IR 05000302/1990009
| ML20043F388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1990 |
| From: | Bradford W, Crlenjak R, Holmesray P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043F381 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-90-09, 50-302-90-9, NUDOCS 9006140459 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20043F388 (12) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y'
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Rep *ott* Ao :
50-302/90-09 Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No:
50-302 License No.
OPR-72 Facility Name:
Crystal River 3 Inspection Conduct #Ma ch 1 -
ril 27, 1990 Inspe fW Sz.-
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Sefior Resident Inspector Date signed Sn SkBko
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W. B'r ' ord esider(t Inspector Date Signed I hd
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Approved by:
R. Crl'enjak, SecCion Chief /
0' ate S'igned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, and facility modifications.
Numerous f acility tours were conducted and f acility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results: Within the :, cope of trd s inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate a co" crative approach to plant control.
The ability to continue the refueling outage with a much reduced Health Physict(HP) force, and to do so maintaining adequate HP coverage of the jobs determined to be priority, was an example of overall cooperation between all plant departments.
One non-cited violation, diesel generator work proceeding without a work package, paragraph 4.b.; and one violation, inadequate range of testing to prove correct index marks, paragraph 7, are contained in this report.
The licensee has taken prompt action to correct both of the violations.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuc' sear Plant Technical Support
- G. Becker, Manager Site Nuclear Engineering Services
- G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production
- J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
- P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
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- J. Colby, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer
- J. Cooper Superintendent Technical Support
- C. Doyel, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering
- R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- V. Hernandez, Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance
- B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent
- W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- W. Neuman, Nuclear Operations Technica; Advisor
- J. Roberts, Assistant Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent
- V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- M. Siapno, Health Physics Supervisor
- R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
- M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph, 2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
Power operations at maximum power limited by condenser delta temperature continued until the scheduled shutdown for the start of Refuel 7 outage on March 14, 1990.
The reactor coolant system was drained to mid-loop on March 22,1990 and remainec at this level until raised for defueling operations.
Defueling 6 h complete on April 27, 1990, a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed re#ds and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
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The following records were reviewed:
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Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-Of-Service Log; Shif t Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance
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Log; Short Tenn Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation k otection Logs.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspcctor independently verified clearance order tagouts.
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Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
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operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
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during backshif ts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activities.
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The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator
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room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.
The inspectors ahn observed conditions in the following areas:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation
The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters 'were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:
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Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid
radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor op rating
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parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
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(2) Shift Staffing c
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The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in l'
accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner, in
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I addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on vurious E
occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational
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problems, and other pertinent plant informat$on durtrig these c
turnovers.
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(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed. A tour of
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the reactor building revealed that the housekeeping was not t
good.
Refueling outage 7 is progressiag and some clutter is
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expected under outage work conditions.
Allowing for outage i
conditions, the amount of equipment, poly, tape, protective clothing and industrial debri.e seen in the reactor building appeared excessive. The licensee agrees and is taking action to reduce the unnecessary clutter in the plant.
(4) Radiological Protection Program
Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify-
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that these activities were in conformance with the facility
policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:
Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including
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step off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing; Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and
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contaminated areas; l
Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and,
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,
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protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.
Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspector.
The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the
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controls were adequate.
(5) Security Control In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included c".
a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit
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Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in l
L the central and secondary alann stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
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(6)
Fire Protection Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire
fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
(7) System Walkdown l
Partial Systems walkdowns were performed during the course of
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this inspection period on the
"A" Emergency Diesel Generator, the.iew startup transformer, "A" station batteries and portions of the Raw Water system.
All of these systems were in a work status as part of Refuel 7.
The clearance tags checked were found to be on the proper components.
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The raw water system is being internally inspected during this outage.
Findings to this point indicate no significant fouling.
Some delamination of the protective coating was noted.
The inspectors, as a result of routine plant tours and various operational and cutage observations, determined that housekeeping could be improved, that the outage was being performed in accordance with the schedule, that a conservative awareness of HP requirements was apparent, that the security program was effective, and that clearances, were being properly performed.
3.
Review of Maintenance (62703) and Surveillance (61726) Activities Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
- SP-210 ASME Class 2 & 3 Pressure Testing;
- SP-220 Source Range Functional Test During Refueling l
Operation; L
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
- SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps; L
- SP-332, Monthly Steam Line and Feedwater Isolation Functional
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L Test; l
- SP-346, Weekly Refueling Containment Penetration Checks;
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- SP-349A, Emergency Feedwater Pump EFP-1 Operability Demonstration;
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- SP-3548, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EGDG-1B;
- SP-406, Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements;
- SP-522, Station Batteries Inspection and Battery Charger Load Test;
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- SP-523, Station Batteries Service Test; and,
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- SP-673 Functional Test of Fuel Transfer System.
In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire
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prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
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i quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following i
maintenance activities:
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MUV-18, Hydrostatic Test - WR 10869;
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PT-130, Rev. 4. Hydraulic Pipe Snubber Test Procedure;
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MUV-292, Rewire valve on 3A MU pump;
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PM-167, EFIC Time Delay Relay Testing;
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Trouble shooting of spent fuel pool fuel handling crane;
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MP-122, QC Disassembly & Reassembly of Flanged Connection;
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FP-203, Defueling and Refueling Operation;
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FP-601C, Operation of Spent Fuel Handling Bridge FHCR-3; (FHCR 4A &
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FP-6010, Operation of Fuel Transfer Carriage and Upender
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4B);
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MAR 87-12-10-01, Reactor Building Fuel Handling Equipment
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Upgrade; and, MAR functional test procedure for:
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TP-1, Reactor Building fuel Handling Building Upgrade; TP-2, Reactor Building Fuel Handling Building Upgrade.
For the surveillance and maintenance activities observed and listed above, the inspectors determined that the work was performed in a satisfactory manner in accordance with procedural requirements.
4.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations
. Reports (71707)
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a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported imediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
LERs 88-26, 89-29, 89-30, 89-36, 89-38, and 89-41 are closed.
(1)
(Closed) LER 88-26:
Lack of valve position indicator causes improper system alignment resulting in failure to sample liquid released to the environment.
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The licensee's corrective action consisted of disassembly, cleaning and inspection of the valves.
The valve stems were replaced with longer valve stems.
Local valve position indicators have been installed.
This work is documented on Work Requests 11315, 11316, and 107867.
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(2)
(Closed) LER 89-41:
Unknown failure in the control rod transfer logic allows partial simultaneous withdrewal of two safety groups.
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This was evaluated documented on Nuclear Plant Safety Evaluation
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(NPSE) 90-0046, dated February 22, 1990.
The faulted relays were replaced and documented on Work Request 257995.
(3)
(Closed) LER 89-30: Installation of incorrect pump impeller on raw water pump 2B.
t The licensee's corrective action consisted of installation of a new and correct pump impeller and a completed inspection of the
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pump internals.
This is documented under Work Request 250311.
j The pump was tested under SP-344B, Rev.13, NSCC B-Train
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Quarterly Op:r:bf'd+y Surveillance.
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All purchases of safety-related equipment is receipt inspected under QPSR 89-40.
Actions taken included verification of the
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trim dimensions and number of vanes in each RW pump impeller currently in storage.
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(4)
(Closed) LER 89-36:
Errors in the safety listing caused procurement and installation of unqualified equipment.
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The licensee's corrective action consisted of replacement of transmitters DH-07-LT and DH-37-LT with qualified transmitters under MAR 10-13-01 dated October 31, 1989.
This MAR corrected the Safety List to identify the transmitters to be RG-1.97
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instruments.
The Safety List review was completed and is
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documented on a letter to W. L. Rossfeld (NEA 90-0330), dated February 20, 1990.
(5)
(Closed) LER 89-38:
Personnel error causes failure to establish administrative controls.
The licensee's corrective action includes revising Operating Procedure 402, Makeup and Purification System.
This-revision f
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was dated December 21, 1989 and included control of valves MUV 9, 62, and 69.
Power supplies for these valves has been changed
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to allow locking the electrical breakers open at the respective motor control ' center.
This work is documented on MAR 82-10-19-07 and Work Request 49941.
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy, to verify the following: TS are complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by TS,
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On March 14, 1990, the licensee found that work on the "A" emergency diesel was proceeding without an approved work package present, The diesel had been tagged out for the scheduled outage modifications.
The work was stopped and the work package obtained.
After the work package was obtained and at the work site, the work continued. The licensee ensured that the contractor / vendor understood the administrative requirements.
This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the
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NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
The licensee documented this violation in NCOR 90 36.
j Non-cited Violation (302/90-09-01):
Diesel generator work
proceeding without a work package.
5.
FollowupofEvents(93702)
a.
Discretionary enforcement to allow continued operation with the reactor coolant pump power monitor TS surveillance not performed was granted by telephone on February 13, 1989 and followed by letter
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dated February 24, 1989.
This latitude was necessary to allow continued operation with one channel of the pump power monitor tripped, due to one inoperable reactor coolant pump.
The pump power
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monitor logic is two out of four.
With one channel tripped the TS surveillance could not be performed without tripping the reactor.
The discretionary enforcement was allowed only until the next plant shutdown which began on February 26, 1989 to repair the inoperable reactor coolant pump.
This discretionary enforcement is no longer active. This item is closed, b.
On April 23, 1990 the inspector was approached by construction electricians who were working on 480V and 4160V electrical cables.
The work was located in the control complex on the 95 ft, and 108 ft.
elevation, it was found that these cables have an internal wrapping of asbestos.
The workers were concerned about health hazards and adequate personnel protection when the asbestos wrapper was cut and
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exposed, j
The inspector discussed their concern with the licensee. The licensee
stated that the contractor did not as yet have a qualified asbestos inspector but would have one very soon.
The contractor has completed
the required training but has not received formal notice of his test-resul ts.
The licensee also stated that the contractor had received training which described asbestos hazards as requiring the same protection as for radioactive particles in the atmosphere and surface contamination.
FPC is initiating further training.
Once aware of the asbestos hazard in the rooms where the cable was cut the licensee stopped work.
Airborne asbestos samples were taken and cleanup of the affected areas was perfccmed.
Medical examinations were made available to the persons involved.
A test cut of the cable with sample instrumentation and proper protective clothing is underway to accurately detennine the levels of asbestos generated by the cutting operation.
Samples taken at the actual work site, after work was
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stopped, were found to be below regulatory limits.
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In response to a worker's concern for working in asbestos without
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proper protection, an Occupational Safety and Health Association (OSHA)
investigator visited the site on April 26, 1990.
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'6.
ReactorCoolantSystemMid-loopOperationDuringRefuelingOutage(Generic
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Letter 88-17) Ref. FpC response to Generic letter 88-17 dated January 4, i
1989(71707)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's conditions for prevention of loss of decay heat removal while reactor coolant inventory is at reduced levels.
The following actions were verified on March 30, 1990, and found to be satisfactorily completed:
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a.
Prior to mode 5 at mid-loop operation each shif t supervisor is i
required to brief oncoming personnel.
This is documented in Control i
Room Order LO#90-045, dated March 14, 1990.
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b.
Containment closure capability is covered in Operating Procedure (0P)
417, Containment Operating Procedure.
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Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature.
Two continuous core exit
temperature indicators are operable. This item is covered in OP-404, Decay Heat Removal System.
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RCS level indication.
Two independent and continuous level indications.
This item is covered in OP-404, Decay Heat Removal
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System, e.
Avoidante of RCS perturbations.
This item is covered in OP-404, Decay Hen Removal System, f.
RCS inven: ry addition.
This item is covered in OP-404, Decay Heat
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Removal Syssem.
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Contingency plans to repower vital busses are covered in appropriate operating procedures.
7.
Refueling (71707)
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On April 20, 1990, the licensee commenced defueling operations. The first
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two fuel assemblies removed were N02 and 003.
These fuel assemblies were L
the wrong assemblies.
Fuel assemblies M02 and NO3 were the correct assemblies.
This error was caused by improper indexing match marks which had been placed on the fuel handling trolley by the contractor who made the modification to the fuel handling mechanism.
The contractor had changed the trolley index markers to add the letter "J" and omit the letter "0".
The refueling procedure had been written to coincide with the original match marks.
The licensee stopped all fuel movements. The fuel i
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movement mistake was evaluated and documented.
Initial conditions to continue the procedure were re-established and the indexing problem was corrected.
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The modifications to the fuel handling equipment was completed under MAR 87-12-10-01.
The post modification test procedure TP-1, MAR Functional
Test for Reactor Building Fuel Handling Equipment Upgrade, was prepared to
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test the equipment.
The bridge and trolley index marks were checked in step 7.3.3.49 of the procedure by positioning the bridge at index mark "8" and the trolley at index mark "H".
This is directly in the center of the reactor core.
This move was correct.
If other index marks had been selected in any position past position "H" the error in the trolley index would have been identified and corrected prior to fuel movement.
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This otherwise good test procedure was marred by an inadequate range of testing to prove the index marks were correct. This is a violation.
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Violation (302/90-09-02):
Inadequate range of testing to prove correct index marks.
8.
Plant Modifications (37828)
The inspector observed portions of the
"A" emergency diesel generator upgrade.
This upgrade was in three major parts; additional lube oil coolers, modified combustion air intake, and modification of the diesel to
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a higher horsepower rating.
The work observed, which included parts of
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all three MARS was accomplished per written procedures.
The one exception to working by procedure was documented as a non-cited violation in paragraph 4.b. of this report.
During the modification of the diesel, the FPC component engineer was at the work site frequently.
Portions of the functional testing were witnessed by the resident inspectors.
The testing was conducted in accordance with procedure and was successful.
The modified diesel, oil coolers, and intake air supply all functioned properly.
The 30 fast starts are to be accomplished.af ter the diesel is declared operable.
The procedures used were:
MAR 88-01-19-01, Emergency Diesel Generator Upgrade; MAR 88-10-19-01, Diesel Generator Combustior Air Intake; MAR 88-11-10-01, EDG Lube Oil Coolers DLHE-In/1B and DLHE 2A/2B; and, MAR 88-01-12-01 Test Procedure 1 MAR Functional Test.
This project has been well planned and executed marred only by th6 lack of proper procedures in place at the work site at the start of the diesel upgradeMAR(Seeparagraph4.b).
9.
Strike Implementation (92710)
On March 26, 1990 a sick out (workers calling in sick) of contract health physics workers began. This walk out continued for approximately one week with most HPs reporting back to work by Aoril 2,1990.
On one day, March 29,1990, the contract work force reported to work, then about 50 percent of-them lef t the site.
No FPC personnel took part in this event.
No threat to the safety of the plant was observed nor was the health and safety. of the public challenged by this walk out.
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management of the on-going refueling outage was conservative in that priority was assigned to work tasks and only those that could be properly controlled were permitted to continue.
The status of on-going work was reviewed and discussed at the daily meetings with area managers to ensure the proper HP controls were in place.
No attempt to stop normal traffic in or out of the plant was observeo'
The licensee does not have a strike contingency procedure since all contracts include a no strike clause. The contract ends December 1, 1991, J
If no written notice to end the contract is. received by FPC sixty days prior to contract expiration the contract continues. FPC has a policy document which provides guidance to prepare for a strike if the notice to end the contract is received. Since only contractors were involved in the j
walkout the policy guidance was not implemented.
l The licensee performed well while continuing, in a conservative manner,
the refueling outage with health physics.sfety as a priority.
10, Exit Interview (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on April 27, 1990.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the non-cited violation and violation.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did t
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed s
by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference 50-302/90-09-01 Nua-cited Violation - Diesel generator work proceeding without a work package.
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i 50-302/90-09-02 Violation - Inadequate range of testing to prove correct index marks.
l 11. Acronyms and Abbreviations CCTV - Closed Circuit Television CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations L
- Emergency Diesel Generator (
- Florida Power Corporation
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- Health Physics ISI
- Inservice Inspection LER
- Licensee Event Report MAR
- Modification Approval Record l
NCOR - Nonconforming Operation Report NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
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NPSE - Nuclear Plant. Safety Evaluation l
OP.
- Operating Procedure L
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OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Association PM
- Preventive Maintenance RCA
- Radiation Control Area RCS-
- Radiation Work Permit SP
- Surveillance Procedure STI
- Short Term Instruction b
TS
- Technical Specification I
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