IR 05000335/1982004
| ML20052C006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1982 |
| From: | Bibb H, Dance H, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052B984 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-335-82-04, 50-335-82-4, NUDOCS 8205040255 | |
| Download: ML20052C006 (8) | |
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'o,j UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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e REGION 11 101 MARLETTA ST N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report tio. 50-335/82-04 and 50-389/82-03 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street fliami, FL 33152 Facility llame:
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2
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Docket No. 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67 and CPPR-144 Inspection at St Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
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J 9 Eb S. A. Elrod'
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3 9 8k Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Ddte Signed Project and Resident Programs SUf111ARY Inspection on January 11, 1982 - February 12, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 283 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of Till Items, Surveillance, Licensee Event Reports and Operational Safety.
Resul ts Of the four areas inspected, no apparent item of noncompliance were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance; was. found in one area (Severity Level 5 - Failure to establish or implement procedures) (Unit l.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
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C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager
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- J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent i
J. E. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent D. A. Sager, Operations Supervisor N. G. Roos, Quality Control Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor C. F. Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
R. R. Jennings. Technical Department Supervisor B. W. Mikell, Outage Coordinator C. A. Pell, Reactor Engineering Supervisor H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J. G. West, Security Supervisor J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator 0. D. Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor L. W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor N. D. West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor C. L. Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor H. B. Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Electrical T. A. Dillard, Assistant Plant Superintendent - flechanical
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A. W. Bailey, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Walls, Quality Control Supervisor (Acting)
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, shift technicians advisors, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 25, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 335/80-35-07, Safety Grade Installation of PORV/ Safety Valve Acoustic Flow lionitor.
This item is discussed in paragraph 6.d.
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b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 335/81-02-09, Audits of Power Resources Staff and Quality Assurance Committee.
Review of Audits QAS-PRS-81-1 completed April 13, 1981 and QAS-QAD-81-1 (JUtiA Audit) shows that these audits have been completed. QI-18-QAD-2 -
Auditing of the Quality Assurance Committee, Company fluclear Review Board and Quality Assurance Department, Revision 0 was issued July 3,1981.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Event Repcrts Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropri-ate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
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- 81-47
"A Disel Generator Turbocharger
- 81-48 Seismic Instrumentation
- 81-49 Channel
"D" RWT Bistable
- 81-50 Shutdown Itargin
- 81-51
"A" Auxilary Feed Pump
- 81-52 Linear Heat Rate
- 81-53 Electrical System
- 81-54 Missed Surveillance
- 81-55 liissed Surveillance
- 81-58 High Range Radiation Bistable
- 81-59 Containment Vacuum Relief Valve
- 81-60 Primary Sample Valve
- 81-61 Component Cooling llater Valve 6.
Licensee Actions Taken on Till Action Items a,
(Closed Unit 1) Item I.A.1.3.2.A. - Minimum Shift Manning.
This item is closed based on review of administrative procedure 0010120, Rev.16, Paragraph 8.2.
b.
(Closed Unit 1) Item I.A.1.1. - Shift Technical Advisor. This updates inspection reports 335/80-35 and 335/81-05. The inspector reviewed NRC letter of January 26,1982 (Clark-Uhrig), which provides the results of an NRR post-implementation review of I. A.1.1.
This letter, in conjunction with previous inspections, closes I.A.1.1.
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c.
(Closed - Unit 1) Item II.E.4.2.5.B - tiodification of Containment Pressure Set Point.
This is a update of paragraph 8.C of inspection report 335/81-16.
FP&L letters L-81-165 - dated April 9, _1981 and
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L-81-226 dated May 27, 1981 proposed no change in the present set L
point of 5 psig. An NRC safety evaluation dated January 25, 1982 concurred with the FP&L proposal.
d.
(Closed - Unit 1) Item II.D.3 - Install Direct Indication of Valve position.
This is an update of paragraph 7.e. of inspection report 80-35.
Items reviewed included Plant Change 83-81, plant work order 4002, I&E procedure 1400170, revision 0, and Technology for Energy letter of November 16, 1981.
Additionally, portions of the physical installation and testing were observed by the inspector during the fall 1981 refueling outage. Plant Change 83-81 upgraded the environmental qualifications of charge converters and of accelerometer cables.
It also installed two new accelerometers for power onarated relief valves.
These accelerometers are located outside the pressurizer shield cubicle.
This location has been detennined by the vendor to be
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acceptable.
Unresolved item 335/80-35-07 concerned the cable runs for this instru-ment possibly not being seismically qualified.
It appears that the
past reference was to the cable from the accelerometer to the charge converter. This cable is a part of the accelerometer. These were
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under test by the vendor at the time of original installation,
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ultimately could not be qualified, and were replaced with qualified units. UNR 335/80-35-07 is closed.
(0 pen Unit 1) Item II.B.4.2.B. Complete training for mitigating core c.
damage. The reviewed training records showed a February 2,1982 completion date, except for the plant manager who has not received this training. This is apparently due to a misinterpretation of the requirement by the licensee.
This will be reinspected during a future j
inspection.
f.
(0 pen Unit 1) Item II.F.1.3 Containment High - Range Monitor. The
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inspector verified installation in accordance with the NUREG 0737 specifications and Appendix B criteria.
Two incomplete items are:
operator training and availability of the control wiring diagram in the control room.
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(0 pen Unit 1) Item II.F.1.4 Containment Pressure. The wide range
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l pressure instruments were verified to be installed.
The inspector found the sensing line containment isolation valves to be shut-rendering the instruments inoperable.
They were opened af ter
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discussion with the inspector. The base cause appeared to be failure to include alignment of these new valves in a procedure. Three incomplete items are: valve lineup instructions, completion of operator training, and availability of a control wiring diagram in the control room.
h.
(0 pen Unit 1) Item II.F.1.5 Containment Level Overlapping narrow range (one channel) and redundant wide range instruments were verified to be installed.
Incomplete item include:
The narrow range instrument face reads 0 to +7 feet vice -7 to 0 feet, the control wiring diagram was not available to the control room operator and training was not complete. The inspector was informed that operating instructions were not issued yet. Additionally, the calibration of these instruments is suspect because one redundant wide range instrument read +2 feet of water above the sump top while the other shows its minimum reading of -1.
The narrow range (-7 feet to 0 feet) instrument indicated 2 feet of water in the sump while the existing sump level instrument indicated less than 10 inches of water in the same sump.
7.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements. The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activites were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work req'sests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Plant Work Order #0060 issued to investigate excessive noise and vibration in the "C" Intake Cooling Water pump. A bearing was replaced
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and the pump tested and returned to service.
b.
Plant Work Order #2655 issued to repair the "A" Diesel Generator water heater.
c.
Plant Work Order #2667 issued to work on pressurizer code safety relief valve, V-1201, and place it in storage as a spare.
During review of the PW0, a new revision, Rev. 3, to General Maintenance Procedure M-0017, Pressurizer Safety Valve Maintenance, was issued which deletes
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the torque requirement (750 ft-lb.) and the Q.C. hold point signature
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- from the torquing of the inlet flange nuts. This is contrary to the valve vendnr's recommendations. This item was also noted independently
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by another NRC inspector and is addressed in inspection report 335/82-03.
Regional management contacted FPL General Office Management to review this item.
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8.
Surveillance Observation The inspector observed portions of I&C Procedure 1400050, Revision 22, Reactor Protection System Monthly Functional Test. The inspector verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during i
the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Operational Safety Verification
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a.
The inspector observed control room aperators, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
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including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the high pressure / low pressure safety injection systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments, and reviewed a liquid release made on December 21, 1981 under Liquid Release Pennit No. 81-43 to assure
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compliance with 10 CFR 20 limits.
b.
On January 26, 1982, Clearance 1-1-118 called for the following roots valves to be closed and tags attached-V-3853, 3858, 3492, 3493 and 3494, in order to isolate and calibrate HPSI/LPSI gages.
Instead, the gage-stop valves upstream of each of these valves were shut and the
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tags hung on the gage stops.
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Though this is, in fact, a better isolation, since the gages are outside of the HPSI/LPSI rooms, the nuclear operator hanging tags did not have to suit up, and this minimized his exposure in accordance with good ALARA practices.
However the operator failed to follow existing clearance instructions or get them changed.
The clearance form was not annotated to show what valves were actually tagged.
This item is an example of failure to properly implement procedures in accordance with Technical Specification 6.8.1.
(335/82-04-01).
c.
On January 27, 1982 During a routine valve lineup check in accordance with OP 0410020, HPSI/LPSI Normal Operation, the inspector found two valves to be open that the procedure indicated should be closed. These two valve V-7219 and V-7227, are instrument line isolation valves for pressure transmitters PT-07-5A and PT-07-5B respectively. These pressure transmitters send their signals to a pressure indicator (PI-07-5A) and a pressure recorder (PR-07-48, 5B) on the post-accident panel in the control room, giving continuous indication of containment
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spray pump suction pressure under post-accident conditions when the pumps have switched to pumping from the containment sump.
The two valves were in the desired post-accident position and the procedure was wrong. A review of plant records indicated that these two valves were last confirmed as " closed" on November 29, 1981 per OP-00410020, HPS1/LPSI Normal Operation, by two separate operators. No notation was entered on the procedure that recognized the procedure was in error.
Interviews with control room personnel could not determine how or by what authority the two valves were opened. This is an example of failure to properly establish and maintain procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1. (335/82-04-01).
d.
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the following procedure changes for content, Facility Review Group review, compliance with technical specifications and items such as cleanliness requirements, QC hold points and data points specified.
Administrative Procedure 0010432, Rev. 17 - Plant Work Orders
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Administrative Procedure 0010120, Rev.16 - Duties
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and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift.
thintenance Procedure 1h0311 Rev.1 - Equipment Access Hatch
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Removal and Replacement.
thintenance Procedure th0010, Rev. 4 - Reactor Coolant Pump seal
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Cartridge Assembly Flow Test.
Maintenance Procedure H-0011, Rev. 4 - Reactor Coolant Pump seal
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Rebuilding.
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Off Normal Procedure 0310030, Rev.12 - Component Cooling Water -
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Off flormal Operation.
No violation or deviations were identified.