IR 05000335/1985027
| ML17308A162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Crowley B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A161 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-27, 50-389-85-27, IEB-80-08, IEB-80-8, NUDOCS 8512240077 | |
| Download: ML17308A162 (14) | |
Text
~Pg REMI Wp0 Qa i.g
+**<<+
UNITED STATES NLICLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/85-27 and 50-389/85-27 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Con Inspect r Approv d by November 18-22, 1985 C
y
/8 //u 85 Date Signed
/> /0 8~
J.
J ake, Section Chief E
i eering Branch D v sion of Reactor Safety ate Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 38 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Core Support Barrel Inspection (Unit 1),
Upper Guide Structure Lift Failure (Unit 1),
Nuclear Welding (Unit 1),
Nondestructive Examination (Units
and 2),
Inservice Inspection (Unit 1),
Inspector Followup Items (Unit 1),
and IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8512240077 851212 PDR ADOCK 05QQO335
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- K. N. Harris, Plant Vice President
- D. A. Sager, Plant Manager
- J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent T. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent
- N. G.
Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor T.
F. Skiba, Welding Supervisor
- C. T. Hamilton, Project QC Supervisor M.
Lamb, Construction Superintendent J. J. Hutchinson, MCI, EIT Supervisor D. Culpepper, Power Plant Engineering D.
E. Currier, Jr.,
Level III Examiner P.
W. Heycock, Inservice Inspection ( ISI) Coordinator J.
W.
adams, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer J. J. Walls, QC Engineer Cther licensee employees contacted included engineers, QC personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations G. Anglehart, Resident Site Services Manager, Combustion Engineering, Inc.
(CE)
W. J.
Cook, Task Manager Core Support Barrel, CE B.
R.
Wade, Site Coordinator, CE G.
S. Bloomquist, QC Superintendent, CE NRC Resident Inspectors
"R.
V. Crlenjak, Senior Resident Inspector H.
E. Bibb, Resident Inspector
"Attended exit interpiew Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 22, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
General Inspection (54834B)(42902B)(42940B)
(Unit 1)
The inspector conducted a general inspection of portions of the reactor and auxiliary buildings to observe activities such as housekeeping, material identification and control, and material storage.
b.
Core Support Barrel (CSB) Inspection (73753B) (Unit 1)
During a refueling outage in March 1983, the thermal shield and the core support barrel (CS)
in the area of the thermal shield attachment lugs were found to be damaged.
The thermal shield was removed and the CSB repaired (See Region II reports 50-335/83-13 and 50-335/83-36).
In general, the repair to the CSB consisted of installing expandable plugs in various sized crack arrester holes or attaching cover plates over machined holes using expandable plugs.
During the current outage (first refueling outage since repair to the core support barrel),
the repaired areas were inspected to insure the integrity of the cover plates and plugs and that no further degradation to the CSB had occurred.
The inspection was being performed by CE in accordance with CE document 19384-MPS-4GL-001, RO, "Guidelines for Post Cycle Six Inspection of Core Support Barrel Plugs and Plates, St.
Lucie 1".
In accordance with this document and referenced documents, the applicable code was the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1977 Edition, S78 Addenda.
The inspector reviewed/observed the following:
( 1)
The following CE documents c'ontrolling the inspection were reviewed:
Design Requirement 19367-DR-8, R2,
"Requirements for Nonde-structive Examination of St.
Lucie Unit 1 Core Support Barrel Repaired Areas" Design Requirement 19367-DR-9, R2,
"Acceptance Criteria for St.
Lucie Unit
CSB Expandable Plugs" CE Site Traveler ST No.
19384-001, RO,
"Post Cycle Six Mechanical Inspection of CSB Expandable Plugs" CE Site Traveler ST No.
19384-002, RO,
"Visual and Eddy Current Examinat;ion of CSB Patches and Plugs"
,1
19384-003, RO, "Engineering Evalua-tion of CSB Expandable Plugs" CE Procedure 682-ISI-072, R3,
"Procedure for the Remote Visual Examinations for Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals" (2)
In-process visual (VT) inspection of lugs 4 and 6 repair areas was observed.
The inspector also observed activities associated with plug flange deflection measurements for lug 6 repair area and the bottom 3" plug at lug 3 repair area.
Activities associated with rotation of the CSB and positioning the deflection measurement equipment and the VT equipment were observed in the refueling pool.
(3)
In addition to observing in-process videos of inspection of lugs
and 6 repair areas, th'e "overview" video tape of lugs 5, 6, and
repair areas was reviewed.
In addition, the video tape for VT inspection of lug 8 repair area was reviewed.
(4)
Deflection calculation and evaluation.
data were reviewed for lug 8, plugs 1 and 2.
(5)
Personnel certification records for 2 level II VT examiners and one ISI Positioner Operator were reviewed.
Upper Guide Structure (UGS) Lifting Failure (60705B) (Unit.'.)
On November 6, 1985 while removing the UGS in preparation for fuel movement, one of the three lift rig attachments to the UGS gave way.
This placed the UGS in a tilted position with its full weight supported by the remaining two attachment points.
A later inspection revealed that the attachment bolt had not been fully engaged into the UGS flange threaded hole (See Region II Report 50-335/85-29 for a
more detailed inspection of this problem).
The UGS was successfully removed using a
modified lift rig.
During the current inspection, the inspector discussed with the licensee the plans for reinstallation of the UGS and evaluation of and damage to the UGS and UGS lift rig.
The following summarizes the licensee'c plans and the inspector's review:
Prior to re-installation, the UGS will be inspected for damage.
The inspector reviewed the following CE documents which were to be used for the inspection:
19367-MPS-SGL-050, R01,
"Video Inspection Guideline for the Upper Guide Structure for St.
Lucie, Unit 1" ST No.
607299-001, RO, "Visual Inspection of the Upper Guide Structure"
The UGS lift rig was modified to transmit the weight of the UGS directly to the lift rig "Delta Beam" rather than through the lift rig columns.
This required the manufacturer of three
"Long Bolts" to fit inside the columns.
The "Long Bolts" attach to the "Delta Beam" and thread into the UGS flange thus transmitting the weight of the UGS directly xo the "Delta Beam".
By the close of the inspection, the damaged UGS flange threaded hole had been tapped and the three
"Long Bolts",.threaded into the UGS flange.
Plans were to assess the damage to the lift rig structure and perform necessary repairs/replacements after the outage.
The CSB lift rig "Tripod" and the UGS lift rig "Delta Beam", which were to be used for re-installation, had been visually examined by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed the inspection reports for these inspections.
The inspector reviewed inspection reports covering load testing of the auxiliary system "J-hooks" used to remove the UGS.
Wi".hin the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Nuclear Welding (55050) (Unit 1)
The inspector examined ASME Code welding as indicated below to determine whether application code and regulatory requirements were being met.
The applicable code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 1980 Edition including Addenda through the Winter of 1980.
a.
Welder Performance Qualification The inspector reviewed the qualification records and status records for the below listed welders relative to the field welds listed in para-graph b. below.
LFNQ LFMR LFOD LFNW b.
Production Welding The inspector observed welds 001, 002, 003, and 004 on drawing CNO 06422-1624 at the final weld status.
The welding was observed to determine whether:
Work was being conducted in accordance with a
document which coordinates and sequences operations, references procedures, establishes hold points, and provides for production and inspec-tion approval.
Weld identification and location were as specifie Procedures, drawings, and other instructions were at the work station and readily available.
Welding procedures specification (WPS)
assignment was in accord-ance with applicable code requirements.
Welding technique and sequence were specified and adhered to.
Welding filler materials were the specified type and traceable procedure and was inspected.
Meld joint. geometry was in accordance with applicable procedure and was inspected.
Alignment of parts was as specified.
Preheat and interpass temperatures were in accordance with procedures.
Electrodes were used in positions and with electrical characte-ristics specified.
Process control system had provisions for repairs.
Welders were qualified.
Inspection personnel were qualified.
Melding Material Control Receiving inspection and material certification documentation were reviewed for the following welding materials being used for the welding observed in paragraph b.
above.
3/32" E7018 Ht.
33043 Code 0257 RIR 9602-5014 1/8" E7018 Ht.
92087D Code 0222 RIR R-82-1317 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identi-fie.
Magnetic Particle Examination (57070) (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector examined the magnetic particle,(MT) examination activities described below to determine whether applicable code and regulatory require-ments were being met.
The applicable code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections III and V, 1980 Edition, W80 Addenda.
"Magnetic Particle Inspection PSL" was reviewed to determine whether the procedure had been approved and issued in accordance with the gA program.
In addition, the procedure was reviewed to determine whether the following parameters were specified and controlled in accordance with applicable requirements:
Method - Continuous Surface Preparation Particle Con'trast Surface Temperature Light Intensity Coverage Prod Spacing Magnetizing Current Yoke Pole Spacing Acceptance criteria are specified consistent with the applicable code and specific contract requirements.
b.
Personnel certification records for the examiner who performed MT inspection of the welds listed in paragraph 6.b.
above were reviewed.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Inservice Inspection - Reviewing Procedures (73052B) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
The applicable code for the procedures reviewed is the ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
ÃI, 1980 Edition, W80 Addenda.
The following program and procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel, and compilation of required records:
Document MCI-ET-85-001, RO,
"Inservice Examination Plan for Eddy Current Inspection of Steam Generators" NDE 1. 1, R3,
"Eddy Current Examinations of NonFerromagnetic Tubing with Multifrequency Techniques"
In addition, Procedure NDE 1. 1 was reviewed for technical content in the areas of:
specification of a
two channel examination unit and indication equipment such as indicator, meter, tube, strip-recorder or tape; maximum sensitivity; material permeability; description of method examination; calibration; and acceptance criteria.
In this area of inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753B)
(Unit 1)
The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
See paragraph
above for the applicable code.
a.
Personnel certification records were reviewed for the following eddy current examiners:
2 Level I-Examiners 1 Level II Examiner 1 Level IT Examiner 2 Level IIA Examiners b.
In-process ET inspection was observed for the following steam generator tubes:
Steam Generator A Hot Leg -
L 106 R38 L 106 R40 L 106 R42 L 106"R44 Steam Generator A Cold Leg - L 51 R69 L 51 R71 L 51 R73 Steam Generator B Hot Leg
-,
L 120 R8 The inspections were compared with the requirements of applicable procedures in the areas of:
Equipment Sensitivity Test Method Calibration Acceptance Criteria The inspector discussed the ET program and status with the licensee (1)
The original program specified that approximately 2100 tubes in each generator be inspected.
The sample size and distribution was picked to addre'ss the following known problem areas:
e U-bend problems Rows 3 through
Sludge Pile and Egg Crate Indications (Inspected tubes from hot leg side)
Drilled Support Plate Problems ( Inspected from cold leg side)
Based on results as of November 22, 1985, it appeared that the scope of the inspection would be expanded to include approximately 100% of the tubes in both generators.
(2)
As of November 22, 1985, the following table summarizes the ET test results:
A Inlet A Outlet B Inlet B Outlet Total Tubes Inspected and Analyzed 3645 1992 2559 3120 Indications
<20%
47
53 Indications
>
20% <40%
41
19 Indications
>40%
9 12'he indications were scattered, but in general, the indications
+20% were predominantly between the tube sheet and the first egg crate support.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Inservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation (73755) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the ISI records described below to determine whether the records were consistent with regulatory requirements and applicable procedures.
The applicable code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1974 Edition, S75 Addenda.
Inspection reports for the following pipe hangers were reviewed:
~Han er SIH-95 SIH-7 MSH-75 ISO Ins ection Re ort No.
M85-6733 M85-6767 M85-6858 Personnel certification records for the VT examiner who inspected the above hangers were reviewed.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspector Followup Items (92701B) - Unit
(Closed)
Inspector Fol 1 owup Item 335/84-06-01, Records of UT Examiner Training or Cracked Stairiless Steel Blocks.
This item pertained to the lack of evidence on site of UT examiner training or cracked stainless steel test blocks.
In interoffice FP&L letter PNS-CI-84-81-6, the licensee justified their training and qualification practices.
There are no further, questions on this item.
12.
IE Bulletins (92703B) (Units 1 and 2)
a.
b.
(Closed)
IEB 335, 389/82-BU-02d, Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants.
See Region II Report 50-335, 389/84-32 for a previous in'spection of actions required by this Bulletin.
During the previous inspection, the inspector noted that the formal training program did not contain procedures for maintenance crew training as required by paragraph 1 of the Bulletin.
During that inspection, the licensee agreed to issue and implement a
training procedure.
During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed the Mechanical Maintenance Training Program,
"Bolting and Fastening".
In addi ion, training records for the -subject lesson plan dated April 17 and 24, May 6 and 13, 1985, were reviewed.
(Closed)
IEB 335, 389/80-BU-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds.
See reports 50-335/80-34, 50-389/80-15, and 50-335, 389/85-14 for previous inspections of this Bulletin.
The licensee provided the following letters of response to the IEB:
Date A
licable to Unit Identif in Number 7/8/80 9/29/80 12/1/80 L-80-215 L-80-323 L-80-394 In July 1984 Report NUREG/CR-3053,
"Closeout of IE Bulletin 80-08:
Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds" was issued.
This report recommended additional actions, based on a review of licensee responses to IEB 80-08, for certain facilities - including St.
Lucie Unit 1.
The licensee's response had indicated one instance in which a
partial bZcking ring had been used in St.
Lucie Unit 1 without the performance of radiography.
This partial backing ri ng weld was addressed as a concern in the NUREG.
However, review of the NUREG reveals that the weld, in question, is in containment sump penetration P-33 and does not meet the definition of
"Areas of Concern", i.e.,
high energy steam or water piping, as defined on page 3 of the NUREG.
Based on the following, the inspector concluded that the intent of the Bulletin had been satisfied:
Review of licensee's responses Review of NUREGICR-3053 Review of a sample of radiographs for penetrations P40 and P64 Review of a sample of construction and vendor weld records for the welds, in question, for Unit 1 penetrations P-l, P-4, P-.27, and P-36.