IR 05000333/1978019
| ML19322A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1978 |
| From: | Knoll R, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A199 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-78-19, NUDOCS 7901040259 | |
| Download: ML19322A208 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-333/78-19 Docket No.
50-333 License No. DPR-59 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
September 19-22, 1978 Inspectors:
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- !7!7f T. F. Stetka, Reactor Inspector datef signed R
M-Enn11.Roactnrinsnoctnr(En-op)
date signed date signed Approved by; OO bk b.
l L7 f 7I E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects cate signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 19-22,1978 (Report No. 50-333/78-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, IE Bulletin and Circular Followup, Licensee Event Report followup, and lic'ensee action on previous inspection findings. The inspection commenced during non-regular hours and involved 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> onsite by one NRC regional based inspector and one NRC regional based inspector Co-op.
R:sults: Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in two areas, two items of noncompliance were identified in one area (Infraction -
failure to test operability of ECCS components following failure of HPCI, para-graph 4.b; Deficiency - failure to submit 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> written followup report, paragraph 4.c) and one item of noncompliance was identified in the fourth area (Infraction - failure to post high radiation areas, paragraph 3.b(3)).
3 0/070267 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Abbott, Operations Superintendent
- R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Burns Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Assistant Operations Superintendent M. Cosgrove, QA Site Engineer
- J. Ford, I&C Superintendent R. Pasternack, Superintendent of Power S. Pobutkiewicz, Technical Services Engineer H. Rickles, QA Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including shift supervisors, reactor operators, and administrative personnel.
- present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (333/78-13-02):
Procedure F-ISP-64-1 has been revised (revision number 4) to change the recorder output tolerances to values.that can be complied with.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/78-13-07):
The licensee located the records showing traceability of the Fluke Model 343A D.C. Voltage Calibrator to recognized standards. This record was reviewed and no inadequacies identified.
3.
Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed selected facility operation logs and toured areas of the facility to determine that operations are in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS).
The facility is presently engaged in a refueling outage and the review of plant operations included refueling operations in progress and determination that necessary systems for this mode of operation were functiona _ _
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a.
The Shift Supervisor's Log, Control Room Operator's Log, Shift and Daily Logs, Jumper Logs, and the Control Room Night Orders were reviewed.
This review combined with panel observa-tions in the control room and observation of various parameters throughout the facility during the plant tour verified that plant conditions' conformed to TS requiremants for the refueling mode of operation.
b.
A facility tour was begun on a back shift at 11:00 p.m.
September 19 and ended at 2:00 a.m. on September 20.
Otaer facility tours were conducted during the day shifts.
The tours included the following areas:
All levels of the reactor building;
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Turbine building;
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Control Room;
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Diesel generator rooms;
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Relay room; and,
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Refueling and construction security access points.
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Due to the facility's refueling outage status, particular emphasis was placed on radiation area controls and plant housekeeping conditions.
The tours identified the following:
(1)
Plant housekeeping was observed to evaluate the licensee's effectiveness in this area with respect to prevention of safety and fire hazards.
General housekeeping appeared acceptable.
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(2) Shift staffing was observed to verify that the required number of licensed and unlicensed personnel were avail-able on site consistent with the plant operating mode.
No discrepancies were identified.
~(3) Radiation areas were observed to verify that radiation
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At approximately 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br /> on September 19 while touring the reactor building, the inspectors observed that the doors providing access to the East and West Crescent Rooms were open. These areas were marked as Radiation Areas.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that these rooms may be High Radiation Areas. The inspectors reviewed the crescent room area survey sheets dated September 17 for the East Room and September 19 for the West Room. This review revealed that the East Crescent Room had area radiation levels of up to 450 mR/hr and the
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West Crescent Room had area radiation levels of up to 250 mR/hr.
Technical Specification 6.11(A)1 requires that areas with radiation levels greater than 100 mR/hr be barricaded and posted as a High Radiation Area. This is an item of noncompliance (333/78-19-01).
(4) During the tour of the Relay Room, a designated "No Smoking" area, the inspectors observed evidence of smoking in the area (filled butt cans, an empty cigarette pack, smoking pipe on a table). These findings were discussed with licensee representatives who stated that personnel were not smoking in the room. The licensee also issued a memorandum to personnel working in the room to remind them of the no smoking restrictions.
The inspector had no further questions on this item but will reexamine this area on a subsequent inspection.
c.
During this refueling outage, the licensee is replacing the feedwater sparger. The inspector examined the shield plug and lifting equipment that will be used to accomplish this modification and reviewed the following documentation:
Safety Evaluation NYF-78-3 (Modification F1-78-36);
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Temporary Procedure No. 22, Feedwater Sparger Replacement
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Operating Procedure; and, FCR 1.0; Installation of Shield Plugs, Fence Post Shielding,
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Vessel Wall Shielding and Vessel Shielding; Rev. O.
No inadequacies were identified.
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4.
Review of Licensee Event Reports a.
The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify that:
The reports accurately describe the events;
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The :afety significance is as reported;
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The report is accurate as to cause;
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The report satisfies requirements with respect to in-
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formation provided and timing of submittal; Corrective action is appropriate;
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Action has been taken; and,
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The event was reviewed and evaluated by the Plant Opera-
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tions Review Committee (PORC).
The following LERs were reviewed.
78-50-78-60 78-69 78-56~
78-63 78-59 78-66 The below items were identified through review.
b.
LER 78-60 reported failure of the High Pressure Coolant In-jection (HPCI) pressure suppression pool suction valve motor operator which rendered the valve inoperable to automatic safety signals. This failure rendered the automatic recircu-lation mode of the HPCI system inoperable.
Technical Specifi-cations (TS) 3.5.C.l.a and 4.5.C.l.a requires verification that all redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are operable if the HPCI system becones inoperable.
Discussions with licensee representatives and reviews of logs showed that these operability verifications were not performed.
This is an item of noncompliance (333/78-19-02).
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c.
LER 78-69 reported an error in the transient analyses of multiple relief valve operation after a reactor isolation event. This event was reported to RI by telephone on August 19, 1978 and was followed up with a two week report on September 1, 1978. The telephone call was not confirmed by a telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission as required by Technical Specification 6.9 (A) 4.1.
This is an item of noncompliance (333/78-19-03).
d.
LER 78-56 reported a core spray outboard injection valve failure. The report indicated that the valve failure was due to a mis-adjustment on the valve's motce driven operator.
Discussions with licensee representatives, however, indicate that the valve failure was due to a key shearing off in the motor driven valve operator. The licensee stated he will submit a revised and corrected LER.
This item is unresolved (333/78-19-04).
LER 78-59 reported exceeding TS pressure suppression pool e.
water level requirements as the result of surveillance test ST-2A, RHR Pump Flow Test, Revision 2.
The inspector asked the licensee whether procedure changes had been made to
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assure this event does not recur. The licensee representative responded that procedure changes had not been made but that i
action would be initiated to revise the procedure to keep the
" Keep Full" system filled and thus prevent recurrence of this event. This item is unresolved (333/78-19-05).
5.
Review of IE Bulletins and Circulars Site documents related to IE Bulletins were reviewed to verify a.
the licensee's responses were timely, accurate and adequate.
No problems were identified with the licensee's responses and planned corrective action for the following IE Bulletins.
IEB 78-01, Flammable Contact Arm Retainers in GE CR 120A
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Relays; IEB 78-03, Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumulations
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Associated with BWR Offgas Systems Operations;
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IEB 78-04, Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem
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Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment; and,
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IEB 78-06, Defective Cutler - Hammer Type M Relays with'
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DC Coils.
b.
The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine if the licensee had received them and taken appropriate action.
(1)
IEC 78-02, Proper Lubricating 011 for Terry Turbir es:
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- The licensee has taken action on this circular and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Turbine was identi-fied as requiring a change of lubricating oil.
The oil will be changed out during this refueling outage. This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
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(2)
IEC 78-08, Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at fluclear Power Plants:
The licensee had completed his review / evaluation for each of the IE Bulletins mentioned in Circular 78-08,
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related, Electrical Equipment at fluclear Power Plants, and has assigned responsibility for the review of the fourteen references listed in the circular to the onsite Quality Assurance Group.
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Except for the environmental qualification of three motor operated valve electric motors within the drywell, no further problems'have been identified to date.
During the present refueling outage, the licensee in-tends to research documentation and physically inspect the drywell for additional splices involving safety-
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related equipment and, if found, determine their environ-mental qualification.
In addition, the licensee will inspect a representative sample of safety-related electrical equipment, including terminal blocks, within the drywell to insure their conformance to design re-quirements. This inspection of electrical equipment and terminal blocks and the resolution of any noncon-
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formance found is expected to be completed by January 1, 1979.
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The inspector found the licensee's planned evaluations
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and action on any identified nonconformances to be acceptable.
Further action on this circular will be reviewed during subsequent inspections and is considered to be an unresolved item (333/78-19-06).
6.
Review of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Supply Surveillance Program During a review of the E.I. H atch Unit 2 nuclear power plant (DN 50-366) reactor protection system (RPS) power supply, the NRC staff identified specific deficiencies in the design of the RPS motor generator voltage regulator. As a result of this finding, the NRC staff asked facilities with similar design RPS power supplies to perform a specific surveillance and calibration program on the voltage regulators to assure proper operation.
The FitzPatrick surveillance and calibration program relative to these voltage regulators was reviewed to verify that the necessary actions were being accomplished.
The licensee has commenced the requested daily surveillance and plans to perform the undervoltage and underfrequency relay cali-brations during this refueling outage.
These calibrations will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
7.
Review of Drywell Temperature History A report to the NRC identified, at a different facility, instances of Drywell temperatu.es which were in excess of FSAR design temeratures and which resulted in electrical cable failures. The elevated drywell temperatures were attributed to drywell cooling system problems.
The inspector asked the licensee about this item and reviewed facility records.
The record review included documentation of drywell ambient temperatures and electrical cable certifications.
- No inadequacies were identified and the inspector had no further questions on this item.
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8.
Followup on IE Bulletin 78-05 Concerning GE Model CR 105X Contractor Auxiliary Contacts On June 19, 1978, the Duane Arnold (DN 50-331) facility licensee reported that CR105 auxiliary contacts used in NEMA Size 2 con-tactors were found to be inoperable.
The problem reportedly resulted from loose plunger arm screws on the auxiliary contacts.
The licensee was apprised of this problem and was asked by the inspector to check their relays to assure the problem does not exist. This item will be checked upon during a subsequent in-spection.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of non-compliance.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 4.d,
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4.e, and 5.b(2) of this report.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 22, 1978.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting, the un-j resolved items and items of noncompliance were identified.
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