IR 05000302/1990014

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Insp Rept 50-302/90-14 on 900428-0601.Noncited Violation Noted Re Failure to Maintain Control of Core Components Location.Major Areas Inspected:Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Facility Mods,Diesel Generator Support Sys
ML20044B098
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1990
From: Bradford W, Crlenjak R, Holmesray P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20044B097 List:
References
50-302-90-14, NUDOCS 9007170306
Download: ML20044B098 (11)


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UNITED ST ATES i

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NUCLEAR RECULATCRY COMMIS$10N s

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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No:

50-302/90-14 o

Licensee: ' Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St.-Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No: -50-302 License No.: DPR-72

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U Facility Name:

Crystal River 3

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Inspection Conducted: April 28 - June 1, 1990

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Inspecto s:

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P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

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,!h IhN74 Approved by:

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1 R. Wlenjak, 3ection 011ef /

D6te S'igned Did sion of Reactor Projects-SUMMARY

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' Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the

areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event

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Reports, facility modifications, diesel generators support systems and makeup 3y system, and: licensee action on previous inspection items.

Numerous facility

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tours were conducted ~and facility operations observed.

Some of these tours and

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observations were conducted on backshifts.

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-Results:' The following non-cited violation was identified and reviewed during.

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this. inspection:

Failure to maintain control of core components location as -

i demonstrated by an unrodded fuel assembly in the core at a rodded fuel assembly

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location. -paragraph 7.

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9007170306 900620 PDR ADOCK 05000302

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L REPORT DETAILS t

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Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees

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  • J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Site Support
  • F. Bailey, Superintendent, Nuclear Projects u

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  • W. Bandhauer, Superintendent Nuclear Operations
  • P.Bassa, Superintendent,NuclearSecurity(Acting)

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  • G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

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  • G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production

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  • J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
  • M. Collins, Superintendent, Nuclear Safety and Reliability

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  • V. Hernandez, Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance

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  • J. Holton, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
  • M. Jacobs Area Public Information Coordinator
  • A. Kazemfar, Supervisor, Radiological Support Services
  • H. Koon, Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
  • W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
  • P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
  • W, Neuman, Nuclear Operations Advisor
  • T. Raper, Superintendent, Nuclear Scheduling
  • S. Robinson, Superintendent, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection
  • V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance
  • W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
  • *F. Sullivan Manager, Nuclear Plant Systems Engineering
  • R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
  • M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist Other licensee employees contacted. included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
  • Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph,

2.

ReviewofPlantOperations(71707)

The plant continued in refueling outage - for the duration of this inspection period.

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Shift Lop; and Facility Records The bspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with l

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Sp2cifications (TS) and the licensee's adainistrative procedures.

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The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation

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Protection Logs, in addition to these record reviews, the-inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts, b.

Facility Tours and Observations L

Throughout the -inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.

Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.

Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

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security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.

The inspectors also observed conditions in the following areas:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and itquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating paran'eters.

(2) Shift Staffing The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.

In addition, the inspector observed shif t turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.

(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions -

i of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or ' ire hazards existed.

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general condition of the plant, even for major outage, was poor.

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Plastic, tape, unused protective clotning, tools, dirt, etc.

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Plant management is taking i

action to get the plant restored to an acceptable level of cleanliness.

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(4) Radiological Protection Program

Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify i

that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory

requirements. These observations included:

Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including

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step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated

clothing; i

Area postings and contrc's;

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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

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contaminated areas; RadiationControlArea(RCA)exitingpractices;and,..

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,

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protective clothing..and respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the

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inspector.

The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work

'i Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.

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(5) Security Control In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included-a. review of,the licensee's physical security program.

The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed

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in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and e

vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages.

and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors;. patrols; and compensatory posts.

In addition, the u

inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit

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Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary darm stations, protected area j

lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the

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security organization interface with operations and maintenance.

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Fire Protection

Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that

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fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire l-fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

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i The inspectors, as a result of routine plant tours and various operational and outage observations, determined that housekeeping could be improved, that the outage was being performed in accordance with the schedule, that a conservative awareness of HP requirements was apparent, that the security program was effective, and that clearances were being properly performed. No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

ReviewofMaintenance(62703)andSurveillance(61726) Activities Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was t

utilized; and TS requirements were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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- SP-306, Weekly Surveillance Log;

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- SP-340B, "B" Train ECCS Pump and Valve Quarterly Operability

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Test;

- SP-346, Containment Penetrations Weekly Check During Refueling Operations;

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- SP-354B, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EDG-1B;

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- SP-358B, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation Logic Functional Test #2;

- SP-406, Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements;

- SP-456 Refueling Interval Equipment Response to an ESAS Test

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Signal;

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- SP-457.. Refueling Interval ECCS Response to a Safety injection Test Signal;

- SP-630, MVP/HPI Check Valves Full Flow Test;

- PT-334, MVP-1C Power and Flow Measurements for EGDG-1B KW Loading Verification; and,

- PT-341, Make-up Pump Hydraulic and Electrical Performance Test.

In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality-control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities: -

MUV-58 - MP-402B, Rev. 4, Maintenance of "Limitorque" Valve Operators

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- Type SMB-00; MP-804, Rev. 4, Installation of Concrete Anchor Bolts and Integrity

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Verification; MP-186, Rev. O, RC Pump N9000 Seal Package Refurbishment and Testing;

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1 WR-NUO245806 MUV-103 Letdown Storage Tank Make-up Valve Seat Repair;

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and.

MAR 90-02-04-01, Battery Ground Detector Replacement.

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for the surveillance and maintenance activities observed and listed above,

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the inspectors determined that the work was performed in a satisfactory

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L-manner in accordance with procedural requirements and met the requirements l

of the Technical Specification.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Safety Systems Walkdown (71710)

l The inspectors conducted system walkdown inspections of 3A and 3B diesel l

generators starting air systems, fuel oil systems, lube oil systems and

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engine cooling syter Portions of the makeup system was inspected.

The system lineups were. verified to be in accordance with license l

requirements for system operability and that system drawings and L

procedures correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

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Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations Reports (71707)

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Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.

Events that were reported inanediately were reviewed as they occurred to detennine if the TS were satisfied, j

LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement l

Policy. LERs 88-19 and 88-28 are closed.

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(1)

(Closed)LER88-19andRev.1: Personnel error leads to battery misalignment and technical specification violation.

L This LER reported that the plant operated approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> without a battery charger supplying the load for a 125 volt DC-bus.

This LER was previously reviewed in NRC Inspection-Report-

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50-302/89-15 and was left open pending completion of set point alarm review modification and evaluation of the effect of the I

load on the battery during the battery misalignment, i

The licensee concluded in revision 1 of the LER, that the battery would have been capable of perfonning its design

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function throughout the event.

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MAR 89-02-14-01 has been initiated which upgrades computer l'

points E-200 and E-201 to give an alarm on reduced voltage. The computer will alarm at a 2 to 3 volt drop in overall battery l

voltage.

This ensures that loss of float voltace will automatically cause an alarm to be initiated.

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(2)

(Closed) LER 88-28:

Deficiency in environmental equipment

upgrade program methodology results in failure to recognize

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cable splices as separate components, t

the licensee's corrective action consisted of (1), a review of documentation through the Environmental and Seismic

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Qualification Program Manual to ensure safety related motor t

operationshavequalifiedterminationsand(2),replacementwith

Ray Chem splices by MAR 88-12-03-01.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

InstallationandTestingofModifications(37828)

Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and cpproved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were. performed in accordance with technically adequate and

approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.

This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.

The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or associated testing observed:

MAR 90-04-09-01, Change Relief Valve Set Point on DHV-44.-

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MAR 84-06-07-02, (ATWS) Anticipated Transients Without Scram.

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functions of the ATWS system is; to provide a reactor trip signal independent of the reactor reactor coolant system (RCS) protection system on indication of highpressu ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) which provides a diverse means' to initiate Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System (EFIC) and trip the main turbine upon-loss of feedwater during power operation.

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MAR 88-01-12-01, This modification increases the rating of the diesel

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generator by the combined effects of separate MAR's listed below.

MAR 88-11-10-01, larger lube oil coolers were installed in place of

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the existing coolers in order to maintain the lube oil temperature within acceptable limits.

MAR 88-10-19-01, A new combustion air intake duct was added to each

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Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) which is independent of room temperature and the existing system.

The new intake duct will provide combustion air of less than 105 degrees F at the turbo charger end intake.

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MAR 87-10-19-01A, This modification removes the existing timing and

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alarm scheme and replaces it with a new timing scheme.

The new timers will monitor the cumulative time that EDG-3A operates above 3250 KW.

An alarm is provided each time the EDG goes above 3250 KW for 10 seconds.

Additional alarms are provided after 24 minutes and 29 minutes of EDG operation above 3250 KW.

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MAR ' 89-01-04-02, New equipment is installed to be used for EDG

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monitoring.

This includes installation of two Foxboro isolators and p

wiring from the EDG Watts and Var meters.

l MAR 90-04-11-01, Installation of a cross connection between day tank

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A and B that feed the EDG's will provide the capability to access fuel supply via fuel transfer pumps A and B to either day tank.

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configuration will provide redundancy to ensure independence of the diesel generator trains to enhance safe shutdown capabilities.

MAR 88-04-11-01,. Sync check relays were installed across both diesel

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generators breakers.

These relays will check the operator action as.

he puts the diesel, generator _on-line by supervising the manual close l

circuit of the generator circuit breaker. This prevents inadvertent closing of the generator breaker if the diesel generator voltage is too far out of phase with the bus voltage for proper synchronized loading.

MAR 88-05-04-01, This modification decreases the loading upon EDG-3B

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by automatically shedding the heat tracing load wher ES actuation coincident with 480 volt undervoltage occurs.

A modification was made to upgrade the pressurizer heater power

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l-supply by MAR 88-11-05-01.

This provides the capability to manually

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align up to 3 - 126 KW groups of "on-off" pressurizer heaters to each redundant emergency power sources to enhance the ability to maintain

. natural circulation cooling during a loss of off-site power.

The nitrogen supply to the reactor building was modified under MAR.

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87-07-28-01 such that a common nitrogen regulator r.ow provides pressure control for the' pressurizer, primary side of both steam

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generators, and a new supply line to the reactor' vessel head.

Each supply header is equipped with individual pressure gauges.

The inspectors also attended formal operator training sessions for the modifications listed above.

The training was judged to be adequate and participation by attendees was good. The modifications were discussed in l

detail and. hand out instruction material packages were complete.

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violations or deviations were identified.

In addition to the-review / inspections-conducted cu the above items, resident and regional inspectors witnessed and reviewed. post maintenance / modification testing performed on major plant work conducted during the outage.

One regional inspector was assigned to follow all 1:

. electrical modifications and was on site approximately every other week l

during the outage (ref. NRC IR Nos. 50-302/90-09,10,13,15,16,and18).

The resident and regional inspectors reviewed procedures for and witnessed

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portions of: A and B EDG testing; ES logic testing; Clark relay testing;

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ES manual and auto actuation testing; new offsite power transformer functional testing; equipment response to ES actuation signal testing; l

Emergency Core Cooling System response to SI test signal; and replacement safety related battery testing, j

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7.

FollowupofEvents(93702)

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On May 9,1990, an error was made in the sequence of control rod shuffling prior to start of core re-load on May 13, 1990.

For this error the

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licensee ended the investigation when the suspect control rod was found to

be in its required position.

However, on May 17, 1990, the licensee's

core verification after refueling found that one fuel bundle that should

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contain a control rod did not.

The control rod was found to be in the

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spent fuel pool in an unused fuel assembly.

FPC immediate ccrrective

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action was to return the unrodded fuel assembly to the spent fuel pool, place the proper control rod in the fuel assembly then re-load the fuel

assembly in the core.

The fuel pools, the reactor: vessel, and the;

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transfer canals had been previously borated, as required, to refueling i

concentrations.

This required poison concentration assures a safe shut-

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down margin, during refueling, taking credit for no control rods in the i

fuel bundles.

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The licensee's investigation into how the unrodded fuel assembly was

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loaded into the core determined that apparently the shuffle error on May 9 resulted in the misplaced control-rod identified on May 17.

The May 9 investigation may have been suspended prematurely when the first-control rod was found to be in its desired location.

Additionally, it was found

that the procedure controlling control rod movement (FP-6010) did not require the same independent verification of control rod movement as was l

required for fuel movement. This lack of verification was a weakness.

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r This event was discussed in the NRC resident inspector monthly exit on

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p June 1, 1990. The licensee comitted to change the appropriate procedures l

to. require the same verification for control rod movement as is now required for fuel movement and to include a visual check of the fuel

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assembly in the upender to verify that the configuration about to be i

loaded into the core is as expected. These changes are to be completed by October'30, 1990.

This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified.in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy i

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were satisfied.

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Non-cited Violation (302/90-14-01):

Failure to maintain control of core components location.

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- Licensee Action on Previously identified Inspection Findings (92702 &

92701)

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(Closed) Violation 302/89-06-02, Inadequate Sodium Hydroxide Surveillance Procedure.

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Al-402B Writers guide was revised to include a check step to insure that valve lineups established by a clearance is properly restored

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and to check that conflicts between clearances, valve lineups, test boundaries and restoration sections do not exist.

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9 The specific surveillance procedure for sodium hydroxide flow testing was revised from one procedure to one procedure for each train thereby making the procedure easier to perform.

A pre-job briefing is also now required. This item is closed, b.

(Closed) Violation 302/89-15-01, Improper electrolyte level in station batteries.

The licensee, after discussion with the battery vendor, added an additional high level mark to compensate for battery heating due to use or charging.

Procedures were revised to reflect this change, i

The newly installed batteries also have this enhanced high level indication. This item is closed, c.

(Closed) IFI 302/89-19-01, Al-2210, Fire Watch Program, addresses

the responsibilities of a fire watch and the training requirements

for a fire watch.

This procedure states in Paragraph 4.4.1.1 that i

fire watches must have no other job assignment to distract their j

attention from the work going on.

This item is closed.

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(Closed) Part 21 Notification for Fairbanks Morse Engine Division Model 38TD8-1/8 Piston Pin (Symbol 16200274).

The licensee received notification from Colt Industries on March 7 j

1990 regarding the potential failure of piston pins which could be used on the upper piston assemblies in 900 rpm turbocharged engines.

The lower piston assemblies are not affected.

The licensee researched their records and determined that these piston pins have not been installed in their diesel engines. Warehouse stock of this marking has been returned to the manufacture.

Both diesel engines have been modified during the refueling outage by the vendor to upgrade the engines to higher rating.

The diesel

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generators have been tested satisfactory.

No' violations or deviations were identified.

9, ExitInterview(30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on June 1, 1990. During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Non-cited Violation.

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The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

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by the inspectors during this inspection, c

Item Number Description and Reference j

50-302/90-14-01 Non-cited Violation - Failure to

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maintain control of core components.

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i Id. Acronyms and Abbreviations Al

- Administrative Instruction AMSAC - ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry

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ATWS - Anticipated Transients Without Scram i

Closed Circuit Television

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CCTV

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CFR

- Code of Federal Regulations

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Direct Current DC

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DSS

. Diverse Scram System

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Emergency Diesel Generator

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EDG

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EFIC '- Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control System Engineered Safeguard System ES

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Fahrenheit i

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Refueling Procedure FP

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Inspector Followup Item IFI

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Inspection Report

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Kilowatt

KW

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Licensee Event Report

LER

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Modification Approval Record

MAR

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Maintenance Procedure

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MP

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Make-Up Valve

MVV

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Non-cited Violation

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NCV

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRC

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Performance Test

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Reactor Coolant

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RC

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Radiation Control Area

RCA

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Reactor Coolant System

RCS

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Radiation Work Pennit

RWP

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Safety Injection

SI

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Surveillance Procedure

SP

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STI

Short Term Instruction

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Technical Specification

TS

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Work Request

WR

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