IR 05000327/1986066
| ML20212H988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Madden P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212H919 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-86-66, 50-328-86-66, NUDOCS 8701280068 | |
| Download: ML20212H988 (14) | |
Text
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. An u? ~ UNITE 3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '[ - o,[ REGION 11 $ ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
- ATLANTA. GEORGIA 3o323 \\*****/ Report Nos.: 50-327/86-66 and 50-328/86-66 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah Inspection Conducte_d: Decem er 1-5, 1986, Inspector:7k-M[[h4- ' .y /f-B&E6 P. M. M dd Date Signed Approved y: / [g/1 /Z-3/-6h T. E.Monlon,'Section Chief Date Signed Plant Systems Section, Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of Fire Protection / Prevention and Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Items.
Results: Two violations were identified - Failure to assign qualified personnel to the fire brigade paragraph 5.e.(1) and inoperable fire barrier separating two safe shutdown related areas paragraph 5.f.(3).
8701280068 870116 gDR ADOCK 05000327 . PDR l __ __ . _ -
. REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- W. H. Baker, Site Fire Protection Engineer
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- E. Craig, Mechanical Engineer
- E. A. Craigge, Industrial Safety Supervisor
- W. A. Drown, Quality Assurance Specialist
- J. R. Harkleroad, Project Engineer, Division of Nuclear Services
- J. D. McCamy, Nuclear Engineer
- D. P. McClaskey, Division of Nuclear Services, Support Operation Manager
- L. M. Nobles, Plant Superintendent
- B. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent
- C. G. Robertson, Director, Division o' Nuclear Services
- B. Schofield, Licensing Engineer
- R. L. Tye, Division of Nuclear Services, Support Operations, Fire Protection Supervisor
- P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager
- R. Westbrook, Fire Protection Engineer, Division of Nuclear Services
- G. Williams, Site Fire Marshal Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engi-neers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspecticn scope and findings were summarized on December 5, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licentec. The following items were identified during this inspection.
a.
Unresolved Item (327/86-66-01 and 328/86-66-01), Fire Protection Audit Program Fails to Properly Audit the Licensee's Fire Protection QA Program and Plant Fire Protection Program para' graph 5.d.
' b.
Violation Item (327/86-66-02 and 328/86-66-02), Failure to Assign Qualified Personnel to the Fire Brigade paragraph 5.e(1).
c.
Violation Item (327/86-66-03 and 328/86-66-03), Inoperable Fire Barrier Separating Two Safe Shutdown Related Areas paragraph 5.f.(3).
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters 'This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions.
The new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5d.
5.
Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704) a.
Fire Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative Procedures: - Physical Security Instruction (PHSI) - 13, " Fire", Revision 49, October 3, 1986 Plant Housekeeping, SQA66, Revision 10, Octobe.- 14, 1986 - Hazard Control Instruction, HCI-HM5, October 27, 1986, Storage Use - and Handling of Flammable Liquids Hazard Control Instruction, HCI-HM6, January 31, 1984, Safe Use of - Chemicals Administrative Instruction AI-15, Revision 16, October 15, 1986, - " Torch Cutting, Welding, Open Flame, Grinding and Spark Producing Work Permit - Program Area 19 - Fire Protection Manual Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the NRC guidelines of the document entitled " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance" dated June 1977 and the licensee's commitments in the letter to the NRC dated January 24, 1977.
b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspector reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveil-lance Procedures: SI-172, "Fi re System Testable Valve Cycle, " Revision 10, - October 23, 1986 > -. - - - _ -,.-,_ --
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- SI-177.1, " Unit 1 Spray and/or Sprinkler System Functional Test," Revision 3, October 1, 1986 - SI-177.2, " Unit 2 Spray and/or Sprinkler System Functional Test," Revision 2, July 18, 1986 SI-191, " Fire Hose Station Inspection Unit 0," Revision 8, - October 3, 1986 - SI-19.1, "Fi re Hose Station Inspection Unit 1," Revision 0, October 31, 1986 SI-701, " Visual Inspection of Fire Doors," Revision 2, October 27, - 1986 SI-261, " Visual Inspection of Technical Specification Fire Doors - On A Periodic Basis," Revision 8, May 29, 1986 The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications. In addition, these procedures were reviewed to deter-mine if the inspection and test instructions followed general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire protection program guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes. Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures are sati sf actory.
c.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests The inspector reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test records for the dates indicated: SI-172, Fire System Annual Testable Valve Cycle, August 24, 1984, August 21, 1985 and August 18, 1986 SI-177.1, Unit 1 Spray and/or Sprinkler System 18 month Functional test, March 3, 1984 and September 26, 1985 SI-177.2, Unit 2 Spray and/or Sprinkler System 18 month Functional Test, October 8, 1983, November 30, 1984 and September 14, 1986 SI-191, Unit Common 18 month Fire Hose Station Inspection, December 18, 1983 and June 19, 1985 SI-701, 6 month Fire Door Inspection August 2,1985, February 21, 1986.and July 21, 1986 .. .- - . - . . _.
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The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
d.
Fire Protection Audit The most recent Technical Specification required audit reports of the Sequoyah Fire Protection Program were reviewed.
These audits were: . Triennial Audit Report SQ-83TS-11, dated September 13, 1983 - Annual and two year audit report SQ-8400-13, dated August 28, 1984 - Annual audit report QSQ-A-85-0011, dated September 18, 1985 - Triennial and two year audit report QSQ-A-86-0010, dated - September 5, 1986 The inspector reviewed the above audit reports and c'etermined that the 1983 triennial audit adequately addressed the scope of Technical Specification 6.5.2.8j.
The 1983 Triennial audit criteria appeared to be developed utilizing the licensee's NRC fire protection commitments, Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, applicable sections of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and the supplemental guidance to BTP 9.5-1 entitled, Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsib111 ties, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.
In addition, the scope of this audit appears to follow the audit guidance provided by Generic Letter 82-21, Enclosure 3.
However, it appears that the licensee's 1984 annual, 1984 two year, 1985 annual and 1986 triennial and 1986 two year audit reports did not utilize an audit criteria which verified the Sat:.oyah Nuclear Plant's Compliance with their NRC fire protection commitments and the issued fire protection safety evaluation reports. In addition, the licensee's two year audit reports have not been verifying that the BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A fire protection quality assurance program guidance is being properly implemented.
With respect to overall licensee's fire protection audit program it appears that the subject audits, with the 1983 triennial audit being the exception, are not being performed utilizing the audit guidance provided in Generic Letter 82-21 Enclosure 2, Quality Assurance, and Enclosure 3, Minimum Elements That Should be Incorporated in Annual and ____ Triennial Fire Protection Audits. Also, the inspector could not verify by reviewing the subject audit reports, with the 1983 triennial audit being the exception, which items of Technical Specification 6.5.2.8 the audit report were attempting to address.
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The NRC has received employee concerns with regard to the 1986 triennial audit report and these concerns will be evaluated during a subsequent NRC inspection. Therefore, the above audit discrepancies are identified as Unresolved Item (327/86-66-01 and 328/86-66-01), Fire Protection Audit Program Fails to Properly Audit the Licensee's Fire Protection QA Program and Plant Fire Protection Program.
e.
Fire Brigade (1) Training The inspector reviewed the training and drill records for four brigade leaders and.eight brigade members for the first three quarters of 1986.
The records reviewed indicated that each of these leaders and members had received an annual medical review, attended the required training and participated in the required number of drills. The inspector also verified that a fire brigade drill had been conducted within the specificed frequency for each shift for 1985 and the first three quarters of 1986. The fire brigade training records which were inspected were found satis-factory except that on August 29, 1986, the fire brigade leader assigned to the Group 5 fire brigade shift was not qualified for brigade duty. The August 26, 1986, Fire Brigade Membership Status Report indicated that the individual was qualified; however, this individual had only attended four of the last eight quarterly fire brigade training sessions.
This is contrary to the licensee's Procedure PHYSI-13, Section 3.1.8.3 which requires that each individual attend a minimum of six of eight quarterly classroom training sessions during a two year period.. Therefore, this is identified as Violation Item (327/86-66-02 and 328/86-66-02), Failure to Assign Qualified Personnel to the Fire Brigade.
In addition, on October 14, 1986, the fire brigade leader assigned to the Group 4 fire brigade shift was not qualified for fire brigade duty. The October 8, 1986, Fire Brigade Membership Status Report indicated that the individual was not qualified for fire brigade duty.
However, plant personnel making the fire brigade shift assignments failed to recognize the unqualified status of the individual assigned to the brigade.
Therefore, this is another example of Violation Item 327/86-66-02 and 328/86-66-02.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's initial fire brigade training program to verify that the following training topics are being covered: Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific - identification of each individual's responsibilities.
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- Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
- The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.
- Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
- The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals, fire resulting from construction or modifications (welding), and record file fires.
- The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and emergency breathing equipment.
- The proper methed for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.
- The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activi-ties (fire brigade leaders only).
- Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.
- Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.
Based on this review, it appears that the licensee's initial fire brigade training program as outlined by licensee's procedure PHYSI-13 covers the above required training topics.
In addition, it appears that the licensee's fire brigade training program repeats the basic fire fighting skills of the initial program to qualified fire brigade members on an annual basis during the classroom session of the annual fire brigade reference training.
In addition, the licensee's procedure PHYSI-13 requires each individual to attend a minimum of six of eight quarterly classroom training sessions during a two year period.
Therefore, in order for the licensee to ensure that each fire brigade member meets the required eight quarterly fire brigade training sessions, the classroom training portion of the annual refresher training counts for one of the four required quarterly training sessions each year as a make-up. This approach appears to meet the intent of the NRC guideline.. .- . . . _. _ ' . , A '
The licensee's ' staff indicated that the fire brigade initial and quarterly training programs are - being conducted by. their fire l brigade training division and are no longer being conducted by the site fire protection staff. The inspector requested to review the
lesson plans associated with the initial fire brigade-training program, the annual refresher, and the quarterly classroom training sessions held in 1986. The licensee indicated that the lesson plans were not available on site for the inspector's review. The inspector advised this licensee that the subject fire brigade training lesson plans should be made available and a copy,
of these plans should be. maintained on site for audit purposes.
- The review of the fire' brigade training program lessen plans will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(2) Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies
The inspector reviewed the following plant fire fighting
strategies: ,. Diesel Generator Building, Revision 3, June 6, 1983 - Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3, May 24, 1984 - <
l ERCW Pumping Station, Revision 0, November 2, 1983 - Charging Pump and Safety Injection Pump Rooms, Revision 0, -
November 17, 1986 , 125V Vital Battery Rooms, Rovision 0, November 30, 1986 - Based on this review, the inspector determined that the above fire fighting strategies adequately addressed the fire hazards in the i area, the type of fire extinguishants to be utilized, the
direction of Attack, systems in the room / area to be managed in order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the , { room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke j control and salvage.
f.
Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment
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j (1) Inspection of Fire Brigade Manual Fire Fighting Equipment The inspector performed an inspection of the fire brigade equipment, consisting of fire hose, nozzles, tools, and miscella- ' , neous equipment, stored at the fire brigade equipment response location located in the Service Building on elevation 706'-0."
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A total of ten sets of turnout gear (coats, boots, helmets, etc.), ten sets of self contained breathing apparatus, and spare air cylinders are stored at the Service Building fire brigade equipment responses location.
Based on this inspection, the designated fire brigade equipment appeared to be properly maintained and stored in a ready condition.
(2) Outside Fire Protection Walkdown The inspector verified that the two fire pump suction intake structures from the lake were in service and met the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The two fire pumps were found to be in service.
The following sectional control valves in the outside fire protec-tion water supply system werc inspected and verified to be proper-ly aligned and locked in position: 1-26-550 2-26-550 2-26-553 2-26-553 0-VLV-26-0541 0-VLV-26-0542 0-VLV-26-0538 0-VLV-26-0539 0-VLV-26-0564 The following yard fire equipment houses were inspected: FEH-10 FEH-5 FEH-6 The equipment houses contained the minimum equipment requirement of that specified by licensee's fire hazards analysis commitments.
The equipment appeared to be adequately maintained.
A tour of the exterior of the plant indicated that sufficient clearance was provided between permanent safety-related buildings and structures and temporary buildings, trailers, and other transient combustible materials. The general housekeeping of the areas adjacent to the permanent plant structures was satisfactory.
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(3) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features A plant tour i ; made by the inspector.
During the plant tour, the following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspected: - Corridor, 669.0-Al Charging Pump Room 1A-A, 669.0-A9 - Charging Pump Room IC, 669.0 - All - - Charging Pump Room 2C, 669.0 - A21 Charging Pump Room 2A-A, 669.0 - A23 - - Pipe Gallery, 669.0 - A7 Pipe Gallery, 669.0 - A25 - Auxiliary Building Common Area, 690.0 - A1 - Pipe Gallery, 690.A19 - - Auxiliary Building Common Area, 714.0 - A1 6.9ky Shutdown Board Room A, 734.0 - A2 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room II, 734.0 - A3 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 182, 734.0 - A5 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 181, 734.0 - A6 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1A2, 734.0 - A7 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1A1, 734.0 - A8 - Auxiliary Control Room, 734.0 - A1 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 282, 734.0 - A18 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 2B1, 734.0 - A19 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV, 734.0 - A22 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room III, 734.0 - A23 - - Aux. Control Instrument Room 1A, 734.0 - A25 Aux. Control Instrument Room IB, 734.0 - A-26 - Aux. Control Instrument Room 2A, 734.0 - A-27 - Aux. Control Instrument Room 2B, 734.0 - A28 - 480V Board Room 1A, 749.0 - A1 - 480V Board Room 18, 749.0 - A2 - 480V Transformei Room IB, 749.0 - A6 - - 480V Transformer Room 1A, 749.0 - A7 480V Board Room 28, 749.0 - A15 - - 480V Board Room 2A, 749.0 - A16 480V Transformer Room 28, 749.0 - A10 - 480V Transformer Room 2A, 749.0 - All - Cable Spreading Room, 706.0 - C2 - Control Room, 732.0 - C12 - Diesel Generator Room 1A-A, 722.0-4 - Diesel Generator Room 2A-A, 722.0-5 - Diesel Generator Room IB-8, 722.0-6 - Diesel Generator Room 28-B, 722.07 - Diesel Generator Building Pipe Gallery and Corridor, 722.0-9 - Diesel Generator 480V Board Room 1A, 740.5-4 - Diesel Generator 480V Board Room 2A, 740.5-7 - Diesel Generator 480V Board Room 18, 740.5-10 - Diesel Generator 480V Board Room 213, 740.5-13 - ERCW Pumping Station -
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The fire / smoke detection systems, manual fire fighting equipment (i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) sprinkler protection and the fire area boundary walls, floors and ceiling associated for the above plant areas were inspected and verified to be in service or functional except for fire damper assembly in 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV on elevation 734' - 0."
Fire Damper 2-3-1C-926 installed in the fire barrier wall separating 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV from 6.9ky Shutdown Board Room B was found inoperable.
The fusible link closure device was missing, and the damper blade package was held open.
Based on further investigation, the inspector determined that the blade package was being held open by the spring steel blade package closure locking clip attached to the damper frame. This is identified as Violation Item (327/86-66-03 and 328/86-66-03), Inoperable Fire Barrier Separating Two Safe Shutdown Related Areas.
Based on this inspection, it appears that the fire protection features associated with the above plant areas, except as noted, are satisfactorily maintained.
The plant tour also verified the licensee's implementation of the fire prevention administrative procedures. The control of combus-tibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases, and the general housekeeping were found to be satisfactory.
(4) Appendix R Fire Protection Features The inspector visually inspected the fire rated raceway fire barriers required for compliance with Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in the following plant areas: Auxiliary Building elevation 734'-0", 6.9ky shutdown Board - Room B, conduit 4A-2PP756A, 4A-2PP750A and 4A-2PP759A raceway fire barrier assemblies Auxiliary Building elevation 734'-0", 6.9ky shutdown Board - Room A, conduit 4A-1PP762B, 4A-1PP753B and 4A-1PP765B raceway fire barrier assemblies Auxiliary Building elevation 734'-0", auxiliary control room, - tray PO-A, PN-A, and PM-A raceway fire barrier assemblies Auxiliary Building elevation 749'-0", 480V transformer room - 1A, conduit 4A-1PL4982B and 4A-IPL4985B raceway fire barrier assemblies , , I i - - -.,. - , - - - -. --..-, -
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Based on the inspector's observations of the above raceway fire barrier enclosures, it appears that the one hour fire barrier integrity associated with the above fire barrier assemblies was being properly maintained in a satisfactory condition.
The inspector also visually inspected the one hour fire rated barriers separating 'the following mechanical and electrical equipment: Auxiliary Building Elevation 714'-0", common area 714.0-A1, - Column A8 line wall separating "A" and "B" cables.
Auxiliary Building Elevation 690'-0", common area 690.0-A1, T - line between A2 and A3 the wall between the train "A" and "B" component cooling pumps.
Based on this inspection, the inspector determined that the one hour fire resistive integrity associated with the above equipment fire barriers was being properly maintained in a satisfactory condition.
The inspector made a walkdown of the Appendix R related sprinkler protection in the following plant areas: Auxiliary Building Common Area, 690.0 - A1 - Auxiliary Building Common Area, 714.0 - A1 - 480V Board Room 18, 749.0 - A2 - 480V Board Room 28, 749.0 - A15 - Based on this walkdown, the inspector determined that the sprinkler protection provided for the areas identified above provided sufficient protection with respect to controlling an exposure fire.
The following eight-hour emergency lighting units were inspected: Unit No.
Location 2-370-1211 Auxiliary Control Room 0-274-4396 Auxiliary Control Instrument Room B 0-370-11282 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A2 0-370-11312 480V Shutdown Board room 1B2 0-370-11314 480V Shutdown Board Room 1A1 These units were in service, lamps properly aligned and appeared to be properly maintained.
Except as noted above, within the areas inspected, no additional violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Inspector. Followup Items a.
(Closed) LER 84-074, Failure to Comply With Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.
This LER was closed by Inspection Report 86-40. However, an error in the report was discovered with regard to the licensee's corrective actions associated with Interaction Study No. 120.
The report indicated that the power to the motor operated valves identified in Interaction Study No.120 had been removed. However, this statement does not properly reflect the licensee's actual corrective actions associated _with this interaction study.
During normal plant opera-tions, the subject valves are energized and upon a confirmed fire in the cable locations described in Interaction Study No. 120 the power to - the subject valves will be removed. The operator actions associated with this interaction study have been incorporated into the appropriate plant procedure. Therefore, this item remains closed.
b.
(0 pen) LER 327/84-046, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.
The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984, submittal,- analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies. identified in the subject LER and determined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study No. I required a deviation to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the. licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request.
Currently, TVA is scheduled to complete the auxiliary building elevation 690 sprinkler modifications above the counting room suspended ceiling prior to the plants restart. Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection, c.
(0 pen) LER 327/84-049, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.
The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984 submittal, analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study _Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. In addition, the licensee deterr..ined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study No. 6 required a deviation to' the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 'R, Section III.G. in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request.
Currently, TVA is scheduled to complete the auxiliary building north stairwell water and draft curtain modifications prior to the plant's restart.
Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.
d.
(0 pen) LER 327/84-059, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.
The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984 submittal, analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to resolve these
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discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, and 34. In addition, the licensee determined that the corrective actions required a deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request. Currently, TVA is scheduled to complete 182B and 2A2A 480V shutdown board room cable tray water spray system installa-tions prior to the restart of the plant. Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.
e.
(0 pen) LER 327/84-063, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.
In Enclosure 5 to the licensee's December 21, 1984 submittal, the licensee analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, and 59. The licensee determined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study Nos. 57, 58, and 59 required a deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G., in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request. Currently, TVA is scheduled to complete the south, No. 6 and No. 5 stairwell water and draft curtain modifications prior to the restart of the plant.
Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.
f.
(0 pen) LER 327/84-067, Failure to Comply with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984 submittal, analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 86, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, and 108.
The licensee also determined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study Nos. 101, 103, and 104 required a deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G in order to achieve compliance. The NRC on May 29, 1986, issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request. TVA, currently is scheduled to complete the Units 1 and 2 auxiliary building water and draft curtain modification prior to plant restart. Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection. }}