IR 05000298/1993014
| ML20035H471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035H467 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-93-14, NUDOCS 9305050122 | |
| Download: ML20035H471 (9) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION'IV i
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Inspection Report:
50-298/93-14 l
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f Operating Licenses: DPR-46 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power Di. strict i
P.O. Box 499
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Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station
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l Inspection At:
Brownville, Nebraska
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Inspection Conducted: March 29 through April 2, 1993 l
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Inspectors:
L. T. Ricketson, P.E., Senior Radiation Specialist i
l Facilities Inspection Programs Section
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L. Wilborn, Radiation Specialist l
Facilities Inspection Programs Section
Approved:
/d o N /47A6
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F.'Mdrr'ay, Chief,'F
' ties Inspection Datie f.
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Programs Sectio
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Inspection Summary l
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced' inspection of the radiation protection I
program, including planning' and preparation for the 1993 refueling outage, l
training and qualifications, external exposure controls, internal-exposure j
controls, controls of radioactive materials and contamination, and the program to maintain occupational exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)..
Results:
The licensee sufficiently supplemented the permanent staff with contract
radiation protection technicians (Section 2.1).
Contract radiation protection technicians met qualification requirements
(Section 2.2).
All supervisors and professional staff members had received continuing
training in their specialty (Section 2.2).
Dosimetry was. properly used by' radiation workers (Section 2.3).
- 9305050122 930429 PDR ADOCK 05000298 G
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Special work permits provided excellent guidance to radiation workers.
- The radiation protection organization provided good coverage for work activities (Section 2.3).
Prejob briefings were conducted very well, but there was no positive way
to ensure that all targeted workers received the briefings (Section 2.3).
Radiological work areas were properly posted and controlled. Postings
and surveys rovided excellent information regarding radiation levels.
(Section 2.3.
A good internal exposure control program was implemented, although the
licensee was experiencing a problem with the whole-body counting equipment (Section 2.4).
Radioactive materials were properly controlled (Section 2.5).
- Housekeeping in the radiological controlled area ranged from good to
fair (Section 2.5).
Total person-rem was below established ALARA goals (Section 2.6).
- Attachment:
Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
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1 PLANT STATUS l
The licensee was conducting the 1993 refueling outage. The inspection was
conducted on days 24 through 28 of the planned 56 day outage.
2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE DURING EXTENDED OUTAGES (83729,.83750)
L The licensee's program was inspected.to determine compliante with Technical i
Specifications 6.1.2, 6.1.3, and 6.1.4 and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, l
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and agreement with the commitments of Chapter XIII of the Final Safety Analysis Report l
2.1 Plannino and Preparation
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The licensee supplemented the permanent radiation protection staff with'
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l 74 contract radiation ' protection technicians.. The licensee begar, training -
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some of the technicians in December 1992 in the site specific. radiation
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control procedures. Technicians interviewed by the inspectors stated that:the j
training compared favorably with training they.had received atiother-i facilities.
i Six decontamination personnel were employed to maintain plant housekeeping.
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Early in the outage, some of the health physics' technicians' worked more than l
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72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period; however, the inspectors determined that they did
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so with prior approval from senior-management, in accordance with procedural
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guidance.
l 2.2 Trainino and Qualifications
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l The inspectors reviewed selected resumes of senior contract radiation protection technicians and determined that they met qualification-
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requirements.
Licensee representatives stated-that they'did not use a j
screening examination to aid in the selection of personnel.
f The continuing training, this year, for supervisors and professionals in the licensee's radiation protection organization consisted of vendor training on the new 10 CFR Part 20.
2.3 External Exposure Control The licensee had an adequate supply of thermoluminescent dosimeters. The inspectors observed licensee personnel working in the radiological controlled area and in the drywell and did not identify problems associated with the improper.us'e of personnel dosimetry. On tours of the drywell, the inspectors noted that special placement of thermoluminescent dosimeters was employed on certain jobs to monitor portions of the whole body with the greatest exposure.
' The licensee also used dosimetry vests for multibadging personnel.
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The inspectors reviewed selected special work permits and noted that they
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provided excellent guidance to workers and were easy to understand. Workers
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interviewed confirmed this. However, the inspectors reviewed the
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circumstances involved in an event occurring on March 8, 1993, when two contract mechanical maintenance workers entered into a special work permit l
area without reading the special work permit instructions. The review of this
event will be documented, in detail, in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/93-13.
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The inspectors noted isol:.ted examples of workers not recharging their j
self-reading dosimeters before entry into a special work permit area.
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Guidance provided to workers' stated that if the' dosimeters indicated an accumulated dose greater than 50 millirems, the dosimeters should be i
recharged. This would be significant only if an individual received enough j
exposure to cause the dosimeter to go off scale.
In such a case, the i
thermoluminescent dosimeter would then have to be processed to determine the individual's true exposure.
The inspectors observed that high range dosimeters required by some special work permits were maintained conveniently near the sign-in sheets for the special work permits.
However, some of the dosimeters indicated accumulated i
doses as high as 600 millirems. The inspectors also noted there were no dosimeter chargers near some locations nor did the dosimeters appear to be routinely reviewed by the radiation protection team in charge of that particular area of the facility.
The radiation protection organization implemented the team concept of providing coverage for various work activities. Licensee radiation protection technicians were placed in charge of teams of contract radiation protection
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technicians and assigned responsibility for certain areas of the' plant.
l Licensee representatives stated that the team concept had worked well to i
ensure responsibility of specific projects and areas.
The inspectors observed i
various work activities and noted that radiation protection' technicians provided good coverage and~ control.
The inspectors attended a prejob briefing before the removal of control rod l
drive cap screws. The meeting was conducted in a room adjacent to the
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l technical support center. The facilities were well. suited for this purpose l
with sufficient space and privacy._ The meeting was well orchestrated and
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addressed all important issues. The licensee implemented a practice of video taping all ALARA prejob briefings. This ensured consistency if the briefing material had to be presented to additional personnel unable to attend the
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original meeting.
It also documented the subject material discussed, should-questions arise.
Prejob briefings were not a requirement of special work permits, but they were conducted routinely before high dose jobs. However, the licensee had no t
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mechanism to ensure positively that only workers receiving a prejob briefing were allowed to work in accordance with the special work permits for high dose jobs.
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The inspectors observed operations involved in the. removal and transfer of-control rod drives to the rebuild room.
The inspectors noted the use of
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television cameras and good health physics practices during the evolution.
l However, the inspectors noted that individuals working on the third floor at j
the entrance to the control rod drive-rebuild room were working without the
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benefit of a guardrail or safety belts as they reached out to grasp the.
l control rod drive ~ transfer box and _ pull it toward the deck. The inspectors.
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j discussed the matter with the senior resident inspector and was discussed with
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licensee representatives for. action as' appropriate.
The. inspectors madeJseveral tours of the radiological controlled area and
'l noted that areas were ;.roperly posted. The posting used in radiation areas
clearly displayed radiation levels at~various points of interest ~.. The i
inspectors also toured the drywell and noted that the posting intended for the-door to the under-vessel area was not.in place.- (The posting was not a j-radiation area posting but did provide instructions' identifying-individuals to
be notified before entry into the area.) The. inspectors determined that the
posting'had been' removed by workers inside the under-vessel area. The posting..
l was supported by a rope and'thus could not~ be put back in place.without.
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preventing egress from the area. The sign could.have simply been attached i
directly to the door.of the area.-
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k The inspectors' reviewed control of high radiation areas'and made independent
measuremtnts but did not identify areas'needing additional control or posting.
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The inspectors r_eviewed a radiological safety incident report (RSIR 93-02)
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documenting unexpected radiation levels ' observed during the removal of a i
source range monitor shuttle tube. Radiation levels as high as 80 roentgens per hour were noted and work was stopped by the radiation protection
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' technician. - The~ three workers received a total. radiation' exposure of
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143 millirems.
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A special planning session was convened and a special procedure for retrieval of the shuttle tube was written. The source range monitor shuttle tube was-1ater recovered and placed in the. spent fuel pool. The total _ exposure for personnel involved in the recovery operation was 268 millirems. The incident-did not result in personnel exposure more than allowable limits.
Planning for recovery produced excellent results in minimizing exposure.
2.4 Internal Exposure Control Through whole-body counting, the-licensee identified that-a few individuals =
-had received minor: intakes of cobalt-60 as a. result of inspection work in the torus. The'i.u kes~were approximately 10 nanocuries.
Individuals were counted again later and found to have no identifiable-amounts of material.
As a precaution, the radiation protection department ordered,that further torus inspection work be performed while wearing-respirators.
The licensee was tracking maximum permissible. concentration - hours for some individuals'; however, no one.was approaching regulatory limits.
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On tours, the inspectors observeu that engineering controls such as portable, filtered ventilation units were used in a number of work areas to reduce the need for workers to use respirators.
i The licensee experienced computer hardware difficulties with~ the whole-body i
counter. The licensee was evaluating the possible causes and corrective j
actions in association with the vendor of the equipment. The licensee had no
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backup capability. _ Licensee representatives _ stated.that they anticipated l
replacing the present, leased unit with a new, purchased unit, sometime
between July and September 1993.
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The_ inspectors reviewed respirator issue records and compared them with user i
qualification records and identified no problems.
2.5 Controls of Radioactive Materials and Contamination. Surveys. and l
Monitoring-The inspectors observed.the use of personnel contamination monitors by workers leaving contaminated work areas and the radiological controlled area and identified no problems. The licensee used both gamma-sensitive and beta-sensitive contamination monitors at the exit of the radiological
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l controlled area. Using information from the personnel contamination monitors, j
the licensee determined there had.been more than 80,000 entries into the-
radiological controlled area since the start of the outage.
From special work i
permit sign in sheets, the licensee determined there had been more than 500
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entries into the drywell during the same period. There have been 31 skin
contaminations identified in 1993.
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The inspectors identified no problems with the surveying and ~ releasing of i
items from the radiological controlled area. The licensee used tool monitors and smear sampling to determine that items were free of radioactive
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contamination. Release forms accompanied free-released material and material.
i going to the warehouse.
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l Housekeeping within.the radiological controlled area ranged;from good to fair.
Areas such as residual heat removal-heat exchanger Room B were_ in need of j
attention by cleanup crews.
In numerous areas, barrels holding used j
anticontamination clothing and trash were in need.of emptying. Cleanup-I personnel did not report' to radiation protection management. This matter was discussed with licensee representatives at-the exit meeting.
The licensee:used the shredder / compactor _' routinely.and shipped dry. activated
. waste off site to' reduce the volume of waste that had to be stored. Thus far, the licensee had performed well in this area, keeping pace with the waste generated by the outage.
The inspectors confirmed that consignees of shipped radioactive materials and-contaminated components, such as' pump motors, held valid licenses to possess radioactive materials.
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2.6 Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA, i
The outage goal was 288 person-rem.
Licensee representatives stated'that the l
cancellation of some of the work in the torus would result in a net savings of i
approximately 17 person-rem; however, emergent work might consume this l
savings; therefore, the person-rem goal for the outage was not reduced.. At-
the time of the inspection, the total radiation dose was slightly below the
projected goal for that point in the outage.
i Licensee representatives stated that they experienced good success with their
" soft" shutdown of the plant before the outage. The slow, controlled shutdown l
aided ~in the control of crud bursts and improved reactor water cleanup.
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ALARA representatives discussed with the inspectors the results of. extensive
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hydrolazing of nozzles that were to be repaired or have service inspection
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performed during the outage. Survey results indicated that radiation levels, i
l in most cases, were reduced by 200-300 percent.
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ALARA ' personnel performed daily reviews of the doses accrued by jobs and
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updated dose totals (using self-reading dosimeter information).. This.
j operation had to be performed' manually by reviewing each sign in sheet.
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The inspectors noted that ALARA personnel made frequent tours of the'drywell
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to observe work in progress. ALARA~ representatives stated that an ALARA j
l representative made daily inspections.
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2.7 Conclusions
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The licensee supplemented the permanent staff with enough' contract radiation
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protection technicians. The contract personnel were brought to the site early
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enough to be properly prepared and trained in.the licensee's procedures.
Contract radiation protection. technicians met qualification requirements.
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All licensee supervisors and professional staff members of the radiation I
protection department had received continuing training -in their specialty.
An ample number of thermoluminescent dosimeters was available for use during the outage. Dosimetry was properly used by radiation workers.
Special work permits provided excellent guidance to radiation workers.
Generally, workers followed the instructions-and'the radiation protection organization maintained good control of work-activities in the radiological controlled area.
Prejob briefings were conducted very well and'provided comprehensive information, but there was no positive way to ensure that all-targeted workers j
received the briefings.
- Radiological work areas were properly posted and controlled. The postings and
surveys provided excellent information about radiation levels in the areas.
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-8-A good internal exposure control program was implemented although the licensee I
was experiencing a problem with the whole-body counting equipment.
Engineering controls were used where possible.
Respirator users were properly qualified.
Radioactive materials were properly controlled.
Personnel exiting the
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radiological controlled area used personnel contamination monitors properly.
i Housekeeping in the radiological controlled area ranged from good to fair, depending on the location within the plant.
The licensee took actions to reduce source term and resulting personnel exposure before the commencement of outage work. As of the end of the inspection, actual radiation dose was below the person-rem level projected to
that point in the outage.
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ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED l
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1.1 Licensee Personnel l
- G. R. Horn, Nuclear Power Group Manager R. L. Beilke, Radiological Support Supervisor
- T. J. Chard, Health Physics Supervisor
- M. A. Dean, Nuclear Licensing Safety Supervisor i
- J. W. Dutton, Training Manager
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- R. L. Gardner, Plant Manager i
- M. A. Gillan, Training Supervisor
B. L. Hall, Health Physicist i
- J. M. Meacham,. Site Manager
- C. R. Moeller, Technical Staff Manager i
D. P. Oshlo, ALARA Coordinator
- J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager i
- G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
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1.2 NRC Personnel
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- R. A. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector l
- J. E. Gagliardo, Chief, Section C, Division of Reactor Projects i
W. Walker, Resident Inspector l
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.. In addition to the personnel listed, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this
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inspection period.
l 2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on April 2, 1993.
During this meeting, the l
inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did l
not identify as proprietary, any information provided to, or reviewed by the
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inspectors.
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