IR 05000302/1981007
| ML20010A653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1981 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Beverly Smith, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010A647 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-81-07, 50-302-81-7, NUDOCS 8108110640 | |
| Download: ML20010A653 (18) | |
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UNITED STATES
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'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e.
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E REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 Y
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303 g
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Report No. 50-302/81-07 Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 320134th Street, South St. Petersberg, Florida 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant Donet No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at near Crystal River, Florida
tta O C 6 /2 W
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Insoector: t T. F., Setka, Senior Residebt Inspector Date Signed
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h iL G. W. SmftY, ~ Resider.t InspecJop Date'sigried
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Approved by-
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P./J. Kellogg,S#ct4en-Gb4efrDivision of Date Signea
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Resident ar4 feactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspectjon on April 29 through May 22, 1981 Areas Inspected Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and Non -Conforming Operations Reports (NCOR's), Non-Routine Evens, licensee action on IE Bulletins, Implementation of TMI Action Plan item, and licerisee action on previous inspection items, numerous facility tours were conducted and faci 11ty operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on back shifts.
This inspection report also includes meeting with Operater Licensing Branch (OLB)
personnel.
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The inspection involved 171 hours0.00198 days <br />0.0475 hours <br />2.827381e-4 weeks <br />6.50655e-5 months <br /> onsite by the two resident inspectors.
I Results
One violation was identified,
' Failure to have three auxiliary Building charcoal
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filter banks coerable during olant operation, paragraph 9.b)
8108110640 810304 T-PDR ADOCK 05000302l
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DETAILS t
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Baynard, Manager, Nuclear Support Services
- G. Eolt, T chnical Services Superintendent e
- C. Brown, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor
- J. Bufe, Compliance Auditor s
M. Collins, Reactor Specialist
- J. Cooper, QA/QC Compliance Manager W. Cross, Operations Engineer
"B. Crane, Planning Engineer i
- G. Hebb, Nuclear Shift Supervisor I
"V. Hernandez, Compliance Auditor l
S. Johnson, Maintenance Staff Engineer
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W. Kemper, Plant Training Manager
- K. Lancaster, w;ality As surance Audi tor B. Lucas, Secs ity Officer
- T. Lutkehaus, Technical Assistant to the Nuclear Plant Manager
- P. McKee, Operations Superintendent G. Perkins, Health Physics Suoervisor
- D. Poole, Nuclear Plant Manager l
G. Ruszala, Chemistry / Radiation Protection Manager
- D. Smith, Technical Assistant to the Nuclear Plant Manager J. Lander, Maintenance Superintendent L. Tittle, Performance Engineering Supervisor
- G. Williams, QA/QC Supervisor
- K. Wilson, Licensing Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, mainenance, chem / rad, and corporate personnel.
- Prestnt at the exit interviews.
2.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on numerous occasions during and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 22,
'. 9 81. During this meeting the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting the violation, unresolved item (s), and inspector followup item (s) were discussed.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-39-06): The licensee has developed an ambitious plan to solve the limitorgue valve problems that have developed at the facility. This plan, outlined in a memorardum dated April 23, 1981, will have operational and procedural changes for limitorque operation and maintenance completed by the end of June,1981. Additional modifications to the limitorque will be completed by the end of the third refuel outage scheduled to begin in Septemter,1981.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-05-09): The recommendec corrective actions from the " Lessons Learned Task Force" Reports Nr the reactor trip that occurred during the period of April 11 and 12, 1931, have been completed. The inspectors re/iewed these reports and verified completion of the corrective actions. The inspectors are satisfied with the accuracy of the report.s and with the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-01-14): The 1icensee has revised procedure PT-120 as revision 6'on May 14 to assure that the incore amplifier gains are checked prior to escalating to the 75% to 100*; full power range.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-22-03): The licensee submitted a revised response to IE Bulletin 79-21 on June 6,1980.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-28-01): The licensee has initiated a Request for Engineering Information (REI) 80-08-03 on August 6, 1980 to upgrade the communications system external to the Reactor Building, Auxiliary Building, and Intermediate Building (these areas had the ccmmunications systems upgraded from previous modifications). In addition, I
the licensee has outstanding Modifiaction Approval Record (MAR) 79-12-5 in progress to ad additional communication speakers in plant areas that have recently been icentified as having audibility problems.
This MAR is expected to be completed lay the end of the fall 1981 refueling outage. This item remains 9 pen pending completion of the review of REI 80-03 and the completion of MAR 79-12-5.
(Closed) Open Item (302/79-50-08): The licensee has completed their upgrade of the communication system as stated in their response to IE Bulletin 79-18 and is in process of further improving the system. Further improvements to the system will be tracked under item (302/60-28-01).
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-05-08): The licensee has revised
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procedure SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection / Maintenance, on May 21, 1981, to include checking and cleaning of the crankcase ejector and oil separator.
This procedure is performed each refueling outage.
Monthly surveillance test results have indicated ro clogging problems on the B Emergency Diesel Generator and tnerefore the licensee intends to wait until the fall refueling outage before cleani g these devices on this generator.
This action is considered to be acceptable by inspectors.
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(Closed)
Unresolved Item (302/79-01-01):
Tt 9 licensee has upgraded the j
Auxiliary Building evacuation alarm syste.n as described in items (302/80-28-01) and (302-79-50-08) listed in this paragraph.
Further progress on this item will be tracked in accordance with item ( 302/80-28-fal).
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/79-41-05):
The licensee %s revised Surveillance Procedure (SP)-443, Master Surveillance P l '.n, to clari fy rescheduling 5.P. performance to meet the htent of Technical Specification (TS) requirements in regard to "complets" and " piece-meal S.P. performance.
The inspector reviewed the revision to SP-443 and has no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/79-50-02):
The licensee has-complete'iy revised their Emergency Plan to be consistent with the revised requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Append'x E and various NUREGS and Regulatory Guides.
An emergency drill was conducted on April 22, 1981 to verify
' effectiveness of the new plan The inspector reviewed the plan and observed
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the drill and have no further questions cn this item.
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Inspector Followup Item (302/79-41-02):
5P-301, Lotked Valve List, has been revised to specify the method of locking open Core Flood Valves (CFV)-5 and 6.
Operating Procede-e (0P)-202, Plant Heatup, already contains instructions concerning the method for locking open CFV-5 and 6.
The inspector reviewed the revision to SP-301 and the existing instructiora in OP-202 and have no further questions on this iten.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/79-41-01):
The licensee agreed to update system flow diagrams to reflect normal it: plant valve positions under normal operating conditions on a change-to-drawing-when-other-changes-are-to-bc-made-basis. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and have no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Insipector Followup Item (302/79-44-01): and (302/79-44-02):
The frequency meters for 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were calibrated on 10/24/79 and 10/25/79 respectively.
In addition, Preventative i
Maintenance Procedure (PM)-102, Protectie Electrical Relays, and Maintenance i
Proceduro (MP)-407, Maintenance of Switchboard Meters and Associated i
Transducers for Emergency Diesel Generators, have been issued to establish a routine program for calibration and/or testing of safety related metering and relaying devices. The inspectors have no further questions on these
items at this tima.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/79-41-03):
SP-119, Feedwater Block Valve Functional Testing, has been issued to perform periodic dynamic checking of feedwater valve sequence operability.
The inspector reviewed this procecure and has no further questions on this item.
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I (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-01-06): The licensee has completed
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the weekly surveillance testing on Air-Handling Valves (AHV)-IC and ID.
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These valves will now be tested during their normal routine surveillance frecuency. The inspectors reviewed the results of the surveillance testing to verify satisfactory data. This item remains open pending completion of
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-22-02): The licensee has revised i
EP-106 to caution operators that pressurizer level errors may occur due to high reactor, building temperatures.
The licensee will make additional t
revisions to EP-105 and EP-106 as discussed in paragraph 7.d of this report
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under IE Bulletin 79-21. These changes will be tracked under this bulletin
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which remains open.
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Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters which more information is required to determine t
whether they are acceptable or may result in violations.
New unresolved items identified during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.A and -
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5.B (10)a.
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5.
Review of Plant Operations The plant continued with power operations (Mode 1) until May 8, at which i
time a plant shutdown.and cooldown was conducted as required by T.S. 3.0.3 due to being in excess of the action statement of T.S. 3.7.8.1 (see section
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I 9.b of this report for detai.,).
The plant - returned to Mode 1 power
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operations on May 10 and continued in this Mode for the duration of the j
inspection period.
A.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
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j The inspectors reviewed the records listed below and discussed various
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entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with T.S. and the licensee's administrative procedures.
-Shift Supervisor's Log;
-Operators's Log;
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-Eauipment-Out-of-Service-Log; I-Shift Relief Checklist;
-Control Center Status Board;
-Short Term Instructions; i-Auxiliary Building Operators' Log; and
-Operating Daily Surveillance Log.
In additional to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified
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selected ciecrance order tagouts.
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On May 22 the inspector observed three danger tags that were installed to
isolate and bypass a steam trap on the steam suppl) line to the steam driven
emergency feedwater-pump (EEP-2).
The tags were extremely faded and difficult to read. A check of the clearance order log revealed that this clearance order (2-76) was missing. A copy of the clearance order was finally located in the document control room with. clearances that were completed and ready for 11crofilming. A check of the clearance indicated the clearance was released (work completed on the steam trap) on February 28, 1981, but the tags associated with the. clearance had never been removed.
The clearance was returned to the control room, tne tags were removed and
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the steam trap was returned to service.
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Unresolved Item (302/81-07-01): Determine the adecuacy of the system used
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to retur equipment / components to service subsequent to maintenance.
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l B.
Facility Tours and Observations
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Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
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observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activities were conducted during back
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l shifts. Also during this inspection period, numerous licensee meetings
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were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management
activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
-Security perimeter fence;
-Turbine Building:
-Control Room;
-Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms;
-Au v liary Building;
-Intermdiate Building;
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-Battery Rooms; and, l-Electrical Switchgear Rooms.
.During these tours, the following observsations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - the following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance
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with the Technical Specifications for the current operational
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mode:
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l-Equipment operating status;
-Area, atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors;
-Electrical system lineups; r-Reactor Operating parameters; and-Auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
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(2) Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified by numerous checks that c
coerating shift staffing was in accordane with Technical bpecification requirements. In addition, the inspectors observed shif t turnovers on different occasions to verify the continuity of
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status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information was being accomplished.
(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the faciiity were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards exist.
The general housekeeping conditions are acceptable.
(4) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCA's) were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These obser-vations included review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and area posting.
Area postings were verified for accuracy through the use of the inspector's own radiation monitoring instrument.
No problems were identified in this area.
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(5) Fluid Leaks - Various plant systems were observed to detect the presence of leaks. No problems were identified in this area.
(6) Piping Vibration - No excessive piping vibrations were noted.
(7) Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed. No problems were identified in this area.
(8) Security Controls - Security Controls were observed to verify that -
security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty and access
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to the protected area is controlled in accordance with the facility security plan. No problems were identified in this area.
(9) Surveillance Testing - Surveillance testing was observed to verify that:
-Approved procardures were being used;
-Qualified personnel were conducting the tests;
-Testing was adequate to verify equipment operability, and-Calibrated equipment, as required, were utilized.
The following test were observed:
-SP-501, Halon System Surveillance;
-SP-363, Fire System Test (Capacity check on fire pumps);
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-SP-370, Quarterly Cycling cf Valves (Cycling of CAV-61 to demonstrate operability);
-SP-179, Containment Leakage Tests, Type B&C (Data review for AHV-1C and ID);
-SP-187, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System Testing (Data review);
-SP-320, Operation of Boron Injection Sc'irces and Pumps (Data
review);
-SP-317, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance (Data review); and-SP-430, Containment Air Locks.
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No problems were noted in this area.
(10) Maintenance Activities The inspector observed mainenance
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-Approved procedures were being utilized;
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-Correct equipment clearances were in effect;
-Work Requests (W/R's), Radiation Work Permits (RWP's), and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as required, were issued and being
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followed; and,
-Quality Control personnel were available for inspection activities as required.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
-PM-112, Inspection, Cleaning, Shooting, and Plugging of Heat Exchangers;
-011 Cooler replacement on Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water Pump (SWP)1A;
-Review of work documents associated with removal and replacement of Auxiliary Building Charcoal filters;
-Troubleshooting of "e" Inverter subsequent to inverter failure;
and-Review of work documents associated with the installation of a temporary replacement for a ruptured expansion joint on the turbine building waste neutralizer tank.
As a result of these' observations, the following were identified:
a.
During SWP-1A oil cooler replacement the inspector noted that Maintenance Procedure (MP)-122, Disassembly and Reassembly of Flanged Connections, was not present at the jobsite during the cooler replacement as required by the work request.
This procedure requires Quality Control (QC) notification prior to job commencement and numerous QC inspections during tFe job
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performance. QC was not notified and did not observe any portion i
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l of the cooler replacement. A QC inspector noticea this fact while observing the shop leak test on the removed oil cooler.
The affected oil cooler on SWP-1A was then removed and reinstalled per MP-122 with QC's presence.
Unresolved Item (302/81-07-02):
Verify procedures are being used during the performance of maintenance activities.
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b.
While observing troubleshooting on "e" Inverter the inspecto, noted that a considerable amcunt of dust had accumulated in the
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inverter cabinet.
A check of the other inverters indicated a similar dust problem. Thece is no filter system installed on the inverters to limit dust buildup.
The inspector checked several Engineering Safety Feature cabinets, Reactor Protective System cabinets and electrical switchgear motor control centers to determine the extent of dust accumulation on other electrical / electronic components. This review indicated a lack of a comprehensive program for periodic filter cleaning and/or j
cabinet cleaning on electrical / electronic systems to preclude the buildup _ of dust.
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Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-03):
Review the licensee's progress in establishing a
routine program for filter cleaning / cabinet cleaning on electrical / electronic systems.
(11) Fire Protection - Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and inspected for operability. No evidence of smoking was observed in tne designated "No Smoking"
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areas.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Non-Conforming Operations Reports (NCORs)
a.
The inscector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:
-The reports accurately describe the events;
-The safety significance is as reported;
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-The report satisfies requirements with respect to information provided and timing of submittal;
-Corrective action is apropriate; and,
-Action has been taken.
LER's 81-21, 81-22, 81-23,81-24, and 81-26 were reviewed. This review identified the following item:
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LER 81-22 reported the inoperability of main steam isolation valve M5V-414 due to failure of taa valve actuator. The valve actuator was
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subsequently modified and repaired to improve realiability but tne cause of the actuator's failure has not been determined.
A suppiemental report will be issued when the failure mode has been determined.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-04): Review supplemental report to LER 81-22 concerning MS V-414 failure Mode.
b.
The inspector reviewed NCOR's to verify the following-
-Compliance with the Technical Specifications;
-Corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion;
-Generic items are identified and reported as required by 10CFR 5.rt 21; and,
-Items are reported as required by the Technical Specifications.
The following NCOR's were reviewed:
81-114 81-161 81-170 81-115 81-162 81-173 81-118 81-163 81-175 81-130 81-165 81-176 81-157 81-166 81-178 81-158 81-167 81-180 81-159 81+168 81-181 81-160 81-169 81-182 Based on tnis review, the following item was identified:
NCOR 81-130 reported the dropping of glass debris from a broken light bulb into spent fuel pool "A" during installation of new high density fuel racks.
Removal of the glass will be difficult, therefore the licensee is performing an engineering review to determine if the glass can be left in the pool.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-05): Review the engineering evaluation on the glass debris in Spent Fuel Pool A.
7.
Review of IE Bulletins The following IE Bulletins (IEB) were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the licensee's actions:
a.
IE-79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corooration
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IEB 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trio Device in Circuit Breakers
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for Engineered Safety Systems c.
IES 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High Noise Areas
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The licensee has completed the addition of an Auxiliary Building (AB)
tone alarm in accordance with Modification Apoproval Record (MAR)
79-2-1 on May 21, 1979 and has completed the installation of visual evacuation alarm indicators in accordance with MAR 79-6-12 on April 18, i
1980.
The licensee is presently working MAR 79-12-5 to install additional communication speakers throughout, the plant in areas where audibility is still a problem.
It is expected that this MAR will be completed by the end of the refuel outage scheduled for the Fall of 1981.
The completion of MAR 79-12-5 will be tracked under Inspector Followup Item (302/80-28-01) and this Bt:11etin is cen:;1dered to be closed.
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d.
IEB 79-21. Temoerature Effects on Level Instruments l
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The licensea has received information from B & W concerning Reactor Building Temperature effects on Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) and Pressurizer level instrumsntation and added cautions and notes to appropriate procedures to warn operators of expected level errors.
Review of the B.& W information and procedure changes, by the in-spector, indicate that only one of the three procedures revised specify the magnitude of the level change that may occur. This observaticn was
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discussed with licensee personnel and the licensee will revise procedures EP-105, Steam Supply System Rupture, and EP-106, Loss of Reactor Coolant or Reactor Coclant Pressure, to include the expected magnitude of level change, i
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-06): Verify procedures *EP-105 and EP-106 are revised to include the expected magnatude of OTSG and pressurizer level
, changes due to RB temperature.
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IEB 79-24, Frozen Lines f.
IEB 79-25, Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety Related Systems
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IEB 79-28, Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA 180 Limit Switches
at Elevated Tamoerature.
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h.
IEB 81-02, Failure of Gcte Type Valves to Close Against Differential
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Pressure
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With the exception of the inspector Followup Item for IEB 79-21 no addi-tional inadequacies were identified and the licensee's actions on these
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l Bulletins are considered to be complete.
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Implementation of Three Mile Island (MI) Action Plan Items The NRC is requiring licer. sees to implement certain items that were
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determined to improve plant safety as a result of the lessons learned from
the TMI accident that occurred on March 28, 1979.
These Task Action Plan
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(TAP) items were delineated in NUREGS 0585. 0660, and 0737, in various
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correspondence between Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the licensees, and in various Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Bulletins and Circulars.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of three TAP items; I.A.1.3 Shift Manning, I.C.5 - Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff, and I.C.6 - Guidance on Procedures for Verifying
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I Correct Performance of Operating Activities. As a result of this review,
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the following items were identified:
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a.
TAP I.A.1.3 The licenses is required to increase the operations shift staffing and administraively control plant staff working hours to minimize the
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amount of hours beyond a normal 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> day that these staff personnel may have to work.
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l Guidance to accomplish these criteria were described in IE Circular i
80-02, " Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours", dated February 1, 1980 followed by the July 31, 1980 letter from D.G. Eisenhut to all power
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reactor licensees. This guidance was st.bsequently summarized with~ the
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issuance of NUREG-0737 in November,1980.
In accordance with the guidance of NUREG 0737, the licensee is required to develop and implement procedures to establish the staffing require-ments and overtime restrictions by November 1,1980.
Based or discussions with licensee management, review of implemented procedures, and observation of licensee activities, the following items have been accomplished:
l l-Administrative Instructions (AI's) have been revised to include l
the guidance ~ described in NUREG 0737.
AI-500 " Conduct of
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Operations", AI-600 " Conduct of Maintenance", and AI 1500,
" Conduct of Chemi stry and Radiation Protection Department",
provide criteria that encompass the complete operating shift staffing.
These AI's require that deviations to the overtime restrictions be authorized by the plant manager or higher levels
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i of management and documented as to cause.
Review of shift staffing schedules and letters of duiation to overtime restrictions by the inspectors provide evideace of the licensee's implementation of this program.
Thi; resiew indicates that the licensee has made reasonable attempts to adhere to the overtime guidelines contingent upon plant conditions and staffing constraints.
-The licensee has a definite shortage of licensed personnel and consequently are operating with 4 shift coverage.
Licensed operator training classes are being conducted with 6 potential reactor operators (R0's) to be examined in May, 1981 and 4 potential senior reactor operators (SR0's) and 19 potential RO's to be examined in December, 1981.
The licensee's goal is to provide 6 shift coverage. It is expected that this goal can be attained with a min mum of 3 additional SR0's and 8 additional RO's.
The licenses has sufficient non-licensed operators and chem / rad and maintenance personnel to meet staf'. ing rcquirements and remain within staff working hour guidelines under normal operating
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conditions.
-The licensee has implemented th licensed operator shif t staffing requirement.of 2 SR0's and 3 R0's per shift with 1 SRO and 1 RO present in the control room at all times. This implementation has been observed by the inspectors as a part of the routine inspec-tion program.
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TAP I.C.5 The licensee.is required to develop and implement procedures that will insure that operting information pertinent to plant safety originating both within and outside the utility organization is continually sup-plied to operators and other personnel and is incorporated into training and retraining programs.
To meet these requirements the licensee has developed and implemented a system entitled " Dissemination of Operational Experience Information" (DOEI).
This system, which is delineated in paragraph 2.27 of administrative instruction AI-500, Conduct of Operations, utilizes a DOEI form to transmit operating information from both within the utility organization and outside organizations to the plant staff.
Implementation of the DOEI system is under the control of the Nuclear Operations Engineer and his staff. These personnel determine what i
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information will be placeu in the system therefore assuring that unimportant or conflicting information is not conveyed to the operators or plant staff.
The DOEI form requires staff members to acknowledge receipt of operational information thus assuring re:eipt of the information to the proper personnel.
Review of the implementation of this rogram by the inspectors r
indicates that the following items are in progress for completion by the licensee:
-The incorporation of operaticaal feedcack information into the training and retraining program is being accomplished, however, prccedures describing how this is achieved have not been issued. These procedures are in draft form with an expected issuance date of July 1,1981.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-07):
Verify issuance of training and re-training program procedures that delineate the methods of incorporating operational feedback information.
-The recommendations of the operating experience assessment group (the Nuclear Operations Engineer and his staff) are presently incorporated into planc actions by Non-Conforming Operating Report (NCOR) checklists and from recommendations from " Lessons Learned" task force reports.
While there is evidence that these actions are being accomplished, there are no procedures delineating these actions.
The licensee intends to revise Administrative Instruction AI-500 to delete the 00EI system from this nrocedure and to issue a new procedure that will encompass the DOEI system and further describe how operating experience assessment group recommendations are incorporated into plant actions.
It is expected that the new procedure will be issued by August 31, 1981.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-08):
Verify issuance of the implementing procedure for the operating experience assessment group.
-There have been no internal audits conducted on the feedback program.
This is reasonable considering the program's implementation date of approximately October 1980.
Discussions with licensee personnel indicate that audits are planned in the future.
c.
TAP 1.C.6 The licensee is required to review and revise procedures, as necessary, to assure that an effective system of verifying the correct performance of operating activities is provided as a means of reducing human errors and improving the quality of normal operations.
This verification system may include authomatic system status monitoring, human verifi-cation of opertions and maintenance activities that are independent of the people performing the activity, or bot _
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To meet these requirements the licensee revised compliance procedure CP-115, In Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders.
These revisions provided additional measures that the plant staff must take to insure that :he operators are kept fully aware of plant equipment status.
These measures included independent verification of the return-to-service of safety equipment and a means of the shift supervisors controlling the issuance of equipment clearances.
In addition, cumpliance procedure CP-113, Procedure for Handling and Controlling Work Requests, provides a means for the shift supervisor to control the issuance of Work Requests (W/R's) which are used to perform maintenance on in plant equipment.
Review of these procedures and observations of plant staff activities by the inspectors indicate that the licensee's implementation of these requirements do not appear to be adequate.
These inadequacies were discussed with licensee management pe'rsonnel as follows:
-The applicability of the guidance of Section 5.2.6 of ANSI Standard N 18.7-1976 has not been fully implemented to cover all surveillance testing.
This was evidenced by recent inspection findings (IE Inspection Report 50-302/81-05) concerning a failure to properly return equipment affecting safety to an operable status apparently due to the surveillance test procedure's lack of step completion signoffs. The licensee is reviewing and revising all surveillance test procedures to assure that tne return to service portions of the procedure require a sign-off for completion of each step.
These reviews and procedure revisions will by completed by August 31, 1981.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-09): Verify that surveillance test procedures are revised to include step completion signoffs for equip-ment return to service.
-The shift supervisors and plant operators are apparently not kept fully informed of system status and of changes in equipment status ar.d the effects of such changes.
This has occured because; (1) Work r quests require a shift supervisor to authorize the work but do not return to the shift supervisor for his concurrence so that work completion can be acknowledged in a timely manner.
(2) Work Requests not written by the shift supervisor or control room operators are not recorded in the control room as having been authorized for work to begin.
Therefore there appears to be little continuity between operating shifts to assure that operating personnel are fully aware-of ongoing inplant work and hence equipment status.
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(3) Equipment clearances are authorized by the shift supervisor for a i
tag out, however these clearances are not acknowledged by the shift supervisor as being either partially or totally cleared.
The licensee is reviewing these inadequancies and will revise procedures Cp-113 and CP-115 to assure positive control of equipment status and changes to equipment status by the licensed operators.
These procedures will be revised and implemented by July 31,1981.
Inspector Followup Item (302/S1-07-10): Verify procedures CP-113 and CP-115 are revised to assure positive enctrol of equipment status and -hanges to equipment status.
-NUREG 0737 requires equipment control procedures to cover the return-to-service of equipment "important to safety". While th.
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licensee has provided equipment control to equipment in systems "
important to safety" (E.G. Emergency Feedwater, Fire Protection, etc.) the procedures only require such controls for ES (Engineereri Safeguards) Equipment and/or safety-related equipment.
The licensee will revise procedures to address all equipment unportant to safety. These procedures will be revised by June 30, 1981.
Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-11): Verify equipment control procedures list equipment important to safety.
9.
None-Routine Events a.
Blown Rupture Disc in the Reactor Collant Evaporator On May 16, 1981 at approximately 1042 hours0.0121 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.96481e-4 months <br /> a rupture disc on the
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Reactor Coolant Evaporato'r was blewn out during filling and flushing operations to reduce radioactivity level prior to.
maintenance operations.
The auxiliary building area radiation monitors (RMA-2 and RMA-3) alarmed and the auxiliary building was i
evacuated.
This event was declared an " Unusual Event" per the licersee's emergency plan. All required notifications were made.
Noble gases released during this went was.1*J of the Technical Specification release limits. The Reactor Coolant evaporator was isolated and access was restored to the auxiliary building at 11:01 hours. The licensee determined that a procedure deficiency
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caused the rupture disc to blow because the waste gas header did not get realigned te the Reactor Coolant Evaporator during filling.
operations. The licensee issued a revision to Operating Procedure (0P)-445, Waste Disposal Evaporators, to ensure the waste gas header is realigned to the Reactor Coolant Evaporator. prior to filling operations. The inspectors reviewed the revision to the procedure and have no further questions on this issue.
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Auxiliary-Buildinc-Charcoal-Filter-Event
On May 8,1981 the inspector was notified by the licensee that the J
action statement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8.1 was exceeded and that plant snutdown to Hot Standby was proceeding per the i
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requirements of T.S. 3.0.3.
The inspector's review of this issue
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identified the following:
On May 5, 1981 at 08:52 hours, the action statement of T.S.
3.7.8.1 was voluntarily entered to perform maintenance and surveillance activities on the auxiliary building ventilation i
system. The action statement allows operation in Modes 1, 2, 3,.
j and 4 for up to 7 days with one filte-system inoperable. During the period of 10:00-12:00 hours, a charcoal absorber bank cell was i
L removed and replaced wich a new cell in each bank for three of the i
four filer systems.
The verify operability of the. filter bank l
after this partial replacement of the charcoal absorber banks, TS
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4.7.P
'.f requires a leak test to be conducted in accordance wih ANSI N510-1975. On May 6, the licensee commenced leak testing on
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the filter systems in accordance with Surveillance Procedure i
(SP)-187, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System Testing and as of May 8 leak testing had not been satisfactorily completed
on any of the three filter systems. At 15:54 hours on May 8, the licensee recognized that the activities conducted on the filter systems rendered three of the four filte-system inoperable and
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that they were in excess of the action statement of T.S. 3.7. 8.1.
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In accordance with T.S. 3.0.3, the clant was shut down from full
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power operation to "ot Standby by 16:54 hours and a cooldown to t
l cold shutdown was commenced.
Additional leak testing was conducted on the three filter banks with unsatisfactory results.
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l All charcoal cells were replaced in the three filter banks and
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satisfactory test results were obtained by 20:00 hours on May 9.
Failure to comply with T.S. 3.7.8.1 during the period of may 5,
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1981 at approximately 12:00 hours through May 8,1981 at 15:54 hours is considered a violation.
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Violation (302/81-07-12):
Failure to comply with T.S. 3.7.3.1 l
during the peiod May 5,1981 through May 8,1981.
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10.
Operator Licensing Branch (OLB) Exit Interview
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On May 22, 1981, the inspector attended an exit interview conducted by OLB.
The OLB was on-site during the period of May 18-22 conducting j
operator licensing examinations.
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One of the comments discussed during this exit was the apparent inacc" racy between logic drawing for the Integrated Control System (ICS)' and the actual system operation. The licensee will review the ICS logic diagrams to assure that the diagrams indicate actual system function.
Inspector Followup item (502/81-07-13):
Verify the licensee has reviewed ICS logic diagrams to insure that correct system function 12 indicated.
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