IR 05000293/2014004
| ML14302A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2014 |
| From: | Raymond Mckinley NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Dent J Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| McKinley R | |
| References | |
| IR 2014002, IR 2014004 | |
| Download: ML14302A592 (27) | |
Text
October 27, 2014
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2014004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) REPORT 07201044/2014002
Dear Mr. Dent:
On September 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 23, 2014, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.
50-293 License No.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000293/2014004 and ISFSI Report 07201044/2014002
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I==
Docket No.
50-293
License No.
Report No.
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy)
Facility:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Location:
600 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, MA 02360
Dates:
July 1, 2014 through September 30, 2014
Inspectors:
E. Carfang, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
B. Scrabeck, Resident Inspector, DRP
John Nicholson, Health Physicist, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
(DNMS)
Clyde Morell, Materials Engineer, DNMS
Earl Love, Safety Inspection Engineer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Approved By:
Raymond R. McKinley, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000293/2014004; 07/01/2014 - 09/30/2014; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim);
Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Pilgrim began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 16, 2014, the unit reduced power to 21 percent to repair the 3B feedwater heater. On August 22, 2014, power was increased from 21 percent to 50 percent to perform a condenser thermal backwash, and returned to 100 percent power on August 23, 2014. The unit operated at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
During the week of August 18, 2014, the inspectors performed an inspection of the external flood protection measures for Entergy. The inspectors reviewed technical specifications (TS), procedures, design documents, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 2.4.2.4, which depicted the design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general site walkdown of all external areas of the plant, including the turbine building, auxiliary building, and berm to ensure that Entergy erected flood protection measures in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine if Entergy planned or established adequate measures to protect against external flooding events. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
Salt service water (SSW) system during maintenance on the 208B SSW pump on July 14, 2014
107B emergency diesel generator (EDG) during planned maintenance on 107A EDG on July 29, 2014
Control rod drive (CRD) system following the 209A CRD pump motor replacement on September 5, 2014 High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system during maintenance on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system on September 16, 2014
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TS, work orders (WOs),condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)
==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
Diesel driven fire pump area on July 25, 2014
Electric fire pump area on July 25, 2014
A Reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) room on July 25, 2014
CRD pump quadrant on August 8, 2014
Lube oil storage room and turbine lube oil reservoir on August 20, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
Annual Review of Cables Located in Underground Bunkers/Manholes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an inspection of underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding that contain cables whose failure could affect risk-significant equipment. The inspectors performed walk downs of three risk-significant areas: manhole 4, manhole 5, and cable pit 2B. Manholes 4 and 5 contain offsite power cables from the start-up transformer. Cable pit 2B contains offsite power cables from the shut-down transformer.
Inspectors verified that the cables were not submerged in water, that cables and/or splices appeared intact, and observed the condition of cable support structures. When applicable, the inspectors verified proper sump pump operation and verified level alarm circuits were set in accordance with station procedures and calculations to ensure that the cables will not be submerged. The inspectors also ensured that drainage was provided and functioning properly in areas where dewatering devices were not installed. For those cables found submerged in water, the inspectors verified that Entergy had conducted an operability evaluation for the cables and were implementing appropriate corrective actions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operators annual requalification simulator examination on September 23, 2014, which included a HPCI pump failure, emergency depressurization, and two emergency action level declarations. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the control room supervisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed low power operations at 21 percent power during the 3B feedwater heater repairs starting August 17, 2014 and lasting through August 22, 2014.
The inspectors also observed portions of the power ascension on August 22. The inspectors observed reactivity control and infrequently performed evolution briefings to verify that the briefings met the criteria specified in Entergys administrative procedure EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions, Revision 12. Additionally, the inspectors observed crew performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, or component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the MR in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by Entergy staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2).
Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries.
MR (a)(1) evaluation for the station blackout (SBO) diesel exceeding MR reliability performance criteria on March 19, 2014
107B EDG trip due to high jacket water temperature on July 14, 2014
MR (a)(1) evaluation of offsite power line 342 unavailability the week of August 18, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Elevated risk during planned maintenance on the battery charger transfer switch and reactor protection system the week of June 29, 2014
Elevated risk during A5 and A6 emergency 4KV buses under voltage testing and planned maintenance on the 107A EDG on July 29, 2014
Elevated risk during planned maintenance on HPCI system on August 11, 2014
Elevated risk during planned maintenance on the shutdown transformer and SBO EDG on August 25 - 28, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
Insulation resistance on startup transformer below procedural limit on June 24, 2014
Startup transformer cables submerged due to sump pump failure on July 8, 2014
208E SSW pump air release valve leakage on July 19, 2014
In-service testing of 1B residual heat removal (RHR) pump suction relief valve on September 15, 2014
The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to Entergys evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification Engineering Change 52053, Install Temporary Sump Pumps in Manholes #4 and #5, to determine whether the modification affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety. The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing results, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
B Drywell containment high radiation monitoring system replacement on July 13, 2014
107B EDG trip on high jacket water temperature during testing on July 14, 2014
Overhaul of the 208B SSW pump on July 15, 2014
202C RBCCW pump mechanical seal replacement on August 1, 2014
Replacement of HPCI controller square root converter on August 12, 2014
Repair to C traversing incore probe on August 25, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and Entergy procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
EDG and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance on July 1, 2014
Low Pressure Core Injection System Loop A Operability - Pump Quarterly Flow Rate Test and Valve Test on July 8, 2014 (in-service test)
Diesel Generator B Initiation by Loss of Offsite Power Logic on July 15, 2014
Daily Surveillance Log on August 24 & 25, 2014 (leak rate)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Entergy emergency drill on July 30, 2014, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The drill included an explosion in the protected area, an inadvertent HPCI injection, and flooding in a vital area. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.
The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergys critique and to verify whether Entergy staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Mitigating Systems Performance Index (3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Entergys submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index for the following systems for the period of July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014:
High pressure injection system (HPCI)
Heat removal system (RCIC)
Residual heat removal system (RHR)
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys operator narrative logs, CRs, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Safety System Functional Failure (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Unresolved Issue (URI)05000293/2014002-01, Reporting of Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator for Ultimate Heat Sink Inoperability, regarding the inoperability of the Ultimate Heat Sink on July 16, 2013 and July 17, 2013. These events were reported under Licensee Event Report (LER)05000293/2013-007-00, and documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000293/2013005. This URI was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000293/2014002. To determine the adequacy of Entergys actions, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys plant logs, CRs, LERs, and NRC integrated inspection reports.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that the engineering evaluation performed by Entergy was adequate to demonstrate that, during the event, plant systems were capable of performing their safety functions. Entergys action to revise their PI data to show zero Safety System Functional Failures, in accordance with the guidance of NEI Document 99-02, was appropriate. URI 05000293/2014002-01, Reporting of Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator for Ultimate Heat Sink Inoperability, is closed.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Entergys entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR screening meetings.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Sample:
Tracking of Allowable Secondary Containment Gap Margin
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys causal evaluations and corrective actions associated with secondary containment leakage evaluations. The issue involves the measurement of existing gaps in the reactor building truck lock doors due to damage to the door in March of 2013, and the evaluation of these gaps along with system testing and calculations of allowable leakage. Additionally, the scope includes actions taken by Entergy in response to the inspectors identification of previously unidentified gaps in June of 2014.
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys causal evaluations and corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the secondary containment and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergys CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that, in general, Entergy adequately identified, characterized, and implemented corrective actions associated with the measurement of secondary containment gaps and leakage. The inspectors noted weaknesses in work practices and in the completion of quality records associated with reactor building truck lock door inspections, as well as differences between the secondary containment leakage calculations and the operations tool that tracks secondary containment gaps. Entergy took appropriate actions to correct these conditions, and the inspectors determined that these deficiencies were minor because at no time did they result in an inappropriate declaration of secondary containment operability and therefore had no safety impact.
Additionally, Entergy took appropriate compensatory measures to maintain operability and to conduct additional testing when inspectors identified additional gaps that challenged the margin for secondary containment operability. This additional testing verified secondary containment operability and revealed that Entergy was conservative in performing calculations that determined allowable gap margins. Gaps that were already in existence during the testing were unnecessarily counted against the calculated margin. Entergy completed temporary repairs to the reactor building truck bay door and scheduled permanent repairs under WO 00275465. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to identify the additional gaps was minor because the overall gap was within the allowable margins of the secondary leakage calculation and system operability was maintained. The inspectors determined Entergys response to the issue was adequate and commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions taken and planned are reasonable to resolve the issues.
.3 Annual Sample:
Review of the Operator Workaround Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds, operator burdens, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and open main control room deficiencies to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated whether station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewed operator workarounds as specified in Entergys procedure EN-FAP-OP-006, Operator Aggregate Impact Performance Indicator, Revision 2.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys process to identify, prioritize, and resolve main control room distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspectors reviewed the system used to track these operator workarounds and recent Entergy self-assessments of the program. The inspectors also toured the control room and discussed the current operator workarounds with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that the issues reviewed did not adversely affect the capability of the operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors also verified that Entergy entered operator workarounds and burdens into the CAP at an appropriate threshold and planned or implemented corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 Plant Events
a. Inspection Scope
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in Inspection Manual Chapter 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Entergys follow-up actions related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.
Unplanned downpower to 21 percent on August 16, 2014, due to a leak on the 3B feedwater heater
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 (Closed) LER 05000293/2014-001-00: Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
On May 6, 2014, the inspectors identified that Pilgrim was not in compliance with the TS requirements for inoperable primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs), because there was not at least one isolation valve closed and deactivated in the same line as an inoperable PCIV. The issue originated with TS Amendment 113 from 1988, which added the requirement to deactivate credited isolation valves in the same line as an inoperable PCIV. Entergy did not adequately revise procedures and practices to align with the current TS requirements. The enforcement aspects of this issue are discussed in IR 05000293/2014003. The inspectors did not identify any new issues during the review of the LER. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
Preoperational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (60854, 60854.1)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and evaluated Pilgrims performance during NRC observed pre-operational dry run activities associated with their planned operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The inspectors observed Pilgrim dry run activities on August 12-13, 2014 (Dry Run #1) and September 3-4, 2014 (Dry Run #2). During both dry runs the inspectors observed pre-job briefs and verified Pilgrim utilized adequate radiological controls and discussed relevant examples of operating experience.
During Dry Run #1 the inspectors observed welding and nondestructive examination activities to determine whether the Pilgrim staff and contractors had developed the capability to properly weld and perform nondestructive examination of the multi-purpose canister (MPC) to be used in storage of spent fuel at the Pilgrim site. The inspectors observed the welding equipment setup, welding of the mockup inner and outer covers, visual weld examination, penetrant testing, hydrogen monitoring, and helium leak testing of the vent and drain port cover plate welds. The inspectors reviewed portions of the work instructions and procedures that were being used. The inspectors verified that work instructions and procedures appropriately captured the commitments and requirements contained in the Safety Analysis Report, the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report, the Certificate of Compliance, No. 1014, Amendment 7 (issued to Holtec International), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, and 10 CFR Part 72. The inspectors examined the welding equipment, observed welding on each of the MPC components, and reviewed welder qualification records.
During Dry Run #2 the inspectors observed Pilgrims MPC fluid handling portions of the loading and unloading operations which included hydrostatic testing, blowdown, vacuum drying, and helium backfill of the MPC. The inspectors verified that the required vacuum pressure could be achieved and pressure maintained within the TS limits. The inspectors verified that procedures were adequate to ensure requirements for minimal water content within a loaded MC could be achieved, and an inert atmosphere maintained to support the safe storage of spent fuel assemblies. The inspectors discussed with Entergy personnel initial actions they would take in accordance with the abnormal conditions procedure should a dry cask system need to be unloaded.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 23, 2014, the inspectors presented the quarterly baseline inspection results to Mr. John Dent, Site Vice President, and other members of the Pilgrim staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Dent
Site Vice President
J. Blagbrough
Senior System & Components Engineer
G. Blankenbiller
Chemistry Manager
T. Bordelon
Performance & Improvement Manager
D. Burke
Security Manager
R. Byrne
Licensing Engineer
D. Calabrese
Emergency Planning Manager
B. Chenard
Engineering Director
F. Clifford
Operations Support Manager
J. Cotter
Operations Training Supervisor
B. Deevy
System Engineer
P. Doody
Senior Lead Enginner
M. Gatslick
Security Compliance Supervisor
J. Gerety
System Engineering Manager
P. Glover
SSW System Engineer
R. Haislet
Operations Supervisor
P. Harizi
Design Engineer
S. Hudson
System Engineer
M. Jacobs
Nuclear Oversight Manager
J. Keene
System Engineer
L. Kinney
Holtec Project Manager
P. Kristian
Senior Project Manager Dry Cast
M. Landry
Systems & Components Engineer
J. Macdonald
Senior Operations Manager
C. McDonald
Training Manager
R. Metthe
Senior Engineer
R. Morris
Senior System & Component Engineer
J. Moylan
Manager Project & Maintenance Services
L. Murray
Project Manager
P. Nigro
Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
J. Norris
Radiation Protection Supervisor
D. Noyes
Director of Regulatory & Performance Improvement
J. ODonnell
Systems Engineer
R. ONeil
Operations Supervisor
J. Ohrenberger
Senior Maintenance Manager
E.C. Perkins
Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Sheridan
Operations
D. Small
Design Engineer
S. Solar
Holtec Director Site Services
P. Stover
Radiation Protection Supervisor
S. Verrochi
General Manager Plant Operations
T. White
Design & Program Engineering Manager
M. Williams
Nuclear Safety Licensing Specialist
J. Yiingling
System Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Closed
- 05000293/2014-002-01 URI Reporting of Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator for Ultimate Heat Sink Inoperability (Section 4OA1)
- 05000293/2014-001-00 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3)