IR 05000335/1987014
| ML17221A306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1987 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17221A304 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-87-14, 50-389-87-13, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8708060249 | |
| Download: ML17221A306 (16) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR R EG ULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATL AN TA, G Eo R G IA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/87-14 and 50-389/87-13 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
Jpne 7 July 4, 1987 Inspectors:.,
.
V. Crlenjak, Senior Resident I
~
J'.
E. Bibb, Resident Inspector
~X7 Approved by:
. Wilson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects ector Date Signed p p zg,~')
Date Signed
- ~
- a/r)
ate Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection involved on site activities in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security, radiation control activities, surveillance activities, licensee actions on previous enforcement matters and plant events.
Results:
Violation -- Failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.3. 1 for operability of the Component Cooling Water System (paragraph 14).
8708060249 870728 PDR ADOCK 05000~35
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees'.
Harris, St.
Lucie Vice President
"G. J
~ Boissy, Plant Manager
"R. Sipos, Services Manager J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
"T. A. Dillard, Maintenannce Superintendent
- J. B. Harper, QA Superintendent
"L.. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor
- R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
"C.
F. Leppla, I 5 C Supervisor
"C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor
"E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
"H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor G. Longhouser, Security Supervisor C.
L. Burton, Reliability and Support Supervisor
"J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator
"R.
E.
Dawson, Asst. Plant Superintendent Mechanical C. Wilson, Asst. Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
"N. G.
Roos, guality Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 8, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
One violation was identified:
Failure to meet the requirements of TS 3.7.3. 1 for oper ability of the Component Cooling Water System (335/87-14-01)
(paragraph 14).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Cl osed
-
Units
5 2)
Unresolved Items 50335/842601 and 50-389/84-28-01:
Requalification for'Senior Reactor Operators.
This item discussed five instances in which senior reactor operators resumed shift duties after being off shift for greater than four months without first
demonstrating operational proficiency.
Administrative Procedure 0005720, Rev.
19, Licensed Operator Requalification Program, now contains the following requirements:
"Proficiency Watchstanding a
All Licensed Operators shall stand one eight-hour watch each calendar quarter in a licensed position.
Plant staff members not routinely assigned licensed duties shall document this watchstanding using Appendix B. If the time between watches exceeds four (4)
months, refer to step 8.2.4.B.
b.
Any licensed operator not actively performing the duties of a Reactor Operator or Senior Operator for a period of four months or longer shall require recertification in accordance with
CFR 55.31(e)
prior to reassuming licensed duties."
(Closed - Unit 1) Unresolved Item 50-335/84-26-02:
Training Records for Management Personnel'his item was closed in Inspection and Enforcement report 50-335/85-12, however, it was not administratively closed in NRC documents.
(Closed - Unit 2) Violation 50-389/85-17-01:
Failure to Change Procedures After Plant Change/Modification.
This item is closed based on subsequent monthly"inspections of plant maintenance activities.
(Closed Unit 2) Unresolved Item 50-389/87-09-01:
Review Rolled Leads on Reactor Turbine Gage Board (RTGB).
The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER), 389/87-04, dated May 22, 1987 and the events associated with the resulting reactor trip on April 22, 1987.
The following were concluded based on this review and a
review of the Licensee's reconstruction of the event.
b.
C.
A rewire of the turbine trip relay was performed under the temporary lifted lead and jumper program to correct a wiring deficiency.
The repair was necessary to avoid reactor trips caused by loss a single non-safety AC power source to the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS).
This rewire consisted of two wires being changed and tagged's being in an abnormal configuration per the draw'ing.
Plant Change/Modification (PC/M),
392-283, was incorporated on September 23, 1983 to change the associated, documentation and drawings, etc.,
making the rewire a permanent change.
Testing, which would cause a reactor trip, was delayed until a future shutdown.
Testing was performed on 8/30/84 to verify that the PC/M met it'
intended function.
Testing instructions required verification of the trip circuits and to "restore all circuits to normal and inform NPS
[Nuclear Plant Supervisor]
Functional Test Completed."
During a
recent review of the April 1, 1987 event, plant management associated
with the instrumentation department surmised that the technicians restored the configuration to it's original state as it existed prior to performance of-the PC/M.
d.
Circulating water pump ammeter calibration were being performed on April 22, 1987 and a reactor trip was experienced.
A review of this event led to the finding that the two wires that were rolled in the PC/M were not in their required positions and that the technicians had jumpered the wrong two wires during their calibrations.
This event is an isolated case which involved non-safety related equipment.
The Inspector reviewed the corrective actions initiated as a-result of 'this event such as (1) the color-coding of the floor in the control room panel area to lessen the chance of confusing panels with similar numbered terminal boards and (2) additional requirements for specific independent verification of proper jumper placement requirements.
These corrective actions should lessen the possibility of the recurrence of this event.
In addition, the inspector performed a partial review of the following PC/M packages to verify that the issues of the safety evaluations, seismic and environmental qualifications, post-maintenance testing, and drawing and procedure updates were addressed.
Packages reviewed were; 047-286 (Miscellaneous Intake Cooling Mater Modifications),
067-185 (Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Interposing Relay Replacement and Status Indication Modification), 017-187 (Add Drains to CCM Heat Exchanger),
and 054-286 (Torque Seating Isolation Valves).
Document Control Procedure, f16-PR-PSL-1, Revision 12, was reviewed.
This procedure provides instruction for control of plant documents which prescribe activities affecting quality to ensure up-to-date requirements are being utilized by Nuclear Energy Department plant personnel.
The review of the above did not result in any outstanding unresolved safety issues.
Unresolved Items (URI)
An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
One Unresolved Item was identified concerning the licensee's program for configuration control of safety related systems (URI 50-335/87-14-02)
(paragraph 14).
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were, properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During
tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns.of ECCS systems.
Valve, breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room. 'uring the inspection period the inspectors conducted complete walkdowns in the accessible areas of the unit
AC and OC switch gear and emergency diesel generators and unit 2 chemical and volume control system and diesel generators to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications were performed on the following systems:
units 1 and 2 chemical and volume control, diesel air start, main and auxiliary feedwater.
The NRR Project Manager (PM) for St.
Lucie Plant visited the site June
through June 12.
He reviewed various Technical Specification (TS)
survei llances,
CFR 50.59 plant change/modification packages, compared the station blackout procedure for Unit 1 against Unit 2 and conducted various tours.
The refueling water tank temperature data for Unit 1 were reviewed for August 1986 and January 1987; all readings were within TS limits.
The main steam isolation valve closure time data for Unit 1 were reviewed for 1986; all closure times were within TS limits.
The ultimate heat sink barrier dam isolation valve cycling data for Unit 1 for the last six month interval were reviewed; it was found acceptable.
The dose equivalent iodine-131 reactor coolant system concentration was reviewed for Unit
for the end of the last cycle (Cycle 7); the value was within TS limits during full power operation.
Oetermination of steam generator leakage and pressurizer code safety valve leakage was discussed with the licensee; steam generator leakage is quantitatively monitored if above minimum detectable limits.
Safety valve leakage can be qualified but it would not necessarily be qualified at. much less than one gpm.
Unit 2 containment internal pressure data for November 1986 were reviewed.
The, internal pressure was always within limits; the 8-inch containment mini-purge system was used occasionally during the month of November to maintain pressure control.
A number of PC/M packages were reviewed.
Emphasis was placed on the safety evaluation conducted by the licensee.
Packages reviewed included; main steam safety lift lever removal (175-284),
condenser cathodic protection modification (214-284),
main feedwater isolation valve air check valves (101-285),
instrument air upgrade-tie-ins (210-285)
,
main steam isolation valve accumulator check valve replacement (025-286),
and miscellaneous intake cooling water system modifications (047-286).
All safety evaluations were adequat The station blackout procedure for Unit'
was compared to Unit 2.
The Unit 2 blackout procedure was found acceptable when Unit 2 was licensed.
Station blackout is currently an active license issue of Unit 1.
An open item contained in, a draft safety evaluation on this subject dated February 13, 1987 dealt with Unit 1.
The station blackout procedure's for Unit
and 2 are 1-0030143 and 2-0030143, respectively.
The common procedure is. entitled
"Total Loss of AC Power."
The procedure is identical for each unit. It should be noted that the licensee also has a
procedure called station blackout.
The station blackout procedure addresses loss of offsite AC.
Therefore, there is a difference between the licensee's nomenclature and the Commission's nomenclature in regard to blackout, The Commission considers blackout to be loss of all AC offsite and onsite.
Various tours were conducted.
Portions of the intake cooling water system and component cooling water system were reviewed for each unit.
A comparison was made between Piping and Instrument diagram valve numbers and the valve tags. 'alve lineups were also checked.
No discrepancies were found.
,The underground piping runs from the intake cooling water pumps to the component cooling water heat exchangers were reviewed.
For both units, portions of the underground piping run under the turbine building gentry crane load path.
A restriction was found for the Unit 2 load path.
This was limited to a load not to exceed five tons where the unde~ground piping was located (just south of the Unit 2 turbine building).
No similar restriction was placed on Unit 1.
The Unit
underground piping runs between the two turbine buildings.
The apparent discrepancy was discussed with the licensee and it was ascertained that the Unit
piping separation was enough not to require a
similar restriction.
This explanation by the licensee was found acceptable and this discrepancy was resolved.
While touring the area containing the station fire suppression water supply,. it was noted that city water tank 1B was out of service for more than seven days.
Technical Specifications require a special report within
days under these conditions.
The licensee was in the process of writing the special report during the PM'
visit.
While touring the areas containing the main steam safety valves, the PM found a
number of safety valve caps seals missing on the 8 train for Unit 2.
This was brought to the licensee's attention.
While touring the outside areas of the Unit
auxiliary buildings it was noted that an auxiliary building door was open; a Plant Work Order (PWO)
tag was on the door.
The door's locking mechanism was broken.
This was brought to the licensee's attention; the door was fixed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
While touring the basement area of the Unit 1 auxiliary building, two fire doors (RA5 and RA3) associated with
, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
pump room were found open.
No personnel appeared to be'orking in the room at the time.
This was discussed with the licensee and although keeping fire doors closed is not a technical specification requirement for Unit 1, it is the licensee's practice to keep fire doors closed when not in use.
The licensee also indicated that although not a requirement, there is a fire watch conducted on a twenty-four hour basis for each unit.
The PM stated that the staff
assumed that these doors would be closed when a fire protection exemption was granted for this fire area.
It is believed that this was an isolated case and no further action was taken.
The PM and the Senior Resident Inspector briefed the site Vice President and Plant Manager regarding the above PM activities prior to the PM existing the site on June 12, 1987.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated'he inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
The inspectors performed an'n-depth review of the following safety-related tagouts (clearances):
Unit
1-6-15 1-6-49 1"6-74 1-6-95 1A Boric Acid Preconcentrator Filter 1B Component Cooling Mater Heat Exchanger lA Reactor Drain Tank Pump Security SUPS Inverter Unit 2 2-6-70 2-6-80 2-6-86 2-6"87 2B Maste Gas Compressor 2A Boric Acid Concentrator Control Panel 2B Intake Cooling Mater Pump Fire Zone 3F Technical Specification (TS) Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operations (LCOs)
and results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happene.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities
. on selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review; limiting conditions for operations were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used'ere properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work, requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding
'obs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Work Order No.
2967 4074 U1 - Vital Door No.
276 Repair Lock U2 - Perform Weekly Battery Inspection 4862 U2 - Quarterly Preventative Maintenance on Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)
4977 U2 - Quarterly Preventative Maintenance on RAB supply Fan 9.
Review of Nonrountine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occur red to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of upmost consideration.
The following LERs are considered closed:
Unit 1 87"04 87-05 87-06 87"07
"87-08 Steam Generator Tube Not Plugged Containment Local Leak Rate Exceeds TS Limit
.Inadvertent Main Steam Isolation Signal While Shut Down Inadvertent Start of 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Apparent Loss of Redundant Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (This event was the subject of a special inspection report.
The inspection was conducted by a
Region II specialist.
(ref.
IE Report No. 50-335/87-09))
Unit 2 87-01
- 87-03
- 87-04 Reactor Trip During Auxiliary Feedwater Surveillance Reactor Trip Due to Inadvertent Actuation of Main Steam Isolation Signal (ref.
IE Report No. 50-389/87-09)
Rolled Leads RTGB (see paragraph 3, this report)
- In-depth Review
~
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that.measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
Surveillance Observations During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that plant operations were in compliance with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operations were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel'he inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance.
Unit
AP1-0010125A Check Sheets 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
Unit 2 AP2-0010125A Check Sheets 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and Data Sheets 25, 26 and
12 'utstanding Items List (OI L) Closeout Action s The following items were closed out in the NRC OIL based on the
'inspector's investigation of the particular item, licensee actions taken, or determination of non-'applicability to St. Lucie:
(Closed - Unit 1 5 2) Temporary Instruction 2515/77 Survey of licensee's response to selected safety issues.
Not applicable to St.
Lucie and TI expired December 31, 1986.
Closed for Units 1 5 2.
(Closed Unit 1 5 2)
Temporary Instruction 2515/80 - Data collection for the performance indicator trial program.
Data was provided as requested.
Closed for Units 1 5 The following 10 CFR Part 21 items have been addressed by the licensee and are considered closed.
Unit
P21 84-01 ITE 27N Undervoltage Relays.
The licensee performed a
substantial safety hazard analysis and concluded-that a substantial safety hazard does not exist at St. Lucie.
Reference FPKL 'letter EPM-84-888 dated June 8, 1984.
P21 85-03 - Pacific Scientific Pipe Clamps Slippage..
The licensee conducted in-field inspection and re-torquing of all subject pipe clamps.
Reference FP&L letter EPO-85-2769 dated December 19, 1985.
P21 85-05 Faulty AK and AKR Undervoltage Trip Devices on GE Circuit Breakers.
The licensee conducted in-field inspections of the subject devices and determined that problems identified in the Part 21 report did not exist.
reference FPKL corrective action request CAR-050485 dated May 10, 1985
'21 85-06 Brown Boveri K Line Circuit Breakers.
The licensee has never experienced the problems described in the Part 21 report.
However, as a
precaution, 6 breakers from each unit were inspected for evidence of the problem with negative results.
Reference FP8 L, corrective action request CAR-050485 dated May 10, 1985.
P21 85-07 Containment Purge Valve.
The licensee inspected all safety-related valves and a majority of non-safety-related valves.
No discrepancies were noted.
Reference FPKL corrective action request CAR-061385 dated June 12, 1985.
P21 86-01 Alignment Dowels on Replacement Connecting Rod Bearings for Diesel Generators.
All replacement bearings in stores were inspected for proper dowel hole position.
Reference FPKL corrective action request CAR-081286 dated September 10, 1986.
P21 86-03 -
SOR Differential Pressure Switches Failed to Function.
The subject switches are not used at St. Lucie.
Reference FP8L corrective action request CAR-082986 dated August 22, 1986.
P21 86-04 ITT Air Motor Operated Valves.
The license performed a piping stress analysis and provided verification that the-lower natural frequencies of the ITT valves had not resulted in stresses in excess of allowable code levels.
Reference FPEL corrective action request CAR-110286 dated November 7, 1986.
Units 2 P21 85-02 - Pacific Scientific Pipe Clamps Slippage.
The licensee conducted in-field inspection and re-torquing of all subject pipe clamps.
Reference FP8 L letter EPO-85-2769 dated December 19, 198 P21 85-04 - Faulty AK and AKR Undervoltage Trip Devices on GE Circuit Breakers.
The licensee conducted in-field inspections of the subject devices and determined that problems identified in the Part 21 report did not exist.
Reference FP&L corrective action request CAR-050485 dated May 10, 1985.
P21 85-05 Brown Boveri K Line Circuit Breakers.
The licensee has never experienced the problems described in the Part 21 report.
However, as a
precaution, 6 breakers from each unit were inspected for evidence of the problem - with negative results.
Reference FP5L corrective action request CAR-050485 dated May 10, 1985.
P21 85-06
-
Containment Purge Valve.
The licensee inspected all safety-related valves and a majority -of non-safety-related valves.
No discrepancies were noted.
Reference FP8 L corrective action request CAR-061385 dated June 12, 1985.
(Closed Unit 1) Inspector Followup Item 50-335/85-IN-94.
The Inspector Followup Item was opened in IE Report 50-335/85-36.
IE Information Notice IEN-85-94 discussed several instances of common mode failure of ECCS mini-flow recirculation.
Further review of St.
Lucie ECCS procedures and system drawings indicated that recirculation now can be maintained.
(Closed - Unit
5 2)
IE Information Notice 86-IN-98, Offsite Medical Services.
The licensee received the subject notice and has routed it to thei r Emergency Planning Coordinator.
Tracking for action is under their system number FOP 86-162.
(Closed - Unit 2) Inspector Followup Item 389/84-37-02 Licensee Control of Tank Strapping List.
The licensee now controls various operator aids such as plant curves and tank strapping lists with Administrative Procedures (AP)
0010140, Control of Operator Aids.
Additionally, the operator aids log book is audited for correctness and need quarterly by the Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor in accordance with AP 2-0010125A, Data Sheet 28, Surveillance Data Sheets.
(Open - Unit
4 2)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335, 389/85-12-01 Proceduralize Determination of Safety Related and Radiation Work Permit Requirements for Plant'ork Orders.
This item was discussed in IE Report 50-335,389/85-12, in particular, that the requirements outlined in HP-1 section 4.0 are not referenced in Administrative Procedures 0010432, Nuclear Plant Work Orders and guidance for the planners.
This items will remain open for future inspections.
(Closed - Unit
5 2)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335, 389/85-12-03-Revise Procedure OP-0010122, Section 7.2 To Require the Retention of Clearances for 5 Years.
The licensee has modified the subject procedure to require clearance retention in accordance with gI 17-PR-PSL-1, (}uality Assurance Records, which in turn requires retention in accordance with the appl icabl e Technical Speci f i cation (TS).
The appl icabl e TS, 6.10.1.b,
requires retention for
years of records and logs of principal maintenance activities.
(Closed - Unit 1 5 2) Unresolved Items 50-335/85-28-02 and 50-389/85-28-02 Uncertainties in Time of Performance of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Surveillance.
These items'ere closed out in IE reports 50-335/87-10 and 50-389/87-9, but failed to be deleted on the OIL.
Reported here for administrative purposes only.
(Closed
-
Unit
. 2)
Unresolved Item 50-389/86-22-01
-
Scheduling of Technical Specification Required Survei llances.
The licensee has corrected the problem involving a surveillance being inadvertently dropped from the surveillance schedule.
(Closed Unit 2)
Inspector Followup Item 50-389/83-69-01
- Safety Injection Tank and Containment Pressure Sigma Gauges Green Band.
This item discussed green band operating areas on the subject sigma gauges being outside the Technical Specification limits.
The safety injection tank nitrogen over-pressure sigma gages were repainted and now indicate an
"acceptable" operating green band for 590 to 625 psig which is more restrictive than the Technical Specification limits of 570 to 650 psig.
The containment pressure gauges on the RTGB, while still having a green band outside the TS limits, are not used for confirmation of the narrow TS band of -0.368 to +0.400 psig.
Instead, a water manometer gauge on the post-accident panel is used which has a green band from +11.07 to -10.18 inches of water which corresponds to the TS psig limits.
Readings are logged every four hours, (Closed - Unit 2)
Inspector Followup Item 50-389/84-10-01
- Review of Overtime.
Administrative Procedure 0010119 was amended to include monthly preparation of overtime by department and review by senior management.
(Closed - Unit 2) Inspector Followup Item 50-389/84-27-03 Nonconformance in Handling A Spent Fuel Rack.
Subsequent observations of refueling operations have shown satisfactory manipulations.
Bulletins and Circulars The following IE Bullet'ins (IEB) and IE Circulars (IEC) were reviewed to ensure receipt, evaluation and appropriate licensee actions taken.
(Closed - Unit
8 2)
IE Bulletin 85-01 - Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
FP8 L responded to the subject bulletin with letter L-86-88 dated February 28, 1986.
Their response has been reviewed and determined to be satisfactory to meet the requests in the bulletin.
(Closed Unit
& 2)
IE Bulletin 86-02 Static "0" Ring Differential Pressure Switches.
The licensee responded by letters L-86-314 dated July 28, 1986 and L-86-323 dated August 5, 1986, indicating that St.
Lucie
and
do not have any of the subject switches installed in
safety-related systems or in systems subject to the limiting conditions for operation in the Technical Specifications.
(Closed Unit 2)
IE Bulletin 82-BU-02 Degradation of Threaded Fasteners.
This item was closed out in IE report 50-335/389-85-27, but failed to be dropped from the Unit 2 "open" items list.
The latest lesson plan ( 1302180)
includes lectures, movies, slides, handouts and an exam on the following topics:
a. 'oric acid corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of threaded fasteners.
b.
Use of MME on nuclear safety-related equipment c.
Threaded fasteners of closure connections on reactor coolant pressure boundaries.
d.
Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary diagram.
e.
Fastener performance.
f.
Proper preloading.
g.
Fastener designs and application.
h.
Fastener installation.
i.
Bolting patters.
j.
Lubricating fasteners.
k.
Locking devices.
1.
Methods of removing frozen fasteners.
(Closed - Unit 2) Unresolved Item 50-389/85-07-01 Analysis Justifying Lack of Missile Barriers in Vicinity of "C" Charging Pump Circuit Breaker.
The inspector reviewed a report (JPE-L-85-35)
generated by the licensee's engineering staff and issued on July 16, 1985.
The study showed that
.
catastrophic failure of the control rod drive set flywheel was not a
credible event and a missile barrier was therefore not applicable.
14.
Plant Events On June 14, 1987, the
"B" Main Feedwater Pump tripped, causing a main turbine runback to 605.
Primary pressure and temperature were increasing rapidly due to power mismatch.
Reactor operators began to insert control rods and restarted the
"B" main feedwater pump ll seconds after its initial trip.
The power mismatch was still too large and the reactor tripped on high pressurizer pressure
seconds into the event.
All
protective systems responded normally.
No cause has been determined yet for the feedwater pump trip.
Efforts to return the unit to full power were hampered by the discovery of an air leak in the 1A Main Transformer.
The leak was located and repaired.
The unit returned to power on June 16.
On June 19, 1987, with Unit 1 at 100% power, the licensee discovered that the lA and 1B component cooling water (CCW)
heat exchanger outlet cross-connect valves, V-14439 and 14169, were in the open position.
Both trains of CCW were capable of supplying full system flow to the associated components.
However, the incorrect lineup effectively eliminated redundancy (independence),
under certain conditions, between the two trains of CCW.
This condition had existed since June 8, 1987, when the 1B CCW heat exchanger was removed from service for repairs, requiring that the A and B trains be cross-connected.
Repairs were completed on June 9, 1987 and the 1B CCW heat exchanger returned to service.
Unit
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3. 1, requires at least two independent component cooling water (CCW) loops be operable in modes 1,
2, 3,
and 4.
Additional, with only one CCW loop operable, restore at least two loops to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot
'tandby within the following
hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, both of the Unit
CCW loops were cross-connected, resulting in a
loss of redundancy (independence),
under certain conditions, from June 8, 1987 until June 19, 1987.
Violation 50-335/87"14-01.
During the inspectors investigation of this event it was discovered that one of the two valves, V-14169 was entered into the
"Valve, Switch Deviation Log", Appendix C of. AP 1-0010123.
The position of the other valve was apparently not logged at all.
Further, this deviation log was not reviewed by Operations personnel.
Pending review of the licensee's program for configuration control of safety-related systems, this will be carried as an Unresolved Item (URI 50-335/87-14-02).