IR 05000334/1990010
| ML20043C087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1990 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043C085 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-90-10, 50-412-90-09, 50-412-90-9, NUDOCS 9006040014 | |
| Download: ML20043C087 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos. 50-334/90-10 & 50-412/90-09 Docket Nos. 50-334 & 50-412 License Nos. NPF-66 & NPF-73 Licensee:
Duauesne Lhht Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingnort. Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name:
Beaver Vallev Atomic Power Station. Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Shippingnort. Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
May 1-3.1990 h
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,4$1 Team Members:
C. Z. G6tllon, Ifegional Team Leader hate'
J. Beall, SRI, Beaver Valley E. Fox, Region 1 J. Furia, Region 1 P. Wilson, RI, Beaver Valley -
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O Approved By:
m W. J. LazajuX Chief, Emer6ency
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Preparedness Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on May 1-3,1990 (Report Nos. 50-334/90-10 and 50-412/90-09).
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness (EP) inspection and observation of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on May 1,1990. The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I personnel.
Resuks: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on May 2,1990.
E. J. Bmh, Director, Personnel Administration E. R. Cohen, Director, Radiological Operations S. C. Fenner, Manager, Quality Services L R. Freeland, Manager, Operations H. L Harper, Director, Security D. R. Kline, Administrator, Security J. A. Kosmal, Manager, Health Physics
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W. S. Lacey, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Services l
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F. J. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor T. P. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit L D. O'Neil, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance
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K. L. Ostrowski, Manager, Operations Assessment j
F. L Pavlechko, Director, Emergency Planning l
J. M. Sasala, Director, Nuclear Communications j
R. M. Vento, Director, Radiological Engineering j
T. R. Zusinas, Director, Maintenance Training l
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During the conduct of the inspection, other licensee personnel were interviewed and observed in performance of emergency response duties.
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i 2.0 Emergency Exercise i
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The Beaver Valley full-participation exercise was conducted on May 1,1990, from 3:00 p.m. until 9:30 p.m.
2.1 Pre exercise Activities
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The exercise objectives, submitted to the NRC Region I on January 23,1990, I
were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On February 20,1990 the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
In general, the NRC review of the scenario revealed the submittal to be complete in most areas. However, several areas were identified with a lack of detail in descriptions of activities associated with inplant repair and corrective actions. Revisions were made to the scenario and events data. Following the revisions, it wn:, determined that the scenario would provide for adequate testing
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of major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (EPIP)
and also provide the. opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in neeu of corrective action. NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on May 1,1990 and participated in the discussion of response actions expected during the scenario. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee and were also discussed during the briefing.
2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:
1. Medical emergency involving contaminated / injured personnel; 2. Reactor Coolant System leak into containment; 3. Condensate pump trip; 4. Auxiliary feedwater pump damage caused by a breakaway turbine blade; 5. Safety injection on low pressurizer pressure; 6. Loss of high head flow; 7. Core uncovery and minor fuel damage; 8. Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment; 9. Declaration of Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications; and 10. Recommendations of protective measures to offsite authorities.
The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response facilities. Response actions of personnel from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia were demonstrated in the Emergency Operations Facility. In addition, two members of the NRC Region 1 Incident Response Team participated as State Liaison Officers at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Harrisburg.
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2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency response organization (ERO), activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of'
emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The %v:g activities were observed:
1. Detectam, classification, imd assessment of scenario events; 2. Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3. Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; 4. Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 5. Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 6. Provisions for inplant radiation protection; 7. Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; 8. Maintenance of site security and access control; 9. Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 10. Assembly and accountability of personnel; 11. Provisions for communicating information to the public; and 12. Post exercise critique.
3.0 Classification of Exercise Findings Emergency preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows:
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3.1 Exercise Strengths Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's response that provide strong.
positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plam conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
3.2 Exercise Weakness An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness coub have precluded effective implementation of the Emergency Plan in the area observed (in the event of an actual emergency). Existence of an exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public.
3.3 Areas for improvement An area for improvement is a finding which did not have a significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, but should be evaluated to determine whether corrective action could improve any programmatic or performance area.
4.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use
.of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. Exercise observations were identified in each of the -
emergency response facilities.
4.1 Control Room The following exercise strengths were identified.
1.
Operations staff quickly recognized changing plant conditions.
Classifications were proper and notifications were timely.
2.
Operations staff demonstrated good use of Emergency Operating Procedures and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.
3.
Record keeping was complete and logbooks were well maintained throughout the exercis _ _ _ _ _.
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No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
1.
Briefings of operations staff did not include updates on existing radiological conditions, TSC assignments, or status of response activities outside the control room.
2.
Due to high noise levels, public address announcements were inaudible in the fuel handling building.
3.
Staging the control room portion of the exercise in a tabletop format, away from the panel and display area detracted from realism and hindered response actions of operations staff with regard to recognition of degrading plant conditions. Consideration should be given to use of the simulator for exercises so that operators have the opportunity to carry out their emergency response ro'es more realistically.
4.
During the medical emergency, an interruption in the response provided by offsite emergency medical technicians (EMT) occurred due to the victims being located inside a vital area of the plant. The licensee indicated that security procedures do not allow non badged personnel access to vital areas during drills (even when accompanied by security
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4.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)
The following strengths were identified.
1.
Direction and control demonstrated by key TSC coordinators was strong, particularly the Emergency Director position.
2.
The Emergency Director effectively used support personnel to perform priority tasks.
3.
Classification of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency were well coordinated with Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff and in accordance with emergency action levels.
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No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
4.3 Radeon Operations Center (ROC)
The ROC is the designated emergency response facility used for coordinating activities of inplant repair and corrective action teams.
The following exercise strengths were identified.
1.
Good information flow between personnel in the ROC and those in the control room, TSC, and EOF was maintained to ensure assigned tasks were effectively carried out.
2.
Priorities for each inplant task assignment were carefully evaluated prior to implementation.
3.
Repair teams demonstrated good knowledge of contamination control techniques when performing required maintenance.
.No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
1.
An unusually long delay was observed in dispatching the inplant team to locate the containment penetration leak because emergency radiation work permit (RWP) authorization could not be readily obtained.
2.
Portable radio problems were encountered between the-ROC and site boundary monitoring teams as transmissions were lost on several occasions.
'4.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOFT The following exercise strengths were ider.tified.
1.
Personnel in the EOF were knowledgeable of their emergency response functions and used implementing procedures efficiently to carry out their assignments.
2.
Direction and control of activities in the EOF provided effective and timely resolution to problems.
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Dose assessment calculations were performed continuously and were based upon plant conditions. Updates on radiological conditions were discussed with State representatives at regular intervals.
4.
Facility activation, staffing, and accountability of personnel was timely.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
1.
Following the General Emergency, the licensee did not coordinate well with affected states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) when formulating the protective action recommendation (PAR). According to the Beaver Valley Emergency Plan, reasonable effort shall be taken with the states and the NRC to arrive at a consensus protective action.
However, the PAR was developed solely by the Emergency Response Manager (ERM) in conjunction with dose assessment staff. The recommendation was then issued-to each state via the gold telephone communication link, thereby neglecting state personnel present in the EOF. The licensee must ensure that the Emergency Plan is carefully
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Prior to classification of the Site Area Emergency by the Emergency Director and ERM, consideration was not given to collaborating with other EOF staff members to obtain assistance in evaluating initiating conditions.
3.
News announcement #6, which provided a plant status update, contained erroneous information regarding reasons for classification of the Alert.
5.0 Licensee Action on-Previously Identified items Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, areas for improvement identified during the previous emergency exercise (Inspection Report Nos. 50-334/89-14 and 50-412/89-15) were acceptably demonstrated and not repeated.
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6.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on May 2,1990 during
.which the licensee's lead controllers summarized observations from the exercise, The critique was thorough and documented deficient areas in need of corrective action. The licensee indicated that critique items would be tracked in their internal open item tracking system.
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7.0 Exit Meeting
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Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee i
representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. Team observations made during the exercise were summarized.-
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The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no s'::tions were observed. Although there were areas
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identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the. scope and
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could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.
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