IR 05000412/1990014
| ML20043G324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1990 |
| From: | David Beaulieu, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043G320 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-90-14, NUDOCS 9006200153 | |
| Download: ML20043G324 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report No-50-412/90-14 Docket No.
50-412 License No, NPF-73 Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15271 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Location: 'Shippingport, Pennsylvania
' Dates: April 30 - May 4, 1990 Inspector:-
boAi (A ClO n
inii 0,Beaulieu,RactorEngineer date Approved By:-
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William Ruland, Chief'
date Reactor Projects Section No. 4B Division of Reactor Projects-Inspection' Summary:
Region'I Inspection Report No._50-412/90-14 for April.30,-
May 4, 1990 Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection to verify the alignment and'
material contiiiion of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system in Unit' 2 by per-
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forming a detailed'walkdown of the system.
'Results: The AFW system components wer < in the required alignments, instrumentation was valved-in with appropriate calibration dates and the
.overall conditions observed were satisfactory.
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9006200153 900612 PDR ADOCK 05000412 O
PNU
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Details 1.0 Individuals Contacted 1.1 License) Employees
- F. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor
- C, Kirschner, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- A; Mizia, Quality Assurance' Supervisor
- N., Tonet, Manager Nuclear Safety
- T. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Operations
- F. Schuster, BV-2 Nuclear Operations Manager
- B. Sepelak', Licensing Engineer
- R. Hecht, I&C Director
- J. Forney, I&C' Engineer K. Ostrowski, Operations Assessments Manager 1.2 NRC
- P, Wilson, Resident Inspector
- J. Furla, Radiation Specialist The above individuals attended the exit meeting on May 4, 1990.
2.0 Purpose The purpose of this inspection was to independently verify the alignment and material condition of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system in Unit 2 by performing a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.
3.0 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
3.1 Overall Equipment Condition
' An AFW system walkdown was performed to identify equipment and items that might degrade system performance.
Hangers and supports were inspected to insure they were made up properly and aligned correctly.
General area housekeeping was-inspected to ensure appropriate levels-of cleanliness were being maintained and that no flammable materials were present in the vicinity of the AFW system.
Interiors of elec-trical cabinets associated with the AFW system were checked to verify no debris or loose material was present.
Valves were checked to ensure they were installed correctly, had no missing components, and did not exhibit gross packing leakage.
Valves were also checked for any mechanical damage such as bent valve stems and for damage caused by general corrosion.
One concern was identified related to the lubri-cating oil sight glass on all three AFW pumps.
The lubricating oil for the AFW pump bearings drains through a sight glass on each end of the pump to the lubricating oil reservoir.
The sight glass on one end of the pump is made of stainless steel with a clear window. The other sight glass is made of tygon (clear plastic)
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tubing.
There is an approximately five inch space in the piping in
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which the tygon is connected to the open ends of the pipe with hose
clamps.
The inspector's concern was that the plastic tubing was vulnerable to accidental damage.
Damage to tubing could prevent
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lubricating oil draining from the bearing from returning to the lubricating oil reservoir resulting in the the reservoir emptying.
This would result in bearing failures and cause the pump to become inoperable.
.A licensee Engineering Memorandum No. 63682 was written on 7/26/88 addressing this concern. The engineering department review of this on 8/11/88 determined that the modification was safety related and wrote Station Modification Request No. 1584 in which they recommended that the tygon tube be replaced with a stainless steel sightglass. This modification has been given a priority of 12 on a scale from 0 to 65 (65 being the highest priority).
The modification has not yet gone to the Change Review Committee who will evaluate the cost and benefit of the modification and determine whether or not the modification will be performed.
The' inspector considers this course of action satisfactory.
3.2 AFW System Valve Lineup and Breaker Position Verification A complete valve lineup verification of the AFW system was performed using the Operating Manual valve lineup procedure.
Several errors with the valve lineup procedure were identified.
FWE-334 was shut but not locked shut as required by the Operating-Manual.
Operator response to this error _was good.
The operator-always remained within sight of the valve and immediately called the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS).
The NSS looked at the' system: drawing
.and the locked valve list and. determined that the valve was not re-quired to be. locked shut.
Therefore, the problem was determined to be a typographical error with the procedure.
The valve lineup procedure required FWE-331 to be in the position
"0LS."
Since these letters are meaningless it was determined that this was a typographical error.
The system diagram required the valve to be shut and the valve was found to be shut.
The valve lineup procedure required FWE-102, a relief valve, to be locked shut.
This was also determined to be a typographical error since the relief valve cannot be locked shut.
The' licensee had already identified errors in the lineup procedure on the AFW system as well as other systems.
These valve lineups are performed by the licensee af ter a refueling outage and are normally not done at any other time because status boards are used to track current valve positions. When the valve lineups were performed after last refueling outage the operators were asked to note any errors with the valve lineup procedure so that these errors could be corrected before the rext refueling outage.
The three errors the t
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inspector found'with the AFW system valve lineup procedure were the only three errors found by the licensee.
The inspector considers the licensee course of action satisfactory.
A complete electrical breaker position check was done for AFW system-components.
No concerns were identified.
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3.3 Verification of As-installed System Against As-built Prints
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Portions of the AFW system were compared against as-built prints.
It was determined that four pipe caps that were required by the system drawings to be installed were not installed.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes were examined to determine if the codes required pipe caps to be installed.
No
- veh requirement was found.
However, the licensee stated that the pipe caps should be installed because 4 L was a good engineering practice and it was a requirement thr.c systems reflect as-built drawings.
The pipe caps were immediately installed when this problem
.was identified to the licensee.
Inspection of other safety related systems was performed to determine the extent of this problem. Two
. caps'were found to be missing, ole on the. Quench Spray system and one
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on the Low Pressure Safety Injection system, and the caps were -
installed by the' licensee.
Thi problem was considered to have only minor safety significance.
3.4 AFW System Instrumentation AFW system instrumentation was inspected to verify that it was prop-
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erly installed, aligned, and calibrated.
Instrumentation was checked
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for proper valve alignment and to ensure calibration dates were cur-
rent. One problem was noted.
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On 2FWE-FT100A, the AFW flow indicator to steam generator "A",.the high pressure side drain was found to be approximately one and one-half turns open.
This valve was required to be shut. When this valve. is open, it exposes its downstream pipe cap to full AFW pump a
. discharge pressure when the AFW pumps are operated.
Discussions with the licensee revealed that instrumentation drain valves outside containment were' only checked shut af ter use.
These valves were the only safety system valves not checked as part of the plant valve lineup done after a refueling outage.
The drain valves inside containment started being checked shut after a June 7,1989, Unusual Event where there was excessive reactor coolant system leakage from an instrument line end fitting due to a valve being out of position.
Corrective action for this event was to include the drain valves inside containment in the valve lineups done after each refueling outage.
The licensee plans to implement a program to start including instrument drain line valves outside containment in the post-refueling valve lineups.
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I 4.0- Management Meetings The licensee was informe 4 of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the beginning of the inspei+. ion.
The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee repr sentatives during the course of the
' inspection and presented to licensee management at the May 4, 1990, exit
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-interview (see. paragraph 1.0 for attendees).
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. The licensee did not indicate that proprietary
infunnation was involved within the scope of this inspection.
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