IR 05000333/1990014
| ML20043B314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1990 |
| From: | Mcbrearty R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043B312 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0313, RTR-NUREG-313 50-333-90-14, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, NUDOCS 9005290034 | |
| Download: ML20043B314 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
L-Report No.
59-333/90-14 Docket No.
50-333 License No. DPR-59 I-Licensee:
New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093
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Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant i
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: April 2 - 6, 1990 Inspector.
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/Robsri, W. McBrearty, Reactor Engineer date Approved by
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f.'R.~1trosnider, Chief date Materials & Processes Section.6, DRS.
P Inspection Summary:
Inspectio,i on April 2-6, 1990 (Report No. 50-333/90-14)
Areas Inspected:
A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of inservice inspection activities including observation of NDE in progress and QA/QC involvement in ISI. Additionally, the licensee's program for complying with NUREG-0313, Revision 2 and Generic Letter 88-01 was inspected. Also, the inspection was conducted to review the results of the water chemistry program and licensee actions regarding control of occupational exposure to radiation.
Results: No violations were identified.
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Persons Contacted
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W. Fernandez, Resident Manager
- R. Liseno, Superintendent of Power
- G. Lozier, Senior NOME A. McKeen, Chemistry Supervisor
- R.
Penny, Senior NOME
- D. Vandermark, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- G. Vargo, Ph.D., Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent EBASCO Services J. O'Neil, Project Manager C. Pattillo, NDE Level III A. Smith, NDE Level III 2.
Observations of NDE in Progress (73753)
The ultrasonic examination of the scram discharge tank weld number VV-TH-IB, top head to shell, was performed to monitor two ultrasonic indications which were detected during the previous examination performed in October 1988.
The tank welds were added to the licensee's ISI program for the second ten year inspection interval, and for the first time ultrasonic examination of the tank was performed in 1988. The indications were evaluated by fracture mechanics analytical techniques, and were'found to be acceptable.
Construction radiographs were reviewed in 1988 and no evidence of the ultrasonic reflectors
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was observed on the film. The plots of the ultrasonic indications showed that the reflectors were in the weld metal, near, but not et the inside surface. The licensee believes that the reflectors are associated with the welding process, and were present when the weld was fabricated.
The licensee plans to monitor the indications during successive outages until it is confident that no change is occurring, then the weld will be returned to the Section XI examination schedule.
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The scram discharge tank weld was selected for inspection to ascertain that the examination was performed in accordance with ASME Section XI and regulatory requirements. Additionally, the results of the current examination were compared to the 1988 results to ascertain whether changes have occurred.
The examination was performed by an EBASCO UT Level III examiner using the same techniques that were used to detect the indications in 1988. One of the two original indications was detected but the examination could not be completed until additional surface preparation was performed.
Preliminary results showed that the indication located at 25 1/4" from the reference point had not changed significantly from the 1988 results. The examination to detect the second indication was not completed by the time the inspector left the site.
The examination was performed by a properly qualified technician, and complied with applicable requirements.
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In addition-to the above, the certification records of EBASCO NDE technicians were inspected to ascertain that properly certified and qualified individuals were'available to perform examinations at the site.
The records of five technicians, including the Level III examiner who performed the scram
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discharge tahk weld, were inspected and confirmed that each technician was certified _ in accordance with the requirements of SNT-TC-1A, the governing document.
No violations were identified.
3.0 Licensee Response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-01 "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenttic Stainless Steel Piping" (92703)
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Intergranular stress corrosion cracking near weldments in BWR piping has been occurring for almost 20 years.
Early cases were in relatively small diameter piping.
In early 1982, cracking was identified in large diameter piping in a recirculation system of an operating BWR plant in this country.
Since then, extensive. inspection programs have been conducted in BWR piping systems which have resulted in the detection of significant numbers of cracked weldments in almost all operating BWRs.
Substantial efforts in research and development' to resolve this problem have been undertaken, and they are detailed in NUREG-0313 Revision 2,
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" Technical Report on Material Selection and. Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping." NVREG-0313, Revision 2 describes the technical
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bases for the staff positions on materials, processes, and primary coolant chemistry to minimize and control IGSCC problems.
Inspection schedules and inspection sample sizes are based on the susceptibility of weldments to initiation and propagation of IGSCC.
Inspection schedules are comparable to those specified in Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code in cases where the piping' material is IGSCC resistant. NUREG-0313 is referenced in Generic Letter 88-01 and provides the NRC's position regarding inspection and repair of piping systems susceptible to IGSCC.
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p Generic Letter 88-01 applies to all BWR piping made of,austenitic stainless steel which are four. inches or larger in nominal diameter and contain reactor coolant at a temperature above 200'F during power operation, regardless of code classification.
It also applies to reactor vessel attachments and appurtenances; such as, jet pump instrumentation penetration assemblies, and head spray and vent components.
The licensee's schedule of IGSCC examinations was selected for inspection to ascertain that the NUREG-0313 IGSCC categories were addressed, and that the schedule of examinations complied with Table 1 in the GL.
The licensee's IGSCC examination schedule for the 1990 refueling outage is as follows:
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Total Welds Number
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~IGSCC in Scheduled for Generic Letter Description Category Category Exam 1990 Inspection Requirements Resistant
"A"
2 25% every 10 years (at
. materials least 12% in 6 years)
Non-resistant
"C"
12 All within the next 2 materials-stress refueling cycles, then
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improvement (SI)
all every 10 years.
2 years of (at least 50% in 6 operation years)
Non-resistant
"0"
16 All every 2 refueling materials cycles no SI Cracked-
"E"
7 50% next refueling out-reinforced by 1-(size age, then all every 2 weld overlay or knowncrack)
refueling cycles mitigated by SI 3-examined during 1989 maintenance outage Cracked-
"F"
1 All every refueling inadequate or no 1-examined outage repair during 1989 maintenance outage
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-Non-
"G"
3 All next refueling
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resistant, not outage inspected
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During the course of this inspection, the licensee reported that technicians performing a liquid penetrant examination observed moisture on adjacent weld 12-02-2-65, a 12" diameter recirculation system elbow to pipe weld.
A subsequent ultrasonic examination of the 12" diameter weld detected a circumferential crack approximately 41/4" long with two associated trans-verse cracks. A review of the previous examination history of the weld showed that no evidence of IGSCC was reported in 1987, the last time the weld was examined. However, low amplitude geometric indications had been reported in the weld appearing intermittently for 360' around the circumference.
Weld 12-02-2-65, is a category "C" weld, and the licensee plans to expand the examination sample by adding 12 more category "C" welds. The makeup of the expanded sample had not been finalized at the time the inspector
left the site. The licensee plans to repair the cracked weld by the weld overlay technique.
Four additional recirculation IGSCC examinations were performed after the discovery of the cracked weld, three 12" diameter welds and one 28" diameter weld were examined. All were free of any crack.
The inspector determined that the IGSCC ultrasonic examinations were performed by technicians who were qualified at the EpRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina, and whose names appear on the latest issue of the EPRI NDE Center IGSCC Registry.
No violations were identified.
4.0 Quality Assurance /Oua11ty Control Involvement in Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities Quality Control field surveillance reports related to inservice inspection activities were selected for inspection to determine to what extent QA/QC~was involved with those activities.
The selection was made using the QC Field Surveillance Report Log and included the following reports:
-FSR-001-003, -004, -005 and -006 The field surveillances were performed during the period from March 29, 1990
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to April 4, 1990, and covered various phases of ultrasonic examinations that were performed during that time by EBASCO, the licensee's ISI vendor.
Surveillance activities included witnessing the performance of examinations, instrument calibration, and a review of equipment certification records.
A finding associated with FSR-006 dated 4/4/90 noted that the technician who performed the ultrasonic examination of the RPV flange ligaments was not thoroughly familiar with the governing procedure; in that, he had i
failed to properly establish the required distance cmplitude correction
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l curve (DAC).
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The immediate corrective action was to establish the required DAC and perform a valid examination.
In addition, on April 5,1990, the EBASCO NDE Level III examiner conducted a two hour long NDE procedure re-orienta-tion session for 20 of the 22 EBASCO technicians at the site.
The two who were unavailable for the April 5 training were provided with that training on April 6, 1990.
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The procedure re-indoctrination program was considered satisfactory. The inspector had no further questions regarding the matter at this time.
5.0 Water Chemistry control (84750)
Water chemistry data were reviewed as part of this inspection. The methods of collecting and verifying the accuracy of these data were not included in the scope of this inspection.
The inspector reviewed the reactor water chemistry data for the period of January, 1989 through February 1990, and discussed these data with responsible individuals in the licensee's chemistry department.
The licensee follows a combination of BWR Owners Group /EPRI water chemistry guidelines and, additionally, has been following a hydrogen water chemistry program to minimize the initiation of intergranular stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steel piping systems.
The plant's Technical Specifications (T.S.) place limits on conductivity and chloride concentration.
In addition to conductivity and chloride concentration, the licensee controls and tracks the concentration of various other reactor water constituents including su! fate and silica.
The monthly average conductivity of the reactor water during the period reviewed ranged from 0.100 us/cm to 0.171 us/cm which is within the guide-i line limit of 0.2us/cm and the Technical Specification limit of 5.0 us/cm.
The monthly average chloride concentration ranged from 1.796 parts per billion (ppb) to 8.2 ppb the monthly average sulfate concentration ranged from 4.6 ppb to 14.0 ppb, and the monthly average silica concentration ranged from 54.3 ppb to 86.8 ppb; each of which was within the guideline limit of 15 ppb for chloride and sulfate and 100 ppb for silica. Addition-ally, the chloride concentration was well within the T.S. limit of 0.5 parts per million (ppm).
Instances when the limits were exceeded were attributed to reactor shutdowns and to a small lakewater leak in "A" condenser.
The values were brought to acceptable levels within a short period of time.
6.0 Occupational Exposure (83750)
The Cobalt Reduction Program of the New York Power Authority includes an effort to identify and replace materials that contain Cobalt-59, a stable isotope which may be found in plant equipment such as pipes, heat exchangers, and valves. Wear and corrosion mechanisms release Cobalt-59 into the reactor coolant, which transports it to the reactor fuel assemblies where deposition occurs and neutron activt. tion transmutes Cobalt-59 to the radioactive isotope Cobalt-60.
The Cobalt-60 is subsequently released from the fuel surfaces and redeposited on reactor coolant component surfaces.
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The licensee's program for selecting and controlling component materials to minimize personnel exposure to radiation includes the following:
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Control Rod Blades contain pins and rollers that are mcde of Cobalt based alloys which contain approximately 50% Cobalt.
To eliminate that source of Cobalt, the roller bearings and pins for replacement
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Control Rod Blades are specified to contain no Cobalt based materials.
To date, 45 of the 137 total Control Rod Blades in the reactor core have been replaced with Cobalt free rollers and pins.
Eighteen additional blades are scheduled to be replaced with Cobalt free rollers and pins in 1990, and an additional eight are scheduled for replacement in 1991.
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Fuel Grid Straps on fuel assemblies at the FitzPatrick facility are composed of zircaloy which is cobalt free as opposed to Inconel straps containing Cobalt and a potential source of exposure to i
radiation.
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Maintenance personnel have been made aware of EPRI Report NP-3220,
" Cobalt Contamination Resulting from Valve Maintenance."
Procurement Specification JAF-88-04-0, " Gate, Globe and Check Valves (All Sizes), " requires that materials with no or limited Cobalt content be used whue hardened materials are required for wear on surfaces such as stems, guides, seats, and discs, and provides limits that should be observed. Additionally, a procedure is in place which includes steps to inspect for and prevent foreign materials from tntering primary systems.
The Electric Power Research Institute has determined that Feedwater Regulator valves at Boiling Water Reactors are the largest valve contributors to Cobalt introduction to reactor coolant systems.
The FitzPatrick facility has eliminated the regulator valves with_the use of variable speed turbine driven feedwater pumps that do not require flow control valves.
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Maintenance personnel participating in the Mechanic Apprenticeship Program are made aware of how Cobalt-59 is generated in valve repairs and subsequently becomes activated to Cobalt-60. The training also discusses how to mitigate Cobalt contamination through various house-keeping techniques when grinding on valve seats. Additionally, the training lesson plan has been distributed to all plant maintenance mechanics and is referenced by other training concerning valve maintenance.
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The licensee monitors industry programs to control reactor water chemistry to reduce deposition of corrosion products, including Cobalt, on fuel.
The licensee follows a combination of BWR Owners Group /EPRI water chemistry guidelines and additionally, has been following a hydrogen water chemistry program to minimize the initiation of intergranular stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steel piping systems,
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In addition to the above, the licensee has initiated the zinc injection process _as a means of controlling Cobalt plate-out in
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piping systems.
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Chemical decontamination of the recirculation piping performed during,the 1988 refueling outage resulted in a reduction of personnel exposure to radiation estimated to be 600 man-rem regarding outage activities, b
7.0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives, denotad in paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6,1990, ine inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, i
At no time during the inspection was written material provided by the
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' inspector to the-licensee. The licensee did not indicate that proprietary.
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information was-involved within the scope of this inspectica.
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