IR 05000335/1985026
| ML17308A159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1985 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A158 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-26, 50-389-85-26, NUDOCS 8512110508 | |
| Download: ML17308A159 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATL AN TA, G Eo R G IA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/85-26 and 50-389/85-26 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102
,Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.. Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16, Inspection Conducted:
Se tember 24 - November 11, 1985 inspectors: ~ '
R.
V. Crlenjak, Senio Resident Inspector G-C H.
E. Bibb Resident Inspector Approved by:
S.
A. Elrod, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date, Signed o
Date Signed'es>
no SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection involved 386 inspector hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification (TS)
compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance testing activities, and refueling (Unit 1).
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Two unresolved items were identified (paragraphs 7 and 12).
85121 1 0508 851 129 PDR ADOCK 05000335
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"K. Harris, St.
Lucie Vice President D. A. Sager, Plant Manager J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
"T. A. Diliard, Maintenance Superintendent
"L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor
~R. J.
Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. F. Leppla, Instrumentation and Control ( IKC) Supervisor P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
~C.
A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting)
'H.
F.
Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor G.
Longhouser, Security Supervisor J.
Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator
"J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent Electrical
"C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical N.
G.
Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 15, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions.
Unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 7 and 12.
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as requi red,
equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly estab-lished, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
D'uring tours the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-tions, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS).
Valve, breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 1 diesel generators to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requi rements for operability and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, weekly flowpath verifications were performed on the following systems:
Boric Acid makeup Pumps Reactor Coolant Charging Pumps High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps 6.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces,'nd records of equipm'ent malfunc-tions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following safety-related tagouts (clearances):
Unit
1-11-64, lA ljigh Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Pump 1-11-74, 1AB Battery Charger Unit 2 2-11-19, Heating and Ventilation Supply (HYS) 2A and 3A
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and,examined the results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
On October 28, 1985, it was observed that one Unit 1 Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger was out of service for repair.
The heat exchanger end bells were removed with the heat exchanger isolated.
Unit 1 was shut down in mode 5 with the reactor coolant loops drained in preparation for entering mode
( refueling).
Unit
TS 3. 4. 1.4.2 requires that two shutdown cooling loops be operable when in mode 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled.
The licensee'
position was that two shutdown cooling loops were operable with one CCW heat exchanger out of service because the two CCW heat exchangers, can be cross-connected.
This item is unresolved pending further NRC review (UNR 335/85-26-02).
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities on selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review; LCOs were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of out-standing jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported By the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
The-following licensee event reports (LERs)
were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that TSs were being met and that the public health and safety were of upmost consideration.
The following LERs are considered closed:
Unit
"85-01
"85-02
"85-03
~85-04 ECCS Ventilation System Administratively Inoperable Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve Reactor Trip Logic Matrix Test Battery Specific Gravity Level Correction
- 85-05
"85-06 85-07 TS Violation - Control Element Assembly (CEA) 043 Realignment Inadvertent Actuation of Containment Spray Pump LOCA-ECCS Analysis In Error Unit 2
"85-01
"85-02
"85-03
"85-04
"85-05
- 85-06
- 85-07 Reactor Trip by Low Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip By High Steam Generator Water Level Manual Reactor Trip Due to Spurious Control Intercept Valve, Signal Reactor Trip by Turbine Trip on High Steam Generator Water Level Inadvertent Recirculation Actuation Signal Two Dropped Shutdown CEAs Reactor Trip Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure
"In-Depth Review Performed 10.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
The areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, the condition of doors and isolation zones, the control of access and badging, and the aaherence to established procedures.
11.
Surveillance Observations During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that plant operations were in compliance with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TSs for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank level; containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DG electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instru-mentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, test results met require-ments and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
12.
Refueling (Unit 1)
Technical Specification 6.8. l.b requires that written procedures be estab-lished, implemented and maintained for refueling operations.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following Unit 1 refueling procedures:
Procedure No.
1-0010125 Revision No.
Title Schedule of Periodic Tests (Refuel only)
1-1600030 1-0030127 1-0030128 1-0030221 1-011022
, 1-0110052 1-0110054 1-01100 55A 1-0120020 1-0120021 1-0120022 1-0120024 1-0120027 1-1600022 1-1600023 1-1600024 1-1610020 1-1630021 1-1630022 1-1630023 1-1630024
10
10
15
17
12
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)
Accidents Involving New/Spent Fuel Reactor Cooldown -
Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Reactor Shutdown Initial Criticality Following Refueling Coupling/Uncoupling of CEA Extension Shafts 2ero Power Physics Tests After Reload Periodic Rod Drop Time Test Shutdown Margin Suspension During 2ero Power Physics Testing Filling/Venting The Reactor Coolant System Draining The Reactor Coolant System Leak Test Following Reactor Coolant System Opening Pressurizer Steam Space Venting Steam Generator Wet Lay-Up Unit 1 Refueling Operation Refueling Sequencing Guidelines Filling and Draining The Refueling Canal and Cavity Receipt and Handling of New Fuel New Fuel Elevator Operation Spent Fuel Handling Machine Operation Fuel Transfer System Operation Refueling Machine Operation
1"1630025 1-1630027 CEA Change Fixture Operation Dry-Si ppi ng of Irradi ated Fuel Assembly New Fuel Handling Crane Operation 1-1630028
All of the procedures reviewed were found to be technically accurate and properly controlled by plant management.
On October 20, 1985, Unit
was shutdown to commence a 49-day refueling outage.
At the end of this reporting period (i.e.,
November 11, 1985)
core defueling operations were in progress and preparations were being made for the removal and inspection of the core support barrel.
The progress of the outage was delayed about five days when on November 6, 1985, while removing the core internals upper guide structure (UGS),
one of three bolts on the UGS lifting rig pulled loose, causing the UGS to settle in a
degree tilted position about level with the top of the reactor vessel (i.e ~
, well above the core).
The licensee declared an Unusual Event (reference PNO-II-85-105) until the UGS could be secured and moved to its olanned storage area.
A temporary auxiliary lifting rig was promptly designed, fabricated and tested.
On November 9, 1985, the UGS was success-fully lifted and tr ansferred to its storage area.
Preliminary inspections have revealed no damage to the vessel internals or the UGS; some damage to the UGS lifting rig has been identified.
The licensee plans a detailed inspection of the UGS, core barrel, reactor vessel and lifting rig.
Additionally, a complete review of lifting rig operations for all major reactor vessel components is being performed to determine the causes of this incident and to prevent similar problems in, the future.
Until the licensee and the NRC complete a review of this event, this item is 'unresolved (UNR 335/85-26-01).
13.
Information Meeting with Local Officials (94600)
On October 15, 1985, the resident inspectors met with the St.
Lucie County Commissioners to introduce themselves and discuss their role and the current status of St.
Lucie Units
and 2.
The Commissioners were also provided with current addresses and telephone numbers at which the resident inspectors could be contacted when necessary or desired.