IR 05000335/1985032

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Insp Repts 50-335/85-32 & 50-389/85-32 on 851209-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Insp Findings,Snubber Surveillance Program & IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Masonry Wall Design
ML17308A194
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/16/1986
From: Jape F, Lenahan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17308A193 List:
References
50-335-85-32, 50-389-85-32, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8602030025
Download: ML17308A194 (14)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-335/85-32 and 50-389/85-32 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket NoseI 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:

DPR-67 and NPF-'16 Facility Name:

St. Lucie 1 and

'1 Inspection Conducted:

December 9 - 13, 1985 Inspector:

J. J.

Lena a

Approved by:

F. Jape, Section C ief Engineering Programs Branch

.

Division of Reactor Safety

/r~ db Date Signe Date Signe SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 30 inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup on licensee action on previous inspection findings and a

previously identified inspector followup item, the snubber surveillance program, and IE Bulletin 80-11.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
  • T. A. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent
  • K. Harris, Vice-President
  • P.

W. Heycock, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Coordinator J. Krumins, Site Engineering Supervisor

  • N. G. Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor R.

Simms, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor

  • N. T. Weems, Site QA Superintendent C. Wilson, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
  • H. Bibb
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview 3.

Other licensee employees contacted included three engineers and two technicians.

NRC Resident Inspector The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 13, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

~No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.

(Closed) Violation Item (389/83-44-01),

Inadequate NCR/IR Review~',,Board Use-As-Is Disposition The licensee's corrective actions for this violation are stated jn the licensee'.s August 10, 1983, letter number L-83-442, to NRC Region II.

This violation occurred due to the failure of the licensee to adequately document justification for the findings of the NCR Review Board.

Corrective action for this violation involved review of ten percent of the approximately 2500 inspection reports ( IR) disposi,tioned by the NCR Review Board as "Use-as-is".

The review.was performed by three task groups (Mechanical, Civil, and Electrical)

composed~i of individuals who had not served on the NCR Review Board.

The findings of the task groups were documented on a form titled "Task Group Review

of Use-As-Is Inspection Reports".

The forms document determination of the adequacy of the NCR/IR review process and answers the following questions:

(1)

Was information included in the IR sufficient for evaluation by the NCR Review Board?

(2)

Did the inspection report include sufficient inspection data for evaluation by the NCR Review Board?

(3)

Was there a deviation from a design or quality requirement?,'4)

If there was deviation from design or quality requirement, was that deviation technically justifiable?

(5)

Was "Use-as-is" the proper disposition?

The results of the licensee's review uncovered no significant hardware deficiencies, nor were the task group disposition of the individual IRs different from the original NCR Review Board dispositions.

The inspector reviewed the log of IRs disposition "Use-as-is" by the NCR Review Board and determined that those reviewed by the task groups were representative of the "Use-as-is" IRs.

A detailed examination of the review efforts of the task groups was made by an NRC inspector during an inspection documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-389/83-49.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

Violation Item (389/83-44-02),

Bypassing Inspection Hold Points During Hodifications of Nasonry Walls.

The licensee's corrective actions for this violation are stated in the licensee's August 10, 1983, letter number L-83-442, to NRC Region II.

The inspector previously inspected the licensee's corrective action for this violation during an inspection conducted September 26-29, 1983, which is documented in Inspection Report 50-389/83-60.

During inspection 83-60, the inspector verified that the licensee's corr~ective action had been completed for all the masonry walls except for,wall numbers 1,

24, and 162/163.

The work remaining to be completed for these walls was documentation of gC inspection of the modifications.

Subsequent to inspection 83-60, the licensee wrote Deviation Report (DR) number 1604G and nonconformance report (NCR) number NCR 1430C.

DR 1604G was written to document missing inspection records for inspection of welds required to complete the modifications for wall numbers 162/163.

The welds were cleaned and inspected by the licensee to disposition DR 1604G.

The inspector reviewed Inspection report G-84-602 which documents inspections of the welds.

NCR 1430C was written to document missing inspection records for modifications

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Unreso1 ved Items 5.

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completed to wall numbers

and

and since the modifications (thru-bolt installation) to the walls were not completed in acco'rdance with requirements specified in the applicable design documents, Design

Change Notice 513.2741.

During a review of inspection documentation, the licensee determined that IR C-83-1485 documented inspection of grouting of thru-bolts for walls

and 24.

This IR was incorrectly labeled when it was written and referenced an incorrect drawing'nd wall numbers.

The licensee documented the as-built location of!. the thru-bolts installed of wall numbers

and

on inspection reports attached to NCR 1430C.

The as-built locations were reviewed and approved by EBASCO to disposition the NCR.

The inspector reviewed the inspection documentation and examined wall numbers 1 and 24 and verified that the as-built drawings accurately reflected the locations oI'he

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thru bolts as installed on the walls.

This item is closed.

jl Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

Independent Inspection Effort The inspector examined procedure number 0010433, Control of Heavy L'oad Lifts.

This procedure provides guidance required by NUREG 0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, to control handling of heavy loads in proximity of spent fuel and safety-related equipment.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

Snubber Surveillance Program - Unit 1 (Module 61729)

The inspector reviewed procedures and quality records related to the s'nubber surveillance program.

Acceptance cri.teria examined by the inspector appear in Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.7. 10.

!l a.

Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedures The inspector examined the following procedures which control snubber surveillance and inspection activities:

(1)

FP8L quality instruction number QI 10-PR/PSL-6, Control!,

Inspection, and Monitoring of Mechanical and Hydraulic Shock Arrestors (Snubbers)

(2)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 2.4, Qualification of Technicians (3)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 9.1-1, Removal and Reinstallat'ion of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (4)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 9.3-1, Procedure for Disassembly of PSA Mechanical Shock Arrestors

II le II(

(5)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 10.2-1, Limited Functional Examina-tion (VT-4) of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (6)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 10.4-1, Visual Exam of Hydraulic Snubber (7)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 11. 1-1, Functional testing of PSA Mechanical Shock Arrestors (8)

Paul Munroe procedure QSS-QAP 12. 1-1, Control of Measurement and Test Equipment b.

Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed the results of surveillance inspections performed November-December, 1984 on Unit 1 snubbers.

These records included the following:

(1)

Results of visual inspections performed on the 20 hydraulic snubbers installed on the steam generators and reactor coolant pump motors (2)

Results of visual inspection performed on mechanical snubber numbers 1-021 through 1-025, 1-039, 1-045, and 1-106, through 1-110 (3)

Results of functional tests performed on hydraulic snubber numbers 1-001 and 1-002, installed on steam generator 1A (4)

Results of functional tests performed on various mechanical snubbers (5)

Service life records for hydraulic snubber seals Review of the results of functional tests performed on the hydraulic snubbers disclosed that both snubbers tested failed to meet the functional test acceptance criteria.

The test failures were documented on Deficiency Report numbers DR-25-PSL-1-85-16 and DR-26-PSL-1-85-17.

Examination of the snubbers disclosed that the test failures were due to debris blocking the lock-up valve bleed orfices.

The problem was corrected by modification of the lock-up valves on all

steam generator snubber bleed valves in accordance with the recommendations of the snubber manufacturer, ITT Grinnell.

The modifications were accomplished under plant change/modification package 180-185, and were being completed as of the inspection date.

Final adjustment of the

steam generator snubber bleed valves was in progress.

The reactor coolant pump motor snubbers were not affected by this particular problem since they are smaller capacity.

However, other problems with the four RC pump motor snubbers resulted in rebuilding/replacement of all four snubber ~

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Review of the functional tests results performed on the mechanical snubbers disclosed that due to a high failure rate, one hundred percent of the mechanical snubbers were functionally tested.

The test failure was documented on 68 deficiency reports.

Disposition of the DRs was to replace the snubbers with new snubbers and perform an investigation into the cause.

The investigation into the cause of the snubber failures, which includes disassembly and examination of the snubbers; metallurgical examination of the snubber parts; and review of functional test methods (to determine if functional test methods may have caused snubber failures)

was ongoing at the time of this inspection.

The licensee will submit a special report to the 'NRC Region II when the investigation is completed.

Within the areas inspected, no violatio'ns or deviations were identified.

7.

(Closed)

IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design - Unit l.

The licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-11 in letters to the NRC Region II dated July 24, 1980 and February 11, 1981.

In letters dated October 4, 1982 and June 14, 1984, to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),

the licensee responded to requests for additional information concerning masonry wall design.

The inspector examined the licensee's action to complete IEB 80-11 require-ments during inspections documented in Report numbers 50-335/81-10, 82-01, 82-24, and 82-35.

Final acceptance of the licensee's criteria used~ifor design analysis of masonry walls is documented in a Safety Evaluation, Report (SER) dated June 26, 1985, titled FPSL St. Lucie Plant Unit 1, Masonry Wall Design IE Bulletin 80-11.

This SER was provided to the licensee in a,',letter dated June 26, 1985 from E. J. Butcher, Division of Licensing, NRR, to J.

W.

Williams, JR, FP8L.

8.

Previously Identified Inspector Follow-up Item (Closed) IFI 389/83-08-01, Review of Piping and Component Thermal Expansion.

The inspector reviewed completed procedure numbers 2-0010184, Reactor Coolant System Component Expansion Measurement

- Pre-Core, and 2-0010185, Piping Thermal Expansion and Restraints (Pre-Core).

The thermal expansion data (measurements),

preoperational test summary, deviations to the procedures, and the problem log were reviewed.

The problem log noted interferences, other unacceptable conditions which )ad to be corrected, and other data points which had to be observed during Hot Ops II (Post-core heatup).

The inspector reviewed various EBASCO and Comb'ustion Engineering letters documenting acceptance of test results or approving corrective actions, if necessary, to be accomplished prior to Hot Ops I ~

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The inspector examined completed procedure numbers 2-0010189, RCS Component Thermal Expansion Measurement

- Post Core and 2-0010194, Piping Thermal Expansion and Restraints (Post Core).

Data observations/measurements were taken at points identified as problem areas during the Pre-Core tests.

Various documents confirming acceptance by design engineers of thermal expansion tests results were reviewed by the inspector.

The inspector concluded that the tests complied with design and FSAR requirements.

Inspector Foffowup 389/83-08-01 is closed.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie J a

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