IR 05000335/1987017

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Insp Repts 50-335/87-17 & 50-389/87-16 on 870713-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Inservice Insp,Mechanical Maint Program & Inspector Followup Items
ML17221A318
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  
Issue date: 07/30/1987
From: Blake J, Crowley B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17221A316 List:
References
50-335-87-17, 50-389-87-16, NUDOCS 8708170285
Download: ML17221A318 (13)


Text

UNITEO STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos ~

50-335/87-17 and 50-389/87-16 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:

50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:

St.

Lucie 1 and

License Nos.:

DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:

July 13-17, 1987 Inspector:

B.

R. Crowley Date Signe Accompanying Personnel:

R.

P. Carrion Approved by:+ J. J.

B ake, Chief Materials and Processes Section Division of Reactor Safety Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters (Units

and 2), inservice inspection (Units

and 2),

Mechanical Maintenance Program (Units

and 2),

order for modification of license relative to primary coolant pressure isolation valves (Unit 1),

and inspector follow-up items (IFIs) (Units 1 and 2).

Results:

No violations were deviations were identified.

8708l70285 870807 PDR

  • DOCK 05000335 Q

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • C. 0. Woody, Group Vice President

'K. N. Harris, Vice President, St.

Lucie Nuclear Plant

  • G. J. Boi ssy, Plant Manager

'J.

B. Harper, QA Superintendent

  • J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent

"C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor

~L.

W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor

"N. G.

Roos, QC Supervisor F. T. Carr, NDE Supervisor, PNS P.

W. Heycock, ISI Coordinator K.

P.

Hughes, Lead Site Civil Engineer

  • D. M. Stewart, Test Group Lead Engineer
  • K. A. Getty, Assistant ISI Coordinator
  • M. J.

Rhodes, QC Corrective Action Request (CAR) Coordinator J.

A. Dyer, QC Inspector D. English, Coordinator of Planning Unit 2 Mechanical Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, QC personnel, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • R. V. Crlenjak, Senior Resident Inspector
  • H. E. Bibb, Resident Inspector

"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 17, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702B)

(Cl osed)

Unresolved Item 389/83-66-01, Concrete Expansion Anchor Calculations.

During a previous inspection, the licensee was requested to verify the validity of the calculations for the concrete expansion anchors of support RC-99-R8A and to clarify all other safety-related seismically

analyzed pipe support/restraint concrete expansion anchor calculations which used comparisons with other supports.

To satisfy this request, a

total of 154 supports were revised, including RC-99-R8A, to incorporate their.specific concrete expansion anchor calculations.

During the current inspection, the licensee supplied a

sample of the revised support calculations including RC-99-R8A, D0-9-R4, and RC-103-Rl.

Also supplied was a

copy of the generic calculations for the baseplate and concrete anchor bolt capacities.

A review of the supplied calculations determined that the revisions satisfactorily address the issue.

Therefore, the calculations are acceptable as revised and this item is closed.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation (73755) (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector reviewed the ISI NDE records indicated, below to determine whether the records were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.

The applicable codes are:

-Unit

Unit 2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B5PV)

Code,Section XI, 1974 Edition, Summer 1975 Addenda ASME B8PV Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda a.

Unit

The Unit 1 "1987 ISI Summary Report" was submitted on July 10, 1987 (FPL letter L-87-290).

The report was reviewed. by the inspector for completeness, clarity and compliance with Article IWA-6000 of ASME Section XI.

The inspector pointed out to the licensee that the report would be clearer if a legend were added for the entries in the results column of the NDE tables.

b.

Unit 2 (1986 Refueling Outage)

(1)

NDE records for the folloying inspections were reviewed:

UT and PT inspection records for pipe welds 10>>-SI-13-FW-901 and 902 MT inspection records for pipe welds 42"-101-722-A and B

UT inspection records for pipe weld 42"-502-771 PT inspection records for pipe weld 10"-362-4-SW-1

UT and PT inspection records for pipe weld 6"-SI-213-FW-1 VT-1 bolting inspection records for valve V-3480 and flange 2"-RC-116-FB YT-2 inspection records for pressure tests 2-1PT-05, 06 and

These records were reviewed to ascertain whether NDE records contained or provided reference to:

Examination results and data sheets.

Examination equipment data.

Calibration data sheets.

Examination evaluation data.

Records on extent of examination.

Records on deviation from program, and procedures including justification for deviation, if applicable.

Records on disposition of findings.

Re-examination data after repair work, if applicable.

Identification of NDE material such as penetrant, penetrant cleaner, couplant, films, tapes, etc.

(2)

UT inspection records for reactor pressure vessel welds 101-121 (upper shell to flange girth weld)

and 101-104-A (head peel segment weld at 0') were reviewed.

The records were reviewed to determine whether:

The method, extent, and technique of examination complied with the licensee's ISI program and applicable NOE procedures.

The examination data were within the acceptance criteria as outlined in the applicable NDE procedure and applicable Code requirements.

The recording, evaluating, and dispositioning of findings were in compliance with the applicable NDE procedure and applicable Code requirements.

Inservice NDE results were compared with the recorded results of prior Section XI examinations.

The method used for NDE was sufficient to determine the full extent of indication or acceptance.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.

Maintenance Program (62702) (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's mechanical maintenance program in the areas indicated below.

Requirements are specified in various Regulatory Guides, Section 6 of the Technical Specifications, and ANSI N18.7-1976.

The following licensee documents were reviewed to the 'extent necessary to assure that procedures were in place (written, approved, issued, and implemented)

to control the activities detailed below:

Administrative Procedure No. 0010432, R31, Nuclear Plant Work Orders Administrative Procedure No. 0010437, R17, Schedule of Mechanical Surveillance Requirements Administrative Procedure No. 0010431, R6, Preventative Maintenance Program Administrative Procedure No. 0010434, R20, Plant Fire Protection Guidelines Administrative Procedure No. 0010132, R8, ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves Administrative Procedure No. 0010122, R31, In-plant Equipment Clearance Orders Administrative Procedure No. 00101118, RO, Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS)

Administrative Procedure No. 0005724, R9, Operating Experience Feedback General Maintenance Procedure No.

1-M-0018, R4, Mechanical Maintenance Safety-related Preventative Maintenance Program General Maintenance Procedure No. 2-M-0018, R4, Mechanical Maintenance Safety-related Preventative Maintenance Program Quality Instruction (QI) 1-PR/PSL-3, Rll, Maintenance Organization QI 2-PR/PSL-1, R7, Quality Assurance Program QI 5-PR/PSL-1, R31, Preparation, Revision, Review/Approval of Procedures QI 10-PR/PSL-l, R12, Quality Control Inspections QI 11-PR/PSL-1, R7, Test Control

QI 11-PR/PSL-2, R13, Mechanical Test Control QI 14-PR/PSL-1, R14, Inspections, Test, and Operating Status QI 15-PR/PSL-1, R8, Nonconforming Material, Parts, and Components QI 16-PR/PSL-l, R17, Corrective Action QI 17-PR/PSL-1, R10, Quality Assurance Records QI 18-PR/PSL-2, R15, Quality Control Surveillance Total Equipment Data Base Nuclear Job Planning System The documents were reviewed in the following areas:

a.

Corrective Maintenance reviewed in the areas of:

(1)

Written procedures for initiating requests for maintenance (2)

Criteria and responsibilities for review and approval of maintenance requests (3)

Criteria and responsibilities for designating an activity as safety-related or non-safety-related (4)

Criteria and responsibilities for performance of inspections of maintenance activities (5)

Provisions and responsibilities for identification of inspection hold points (6)

Methods and responsibilities for performing functional testing following maintenance prior to returning equipment to service (7)

Administrative controls for maintenance records including:

approval of maintenance

'requests identification of personnel who performed maintenance tasks identification of personnel who inspected maintenance work reason for maintenance work description of corrective action identification of functional tests identification of personnel performing functional tests identification of replacement parts or materials identification of test and measuring equipment (8)

Responsibilities for assembly and review of above records for transfer to storage

(9)

Review of completed records to access adequacy of preventative maintenance records (10)

Responsibilities to assure implementation of record review (ll)

Work control procedure relative to requirements for special authorization and fire watch when burning, welding, cutting, etc.,

near flammable material, cable trays, vital equipment, etc.

( 12)

Incorporation of Technical Specification (TS)

revisions into plant requirements b.

Equipment Control reviewed in the areas of:

( 1)

Operating staff granting permission to release equipment for maintenance (2)

Identification and control of environmentally qualified material and equipment (3)

Documentation of testing of redundant components or systems when required by technical specification or

CFR 50

.(4)

Clear identification of status of equipment or systems (5)

Determination when independent, verification has been implemented corr ectly (6)

Procedures and responsibility for returning equipment to service (7)

Incorporation of TS revisions into plant requirements c.

Preventive Maintenance reviewed in the areas of:

(1)

Responsibility for 'the program (2)

Master schedule for preventive maintenance (3)

Documentation and review of completion of preventive maintenance activities (4)

Responsibilities and methods for establishing PM frequencies (5)

Responsibility for periodic upgrading based on system or component failures (6)

Methods for incorporating revisions to TS into pl'ant requirements Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/84 - Verification of Compliance with Order for Modifications of License:

Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation (Event Y) Valves (Unit 1)

The Reactor Safety Study (RSS),

MASH-1400, identified in a

PWR an intersystem loss of coolant accident (LOCA) that is a

significant contributor to risk of core melt accidents (Event V).

The design examined in the RSS contained in-series check valves isolating the high pressure primary coolant system (PCS)

from the low pressure injection system (LPIS)

piping.

The scenario which leads to the Event V accident is initiated by the failure of these check valves to function as a pressure isolation barrier against reactor coolant system (RCS)

pressure.

This causes an overpressurization and rupture of the LPIS low pressure piping which results in a LOCA that bypasses containment.

To better define the Event V concern, all light water reactor licensees were requested by letter, dated February 23, 1980, to provide certain information relative to the valve 'configurations of concern.

FPL's response to the February letter is dated March 17, 1980.

On April 20, 1981, an order requi ring periodic testing of the check valves of concern was issued.

The purpose of the current inspection was to verify satisfactory completion of licensee actions in the implementation of periodic Event V valve testing specified in the order.

See RII Report 50-355/81-16 for documentation of a previous inspection in this area.

The following summarizes the inspector's review:

a.

The current TS, Amendment 81, dated June 5,

1987, was reviewed to ensure that the modification was entered as requi red by the order.

b.

The following implementing test procedures and referenced procedures covering the Event V valves were reviewed:

Administrative Procedure No. 1-0010125, R69, Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks, and Calibrations Administrative Procedure No.

1-0010125A, R3, Surveillance Data Sheets, Data Sheet No.

Operating Procedure 1-0410052, R4, Check Valve Backleakage The procedures were reviewed to verify that test procedures reflected all requirements of the Technical Specifications including:

Use of an acceptable test method-direct volumetric leakage rate or other equivalent means capable of demonstrating that leakage rate limits given in the TS were not exceeded.

Procedures to ensure that leakage rates obtained are for individual valves rather than for combined component Procedures requiring that leakage rates received at test pressures less than the maximum potential pressure differential across the valve be adjusted by assuming leakage to be directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one half power as noted in the SER which accompanies the order.

When reviewed by the inspector, the licensee'

procedures did not contain this requirement.

The licensee stated that they had identified the fact that the requirement

.to adjust leakage rates needed to be included in procedures, but had not yet changed the procedures.

However, since no significant leakage has been detected in the valves to date, there has not been any need to adjust the leakage rates based on actual pressures used.

The licensee did revise procedure 1-0410052 and 1-0010125 during the course of the NRC inspection to include the requirement for adjusting the leakage rates based on the actual test pressures used.

Technical Specification acceptance criteria and corrective action.

c

~

The inspector reviewed the on-. site copies of the Event V order, the original SER, the latest revision of the Technical Specifications and the applicable piping drawings.

These documents and test methodology were discussed with responsible licensee personnel.

In addition, test data, data sheet 25 of procedure 1-0010125, for the following dates were reviewed:

November 28, 1981 January March 1982 April 23, 1984 June 13, 1985 December 20, 1985 March 30,-1987 1981 outage 1984 outage 1985 outage 1987 outage The test data was reviewed in the areas of:

Recording of major test data, leakage rate adjustment when required (See paragraph b. above)

and acceptance criteria based on trending from previous tests Test frequency Recording of as found leakage Documentation of leakage rate trending Test data anomalies Corrective action - if applicable Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

TI2515/84 is considered close.

Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI's) (92701) (Units 1 and 2)

(Closed)

IFI 389/83-49-01, Verification of Completion of Mechanical Equipment Installation.

This item questioned the

"use-as-is" disposition on certain discrepancies noted on mechanical equipment installation inspection reports (construction).

The inspection reports related to inspections for leveling, shimming and torquing not being performed.

This item pertains to questions at the time of plant startup.

The questions were apparently resolved at that time (See FPL Letters SLg-83-136 and SLg-84-010).

The safety significance of this item does not warrant further actions.

b.

(Closed)

IFI 389/83-49-03, Electrical -Support Weld Condition.

This item pertained to electrical support welds that did not meet-requirements.

The questioned welds were rejected and dispositioned.

See FPL Letter SLg-83-136.

This item does not appear to warrant further actions.

C.

(Open)

IFI 389/86-24-02, Revis'ion of Valve Stroke Testing Frequency Requirements.

The licensee stated that applicable procedures will be revised by September 30, 1987.

(Closed)

IFI 335, 389/87-05-01, Review of ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement Program.

The item pertained to the fact that the licensee did not have a

document to "tie together" the various elements of their Section XI repair and replacement program.

(}I 10-PR/PSL-8, RO, Control of Repair and Replacements has been issued.

The document was reviewed briefly during the current inspection to assure that the basic requirements for a repair and replacement program are in place; Further detailed review wi 1 1 be performed during future routine inspections.