatment.
The status of the control rod drive hydraulic control units, emergency diesel generator, and isolation condenser was also inspected.
The reviews con-sidered, as applicable, proper positioning of major flow path valves, operable normal and emergency power sources, proper operation of indi-cations and controls, and proper cooling and lubrication.
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used for the review included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and system diagrams and operating procedures.
No inadequacies were identified.
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4.2 Plarit Incident Reports (71707)
Selected plant incident reports (PIRs) were reviewed to: (1) determine the significance of the events, (ii) review the licensee's evaluation of the events, (iii) verify the licensee's response and corrective ac-tions, and (iv) verify whether the licensee reported the events in ac-cordance with applicable requirements. No inadequacies were identified.
The following PIRs were reviewed; the events are described elsewhere in this report, as referenced: 1-88-29(Section 10.1), 1-88-30 (Section 4.4)
and 1-85-31 (Section 10.2).
4.3 power Reduc _ tion to Repair Leaking Steam Extraction _ Lina to the "B" l
IntermedTate Fressure Feedwater Heater (71Ri7)
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At 11:40 p.m. on June 10, a planned power reduction to 30*. was begun to allow a drywell entry to repair two drywell cooling units (HVH-18 and j
22) and throttling of the leaking extraction steam line to the "B" in-
termediate pressure (IP) feedwater heater.
The inspector noted thorough j
planning by unit management prior to the evolution.
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A power reduction was originally conducted on April 28 to repair HVH-21.
i Maintenance personnel identified a broken shaft HVH-21 was repaired and
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HVH-22 and HVH-18 were discovered with degraded i
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shafts as well.
The licensee identified "bearing creep" as the failure
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mechanism; the bearing setscrews had become loosened and scored the
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shafts.
During the June 11 downpower, engineering personnel inspected
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middle level HVH units for proper lubricatior. and belt tensions and ex-amined bearing and setscrew wear.
The remaining HVH units had no bearing
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creep symptoms.
The licensee is considering replacing the current HVH
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setscrew collars with a concentric collar arrangement recommended by the manufacturer for long term resolution of the HVH failures.
l The "A" recirculation motor generator set (recirc M3) was secured to reduce drywell radiation dose rates, historically recorded to be approx-imately 80 mrem /hr gamma and 50 mrem /hr neutron at 30*4 power (with the
"A" recirculation MG set secured).
The inspector reviewed the health physics survey maps prepared on June 11 which confirmed this information.
The "A" recirc MG is located near HVH-18; dose rates within HVH-18 were between 40 and 100 mrem /hr gamma.
Power was reduced to 25's to further reduce drywell radiation dose rates. After repairing HVH-18, the "A"
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recirc MG was placed in service to allow securing of the "B" recire MG,
which is located near HVH-22.
The inspector noted an effective dose rate reduction: gamma dose rates within HVH-22 dropped from 80 to 180 mRetn/hr to approximately 25 mrem /hr.
Total accumulated dose for the drywell entry was 2574 mrem and airborne concentrations were less thar. 25*4 of the maximum permissible concentration (MPC).
The results were evaluated j
by a regional health physics specialist who found no inadequacies and determined that no quarterly dose limits were exceeded.
HVH-22 and HVH-18 were repaired and returned to service with shafts ob-tained during the interim between the downpowers.
Drywell temperature
remained below Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry condition of 150 degrees F throughout the evolution.
The inspector followed the Itcensee's compliance with Technical Specifications throughout the event, i
including that for single loop recirc operation, and found no inade-quacies.
The extraction steam line to the "B" intermediate pressure feedwater heater developed a leak a few days after the weld patch was installed during the April 28 downpower; a 1/4 inch defect was observed in the lower patch weld.
Using Special Procedure 88-1-03, operations was able to throttle extraction steam flow without isolating the "B" heater string.
Additional weld material was added; no further leaks have developed to date.
No steam leaks have been observed by the inspector during routine
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heater bay inspections.
The inspector had no further questions, j
5.0 physical Security (81064 & 81038)
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l During station tours, the inspectors verified proper implementation of l
selected aspects of the station security program.
These included site access i
controls, personnel searches, compensatory measures, adequacy of physical barriers, reporting of security events, compensatory measures, and guard force
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staffing and response to alarms and degraded conditions.
No inadequacies were
identified.
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The inspectors reviewed the following Safeguards Event Reports (SERs) and found them to be accurate and the licensee's corrective actions to be proper.
The inspectors had no further questions.
SER 88-005-01, dated June 28, 1988.
The licensee submitted a supplement
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to the original SER which reported the May 1, 1988 security force strike,
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to incorporate the May 30, 1988 contract ratification.
SER 88-006-0G, dated June 21, 1988, concerned a guard discovered asleep
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at his post on May 21, 1988.
The event was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-245/88-07.
SER 88-007-00, dated June 24, 1988, concerned the May 24, 1988 discovery
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of an inattentive guard posted as a compensatory measure for an inactive
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intrusion detection device.
The event was addressed in NRC Inspection
Report 50-336/88-13.
l 6.0 Emergency Operating Procedures Tean Inspection (92702)
From June 13 to 30, a team lead by the Special Inspection Branch of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation inspected the Millstone 1 emergency operating procedures (EOPs) per Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515-92.
The objective of TI 2515/92 was to answer the following questions:
(1) Are the E0Ps technically correct 7 (2) Can the procedures be physically carried out in the plant?
(3) Can the plant staff correctly perform these procedures?
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The team identified several deficiencies. On July 15, the inspectors held
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a meeting with the Station Superintendent and the Millstone 1 Operations i
i Supervisor and requested that a letter, detailing their proposed corrective actions based on their understand'ng of the inspection findings as presented in the June 30 exit, be provided to the Director of the Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region I, by July 29.
The NRC may then take action regarding l
Millstone 1 to confirm and/or alter their commitments based on the findings
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j documented in the associated NRC inspection report (50-245/88-200), which has
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All action related to followup and potential enforcement i
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resulting from the E0P inspection will be the responsibility of NRC Region
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7.0 S ent Fuel _ Pool Rerack Project (37700]
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l The Millstone 1 spent fuel pool has a present storaye capacity of 2184 fuel assemblies; 1732 spent fuel assemblies are currently stored in the pool.
The proposed project would increase the pool's storage capacity to 3229 assemblies j
by adding ten new high density rack modules.
The licensee plans to perform a full core of fload (580 assemblies) for the April 1989 refueling outage, which could be accomplished with a standby 152 cell module placed in the cask
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8 laydown e.rea in the event that the rerack project was not completed.
However, the use of the spare rack has not been evaluated by the NRC.
The project would provide spent fuel storage capacity, with full core offload capability, until approximately 1999; Millstone l's license expires in 2006.
On June 16, the licensee met with the NRC to di iss regulatory options.
The NRC decided to review the licensee's design change submittal on a segmented basis and issue separate safety evaluation reports.
The NRC will first review removal of the seismic restraints on the existing racks and their relocation to the southwest corner of tne pool, then the qualification of the new racks, and finally the thermal hydraulic and reactivity considerations.
The NRC will make best efforts to review the first item by September 1, which is the lic-ensee's scheduled construction start date.
The inspectors have attended several licensee project briefings and have no present concerns.
The inspectors will follow the design change through im-plementation, 8.0 NRC Bulletin 88-05, "Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc.
Ml) and West Jersey Manufacturing Company (WJM) (92T01)
On May 6, 1988 the NRC staff issued Bulletin 88-05, "Nonconforming Materials Supplied by PSI and WJM."
The NRC obtained copies of PSI and WJM certified material test reports (CMTRs) that contained false information on material supplied to the nuclear industry.
The NRC requested licensees to review purchasing records to determine if any American Society of Test Materials (ASTM) or American Society of Mechanical Engineer (ASME) materials have been
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supplied by PSI since January 1,1985, or from WJM since January 1,1976.
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The licensee was also requested to review the location of installed components s
in safety-related systems, the suitability for intended service, and conform-ance with code and procurement specifications.
On June 15, the NRC staf f issued Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 88-05 in re-
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sponse to test data on two WJM flanges at Carolina Power and Light's Shearon-Harris nuclear power plant that indicated material properties significantly a
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below the ASME and ASTM specifications.
The supplement to Bulletin 88-05 i
requested license)s to test installed flanges and fittings within 30 days of
receipt of the supplement (July 15), for conformance to ASME and ASTM speci-
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fications, and if deviations were present, to prepare an analysis jystifying
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continued operation of the facility.
l The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities in response to Bulletin 88-05,
and associated Supplement 1.
The licensee's Quality Services, farchasing, and Engineering departments reviewed purchase orders and work orders to de-termine the number of flanges and fittings supplied by WJM and PSI.
The re-
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view identified the number of spare flanges, those currently installed in safety-related systems, and the following vendors that supplied WJM and PSI fittings to the Millstone Station: Radnor, Tyler-Dawson, Guyon, Cunningham Supply, and Pullman Power.
The licensee's corporate Generation Engineering
department coordinated activities at the facility and developed conformance i
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testing for flanges installed in safety-related systems.
The testing results for installed flanges were compared with the vendor's CMTRs and the applicable ASME and ASTM code standards.
As of July 10, the licensee identified no discrepancies between the CMTRs and the ASME/ ASTM code specifications with respect to material hardness values at Millstone Unit 1.
The licensee tested the potential nonconforming mate-rials using an Echo-tip inttrument.
The instrument tests the flange for material Brinnell hardness values.
The examination takes five readings on i
the flange surface, The highest and lowest values are deleted; the three i
remaining readings are averaged together to determine a hardness value.
The licensee told the inspector that the hardness technique was found to be ac-ceptable by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
The inspector dis-cussed EPRI's position with the NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff, and learned that the method is acceptable to the NRC for installed flange l
testing.
At Millstone Unit 1, the licensee identified seven installed flanges manufac-tured by WJM. One flange is located in the service water system, four in the
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isolation condenser steam trap, and two in the liquid radsaste system.
The licensee has conducted a hardness test on the one affected flange on the ser-Vice water header discharge piping.
The flange exceeded the minimum material hardness for SA 105 material.
No inadequacies were noted.
The isolation condenser functions as an emergency core cooling system during a loss of feedwater or flow to the main condenser. As of July 7, the licensee had not i
tested the affected flanges due to high surface temperatures.
The NRC does I
not consider the radwa;,te system critical with respect to Bulletin 88-05, and as of July 7, the licensee had not tested the radwaste system flanges.
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The licensee has identified twenty-one spare flanges manufactured by either WJM or PSI.
1he af fected flanges will be sent to Dirats Laboratory for chemistry and tensile property verification, and to the licensee's testing
i facility for metagraphic examinatier.
The results of all examinations will l.
be included in the licensee response to Bulletin 83-05.
The inspector had no further questions and will continue to follow licensee investigations con-t cerning Bulletin 88-05.
9.0 Surveillance (61726)
The inspector observed the following surveillance test for conduct in accord-ance with current approved proceduros, for test result compliance with tech-nical specification and administrative requirements, and for deficiency cor-rection in accordance with administrative requirements.
No unacceptable con-t ditions were observed.
SP408H, Orywcll High Pressure Scram Functional Test, on June 27.
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10.0 Maintenance (62703)
The inspectors reviewed selected aspects of the following safety related maintenance activities, including procedural adherence, obtainn'ent of required administrative approvals and tagouts prior to work initiation, and verifica-tion of system retest prior to return to service. No inadequacies were noted.
10.1 Service Water Header Leak
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At 9:30 a.m. on June 21, the ifcensee discovered a leak on the service water (SW) pump discharge header, caused by a 180 degree weld crack on the boss for the SW pump discharge pressure instrument (PI) tap.
This PI provides a control room alarm when SW discharge header pressure drops to 30 psig.
Reactor powar was reduced to SS*; to reduce SW system pres-sure to allow investigation of the leak.
Due to the location of the weld
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and the wet conditions, the leak could not be repaired without removing
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the SW system from service.
A temporary encapsulation, essentially a stand pipe constructed over the PI tap, was installed by maintenance on June 22.
The inspector reviewed mechanical jumper 1-88-14, installed
to return the control room annunciator to service, and found no inade-quacies.
The inspectors observed the encapsulation and portions of the system restoration and noted no deficiencies.
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10.2 Emergency Gas Turbine Generator Outage The Gas Turbine Generator (GTG), one of the two emergency on-site power
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sources, failed to start during its monthly operational readiness test I
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on June 29.
The licensee declared the GTG inoperable at 10:22 a.m.,
d placing the unit in a four day TS action statement, per TS 3.5.F.3.
Licensee investigation lead to the replacement of the EGR (Electric Governor Remote) oil pump which supplies the hydraulic pressure required to operate the speed governor.
The inspector observed the replacement, I
l reviewed the automated work order M1-87-11442 and job tagging, and ob-l l
served no deficiencies.
At 10:53 p.m. on June 29, the GTG was retested
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and started within 45 seconds, meeting the 48 second start time required
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The licensee awaited final grooming and a second oper-ability test prior to declaring the GTG operable.
The GTG was again
tested at 9:10 a.m. on June 30, with a start time of 45 seconds; the GTG i
was declared operable at 10:22 a.m.
The licensee tested the GTG at 8:42
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4.m. on July 1, with a 43.5 second start time.
The inspector haa no further questions, i
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11.0 Licensee Event Reports (92700j
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Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to assess LER accuracy, the ade-j quacy of corrective actions, compliance with 10 CFR 50.73 reporting require-I ments and to determine if there were generic implications or if further in-j formation was required.
Except as noted below and in report Detail 3.3, no
deficiencies were noted.
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LER 50-245/88-05, "Insuf ficient Containment Spray Interlock Setpoint."
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This issue was originally addressed in Section 6.0 of NRC Inspection Report 50-245/88-07. While investigating potential fouli?g of the emer-gency core cooling system (ECCS) suction strainers, the licensee identi-fled that if one LPCI heat exchanger outlet valve failed to open while all six low pressure ECCS pumps were running during post-LOCA conditions, adequate net positive suction head might not be ensured.
The 5 psig containment spray interlock setpoint is too low to be solely relied upon
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to terminate containment sprays and prevent ECCS pump cavitation.
No l
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inadequacies were noted in consideration of the above criteria.
The inspectors will continue to follow this issue, which is tracked as UNR
88-05-01.
l LER 50-245/88-42-01, "Failure to Establish a Post Accident Sampling l
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Sys' tem ( ASS) Surveillance." Report Detail 3.3 addresses the potential
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inadequacies of this LER.
12.0 Plant Operations Review Committee (40700)
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The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings on June 8, 15, 17, 29, 30, and July 6.
Technical Specifications 6.5 requirements for committee quorum were met.
The meeting agenda included reviews of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs), Plant Design Change Requests (POCRs), routine proce-dure revisions, and interim changes to procedures.
Thorough technical pre-sentations on the spent fuel pool rerack project were conducted on June 15 and 30.
The inspector noted that the committee discharged their functions
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in accordance with regulatory requirements and observed thorough discussions I
with safety emphasis.
No inadequacies were identified.
13.0 Management Meetings _(30703)
Periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection findings during the inspection period.
A summary of findings was also dis-
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cussed at the conclusion of the inspection.
No proprietary information was
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covered within the scope of the inspection. No written material was provided
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to the licensee by the inspectors.
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