IR 05000317/1980026
| ML19345H023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Architzel R, Callahan C, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H019 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-80-26, 50-318-80-22, NUDOCS 8104300059 | |
| Download: ML19345H023 (16) | |
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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS NEXT PAGE
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-317/80-26 Report No. 50-318/80-22 50-317 Docket No. An_11n DPR-53 C
License.No. npp_go Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Comoany P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Lusby, Maryland Inspection conducted:
December 1,1980 - January 4,1981 ON l'- b 2/HIfl Inspectors:
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R. E. Architzel, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector date signed f. E bM,k b 7_ ln 111
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C. J. Callahan, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed
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date signed.
b d H Ifl Approved by:
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t. t,. Mct.,aDe, dr., Lhlet, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch i
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on December 1,1980 - January 4,1981 (Combined Report Nos. 50-317/80-26 and 50-318/80-22)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector (65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br />, Unit 1; 59 hours6.828704e-4 days <br />0.0164 hours <br />9.755291e-5 weeks <br />2.24495e-5 months <br />, Unit 2).
Areas inspected included the control room and the accessible portions of the auxiliary, turbine, service, and intake buildings; radiacion protection; physical security; fire protection; plant i
operating records; Unit 1 containment; IE Builetins and Circulars; Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Collection System; and reports to the NRC.
l Noncompliances: One (Failure to secure charging flow to safeguard against boron
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dilution during special test with no forced flow through core, paragraph 4).
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8104300059 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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- DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS i
50317-80-12-14 i
80-12-22 j
80-12-15
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80-11-12
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80-11-03
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80-11-06 i
80-11-21 80-10-28
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50318-80-11-10
80-11-16 i
80-11-01
80-11-01 l
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted:
C. E. Brobst, General Supervisor, Chemistry (Acting)
R. P. Bassett, Mechanical Foreman J. T. Carroll, General Supervisor, Operations J. T. Carlson, Foreman, Radiation Safety J. A. Crunkleton, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance S. M. Davis, Senior Engineer, Operations R. E. Denton, General Supervisor, Training / Technical Services C. L. Dunkerly, Shift Supervisor W. S. Gibson, General Supervisor, Electrical & Controls J. E. Gilbert, Shift Supervisor D. E. Huseby, Engineering Technician S. Hager, Engineer, Combustion Engineering J. R. Hill, Shift Supervisor R. P. Heibel, Senior Engineer L. S. Hinkel, Supervisor, Instrument Maintenance M. Konya, Fuel Management Engineer C. Key, Engineer, EED
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J. F. Lohr, Shift Supervisor D. W. Latham, Principal Engineer, Plant Engineering Nuclear R. O. Mathews, Assistant General Supervisor, Nuclear Security P. E. McGrane, Technical Librarian J. R. Mihalcik, Senior Engineer, Fuel Management N. L. Millis, General Supervisor, Radiation Safety G. P. Phair, Rad-Chem Technician E. T. Reimer, Plant Health Physicist J. E. Rivera, Shift Supervisor P. G. Rizzo, Assistant General Foreman, Maintenance L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent R. P. Shetanko, General Foreman, PMD J. F. Shike, Licensed Operator J. R. Speciale, Foreman, Radiation Safety C. R. Skaggs, Machinist J. A. Snyder, Supervisor, Instrument Maintenance T. L. Sydnor, General Supervisor, Operations QA J. V. Shugeot, Supervisor, Nuclear Security K. G. Tietsen, Technical Specialist J. A. Tiernan, Manager, Nuclear Power Department R. L. Wnderlich, Enoineer, Operations M. J. Warren, Enginesring Technician W. L. Whitaker, Assistant General Foreman D. Zyriek, Shift Supervisor C. C. Zapp, Licensed Operator J. M. Yoe, Instructor
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (317/80-15-04):
Improper spacing of Spent Fuel Racks. The inspector verified the licensee's corrective action as stated in their letter dated December 5, 1980.
These actions included the use of an improved procedure format to implement the design change (previcusly accomplished via Maintenance Requests). The inspector reviewed the completed FCR (77-1022) and its associated Nuclear Power Plant Modifica-tion Procedure 77-1022-2, Installing New High Density Spent Fuel Racks.
This procedure documented the correct repositioning of racks NES-1, 2 and 3.
The inspector also reviewed (new) procedure CCI 217, issued August 12, 1980, CCNPP Modification Procedure which implemented the admin-istrative requirements.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (318/79-05-03 and 317/79-11-02):
Cleanup Boric Acid in Charging Pump Rooms and Scaffolding in the ECCS Pump Rooms.
During tours of the auxiliary building the inspector reviewed the general housekeeping status.
No boric acid buildup was noted in the charging pu.np rooms.
The hanger repair program has been completed in the ECCS pump rooms and this scaffolding has been removed.
Housekeeping adequacy will be continually inspected during future NRC inspections.
3.
Review of Plant Operations a.
Plant Tour At various times, the inspector toured the facility, including the Control Room, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Outside Peri-pheral Area, Security Buildings, Health Physics Control Points, Diesel Generator Rooms, Service Building, Intake Structure and the Unit 1 Containment.
Sampling checks of the following were made.
Radiation controls established by the licensee, including
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posting of radiation areas, conditions of step-off pads and disposal of protective clothing.
l Control Room manning, including observation of shift turn-
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l over and panel walkdowns.
Systems and equipment checks for the fluid leaks or abnormal
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piping vibration.
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Seismic restraint and hydraulic snubber checks to verify adequate installation and fluid levels.
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Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness
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and storage to preclude safety or fire hazards.
Control Room and local monitoring instrumentation for various
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components and parameters were observed, including reactor power level, CEA positions and safety +related valve position indication.
Whether proper access controls were established.
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Unit 1 Startup festing (CRD Checks, PSTP-2 Dilution to Critical
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on December 21,1980).
The cause, proposed corrective action, and documentation of
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all Unit 2 Main Control Board alarms were reviewed.
The inspector noted that the licensee permits the Control Room Operator to deactivate Annunciator Windows, without approval of the Shift Supervisor, by removing the associated circuit card and placing a blue dot sticker on the window. The inspector expressed concern that this activity did not appear to be formally controlled and documented in plant procedures. This item is unresolved (318/80-22-01) pending further evaluation.
The following Unit 2 Annunciators were in the alarm condition at the close of this report period.
SI TANK PRESS & LEVEL
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(H-42) MR-0-79-1034 (G-34) MR-0-80-4843 (G-36) MR-0-80-4370 228 RCP CONTROL BLEED-0FF FLOW
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(E-55) MR-0-80-2161 RCP VIBRATION (E-3)
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RCP 218, MR-0-80-673 RCP 22A, MR-0-80-868
RCP 21A, MR-0-80-1545 218 RCP CONTROL BLEED-0FF
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high temp (E-32) MR-0-79-4546 POWER LEVEL RATE BYPASS
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S/U range (0-45) greater than 12% power S/G AUX FEED DISCH. SUCT PRESS
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LOW (C-69) normal operation with low auxiliary feedwater pressure, system in standby.
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STEAM LINE DRAIN PANEL (C-39)
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high levels in drain pots CONDENSATE DEMIN SYSTEM (C-22)
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high conductivity when isolated 24 MOIST SEP REHEAT DRAIN TANK LEVEL
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(C-35) MR-0-80-4533 FW HTR LEVEL HI (C-9) MR-0-80-4909
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23 CONDENSATE PUMP OIL FLOW LOW
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(C-10) condensate pump off CONDENSATE TANK LEVEL HI (C-11)
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MR-0-80-4045 The following Unit 2 Annunciators were out of service at the close of this report period.
SI TANK PRESS &~ LEVEL (H-44 & G-36) - Maintenance Requests
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MR-0-79-4553 and MR-0-80-4370
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22B RCP OIL RSV LEVEL LO (E-57)
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MR-0-80-2943 VESSEL VENT LINE TEMP HI (E-58) Incomplete modification
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218 RCP CONTROL BLEED OFF FLOW (E-31)
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MR-0-80-644 218 RCP SEAL TEMP HI PRESS (E-30)
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MR-0-80-644 22A RCP SEAL TEMP HI PRESS (E-42)
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MR-0-80-4980 22A RCP CONT BLEED OFF FLOW (E-43)
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MR-0-80-4980 BORIC ACID HEAT TRACING (F-3)
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MR-0-80-6049
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SECONDARY PRE POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION (D-28)
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MR-U-81-84 SHUTDOWN GROUP INSERTION PERMISSIVE (D-25)
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MR-80-4382
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The inspector verified Unit 2 Annunciator status by comparing the alarm circuit cards actually removed to those listed in the alarm status log. The Maintenance Request (MR) File was also reviewed to verify that a MR was issued for each annunciator malfunction.
BA TANKS LEVEL LOW (F-23) was found deactivated without an
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associated maintenance request on file. This annunciator was restored to normal operation.
SECONDARY PRE-POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION (0-28) was found
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deactivated without an associated active maintenance request on file. MR-0-81-84 was issued after testing verified the annunciator to be out of service.
LETDOWN PRESSURE (F-9).
The inspector noted that the alarm
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card was pulled for this window (Blue Dot Log April 28,1980)
on December 22, 1980.
Discussions with the Control Room
Operator revealed no apparent reason for the deactivated
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alarm and it was restored to service the same day.
22 HPSI PUMP SIAS BLOCKED AUTO START (G-17) was alarming because
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the hand switch was in the " pull-to-lock" position,.by
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direction of the Operations General Supervisor. The inspector determined that the.eason for using the pull-to-lock feature on No. 22 pump was to force the start of No. 23 pump (by the start-failure logic of No. 22 pump) in an accident situation.
This action would preclude the single failure of the common i
(to pumps 21 and 22) motor-operatcd suction valve (2-MOV-4142 from the Refueling Water Tanks) from disabling both 21 and 22 HPSI pumps.
The inspector further noted that the suction valve, although motor-operated, fails as is and does not receive an SIAS signal.
In the unlikely event of the inadvertent closure
of this valve, the independent suction flow path through No. 23
HPSI pump would be available by operator action.
The inspector further noted that other Pressurized Water Reactors designed t
by a different vendor were built with a single suction flow path for the HPSI (and LP3I) systems.
The inspector asked the licensee to evaluate restoring the HPSI
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pumps to the status described in the FSAR Section 7.3.2.2, Safety Injection Actuation Signal, and associated Logic
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Diagram, FSAR Figure 7-22, Sheet 2.
This action would restore
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three HPSI pumps to operable status and eliminate the hanging alarm.
The licensee stated they would remove the handswitch from the pull-to-lock position.
Annunciator status will be closely followed during future NRC inspections.
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The inspector toured the Unit 1 Containment on several occasiens during the inspection.
Immediately prior to restart from cycla 5 it was observed that several "C" clamps were in place on leakoff lines installed on the packing of several charging system valves.
The licensee stated that these clamps were applied at various times during tb: previous cycle to make a quick fix for packing leaks (The leakoff is between two sets of packing.
Isolating the leakoff makes the second set of packing the pressure boundary).
The leakoffs permit identification of CVS packing leaks as identified (limit 10 GPM) versus unidentified (limit 1 gpm). The inspector expressed concern that the leakoff lines had not been repaired during the recently complated outage.
This item is unresolved pending further review (317/80-26-01).
b.
Review of Operating Logs, Records Logs and records were reviewed to identify significant changes and trends, to assure required entries were being made, to verify Operating Orders conform to the Technical Specifications, to verify proper identification of abnormal conditions, and to verify conformance to reporting requirements and Limiting Conditions for Operation. The following records were reviewed for the report period:
Shift Supervisor's Log
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Unit 1 Control Room Operator's Log
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Unit 2 Control Room Operator's Log
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Nuclear Plant Engineer - Operations Notes and Instructions
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Unit l'and 2's Control Room Daily Operating Logs (sampling
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review)
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Review of Events Requiring One Hour Notification of the NRC The circumstances surrounding the following events requiring prompt (one hour) notification of the NRC via the dedicated telephone (ENS-line) were reviewed.
Seismic Monitoring System
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I Seismic Monitoring System was activated at 5:35 p.m. on december 10, 1980.
Preliminary investigation of the 5 tapes initiated indicata small magnitude blips, possible due to electrical noise.
Unit 1 is in a refueling outage and a worker may have jarred the containment instrements. Contacts with plant workers and with the State Police revealed no indications of an actual seismic event in the plant or nearby.
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Medical Emergencies
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A contractor technician experienced symptoms of a heart attack about 10:20 a.m. on December 14, 1980. A security guard suffered stomach cramps about 3:30 a.m. December 31, 1980. A licensed control room operator had intense groin pain about 12:45 a.m.,
December 22, 1980.
All three individuals were transported to a local hospital by ambulance'.
Radioactivity was not involved in any of these occur-rences.
Technical Specification Violation
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Unit 1 letdown and charging operations were continued without reactor coolant flow from about 12:50 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. on December 15, 1980, in violation of Technical Specification 3.10.5 and 4.10.5.1.
Shutdown cooling was stopped to permit local leak rate
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testing of penetration No. 41 with unit 1 in mode 5.
Failure to secure operations which could cause dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration, and compliance with required hourly surveillance which would have verified charging flow paths closed
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and charging pumps off, apparently resultad from control room personnel unfamiliarity with the applicable technical specifi-cations.
In addition, it appears that the licensed operator stopped shutdown cooling without understanding the plant conditior s associated with that act. The oncoming shift supervisor (4 - 12 p.m.) recognized the Technical Specification Violation during shift turnover and ordered the charging pumps secured.
Baron concentrations before and after this event indicated no change in concentration. This is an item of noncompliance (317/80-26-02).
5.
Allegation of Improper Radiological Controls An anonymous allegation was made to the I&E headquarters Duty Officer at 10:04 p.m. on December 6, 1980 regarding the radiation levels on trash exiting the Unit 1 Containment during the current refueling outage. The
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alleger stated that the radiation contact dose measured in the containment was a factor of ten less than that measured in the trash compactor room.
The resident inspector investigated this allegation on December 8, 1980 by reviewing trash removal procedures and interviewing trash compactor room personnel.
No evidence was identified to support the allegation or warrant additional investigation.
6.
Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Collection System Modification Amendment 48 to License No. DPR -53 for Unit 1 addressed the NRC's eval-uation of fire protection of the Reactor Coolant Pump lube oil collection
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system.
The Safety Evaluation stated that the I&E Resident Inspector would confirm acceptability of the installation.
The inspector reviewed Facility Change Request 79-1023, Units 1 and 2, and supplements 1 - 8 (through December 6, 1980).
The phys' cal installation of the subject modification was also examined on all four Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pumps. The change was completed prior to restart.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.
IE Bulletin Follow-up The inspector reviewed licensee actions on the following IE Bulletins (IEBs) to determine that the written response was submitted within the required time ' period, that the response included the information required including adequate corrective action commitments, and that licensee manage-ment had forwarded copies of the response to responsible onsite management.
The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observations and review of items discussed below.
79-18; Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from
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High Nnise Areas. The licensee responded to this bulletin in a letter dated August 15, 1979. That response addressed plant surveys and subsequent page (alarm) system modifications which had been conducted to assure audibility of the plant emergency alarms, especially in high noise areas. The modifications were completed on July 13, 1976 (Unit 1) and May 4, 1977 (Unit 2). These actions were followed by the NRC as an unresolved item (317/75-20) and reinspected in Inspection Reports 317/76-02 and 317/76-09; and closed following review of the study and modifications in Combined Inspection 317/77-20:318/77-19.
80-11; Masonry Wall Design.
The licensee reported satisfactory
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completion of required masonry wall reevaluation to the Resident l
Inspector on December 19, 1980. A complete written report will be i
submitted by January 9, 1981. This Bulletin will remain open pending
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further review.
i 79-14; Seismic Analysis for As-Built Piping Systems.
On December 15,
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1980, the Resident Inspectors were notified by the Licensing Project
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l Manager that the licensee had reported a misplaced seismic restraint i
on the Unit 1 Containment Spray Riser.
Subsequent inquiry determined l
that this problem was identified by November 17, 1980 and analysis completed on December 4, 1980.
The licensee did not initiate corrective
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action for completion during the current refueling outage because the analysis indicated compliance with the bulletin's inte-im criteria.
On December 17, 1980, the licensee was informed that the interim criteria did not apply to the seismic restraint problems identified
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while in a refueling outage and that the containment spray system was
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considered to be inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.2.1.
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License Amendment No. 49, approved by the Division of Licensing on December 17, 1980, revised Unit 1 Technical Specifications, permitting normal operation of the Containment Spray System with total primary stress for the Design Basis Earthquake less than 2.4 Sh.
Unit I cycle 5 initial criticality was achieved on December 21, 1980.
Licensee corrective action to resolve this deficiency will be evaluated prior to cicsecut of Bulletin 79-14.
79-28; Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA 180 Limit Switches at
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Elevated Temperatures.
The licensee answered this bulletin in a i
letter dated February 21, 1980 stating that no NAMCO EA 180 Limit Switches were in stock or on order for Calvert Cliffs.
Inspector discussions With personnel and review of the instrument indices did not reveal any applications of the subject switches.
80-20; Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral
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Control Switches. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated August 21, 1980 stating that the subject switches were not used at the plant.
Inspector discussions with licensee employees and independent review of the Instrument Indices reveal no use of the switches.
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80-09; Hydromo'.or Actuator Deficiencies.
The licensee responded to
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this bulletin in a letter dated June 18, 1980.
The response stated that the ITT-GC model actuators were not used in safety-related appli-cations at Calvert Cliffs.
Inspector discussions with personnel and inspection activit'es revealed no use of the hydromotor actua-tors.
79-15; Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies. The inspector reviewed the
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licensee's response, dated July 19, 1979 which stated that " deep draft" pumps of the nature involved were not used in safety-related applications.
The pumps identified in the bulletin were vertical turbine pumps with impellers located in bowls in a sump or self con-tained barrels. The inspector also reviewed the FSAR system des-criptions for various low head pumps (Low Pressure Safety Injection, High Pressure Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feed Water, Core Spray, Salt Water, Component Cooiing and Service Water) and verified that these pumps were of a different design than those addressed in Bulletin 79-15.
80-12: Decay Heat Removal System Operability.
The inspector reviewed
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the licensee's response dated June 9, 1980.
In addition, the following items were reviewed:
(a) FSAR Chapters 9.2 (Shutdown Cooling) and 6 (Engineered Safeguards Features), (b) Facility Change Request 80-12 (Units 1 and 2) Install Key Operated Bypass Switches for the Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, (c) Nuclear Plant Engineer - Operations Standing Instruction 80-08 addressing redundancy requirements for
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Decay Heat Removal during modes 5 and 6, and (d) post Licensee * Event Reports describing decay heat removal degradation events.
The inspector
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noted that the licensee has implemented the redundant decay heat removal requirements specified in bulletin item 6.6.
The Facility Change Request referenced will provide a keylock bypass of the Recircu-lation Actuation Signal (RAS) with control. room annunciation of the bypa sed condition. The licensee has not implemented the bulletin's suggestion to disable the RAS preparatory to the Refueling or Cold Shutown Modes. The inspector noted that a RAS signal will trip the Shutdown Cooling (LPSI) pumps, however because the LPSI pump suctions are isolated by manual valves from the Containment Sumps no loss of suction or air binding results.
(Calvert Cliffs uses the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps following RAS).
Because restoration of Shutdown Cooling only involves resetting the RAS signal and restarting the Shutdown Cooling Pumps, a situation such as occured at Davis Besse (two and one-half hours to restore SDC because of air binding) is not likely, however momentary loss of shutdown cooling is likely until the referenced FCR is completed.
The licensee stated that they thought it was more conservative to sustain loss of SDC events than to possibly disable RAS when needed by improper use of jumpers. (Because of the minimum actions required to restore SDC and the now required redundancy for SDC).
No unacceptable conditions were identified by the inspector with respect to the licensee's implementation of Bulletin 80-12.
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80-16: Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with either "A" or "D" Output Codes.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated July 18, 1980 which stated "although we do have the transmitters in use, none furnish a safety-related control, protection, or indication function." The inspector also reviewed the Instrument Indices on a sampling basis and noted (only) the following uses of Rosemount Pressure Transmitters 1 and 2 PDT 122A, RCP flow 1 and 2 PDT 1228, RCP flow 1 and 2 PDT 123A RCP flow 1 and 2 PDT 123B RCP flow 1 and 2 PDT 124 Core flow These instruments were Model 1152 DP differential pressure transmitters, designated "Q" (safety-related) in the Instrument indices.
Further inspector review of the "Q" designation revealed that the licensee had designated these instruments as safety-related for pressure boundary
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purposes only, not for indication. This was documented in the licensee's
"Q" list log item number 593.
Because the bulletin addressed indication as a safety-related function, the inspector further reviewed "Q" list
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designations of the various RCS flow transmitters. The inspector determined that the only safety-related transmitters for RCS flow are the Steam Generator Differential Pressure Transmitters (1 and 2 PCT lilA, B, C and D) used as inputs to the Reactor Protection System.
These instruments provide a voltage readout on the RPS cabinet if the flow function is selected. The Rosemount transmitters provide flow indication to the process computer (non-safety-related).
Reactor Coolant System flow indicators on the Control Boards is provided at Panel 1C06 by instruments 101A, B, C and D.
Reviewing the documentation for these instruments, the inspector noted that they had similarly been classified as safety-related for pressure boundary purposes only and that, because they only provided indication to the operator, they were not safety-related electrically ("Q" List Log Item 651, dated May 18,1976). The inspec.ar stated that the NRC did consider indication to be a safety-related function (refer to the Bulletin paragraph 2
"The safety-related application shall include control, protective or indication functions") in some applications and that the licensee should reevaluate instrument classifications which have been determined non-safety-ralated because they only provide indication. This item is unresolved (317/80-26-03 - 318/80-22-02) pending further review.
8.
IE Circular Review
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The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine that the circular vas received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that further action taken or planned was appropriate.
80-16; Operational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510 00 Trip Units
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and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector checked, during regular and off-shift hours, on whether seli:ted aspects of security met regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures, a.
Physical Protection Security Orcanization
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Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time
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member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be as
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Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area (PA) and the vital areas (VA)
were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed.
Observations of truck and car searches were made, c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging.
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Communications
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Compensatory measures when required
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10.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify
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that the details of the avent were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were in-dicated, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up. The following LER's were reviewed:
LER No.(Unit No.)
LER Date Event Date Subject 80-058/03L (1)
12/12/80 11/12/80 Spurious Opening of No. 11 4 KV Bus Normal Feeder 80-062/03L(1)
12/03/80 11/03/80 Loss of Shutdown Cooling
While Reenergizing ESFAS (IR 317/80-22)
80-063/03L(1)
12/05/80 11/06/80 No. 11 CRAC Unit Failed to
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Restart Following Loss of No. 11 4 KV Bus.
80-064/03L(1)
12/19/80 11/21/80 Seismic Restraint Not In-stalled for Auxiliary Spray Control Valve.
- 80 065/03L(1)
12/29/80 12/15/80 Charging Pumps Left Running
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during Special Test Requiring Them Secured.(see Par. 4)
- Denotes selection for onsite follow-up.
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- 80-056/03L(1)
11/28/80 10/28/80 Five Snubbe s Discovered-Inoperable.
'*80-054/03L(2)
12/10/80 11/10/80 21A SIT Inoperable 80-056/03L(2)
12/16/80 11/16/80 CEA 1 Dropped Into Core 80-053/03L(2)
12/01/80 11/01/80 Containment Particulate Monitor Inoperable 80-051/03L(2)
12/01/80 11/01/80 No. 12 Containment Air Cooler Inoperable due to Controller Shorting Block Flashover.
- denotes reports selected for onsite follow-up.
b.
For the LER's selected for onsite review (denoted by asterisks above), the inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Tectnical Specifications and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.
80-056/03L(1), Five Snubbers Discovered Inoperable.
Four of
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these snubbers were served by a common reservoir and the licensee determined the probable cause to be a loose fitting in the common piping.
The other snubber was inoperable due to loss of fluid from a broken pipe f*.tting (attributed to overtightening). Maintenance personnel were cautioned not to overtighten snubber pipe fittings. With respect to the common reservoirs the inspector reviewed FCR 78-1017 which changes the reservoirs of safety-related snubbers to single reservoirs, with the exception of eight serving each Steam Generator.
The inspector examined about 75 snubbers in the Unit I containment and noted that they had been changed or had their original unique reservoirs.
80-054/03L(2), 21A Safety Injection Tank Inoperable for Three
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Hours.
The inspector asked the licensee about the action taken after discovery of the Safety Injection Tank inoperability.
The action statement for Technical Specficiation 3.5.1 requires the tanks's operable status to be restored within one hour or the plant to be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Neither the LER nor the shift supervisor's log reflected whether a shutdown had commenced. Discussions with the General Supervisor - Operations (GS-0) revealed that the
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licensee's action in these circumstances is to commence a plant shutdown upon the expiration of the initial interval at a perceptible rate of power decrease and to ensure that sufficient time is yet available to achieve the next mode in a controlled fashion. The GS-0 stated that, although this post-tion had been discussed with all shift supervisors, it would also be incorporated into the Standing Instructions.
Dis-cussions with the Shift Supervisor or shift during this event show:d he had started a slow power decrease on the day in question.
Incorporation of these positions into the GS-Operations Standing Instructions will be a follow-up inspection item (318/80-22-03).
11. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
The report includes the information required to be reported by NRC require-ments; test results and/or supporting information are consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; determination whether any information in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of' reported information. Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
November, 1980, Operations Status Reports for Calivert Cliffs No. 1
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Unit and Calvert Cliffs No. 2 Unit, dated December 15, 1980.
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12. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or devia-tions. Unresolved items addressed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 7 of this report.
13.
Exit Interview l
Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of inspection findings was also provided to the licensee at the conclusion of the report period.
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