IR 05000334/1990009

Insp Repts 50-334/90-09 & 50-412/90-08 on 900331-0504.One Noncited Violation Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Protection,Surveillance & Maint, Emergency Preparedness,Security & Engineering

ML20043B297
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/16/1990
From:	Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20043B296	List: IR 05000334/1990009 ML20043B295
References
50-334-90-09, 50-334-90-9, 50-412-90-08, 50-412-90-8, NUDOCS 9005290005
Download: ML20043B297 (17)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION 1 Report Nos.

50-334/90-09 License: DPR-66 50-412/90-08 NPF-73 o

Licensee:

Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279

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Facility Name: Beaver Valley power Station. Units 1 and 2 Location:

Shippingport, Pennsylvania

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Dates:

March 31 - May 4, 1990 Inspector:

J. E. Beali, Senior Resident Inspector

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P. R. Wilson, Resident Inspector P. S. Tam, Senior Project Manager, NRR Approved by:-

William"Rulfn$, Eting Section Chief Date eactor Pr( Xcts Section No. 4B Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary V

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This inspection report documents routine and reactive inspections during day and backshift hours of station activities including:

plant operations;

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radiological protection; surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical-support; and safety assessment / quality verification.

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Results Overall, the facility was operated safely. One non-cited violation was identified concerning the failure to perform a required suryciliance test (Section 4.4).

A review of a Unit 1 inadvertent cooldown and letdown isola-tion event was documented.

Operator response to the transient was notable (Section 2.3.2).

Further review of a Unit I trip resulting from water in instrument air lines is documented (Section 7).

Improvements, in Unit 1 general

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housekeeping (Section 2.1) and material condition of nonsafety related equipment (Section 4.2) were observed.

Seve., evious open NRC items were reviewed and

_ closed during this inspection (Sectitn 9). An Executive Summary follows.

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90052900o5 900518 PDR ADOCK 0500

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TABLE OF CONTENTS i '

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Summary of Facility Activities..............

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Plant. Operations (IP 71707,71710,93702)

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l 2.1 Operational-Safety Verification...........

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2.2. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown'

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2.3 Followup of Events Occurring During the Inspection Period.............,....

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Radiological Controls (71707)...............

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Maintenance and Surveillance (61726, 62703, 71707)....

4.1 Maintenance Observation.....

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j 4.2 Unit 1 Material Condition Improvements........

4.3 Surveillance Observation.

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4.4 Unit 1 Missed Surveillance..............

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Emergency Preparedness (71707)..............

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Security (71707).........,.........,.

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Engineered and Technical Support (37700, 37828, 71707)..

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7.1 Unit 1 Instrument Air Moisture Problem

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Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500, 71707, 90712, 92700, 35502)...................

8.1 Onsite Review Committee...............

8.2 Review of Written Reports..............

8.3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Quality Assurance Update..

'8.4 Mid-Cycle SALP Assessment'.

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Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (IP 71707, 92702, 92701).......................

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Exit Meetings (30703)..................

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10.1 Preliminary Inspection Findings Exit.

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10.2 Attendance at Exit Meetings Conducted by

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Region Based Inspectors (30703)...........

• Indicates NRC Inspection Procedure number used in the inspection of the area.

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - BEAVER VALLEY UNITS 1 & 2 (90-09/08)

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March-31 - May 4. 1990 Plant Operations.The inspectors reviewed a Unit 1 egent concerning an

inadvertent cooldown and a subsequent letdown automatic isolation. Control

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room operator's response to the transient was notable. The inspectors found that the licensee's corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence.

L Improvements in Unit 1 general housekeeping were observed.

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Radiological Protection Routine review of.the area identified no noteworthy

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if deficiencies.

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Surveillance and Maintenance Both surveillance testing and maintenance

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activities were observed. One non-cited violation was identified concerning the failure to perform a Unit 2 required weekly surveillance test on the No.

2-3 125 VDC battery.

The inspectors observed improvements in the material condition of nonsafety related equipment in Unit 1.

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Emergency preparedness Routine review of this area identified no

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deficiencies.

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Security Routine' review of this area identified no deficiencies.

Engineering and Technical Support The inspector reviewed licensee activities associated with a Unit 1. reactor trip on March 30 caused by water in the instrument air lines to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves. The licensee assessment of. instrument air quality is ongoing.

Safety Assessment / Quality Verification The inspectors found previously

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identified diesel generator fuel oil quality assurance concerns were adequately

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resolved.

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DETAILS

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1.

Summary of Facility Activities-

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At the beginning of the period, Unit I was in Hot Standby (Mode 3)

following a reactor trip on March 30, 1990, and Unit 2 was operating at

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=approximately 95% power. Unit I returned to power operation on April 5 and operated at full power until April 25.

Unit 1 power was gradually reduced over a five day period to 69% power due to low cooling tower pump

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suction pressures and to allow main condenser water box cleaning. Unit 1 i

returned to full power operation on April 30 and remained at that level

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until the end of the period.

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L Unit 2 operated at approximately 95% power until April 7 when power was

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reduced to 47% as part of a core life extension schedule. On April 9,

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power was increased to 87% and power was again lowered to 47% as a fuel savings measure on April 13. On April 23, power was increased to approximately 90% for the remainder of the period except for reduction to 47% on weekends as part of the core life extension schedule.

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Plant Operations t

2.1 Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the plant was operated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements.

Regular tours were conducted on the following plant areas:

-- Control Room

-- Safoguard Area

-- Auxiliary Buildings

-- Service Buildings

-- Switchgear Areas

-- Diesel Generator Buildings

-- Access Control Points

-- Intake Structure

-- Protected Area Fence Line -- Yard Areas

-- Spent Fuel Building

-- Containment Penetration

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-- Turbine Buildings Areas During the course of the inspection, di wussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures, L

facility configuration and plant conditions. The inspector verified adherence to approved procedures-for-ongoing activities observed.

Shift turnovers were witnessed and staffing requirements confirmed.

The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and a professional atmosphere was maintained. Inspector comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by licensee personnel.

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Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical

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L Specification (TS) requirement:. Operability of engineered safety

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' features,'other safety related systems and onsite andloffsite power sources were verified.- The inspectors observed.various alarm

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' conditions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance.-

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with plant operating procedures.

Compliance with TS and'implementa-4'

tion of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service

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was inspected.

Logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate-and identified equipment status'or deficiencies..These-

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records included operating logs, turnover sheets', system safety tags,

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and the jumper and lifted lead book. The inspector also examined the

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condition of various fire protection, meteorol.ogical, and' seismic

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monitoring systems.

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g Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control and

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storage-of flammable material and other potential safety hazards.

(he inspector conducted detailed walkdowns'of accessible areas of

both Unit 1 and-Unit 2'.. Unit 1 general housekeeping continued to-

l improve.during the inspection period.- The inspector observed only.

i isolated areas requiring improvement. General housekeeping in Unit 2

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was good. Temporary equipment was found to be adequately restrained i

in both units, d

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2.2 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The operability of selected engineered safety feature systems was.

verified by performing. detailed walkdcwns of the accessible portions'

of the' systems. The inspectors confirmed that system ccmponents were

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in the required alignments, instrumentation was valved-in with-

. appropriate calibration dates, as-built p'rints. reflected the as-insta11ed' systems and the overall conditions observed were

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sati sf actory. The systems inspected during this. period include the

Emergency Diesel-Generator, ' Safety Injection-Auxiliary Feed and

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Recirculation Spray systems. No concerns were. identified.

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L 2.3 Followup of Events Occurring During the Inspection H

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q During the inspection period,-the inspectors provided onsite coverage'

j and followup of unplanned events.

Plant parameters, performance of j

safety systems,'and licensee actions were reviewed.

The inspectors j

confirmed-that the required -notifications were made to:NRC. The-j j

~following events were reviewed:

s 2.3.1 Followup of March 30 Unit 1 Reactor Trip I

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At the end of the last inspection period on March 30, 1990, i

i the Unit I reactor tripped due to the 1C Main Feedwater

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Regulating Valve (MFRV) stroking partially shut.

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Suosequent investigation found a significant amount of

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water in the electro pneumatic converters for all the Unit 1

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MFRVs. The inspector's independent review and evaluation u

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of! the event and the licensee s corrective actions are -

discussed in-Section.7.1.-

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i NP 2.3.2-

' Unit 1' Inadvertent Cooldown and Letdown Isolation, f

g On' April 1, 1990, during the Unit 1 startup following the-March 30 reactor trip, an inadvertent cooldown and automatic

. letdown isolation (an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation)-

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occurred due to the failure if a mai_n condenser steam dump >

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valve. ' At the -time of the event, _ Unit 1: was at 1% power s'

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with, primary heat removal bt>ing contro17ed by the mair,

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condenser steam dump system.; The steam dump system 4as 10

the steam pressure mode 'with main steam header pressure

.being. controlled at 1005 psig.

Steam Generator (5G)

i inventory was being controlled using Bypass Main Feedwater

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. Regulating Valves (BMFRV).

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The event-occurred when a condenser. steam dump valve failed

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.to automatically m'*ut when. main steam pressurecdropped below 10'd5'psig React;

oolant temperature decreased from 545

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degrees'F.to 535 degrees F.

The decrease in reactor:

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j-r coolant temperature:resulted in a. drop lin pressurizer level.-

When pressurizer. level decreased below 14%, two open letdown orifice isolation valves and the!two letdown path isolation

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automatically closed-as; designed.

Control. room operators'promptly! shut the open steam dump l

valve and withdrew control rods to increase reactor coolant

temperature.

Reactor coolant; temperature.was restored to-

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above 541 degrees F_ within.three nin'utes after the start

l eL of the event. - Unit 1 Technical. Specification 3.1.1.5

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limited operation to 15' minutes with reactorr coolant j

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temperature below 541 degrees F.

After pressurizer level returned ta normal, an? attempt was made.to restore;1etdown l

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flow, howeve.

one of Jthe letdown. path isolation v'alves -

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failed closed.

Excess.letdo'wn was placed in service.

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facilitate the' repair:of the failed closed letdown isolatiom

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valve, a controlled shutdown to Hot Standby,(Mode 3) was J

G performed. ~ All. required N3C notifications were made.

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.i The: licensee also determined that the. initial decrease in-

-l Mv steam pressure below 1005 psig-was the result of overfeeding U

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of the SGs ; caused by sluggish response of the BMFRVS.

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Further investigation found water in the air control system

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for the 'BMFRVs as the result of previous instrument air dew j

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point. transients-(see Ser. tion 7.1).

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+4 The failed main condenser steam dump valve'was isolated!and

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.a' temporary modification of the steam dump control system

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was performed to compensate for the failed. valve. -'In

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--addition, the air control components of the BMFRVs were

replaced and airlines checked -for: additional moisture.- The

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failed closed letdown path isolation valve was found to be mechanically bound due to a bent valve stem. :The valve was,

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' repaired and satisfactorily tested.

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions

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and found them to be' adequate.

The licensee's activ' ties-W.,

'associaMd with water in the' instrument air system:isi

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discussed in more detail'in~Section 7.1

The-. prompt.

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i respons'e of the' control room operators minimized the i l cooldown and was considered to'be a notable strength..The p,

-inspector had no further questions concerning the event.-

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3.

Radiological Controls

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- Posting:and control of radiation and high radiation areas were' inspected, i

Radiation Work Permit compliance and use of. personnel monitoring devices;

swere checked. Conditions of step-off pads, disposal of protective

.O clothing, radiation control job-coverage, area monitor: operability and l

calibration:(portable:and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed

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on a: sampling basis.

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No: deficiencies'wereLidentified.

f6 Mdintinace andcSurveillance

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14'1!. Maintenan_ce Observation'

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E 1The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities t'o assure'

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that:

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th0; activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting

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, Conditions for Operation and that-redundant components were

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operable-

-i required 4pprovals'and releases had been obtained prior to

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commencing work;

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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within

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the ski 11s of the trade;

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activities were accomplished by qualified. personnel;

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.where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were

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adequatp and implemented; o

% hold points were established where required and observed;

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. equipment was properly tested and returned te service.

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. Maintenance activities reviewed included:

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MWR-900229-Repair Body to Bonnet Leak and Inspect Internals

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CV-FW47o.

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MWR 900496 Inspect / Repair 18 Main-Feedwater.

o Regulating Valve (MFRV).

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,.MWR.900495:

Inspect / Repair 1C MFRV.

R MWR 905433-Investigate ano Repair, 2Q55-P22B Pump

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Following Thermal Overload Trip.

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g No deficiencies were identified.

I 4.2 Unit'1 Material Condition Improvements-

During the recent-NRC Maintenance Team Inspection, (IR 50-334/99-80; 50-412/89-80),- several material deficiencies were observed in i

nonsafety systems. During walkdowns.o: Unit 1, the inspector

observed on going efforts.to improve material condition of-these systems.

The preservation and reinsulation of the severely corroded-e

Reactor Water Storage Tank Cooling Water System was found'to be particularly noteworthy..The inspector will continue to' follow the g

g a licensee's efforts in this area.

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4.3 Surveillance-Observation

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The inspectors witnessed / reviewed-selected surveillancestests to;

i determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details-

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were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, Technical Specifications were satisfied, testing 4 was performed by- '

qualified personnel.and test results s'atisfied acceptance' criteria or

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were properly dispositioned. Th'e following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:

OST 1.21.4 Main Steam Trip Valve [TV-IMS-101A] Full

Close Test

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OST 1.24.3 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test

[1FW-P-3B]

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OST 2.13.2 Quench Spray Pump [2QSS*P21B] Test OST 2.26.1 Turbine Throttle Governor, Reheat Stop and Intercept Valve Test j

No' deficiencies were identified.

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4~4= Unit 2 Missed Surveillance

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'q V T*m On. April 3, 1990, the licensee determined that a Unit 2 weekly

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- Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test for the No'. 2-3125

-VDC battery was not: performed as required..TS 4.8.2.3.2 required

, vik that-the above battery, its essociated rectifier and DC' bus be

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demonstrated to be operable every seven days'. The surveillance was im'

scheduled to be performed or. March 29, 1990.

Q' b The appa. rent cause.for the missed surveillance was-the failure of the

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f Nuclear Shift Supervisor and Operating Shift Foreman to-independently

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reviewithe surveillance schedule:and. assign the test for performance.

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0nce the deficiency had been discovered, the weekly. surveillance test fo'r No' 2-3 battery was immediately performed and the battery was

%g determined to be operable,

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The# licensee' informed the inspector of other planned corrective-E actions which included the performance of a-Human Performance Evaluation. System analy r, of the-event; a revision-.to the-l

. surveillance schedule format to improve usability; and a: revision to ;

the Operations Department administre Ne procedures to require shift supervisor.to independently-review the surveillance schedule as'part

of the formal shift turnover.

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The inspector concluded the fai'.:r+ t' perform the required

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N battery surveillance test was of minor safety' significance (Severity.

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Level.IV). The licensee formally. reported the event:to the NRC via a i

Unit 2 Licenses Event ReportL90-003-00.

The licensee's investigation j

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and corrective actions were thorough and timely.

In addition, there l

were :no-past similar occurrences identified where a surveillance test

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was missed due to, inadequate review of the test-schedule. Therefore, j

the failure:to meet the requirements of TS 4.8.2.3.2 is not being

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cited b~ecause the criteria specified_ in Section V.G of the~

i Enforcement Policy were met'(Non-cited Violation NRV.

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50-412/90-08-01).

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Emergency Preparedness

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'On May 1, 1990, the annual emergency preparedness exercise.was conducted, l

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The exercise was a full scale exercise with participation from j!

Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. Two specialist inspectors'from

Region I and the resident inspectors observed the exercise.

The inspectors' findings are documented in Inspection Report 50-334/90-10; 50-412/90-09. Aside from the annual exercise, the resident inspector had jl

• a no noteworthy findings during this' inspection period in this area.

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Security'

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Implementation cf the Physical Security Plan was observed in-various plant L,

' areas with regard to the following:

g Protected' Area and Vital-Area ba riers were well maintained and.

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not' compromised;

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Isolation zones'were clear;

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Personne1'and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to

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the Protected Area were properly searched and access' control wcs

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p-in accordance with' approved licensee procedures;.

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-Persons; granted access'to the site were badged to indicate" 1--

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whether they have unescorted access or. escorted authorization;

Security. access' controls to Vital Areas were being maintained:

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and that persons in. Vital. Areas, were properly authorized;

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Security posts-were adequately staffed and equipped, security

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personnel were-alert and knowledgeable regarding position (

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requirements, and that written procedures were available; and c

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Adequate illumination was maintained.

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Engineering <and: Technical Support

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Unit 1 Instrument Air Noisture Problem-

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' Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on March 30, 1989, due<to the IC Main

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Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV)- stroking partially shut (see y

Inspection Report 50-334/90-07; 50-412/90-06)'

During!1icensee

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investigation'a significant amount of water was found in the instrument: air components of the failed ~MFRV. Subsequently, the i

Unit I recovery was terminated due:to problems with a steam dump i

bypass valve (see Section 2.3.1) and water in the air system for.the

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MFRV bypass valves.

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A new air. dryer (IA-D-2) was installed in 1986 to improve the air qua'lity.for the Unit 1 instrument system.

After installation, it was.

determined that the ~ normal air compressor output was insufficient to

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operate IA-D-2, so: the ' predecessor dryer (IA-D-1) was continued in use.

The licensee focussed efforts on improving IA-D-1 reliability and left IA-D-2 essentially spared in place.

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In-the currenticalenaar year, IA-D-1 experienced intermittent-

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failures which, required the. dryer to be bypassed such that only

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p filters were in place to treat the air. About six separate instances-

were noted in which IA-D-1 was taken out of service _for periods of e

,one to'five days. Some of the time the' dryer was in operation, tit.

was in parallel with-filters such.that only part-of: system flow was J

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treated by IA-D-1.

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e System dew point trends indicate that instrument air quality was

impacted by the; chronic dryer problems. During some periods,:systet dew point-~was sufficiently high that moisture intrusion would not

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have been unexpected.

A Following:the' Unit'l startup problems, the licensee obtained higher-

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capacity air compressors (on an interim basis) to utilize IA-D-2.

j rLicensee.self-assessment of the circumstances and events associated

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Lwith the Unit.1 instrument air system were still in progress at the-close.of.the-inspection period.

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8.

' Safety Assessment'and Quality Verification:

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a 8.1 ;0nsite' Safety Committee t

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The: inspector' attended Onsite Safety Committee (OSC) meetings' on--

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' April-26 and May 4. - Technical Specification' member attendance -

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Erequireme.nts were met at both meetings. :The agenda included

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' procedure and design change' package reviews.- In general, member b

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-participat' ion.for. safety: issues was adequate. The.i_nspector will

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continue to monitor the adequacy,and effectiveness of OSC meetings

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and discussions-during future inspections. 'No significant concerns.

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J 8.2 Review of Written Reports j

i The inspector reviewed LERs and other written reports.touthe NRC a

Region I Office to verify that the details of.the events were

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clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether i

further information was-required from the-licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether.the. event warranted onsite t

followup. The following LERs were reviewed:

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Unit 1:

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L LER 90-07 Reactor Trip on "C" Steam Generator Low and

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Steam Flow /Feedwater Mismatch Due to Closure

t of "C" Main Feedwater Regulating Valve.

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'>E-Reactor Coolant.Syscem Letdown Iso 1W n/ESF n

Actuation.

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Unit 2:

LER 90-03-Late Performance of Operating' Surveillance

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Test.

The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the' requirements of 10 CFR 50 Part 7J and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022. Generally,

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the LERs were found to be of high quality with good documentation of, event analyses, root.cause determinations,'and corrective actions.

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i8.3 : Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Quality Assurance Update

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In Inspection' Reports 50-334/89-01 and 50-412/80-01, the. inspector'

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. fuel'oilLquality. 'The inspector noted that the Unit'1. Technical

Specifications. (TS)-la:.ked specific requirements on the quality of diesel' generator oil similar to those-in the Unit 2 TS.

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theilicensee has-applied for, and the NRC has. issued reqt.irements

that.are commensurate with requirements that exist'in1 the NRC's

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current Standard' Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Reactors

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(see Amendment No. 149 for Unit 1 and No. 22'for Unit 2). Tha

inspector has no_mo~re concern regarding the adequacy of the TS.

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It:was stated in the above reports that there was no evidence that-the-quality of diesel fuel oil has been included in the licensee's.

s quality assurance'(QA) program.

Specifically, consumable. items where

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quality is necessary for functional performance of safety-related

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components:should'also be classified as~ safety-related and-thus be-

subject.to the-applicable provisions of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

The inspector reviewed several--documents:

Purchase Orders 0074219,_

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-D085685, and a letter from the licensee to the QA: Manager of-Professional Service Industries dated February 1,.1990 and found

.tnat diesel fuel oil is currently under the licensee's QA' program.

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As a result,.the inspector has no more concerns about quality-assurance of diesel a nerator fuel oil.

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8.4 Mid-Cycle SALP Assessmert

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On April-20,1990, :the Duque = Light Company Vice President, Nuclear

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Group, Mr. J. Sieber, and see r licensee site managers participated in a management meeting with 'TC staff personnel to discuss the status of licensee performant sc the midpoint of the present SALP

rating period. During the meeting, the licencee presented assess-

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ents of their performance in each SALP functional area. Included in-the

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presentations were ongoing and future licensee initiatives to improve

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performance.- At the end of each presentation, the NRC discussed both

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strengthsLand; weaknesses identified during the.present rating: period.

'9; Status of Previous Inspection Findings l

e lThe NRC Outstanding Items List was reviewed with cognizant licensee.

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personnel.

Items; selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed through discussions with 1icensee personnel, documentation reviews and-field inspection to determine 4,ihether licensee actions specified in the

.01s had been satisfactorily completed. The overall' status of'previously

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identified inspection findings was reviewed and planned / completed

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licensee actions were discussed for.the items reported below.

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r 9 '.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-334/Bi-11-01):

Develop administrative l

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controls for the storage of transient equipment in-safety related

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areasi This item concerned the identification of severalcinstances q

where.. temporary equipment, located near safety related equipment, was

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-found to be unrestrained and thus creatingLa concern during potential:

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seismic' events.

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'This item tos reviewed in October 1989 (see Inspection Report -

50-334/89-1d; 50-412/89-18) where the inspectors found that despite.

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the. implementation of written requirements for the--proper storage of j

temporary equipment, unrestrained temporary equipment continued to

. exist.

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-In January,1990, maintenance foremen reviewed the requirements to j

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secure loose equipment in safety related: areas with all maintenance

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. personnel.

Since that review, the inspectors have-not' identified any

.further: instances of unrestrained temporary aquipment in safety'

related areas.

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i 9.2s -(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-412/87-60-01):

Resolve outstanding issues regarding NUREG - 0737, Item II.F.2, Inadequate Core Coolir.g Instrumentation-(ICCI). The following three outstanding issues were identified during the NRC's review of the licensee action's concerning the above item:

a.

Provide additional training / instructions to operators regarding ICCI/ Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) display interpretation; b.

Resolve Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS)

deficiencies (dynamic head redundant sensor algorithm, upper

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range static head channel; and

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Resolve / complete verification and-valioation (V&V) plan issues for ICCI-portion of PSMS.

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.The-licensee conducted PSMS display training for all Unit 2 licensed i

operators The inspector reviewed the licensee's study guide used to

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train the' operators and found it to be adequate. 'When questioned by.

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the. inspector on various occasions, operators appeared to be know--

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ledgeable of the various display information available on PSMS. The-

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inspector had no further' questions _in this area.

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The PSMS-Redundant Sensor Algorithm (RSA) did.not. mark work values

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-from an off-line train as' bad.

Consequently, since the associated

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values from an of f-line train were= not flagged as. bad quality, the

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values were used in the calculation to produce the: trend graph which in:tura resulted.in a bad display. During the first Unit-2 refueling-outage, the RSA-was modified to mark values from an off-line train as bad. The licensee performed ' validation testing af ter the modification. The inspector reviewed the test results which indicated'the concern had been. resolved.

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The licensee's PSMS V&V plan was reviewed by NRR.

The plan was found to.be acceptable (see NRC letter to licensee dated September 24, 1989).

The approved PSMS:V&V is to be fully implemented before startup from the second refueling outage.

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9.3 (Closed) Violation (50-412/89-18-01):

Constant communications not-

maintained as required by technical specifications during Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump testing'. Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS)

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'4.7.1.2, required that constant communications be established and

maintained between the control room and the AFW pump room while the normal AFW pump discharge valve was-closed during surveillance testing.: Contrary:to'this requirement, constant communications were brcken during the performance of the AFW pump surveillance test.

In addition to the TS requirement, the Unit 2 AFW surveillance procedures also required constant communication but did.not specify how it was-to be accomplished.. At the time the operators were utilizing the "Gaitronics" fi n channel phone pager system to meet the constant communications requirement.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective' actions in response-

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to the above violation.

The Unit 2 AFW surveillance procedures were yL-revised to require the use of head sets for maintaining communications.

In addition, training was given to. operations. personnel stressing procedure compliance and the basis for constant communications.

The inspector witnessed several AFW surveillance tests following the implenientation of the above corrective action.

In all instances, constant communications were maintained using head cets as required.

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[9. 4 (Closed) Violation (50-412/89-18-02);

Excessive Overtime During Unit y

2 Refueling Outage. Three instances were identified in which licensed. operators exceeded Technical Specification limits during:the

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Unit 2.first refueling outage.- Licensee procedures to. control ~and

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~1imit overtime were also found not to have been effective in that

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excessive overtime was worked by maintenance and supervisory-personriel involved in safety, related work.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which included direction from.the Vice President - Nuclear Group to all a

managers, revisions to work schedules and addition of a routine -

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post-outage QA' audit of. overtime. The inspector found the'

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y correctise actions to be good ~and an independent review of a sample

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.of work hours during the next refueling outage identified no'

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additional problems;

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9.5 (Closed) Violation (50-334/89-23-01):

Failure to Follow Procedures

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.Resulted-in a Unit 1 Safety Injection Actuation.

This-item concerned l

the failure of licensed operators to. inhibit the : Solid, State

Protection-System (SSPS)-input signals as required by procedure.

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This'in turn caused a safety injection signal to;be inadvertently

act.taed.

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i The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which included:

formal written counseling for the operators involved..In addition,-

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'the event was covered during. operator license _ retraining. The training-

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also' included detailed instruction on the-functions of the SSPS

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switches. The: inspector found the licensee's corrective actions to-

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.be adequate.

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9.6::(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-334/90-04-01):

Failure to Enter Action-Statement for Unit 1 Technical-Specification 3.8.2.1' Following the Failure of the No. 3.Uninterruptible Power Supply.(UPS). -This item i

concerned the operability of-the No.- 3 Vital. Instrument Bus (VIB)

i with its associated UPS inoperable.

On March 14, 1590, an enforcement.

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conference was conducted to discuss the above issue.

Based on the

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information presented, the NRC concluded that operation of.the,No. 3 i

120V VIB without its associated UPS was a degraded condition but did l

not constitute a violation.

i 9.7 (Closed)-Unresolved Item (50-334/90-04-04): Technical Specification i

(TS) 3.8.2.1 was Inadequate in that it did not Address the

'l-Inoperability of Uninterruptible Power Supplies. On April 12, 1990,

the NRC *ssued an amendment (No. 153) to the Unit 1 TS which

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restricted continued operation-to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with_ one uninterruptible-

power supply out of service.

The inspector had no'further questions.

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10.

Exit Meeting'

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'10.1 Preliminary' Inspection Findings Exit

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.i Periodic l meetings were held with senior: facility management euring;

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the course ^of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and

findings

. A.' summary of. inspection findings was further ' discussed

twith the licensee at the conclusion of the report period on

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10.2: Attendance at Exit Meetings Conducted by Region _ Based Inspectors (30703).

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Inspection-Reporting

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Subject l Report'No'

I_nspector

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4/30-5/4/90

. Water Chemistry 50-334/90-11 Kottan Confirmatory 50-412/90-10 Measurements

~5/1-5/2/90 Annual Exercise 50-334/90"10- Gordon.

Evaluation 50-412-90-09 a;'

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