IR 05000317/1980001
| ML19337B021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1980 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19337A991 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-80-01, 50-317-80-1, 50-318-80-01, 50-318-80-1, NUDOCS 8010010213 | |
| Download: ML19337B021 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-317/80-01 Report No. 50-318/80-01 50-317 Docket No. 50-318 DPR-53 C
License No. DPR-69 Priority Category C
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Licensse:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Cnmaany (BG&E)
Charles Center Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 & 2 Inspection at:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection conducted: February 4-29, 1980 Inspectors:
[d M Mm==/M
- /- f - /0 R. Architzel, Resid(nt Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
P, e. /L e C4, b y lial su E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspections on February 4-29,1980 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/80-01 and 50-318/80-01)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, resident inspections (32 hr. onsite, 9 hr. at the Prince Frederick Fire Department) of plant operations including:
tours of the Facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; IE Bulletins; Periodic Reports; Review of Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee Activities; Licensee Action on previous inspection findings; and attendance at the NRC/ FEMA /RG&E and Public Meeting on Emergency Planning on February 28, 1980.
Noncompliances: Three (Infraction - Failure to make a prompt report following the simultaneous inoperability of all Unit 2 Diesel Generators, Paragraph 3.e; Deficiency - P0RSC failure to review Technical Specification Violations identified in NRC Irspection Reports, Paragraph 4.,)
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l Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted:
R. Denton, Nuclear Plant Engineer - Operations W. Gibson, Nuclear Plant Engineer - Performance J. Gilbert, Shift Supervisor L. Hinkle, Foreman - Instrument Mainte ance, Unit 1 L. Russell, Chief Engineer - Nuclear Plant J. Snyder, Foreman - Instrument Maintenance, Unit II Other licensee employees were also interviewed.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item (317/79-16-04; 318/79-13-04); Facility Organization Change Made Involving Technical Specifications without Prior Commission Approval. This item is open pending NRR acceptance or rejection of the change.
(See Paragraph 4.d. )
(Change) Unresolved Item,(317/79-23-01; 318/79-22-01) Implementation of Reporting Requirements.
Reporting requirements were reexamined during this reporting period.
This item is now an item of noncompliance (seeparagraph3.d).
3.
!!eview of ~
Operations
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a.
Plant Tour During the course of the inspection, tours were conducted in the following areas.
Auxiliary Building
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Turbine Building
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Control Room
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Outside Peripheral Areas i
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In addition, the inspector accompanied plant operators during the
conduct of their tours and log taking (Unit 2 Turbine Building Operator - February 5,1980, Service Building Operator - February 22,1980).
The following observations / discussions / determinations were made.
Radiation Controls established by the licensee, including
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posting of radiation areas, the conditions of step off pads, and the disposal of protective clothing were observe.
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Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for
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the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibrations.
The indicated positions of electrical power supply breakers,.
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control board equipment start switcher and remote operated valves, and the positioning of selected manual valves was observed.
Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room
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operators to verify that the reasons therefore were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Control Room manning was verified to be in compliance with
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the Technical Specifications.
Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness,
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and adequacy of storage of material to prevent safety and fire hazards, were observed.
No unacceptable conditions were identifled.
b.
Shift Logs and Record Review The following Shift logs and operating records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log - February 4-29, 1980;
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Unit 1 Control Room Operator's Log - February 4-29, 1980;
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Unit 2 Control Room Operator's Log - February 4-29, 1980;
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NPE-0 Notes and Instructions - February 4-29, 1980;
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Service Building Operator's Log - February 15-22, 1980;
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PSTP-8, Revision 0, February 6,1980, Low Power Physics Test
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Program for Restart Measurements of Core Paramenters - Unit 1, Reviewed February 8,1980; PSTP-7, Revision 2, February 6,1980, RCS Differential
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Pressures, Flows - Unit I, Reviewed February 8,1980.
The logs and records were reviewed to verify the following items:
That Log keeping practices and log book reviews are conducted
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That Log entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently
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detailed.
That Operating Orders do not conflict with Technical Specifications.
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That T. S. Reporting and LC0 Requirements are satisfied.
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That appropriate precautions and decision points were incorporated
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in the Restart Procedures for Unit I following the Hydrogen Peroxide Core Cleaning performed during the January 1980 TMI 2 Short Term Lessons Learned Outage.
Based upon the results of the above reviews, items of noncompliance were identified as described in the following paragraph.
(A separate Investigation was conducted for two Plant Emergencies on February 11 and 12, 1980.
See NRC Report 317/80-02; 318/80-02).
c.
Inadvertent SIAS (Safety Injection Actuation Signal); Subsequent Inoperability of Diesel Generators During a review of the Shift Supervisor's Log on February 5,1980 the inspector noted the following entry on February 3,1980:
"IAS (In Action Statement) 3.8.1.1.1.d (U-2) and 3.8.1.2 (U-1)
from 1512 to 1527 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.810235e-4 months <br /> on February 2,1980.
11, 12, & 21 Diesels were 0.0.S..
This was inititated by shutting down the diesels prior to resetting an inadvertent SIAS which occurred during performance of STP-M-210A."
Inspector review reconstructed the following sequence of events.
Initially (February 2,1980, approximately 1500) Unit 2 was
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at 100% power, Unit 1 was shutdown in Mode 5 with no reactivity changes in progress.
Surveillance Test Procedure M-210A-1, Reactor Protective System Functional Test, Revision 8, was
in progress for Unit I.
At 1509 the I&C Technician performing the STP missed a procedure
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step requiring reseting the SIAS Blocks ("A" and "B") when the permissive light came on prior to restoring the SIAS setpoints from zero pressure to the required setpoints (>
1578 psia). As a result, when the setpoint for initiation was raised an inadvertent SIAS occurred because Unit I was in Mode 5 below 300 psia.
The SIAS started normal ESF loads which were not in " Pull to Lock" and realigned valve.
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1 After the SIAS was initiated the operator noticed that the
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Boric Acid Direct Makeup Valve CVC 514 and Gravity Feed Valves CVC 508 and 509 had opened and No. 11 LPSI pump had started as had.Nos.all,12, and 21 Diesel Generators..
Noting the SIAS "A" and "B" Low Pressure Block Permissive
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lights, the Control Room Operator (Unit 1) attempted to reset the Blocks with the Control Board keylock switches.
In addition, the operator stated that he also depressed the SIAS "A" and "B" reset push buttons, although he did not recall verifying a reset by examining the annuciator panels.
He did verify receiving a normal alarm for SIAS Low Pressure Blocked Condition.
After several attempts to reset the Low Pressure Blocks, tne
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Control Room Operator stated he believed a reset had been effected because the No,11 LPSI pump could be secured (the CR0 and SCR0 stated the " Pull to Lock" feature was not used for this pump. )
In addition, after the first attempt at
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securing equipment the operator could secure the Boric Acid Direct Feed Valves but not the Gravity Feeds.
After a second reset attempt, the SCR0 directed that the Gravity Feeds be shut and the Diesel Generators be secured.
The Unit 1 and 2 Control Room Operators Secured the Diesel
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Generators nearly simultaneously.
(Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant has three Diesel Generators.
When one unit experiences a SIAS initiation, two Diesels are started and made available for the affected unit.
One Diesel'is started for safe shutdown of the unaffected unit.
The Number 12 Diesel is the " swing" diesel for both units.) At 3:12 p.m.,
immediately following the shutdowns, Start Failure Alarms (indicating non operability of the Diesel Generators) were received for all three diesels.
Apparently the Diesel Generators were secured with a start
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signal from the SIAS still present.
Inspector review of the Unit 1 Alarm Typer Printout revealed the following sequence of indications:
1511 SIAS "A", SIAS "B" Alarms; 1512 Diesel 11,12 Start; 1513 Diesel 12 Stop, START FAILURE;
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1514 Diesel 11 Stop, START FAILURE; 1515 SIAS "A" NORMAL; 1524 SIAS "B" NORMAL; 1527 Diesel 11,12 Star.
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The Unit 2 Alam printout revealed the following with respect to Diesel 21 (2 minutes have been added two times for Unit 2 to standardize time reference).
1511 Diesel 21 Start; 1514 Diesel 21 Stop START FAILURE; 1522 Diesel 21 Start.
The Annunciator Panel and Computer Printout alann for the SIAS signal come from off Channel "A-1" and "B-1".
(There are 9 channels for SIAS "A", and 9 for SIAS "B").
The operator was apparently ineffective in resetting SIAS, or the technician performing the test may have interferred with the reset.
Individval reset capability for each channel is provided at the SIAS cabinets in the Cable Spreading Room.
The Control Room reset feature controls all channels but only selected channels appear to have been reset in this instance.
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The Shift Supervisor (SS), upon arrival in the Control Room,
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noted the Inoperability of the Diesel Generators due to start failure, and proceeded to the Diesel Rooms.
The SS established operability.of the Diesels by sequentially depiessing and holding the " Local Alann Reset" for approximately 60 seconds.
Diesel 21 started by itself ifter the 60 seconds, verifying that a start signal was still present at 1522.
Diesels 11 and 12 had to be manually started, indicating SIAS had been reset by 1527.
These times are consistent with those of the alarm printout.
Apparently, during this event selective channels of SIAS "A" and "B" were reset by the I&C Technician or the Control Room Operator.
Inspection findings are described in paragraphs d and e below.
d.
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning why the NRC had i
not been notified on a pronot basis with respect to this event.
(The event occurred at 1512 hours0.0175 days <br />0.42 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.75316e-4 months <br /> on February 2,1980.
The NRC resident inspector became aware of the event during record reviews
on February 5,1980).
The licensee stated that this event had been evaluated pursuant
to T.S. 6.9.1.8.b, " Operation of the unit or affected systems when any parameter subject to a limiting condition for operation (LCO) is less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the LC0 established in the T.S.
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Further review of the applicable LC0 (T.S. 3.8.1.1) for Alternating Current Sources, Operating (Unit 2 was operating at full power)
revealed that action statement d. allows operation for two hours time to get at least one diesel operable, or be in hot standby in the following six hours.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's comments and questioned the applicability of T.S. 6.9.1.8.f,
" Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents, or could prevent by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope wita accidents analyzed in the SAR."
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The inspector further noted that the SAR Chapter 14 assumes for the Design Basis Accident (rupture of the largest diameter reactor coolant system pipe coincident with a loss of offsite power) that at least one diesel generator is available for emergency power.
Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4 (August,1975), " Reporting * of Operating Information - Appendix A Technical Specifications,"
list the following example as a component caused inoperability which, by itself, could prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR:
" clogged fuel line(s) resulting in failure, to supply fuel to the emergency generators."
The inspector stated that although one reporting requirment may not have required a prompt report in this case (LC0 actions statement was satisfied) the other requirements remain effective and it is the licensee's responsibility to ensure that its staff understands and implements these requirements.
Failure to report the inoperability of the Emergency A.C. power system for Unit 2 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is an item of noncompliance (318/80-01-01).
e.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures and report relating to this occurrence.
Operating Instruction - 21, Emergency Diesel Generators,
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Revision 11 dated August 29, 1979.
Surveillance Test Procedure M-210A-1, Reactor Protective
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System Functional Test, Revision 8 dated January 23, 1980.
Licensee Event Report 217/80-010/03L, dated February 8,
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Inspector review of 0I-21 indicated that the procedure as written was not appropriate to the circumstances because neither Precaution i
Section I nor Shutdown Section VI contained appropriate precautions to avoid shutting down the Diesel generators with a start signal present, an action which would cause inability of the Diesel Generator to start automatically or in remote manual if required.
Failure to have an adequate Diesel Generator Operating Procedure is an item.of noncompliance (317/8]-01-01; 318/80-01-02).
4.
Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (PORSC)
A review was conducted to ascertain whether onsite review comittee functions were conducted in conformance with Section 6 of the Technical Specifications.
The inspector reviewed the requirements delineated in Calvert Cliffs Instruction 103c Organization and Operation of the Plant Operations and Safety Review Comittee, Change 6, dated April 11, 1979.
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The inspector reviewed all meeting minutes between January 3,1979 (Meeting 79-1) and December 18,1979 (heting 79-195) and Memoranda to File dated July 30, and April 25, 1979 Subject " Alternates to the P0RSC" appointed by the Chairman.
Findi1gs were as follows:
a.
The P0RSC met in excess of the required monthly meeting frequency.
b.
Quorum requirements, including the Chairman or his alternate plus four members reviewed.
The inspector also verified that changes in the P0RSC membership, including alternates, were documented in the meeting minutes.
c.
Technical Specification Changes reviewed (FCRs 79-12, 23, 28, 46, 107) by the P0RSC.
d.
Membership of the P0RSC was affected by the organization change described in paragraph 2.
(An additional member was created).
As noted in paragraph 2 and a previous inspection report (317/79-16 and 318/79-13),10 CFR 50.69 specifies prior approval of the commission if such a change involves the Technical Specifications.
The change affected T.S. 6.5.1.2, P0RSC composition but did not lower P0RSC capability in any identified way.
This item will be held open pending NRR action.
(317/79-16-04; 318/79-13-04)
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e.
The inspector noted that violations of the Technical Specifications indentified during NRC Inspections conducted in calendar year 1979 had not been investigated and documented by the P0RSC as required by T.S. 6.5.1.6.e.
Violations of the Technical Specifications were identified in NRC Inspection Report Nos:
317/79-02 and 318/79-02; 317/79-05 and 318/79-05; 317/79-07 and 318/79-06; 317/79-11; 317/79-13 and 318/79-10 and 317/79-18 and 318/79-15.
The licensee stated that since the specification stated investigation of the T.S. violations and since a mechanism existed to perform the investigation (in order to prepare a response) that committee action was not required).
The inspector stated that the NRC requires that activities required to be performed by the connittees must be at least reviewed and app.oved by the committee.
If a subcommittee is utilized the results of the subcommittees actions must be formally reviewed, approved and documented by the committee.
The inspector noted that this subcommittee approach had not been utilized by,the P0RSC to review the T. S. Violations and stated that this was an item of noncompliance (317/80-01-02; 318/80-01-
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5.
NRC Review of Reports a.
NRC review of the following periodic resorts has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:
Core Barrel Movement Annual Report, CCNPP Units 1 and 2,
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dated January 25, 1980.
(Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specification 4.4.11.3.
No alert or action level exceeded during calendar year 1979.
January,1980 Operation Status Report for C.C. No.1 Unit,
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dated February 14, 1980.
January,1980 Operation Status Report for C.C. No. 2 Unit,
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dated February 14, 1980.
b.
The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports submitted to the NRC: RI Office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported.
The inspector determined whether generic implications were indicated, further information was required, or onsite followup warranted.
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The following Unit 1 LERs were reviewed:
LER DATED SUBJECT 80-01/03L January 31, 1980 HPI Loop Stop Valve Would Not Open to Throttit: Position 80-03/03L Feb. 7, 1980 Containment Air Lock Leakage 80-04/03L Feb. 8, 1980 Containment Particulate Monitor Inoperable 80-08/03L Feb. 25, 1980 RCP Delta-P Transmitter Sensing Line Leak 80-09/03L Feb. 27, 1980 Fire Hose Removed From
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- 80-10/03L Feb. 8, 1980 11, 12 and 21 Diesel Generators Inoperable
- See paragraph 3.b for additional information.
The following Unit 2 LERs were reviewed:
LER DATED SUBJECT 80-02/03L Feb. 7, 1980 RWT Narrow Range Level Instrument Alarm Inoperable 80-03/03L Feb. 8, 1980 21 Diesel Inoperable to Repair Gasket on Cooling Water Jacket 80-04/03L Feb. 19, 1980 Spurious Loss of Load Trips, RPS Channel B Trip Unit Bypassed 80-05/03L Feb. 22, 1980 Spurious High Power Level Trips, RPS Channel B Trip Units Bypassed 80-06/03L Feb. 22, 1980 Channel A RPS Trip Units Bypassed for Preventive Maintenance
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l LER DATED SUBJECT 80-07/03L Feb. 29, 1980 CEA 54 Inoperable 80-08/03L Feb. 25, 1980 22 Containment Spray Header Made Inoperable to Repack the 22 SDC Cross Connect Valve 80-09/03L Feb. 29, 1980 CEA 32 Dropped into the Core No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin No. 80-04, Analysis of Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater The subject Bulletin was issued on February 8,1980 and required a response within ^3 days.
The licensee responded in a letter dated February 12,196. by providing an enclosure (letter to NRR) describing the containment, Reactor Response changes associated with a proposed design change for automatic initiation of the Auxilliary Feedwater Sys tem.
The inspector noted that the reference did not specifically address the Bulletin items (for exampte(" continuation of main feed or condensate; runout AFW flow) and stated that an additional response was required addressing the specifics of the Bulletin.
The licensee stated an additional response would be sent.
IE B 80-04 renains open and will be reinspected.
7.
NRC/ FEMA Emergency Planning Task Force Meeting with BG&E State, Local Officials and Public The inspector attended and participated in the meeting which was held February 28, 1980 at the Calvert County Volunteer Fire Department in Prince Frederick, Maryland.
The morning session was a working session between the Task Force and the licensee evaluating the recently submitted revised Emergency Plan against NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radb logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
The afternoon session concerned the Task Force and State / Local Officials.
Beginning at 7 p.m. there was a pcriod for public discussion and questions.
A Meeting Summary will be issued by the NRC, Division of Operating Reactors, addressing the topics discussed in greater detai.
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Exit Interview
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During the inspection, meetings were held periodically with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
A sumary of inspection findings was also provided to the licensee at the conclusion of the report period.
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