IR 05000298/1993021
| ML20045H357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045H348 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-93-21, NUDOCS 9307200124 | |
| Download: ML20045H357 (10) | |
Text
-
-
.
!
.
.
APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-298/93-21 Operating Licenses:
DPR-46 Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 Facility Name:
Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection At:
Brownville, Nebraska Inspection Conducted:
June 14-18, 1993 Inspector:
T. W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist Facilities Inspection Program Section A. B. Earnest, Physical Security Specialist Facilities Inspection Program Section Accompanying Personnel:
N. E. Ervin, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
~
[pf 7 7/f3 I#
Approved:
_. ii.
aciT E s Inspection D~ ate P!Taine iurray
,
Programs Sectio V
inspection Summary Areas Inspected:
Special inspection of the licensee's access authorization program as.it relates to the granting of unescorted accesjs.to the plant site.
Results:
The corporate security staff was very professional and the access
authorization program received good management support.
However, management oversight of the program did not appear to be well defined.
Also, some procedures did not accurately reflect actual practices (Section 1.1).
Licensee and contractor background investigation files were generally
complete and thorough.
A licensee procedure was not sufficiently explicit on when an interview would or would not be conducted based upon derogatory information and review of derogatory information and 9307200124 930714 PDR ADDCK 05000290 G
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.,
_
_
__. _ -
. _ _ _. _
.. _.
___ _
.
.-
I
'
.
-2-adjudication determinations were not always adequately documented (Section 1.2).
A very good psychological evaluation program had been established
(Section 1.3).
!
All applicable supervisors and managers had been trained and retrained in
behavioral observation.
However, a violation was identified involving the failure to inform individuals that they had to report all arrests
-
that could affect their trustworthiness.
The training program.needs clarification and specifics to meet Regulatory Guide S.66.(Section 1.4).
A program was maintained to grandfather, reinstate, and transfer access
authorizations. A full background investigation was generally completed
within 180 days.
However, there was no practice or procedure in place to ascertain the activities of individuals away from a licensee or licensee approved behavioral observation program for more than 30 days.
A
'
noncited violation was identified concerning the granting of unescorted access to an unauthorized contractor employee (Section 1.5).
i A very good program for denying or revoking unescorted access had been
established (Section 1.6).
t A very good program was in place to protect personal information from
unauthorized disclosure (Section 1.7).
.
Program audits were a significant weakness in that they lacked depth and
scope (Section 1.8).
A very good records retention system with supporting procedures was in
place (Section 1.9).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Violation 298/9321-01 was opened (Section 1.4).
Violation 298/9321-02 was opened (Section 1.5).
- Attach 5ent:
Attachment - Persons contacted and exit meeting.
- l
.. -. ~. -. -
.
--
- - -.
~
,
_ _.,
p
.
..
-3-DETAILS 1 ACCESS AUTHORIZATION (TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/116)
,
On April 25, 1991, the Commission published 10 CFR 73.56 which required licensees to design and implement access authorization programs by April 27, 1992.
The primary objective of the access authorization requirements is to
+
ensure that all individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety.
of the public, including having a potential to commit radiological sabotage.
l This inspection included a review of the licensee's Access Authorization Program.
,
1.1 Access Authorization Program Administration and Organization The licensee's Access Authorization Program was implemented from an office located at the plant site.
Responsibility for the program was assigned to the Corporate Security Department.
The corporate security manager or_ designee was responsible for making a final determination as to whether unescorted access
would be granted.
The inspectors interviewed program administrators and site representatives and determined that they were very professional and dedicated tu performing their
.!
duties in a responsible manner.
The inspectors reviewed the corporate access authorization procedures and plant directives.
The inspectors noted that the procedures were general rather than providing the detail and specificity necessary to implement the program.
For example, some procedures did not accurately reflect the actual practices being followed when determining grandfathering or conducting interviews concerning derogatory information.
In
,
'
addition, the inspectors determined there was no procedure that covered the Behavioral Observation Program.
The inspectors. also found that procedures referenced the wrong primary sources for guidance.
Some procedures and
.
checklists referenced ANS 3.3 and ANSI 18.17 when they should have referenced Regulatory Guide 5.66.
Some minor administrative discrepancies were discussed with the Security Services Supervisor.
'
The inspectors conducted interviews with corporate and plant security staff and management and determined there was good support for the program.
However, ma'agement oversight of the program appeared disjointed. Without n
conducting interviews, it was difficult to identify individual
'
responsibilities in some rases.
For example, no single manager was responsible for coordinating, implementing, and directing the behavioral observation program to ensure agreement with Regulatory Guide 5.66.
Conclusion The inspectors determined that the corporate security staff was dedicated and very professional.
In addition, there was good management support for the program. However, management oversight of the program appeared to be l
disjointed.
Some procedures did not accurately reflect the actual practices
'
being followed when determining grandfathering or conducting interviews j
concerning derogatory information.
--
-
.
--
--.. -
-.-
-
~
..
-4-1.2 Background Investigations
>
The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of the program to verify the true identity J an applicant and to develop information concerning employment history, EA :ational history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the character and reputation
'
of the applicants before granting them unescorted access to protected and vital areas.
'
The inspectors reviewed approximately 26 background investigation files. The files involved 25 files from the licensee and 1 specific file transmitted from a self-screening contractor.
The files were complete and thorough except for.
the areas discussed below.
During a review of records, the inspectors found two records that contained
derogatory information.
The licensee had reviewed the derogatory information,
'
gathered additional information on each case, and then granted unescorted access to the individuals without conducting an interview as required by the licensee's procedure.
Procedure AAPP 3.3, " Background Investigations,"
Revision 1, dated April 27, 1992, paragraph 6.5.1 states, in part, that if l
during the inquiries, the Security Services Organization develops derogatory information or determines that further action is warranted, the Security Services Organization will contact the applicant and conduct a nonaccusatory
,
interview.
In one case, the licensee did not feel that an interview was necessary since the derogatory information was a first offense driving while
..
under the influence.
In the second case, the licensee had gathered additional
!
information on the derogatory information provided and determined-that the incidents could be attributed to the immaturity of the appli~ cant at the time.
The inspectors reviewed several other records that contained derogatory
information and confirmed that interviews had been conducted..The inspectors noted that the procedure needed to be more explicit regarding the determination of when the receipt of derogatory information would or would not
,
require an interview.
Also, review of derogatory information and adjudication.
i determinations were not always documented as part of the access approval or denial file.
Conclusion i
Licensee and contractor background investigation files were generally complete
and thorough, However, the program procedure was not explicit enough on when an interview would or would not be conducted based upon the derogatory
information and review of derogatory information and adjudication
'
determinations were not always adequately documented.
1.3 Psychological Evaluations j
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for administering psychological tests and the methodology of evaluating the results of those tests.
Regulatory Guide 5.66 states that the tests must be evaluated by qualified and. if applicable, licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.
f
. - -
_, _ _.
m
,.
t
..
l-5-The licensee had contracted with a psychologist in Stuart, Florida, who has a representative in Lincoln, Nebraska, to evaluate the tests of the employees being screened for access.
The psychologist.had standards for use in reviewing test results.
The licensee had developed a very good procedure for the psychological evaluation portion of the program. The psychological tests.
were given_at the site, and they were always proctored by licensee staff to
.i prevent compromise.
Persons taking the tests were positively identified before being given the test.
The licensee was aware of NRC Information Notices. addressing access authorization concerns, and these Information
'
Notices had been sent to the contractors.
Conclusion The licensee's psychological evaluation program was very good.
A very good procedure was developed and used by the licensee.
1.4 Behavioral Observation
The licensee's behavioral observation program was inspected to determine if i
the licensee had a training and retraining program in place to train
supervisors and managers to have the awareness and sensitivity to detect and report changes in behavior that could adversely affect trustworthiness and reliab_ility and to refer those persons to appropriate licensee management for evaluation and action.
The inspectors reviewed licensee lesson plans and procedures.
In addition,
',
the inspectors interviewed licensee supervisory and management personnel from the first line supervisor through the manager level.
All of the supervisory
and management personnel had been trained in behavioral observation. _ It was i
apparent that the behavioral observation program had been implemented and that t
training and annual retraining were on-going.
However, the inspectors
determined from interviews with licensee personnel that the program did not
provide adequate emphasis on nondrug and alcohol related behavior.
For i
example, procedures and lesson plans addressed abcrrant behavior with regard
to poor performance but did not address any other behavior that could be indicative of a potential threat to interrupt the normal operation of a
nuclear reactor, to include the potential to commit radiological sabotage.
In
'
addition, the training for supervisors _on behavior observation and aberrant
'
behavior was conducted by corporate trainers, while training for escorts on
recognizing aberrant behavior was conducted by trainers assigned to the site.
!
'
Interviews of specific training instructors were necessary to determine.how lesson plan changes and reviews were coordinated to ensure they reflected the i
required information.
Further, there was no formal program to determine retention of information disseminated in the supervisory training program.
j Paragraph 1.2.1 of the licensee's' NRC-approved Physical Security Plan states, in part, that all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 will be implemented to
'
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56.
.
Paragraph 9.0 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, individuals with unescorted access authorization must be notified of his/her responsibility to report any arrest that may impact upon his/her trustworthiness.
i
- --.
-.
-
..
-
- -
..
..
-
...
-
.
-. -. -.
- ~.
.
..
k-6-
.
'
The inspectors determined that the licensee had notified individuals that arrests involving drugs and alcohol have to be reported.
However,.the
,
licensee did not notify the individuals of their responsibility to report all
'
-
arrests that could affect their trustworthiness.
The failure to inform
individuals that all arrests must be reported is a violation of the
,
'
requirements of-the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (298/9321-01).
Conclusion
The licensee's behavioral observation program ensured 'that all applicable supervisors and managers had been trained and retrained as appropriate.
However, the program did not place enough emphasis on non-alcohol.and drug related behavior.
The training program required more clarification and specifics to meet Regulatory Guide 5.66.
A violation was identified involving the failure to inform individuals that they had to report all arrests that
affect their trustworthiness.
,
i 1.5 Grandfathering Reinstatement. Transfer, and Temporary Access Authorization Records were reviewed to determine if the licensee was correctly grandfathering, reinstating, transferring, and granting temporary access authorizations.
,
,
The licensee's grandfathering and reinstatement programs were generally.
adequate; however, the licensee did not have procedures'or practices in place
to ascertain the activities of individuals who were away from a licensee r
'
o licensee approved behavioral observation program for more than 30 days. The inspectors reviewed several examples of access authorization transfers.
The
'
licensee had a form that was used to gain information.
The transfer files reviewed were adequate with the one following exception:
!
On April 2,1993, a contractor employee was granted unescorted access into the
,
protected area based upon a NUMARC 91-03 Transfer Request received by Nebraska
,
Public Power District from another licensee.
The contract work was. completed and the employee transferred to a third licensee on April 27, 1993.
On April 29,1993,.the third licensee notified Nebraska Public Power District's access authorization personnel that they had developed information that the contract employee had tested positive for drugs on February 26, 1993, at the first licensee's location, and his access had been revoked.
Nebraska Public Power District's access authorization personnel verified the information and immediately withdrew the individual's unescorted access.
The inspectors found that the NUMARC 91-03 transfer form from the first licensee was annotated with information indicating that derogatory information was on file with the utility. The form also provided the name of a specific person to contact at.
the utility.
This information was apparently overlooked during the Nebraska Public Power District's review process, and the individual was erroneously granted unescorted access.
Nebraska Public Power. District immediately submitted an event report to the NRC in accordance with regulatory requirements.
.
_ _ __,
.-
_
-
.
(
-7-Paragraph 1.2.1 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan states that, effective April 27, 1992, the licensee will adhere to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Pl ant s. " All elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 will be implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56.
Paragraph 8.1 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that an individual's unescorted access authorization granted by one utility in accordance with these guidelines may be transferred to another utility via correspondence, computer data transfer, or telecopy if the gaining utility verifies or receives confirmation that the individual currently holds a valid unescorted acc ss authorization or had a valid unescorted access authorization that was ter ainated under favorable conditions within the past 365 days.
Licensee Procedure, Access Authorization Program Procedure 3.2 states, in part, that the Security Services Supervisor will ensure the transferred investigation meets or exceeds the NUMARC unescorted access authorization requirements.
The Security Service Supervisor will ensure the review is documented and all discrepancies and/or nonconformance items are investigated before granting the individual a clearance.
Contrary to the above requirements, the licensee failed to verify derogatory information on the transfer form.
This resulted in an unauthorized individual being granted unescorted access into the protected area in violation of their NRC-approved Physical Security Plan. This violation is not being cited because the criteria in paragraph Vll.B.2 of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," were satisfied.
This violation was an isolated occurrence and the licensee staff took prompt and effective actions to correct the problem.
The inspectors reviewed the temporary access authorization files on several employees.
The licensee had a system to prevent temporary unescorted access in excess of 180 days.
The licensee also ensured that a full background investigation was normally completed within that 180 days.
Conclusion The licensee had a program to grandfather, reinstate, and transfer access authorizations.
The licensee also ensured that a full background investigation was normally completed within 180 days.
However, there was no procedure or practice in place that addressed measures to ascertain the activities of individuals away from a licensee or licensee approved behavioral observation program for more than 30 days.
A noncited violation was identified concerning the granting of unescorted access to an unauthorized contractor employee.
1.6 Denial or Revocation of Unescorted Access The licensee's corporate security representative or designee was the individual responsible for making a final determination whether unescorted access would be grante.
\\
..
-8-The inspectors reviewed files in which fingerprint submittals had been returned with a criminal record.
In several instances, the persons were granted access.
The inspectors reviewed the rationale used by the licensee in its decision in each instance.
Other files were reviewed wherein persons investigated were denied access because of a criminal record.
The criteria used by the licensee was consistent and equitable. The persons denied access were notified of the denial of access and of their right to review and reply to anything in the records used as a reason for the access denial.
They were also provided with information on the appeal process that was available to them. The inspectors reviewed one file that was in-the appeal process.
Conclusion The licensee had a very good program for denying or revoking unescorted access.
The criteria used by the licensee appeared to be consistent and equitable.
The licensee had an appeal process and personnel denied access were advised of their right to appeal that denial.
1.7 Protection of Personal Information The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and management in order to ascertain that personal information was protected from disclosure to anyone without a need to know and authority to have access to that information.
The background
'
information files were kept in locked containers in a vault with access limited to only those staff members with a need for access.
Procedures were in place to ensure that information was only released to those staff members with a need for access.
Conclusion The licensee had a very good program to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosure.
Procedures were in place to ensure that information was only released to those staff members with a need for access.
1.8 Audits
,
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's audit program to determine if audits of sufficient depth had been conducted.
The licensee had cop [1es of several audits of contractor programs in their records.
Some of the audits were done by other licensees and, according to the rule, can be accepted by the licensee to satisfy their own audit requirements.
In addition, the licensee had copies of audits they had conducted of contractor programs.
The licensee retained responsibility for the effectiveness of the contractors' programs and for the implementation of appropriate corrective actions by the. contractors.
,
The inspectors determined that the licensee had conducted a review of the audits completed by other licensees.
However, the inspectors also noted that the checklists used by both the licensee and other licensees did not list Regulatory Guide 5.66 as the primary reference document. The reference documents that were listed, if followed, could lead to program deficiencies.
The inspectors also reviewed the audits of the licensee's Access Authorization Program for 1992 and 1993.
The audits were conducted by the licensee's
-
-
+
--
--
-
- - - - -
. - - - - - - _. - - - - - - -,
- - -
---*
,o
_ _ _
_,.
.
_ _...
. _ _ _
_. _
_ _ _ _. _.. _
_ __
s 1.,
-9-Quality Assurance department. The audit for 1992 consisted of a review of five records, and the audit for 1993 of one record of individual (s) granted i
'
unescorted access.
The audits verified completion of background checks, psychological evaluations, verification of identity, credit check, employment check, character references, and education.
However, the audits did not i
review the program against the regulatory requirements.
It was also noted:
that program procedures and training lesson plans were not a part'of.the
,
audit.
Based on the preceding, the inspectors determined that the audits i
lacked depth and scope.
If the audits had covered all. areas identified, it is
'
likely that at least one violation and most of the inspector' identified i
concerns could have been identified.
,
Licensees are allowed to grant access based on the investigation of backgrounds by self-screening contractors and background investigation-
-
contractors.
The licensee normally receives only a statement that an individual either does or does not meet licensee program requirements.
That discretion was allowed by the rule based on the premise of good audits of.the contractor programs.
Audit Program weaknesses, as described in the paragraph above, can bring into question the validity of licensee's review of background information if the audits were not adequate or if identified audit findings were not adequately resolved.
It was also noted that program procedures and training lesson plans were not a part of the audit.
j Conclusion j
The inspectors identified a significant program weakness in the area of
'l audits.
The audits did not review the program against the regulatory
,
requirements.
1.9 Record Retention
,
.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records retention activities in order to ensure that records on access authorization were retained for the-appropriate time.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's procedure for records' retention correctly identified the required records and times for the records retained.
'
Since ite, advent of the rule, the licensee had maintained the proper records.
The licensee maintains the records on file at the plant hite.
Conclusion The licensee had organized a good records retention system and supporting
procedures to ensure that the specified records are retained for the correct
-
period of time.
l I
i
-
.
-.
..
-
.
- -
,
t
[
- s
,
ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
- J. Meacham, Site Manager
- F. Bracken, Corporate Security Supervisor
- L. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- S. Bray, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
- M. Dean, Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor
- R. Gardner, Plant Manager
- R. Gibson, Acting Quality Assurance Manager
- M. Hamm, Security Supervisor
- S. Jobe, Operations Training Program Supervisor
- E. Mace, Senior Manager, Site Support
- C. Putnam, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist
- J. Vigil, Corporate Security Manager 1.2 NRC Personnel
- R. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Murray, Chief, Facilities Inspection Programs Section In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
Those employees included members' of the licensee's technical and management staff and members of the security organization.
- Denntes those that attended the exit interview.
2 EXIT INTERVIEW An exit meeting was conducted on June 18, 1993.
During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did riot identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
.
b