IR 05000282/2024003
| ML24318C498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  (SNM-2506, DPR-042, DPR-060) |
| Issue date: | 11/13/2024 |
| From: | Richard Skokowski NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB3 |
| To: | Conboy T Northern States Power Company, Minnesota |
| References | |
| EPID I-2024-003-0065, EPID I-2024-001-0103 IR 2024001, IR 2024003 | |
| Download: ML24318C498 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2024003, 05000306/2024003 AND 07200010/2024001
Dear Thomas Conboy:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. On October 21, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
November 13, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Richard A. Skokowski, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000282, 05000306 and 07200010 License Nos. DPR-42, DPR-60, and SNM-2506
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000282; 05000306; 07200010
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000282/2024003; 05000306/2024003; 07200010/2024001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-003-0065 and I-2024-001-0103
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company
Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:
Welch, MN
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2024, to September 30, 2024
Inspectors:
T. Hooker, Health Physicist
T. Iskierka-Boggs, Senior Operations Engineer
K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector
J. Reed, Health Physicist
D. Sargis, Health Physicist
D. Tesar, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Richard A. Skokowski, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Prescribe Appropriate Procedures for Auxiliary Building Crane Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60855 A self-revealed Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of the Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain adequate procedures for maintaining the auxiliary building overhead crane and for responding to malfunctions of the crane.
Failure to Complete Required Inservice Testing of Safety Related Cooling Water Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.55(a)(1)(iv) when the licensee failed to perform required inservice testing (IST) on safety related cooling water valves. Specifically, the licensee failed to test two safety related cooling water (CL) valves in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (O&M) code, Section ISTC-3510, Exercising Test Frequency.
Violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation 3.0.3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 when the licensee failed to recognize the need to enter the LCO and complete the required ACTION statement. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter TS LCO 3.0.3 and secure movement of irradiated fuel upon the inoperability of the second train of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSVS).
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000306/2024-001-01 LER 2024-001-01 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Reactor Trip and Auto-Start Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to Loss of Suction to the 22 Main Feedwater Pump 71153 Closed LER 05000306/2024-001-00 LER 2024-001-00 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Reactor Trip and Auto-Start Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to Loss of Suction to the 22 Main Feedwater Pump 71153 Closed LER 05000282,05000306/20 24-001-00 LER 2024-001-00 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2,
Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System Inoperable during Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power, where it remained until September 20, 2024, when the unit was shut down for a refueling outage.
Unit 2 The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power, where it remained for the entire inspection period, with the exception of short-term power reductions for testing, and as requested by the transmission system operator.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2B train safety injection system on July 2, 2024
- (2) Unit 2A train safety injection system on July 26, 2024
- (3) Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) prior to 1R34 draindown to 1 foot below the reactor flange on September 23, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Area (FA) 16, elevation 735', bus 122 room on July 1, 2024
- (2) FA 82, elevation 735', train B event monitoring room on July 1, 2024
- (3) FA 75, elevation 735', Unit 2 auxiliary building on July 2, 2024
- (4) FA 73, elevation 695', Unit 2 auxiliary building on July 8, 2024
- (5) FA 92, elevation 755', 122 control room chiller room on July 10, 2024
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill in detection zone 44, elevation 715', turbine building, on September 7, 2024.
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1128, Monthly Backflush of Emergency Bay Intake Pipe, on July 15, 2024
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered on September 3, 2024. Results are that 55 of the 56 licensed operators took and passed their examinations. There were two reactor operators, and one senior reactor operator that passed requiring remediation. There were no failures. One licensed operator (RO) did not take the exam due to being on medical hold. This individuals license was terminated due to medical issues.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the Unit 1 shutdown for the refueling outage on September 20, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator scenarios on August 21, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)ventilation system lineup for fuel handling on July 17, 2024
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)quality control paperwork for various systems and components reviewed on July 23, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)availability during auxiliary feed pressure switch maintenance on July 1, 2024 (2)availability of bus 26 feed to bus 27 pending setpoint change on July 1, 2024 (3)23 inverter failure and RICT implementation on August 2, 2024 (4)loss of 2R-48 and CV-31129 on August 6, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)auxiliary building special ventilation system (ABSVS) operability associated with 1R37 out of service (Technical Specification [TS] basis Limiting Condition for Operation
[LCO] 3.7.12) on July 11, 2024 (2)past operability for ABSVS during cask 54 fuel handling on July 29, 2024 (3)circulation water crossover pipe seismic qualification without hanger on August 26, 2024 (4)
(Partial)
CV-31279 dual indication on August 7, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
- (1) SP 2089B PMT for RHR motor test on July 3, 2024 (2)22 charging pump PMT following maintenance on July 9, 2024
- (3) Work Order (WO) 700105741, SP 1102 11 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump quarterly test on July 18, 2024
- (4) WOs 700068909 and 700122280, 21 auxiliary building makeup air handling unit on July 24, 2024 (5)23 inverter PMT following capacitor replacement on August 6, 2024
- (6) WO 700126719, RHR component cooling heat exchanger inlet valve maintenance and PMT on August 13, 2024
- (7) PMT of 12 battery charger following maintenance on August 21, 2024 (8)121 ABSVS PMT following filter replacement on September 4, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) SP 2088B, train B safety injection quarterly test on July 1, 2024
- (2) SP 1857, 4kV undervoltage (UV) and UV relay test R5 on July 16, 2024
- (3) SP 2856, bus 26 undervolt omicron test on August 1, 2024
- (4) SP 2307, D6 emergency diesel generator fast start on August 2, 2024
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) SP 1106B, 22 diesel cooling water pump monthly test on July 31, 2024
- (2) 22 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) quarterly on August 22, 2024
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)simulator scenario for licensed operator reactor training (non-DEP [drill and exercise performance]) on September 13,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)whole body counter #1 in the old administration building (2)high range GM detector (AMP-100, serial number 5013-002) at the radiation protection instrument storage facility (3)gamma spectroscopy system in the counting room (4)portable friskers at the radiologically controlled area (RCA) exit (5)tool and equipment monitors at the RCA exit (6)portal monitors at the site exit building (7)personnel contamination monitors at the RCA exit (8)portable ion chambers ready for use
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Argos-5 contamination monitor number 2306-193
- (2) GEM-5 portal monitor number 600692
- (3) SAM-11 tool, and equipment monitor number 293281
- (4) Model 9-3 dose rate meter number 536409
- (5) Model RO-2A dose rate meter number 293249
- (6) AMP-200 high range dose rate meter number 7711-015
- (7) Model G10-2-2600-2SR box calibrator number BX3 (8)electronic dosimeter number A0EB4C
- (9) Mirion 6LB contamination counter number 600583
- (10) AMS-4 continuous air monitor number 293273
- (11) CF-18V air sampler calibrator number 293117
- (12) H-809V1 air sampler number 293155 (13)whole body counter fast scan #1 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Unit 2, liquid sample radiation monitor, 2R19
- (2) Unit 1, shield building vent gas monitor, 1R-22
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Unit 1, auxiliary building ventilation system discharge to Unit 1 auxiliary building stack
- (2) Unit 1, shield building ventilation system discharge to Unit 1 shield building stack (3)liquid radioactive waste tanks and sample systems (4)liquid radioactive waste effluent monitor
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
- (1) Unit 1 auxiliary building vent particulate and iodine sample
- (2) Unit 1 auxiliary building vent noble gas sample
- (3) Unit 1 shield building vent particulate and iodine sample
- (4) Unit 1 CVCS monitor tank liquid sample
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
(1)steam generator blowdown liquid release, PILGB2024-178
- (2) Unit 1 in-service purge gaseous release, PIGB2022-218
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
- follow-up to transient CT-11 loss of power to bus 16 with D2 Emergency Diesel Generator out of service on August 28, 2024 (2)
- follow-up to minor IST violation for CV-31652 on September 19, 2024 (3)
(Partial)
- AutoPIPE software error follow-up on August 13, 2024 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complied with reporting requirements.
- (1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000306/2024-001-00 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Reactor Trip and Auto-Start Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to Loss of Suction to the 22 Main Feedwater Pump (ADAMS Accession No. ML24121A043). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 05000306/2024-001-01 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Reactor Trip and Auto-Start Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater due to Loss of Suction to the 22 Main Feedwater Pump (ADAMS Accession No. ML24155A195). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in this Inspection Report 05000306/2024-003. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct, and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
- (3) LER 05000282, 05000306/2024-001-00 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System Inoperable during Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies (ADAMS Accession No. ML24260A256).
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855 - Operation of An ISFSI Operation of An ISFSI
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) cask loading activities from May 20 through July 26, 2024. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities during the loading of cask 54:
- heavy load movement of loaded cask out of the spent fuel pool
- closure bolting and final torque
- vacuum drying
- helium leak testing
- radiological field surveys The inspectors performed walkdowns of the ISFSI pad, which also included performing independent radiation surveys and walkdowns of the ISFSI haul path.
The inspectors evaluated the following:
- spent fuel selected for loading into dry cask storage during this loading campaign
- selected corrective action program documents
- selected 72.48 screenings
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Prescribe Appropriate Procedures for Auxiliary Building Crane Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60855 A self-revealed Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of the Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain adequate procedures for maintaining the auxiliary building overhead crane and for responding to malfunctions of the crane.
Description:
On May 21, 2024, the licensee was removing a loaded spent fuel storage cask from the spent fuel pool during their dry fuel loading campaign. After the cask exited the pool, the auxiliary building crane's band brake engaged, and all crane motion was stopped. The licensee began troubleshooting to identify the cause of the stopped crane.
The TN-40 cask TS surveillance requirement 3.1.2.1 required that a helium environment be established in the cask within 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> after commencing cask draining. When the crane stopped, the cask was in a drained, air-filled condition and did not have a means of forced cooling. The licensee performed an evaluation to demonstrate that the cask could remain in its condition for 44 hours5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> before exceeding the long-term storage temperature limits of the fuel. The licensee entered TS condition 3.1.2.A, Cask initial helium backfill pressure limit not met.
Contingency procedure D95.8 Auxiliary Building Crane Malfunction with a Loaded Cask, noted the 34-hour requirement to establish a helium environment and directed the user to D58.5.6, Auxiliary Building Crane Main Hoist Troubleshooting. The troubleshooting procedure included steps to perform emergency load lowering of a suspended cask and stated that a separate work request would be needed. The licensee drafted a separate work request to lower the cask, but there was not an existing procedure that included all the required actions. Specifically, the licensee needed to prepare the cask to go back into the pool by sealing the lid, attaching hoses to the cask, maintaining pool level, and refilling the cask. The licensee needed to create a new work instruction by combining steps from multiple procedures.
The licensee drafted the new work instruction, and on May 22 the licensee used the emergency lowering procedure to return the cask to the spent fuel pool. Cooling to the cask was initiated 44 hours5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> after draining had commenced. The inspectors determined that the licensee lacked appropriate contingency procedures because the existing work instructions were not comprehensive enough to allow cooling to be restored to the cask within the 34-hour surveillance time. This is the first example of inadequate procedures.
During subsequent troubleshooting of the auxiliary building crane, the licensee identified that the energy absorbing torque limiter (EATL) torque setting was lower than expected. The EATL acts as a mechanical overload limiter and engages the emergency brake if it senses an overload condition. The licensee had adjusted the EATL torque setting prior to the loading campaign during their last periodic inspection. As part of troubleshooting, the licensee and their crane vendor and licensee determined that the EATL was not properly lubricated during the inspection. Inadequate lubrication can cause measurements of the EATL torque setting to read higher than the actual setting. This caused the EATL's newly adjusted torque setting to be lower than what it was measured as.
The inspectors noted that PM 3160-3, Auxiliary Building Crane Periodic Mechanical Maintenance, did not have any steps that required lubricating the EATL prior to checking the setting or changing the setting. The licensee revised the procedure and reset and verified the torque setting on the EATL on June 20, 2024. The inspectors determined that the maintenance procedure for checking and setting the EATL was inadequate because it did not require the EATL to be lubricated which resulted in an erroneous reading. This was the second example of inadequate procedures.
Corrective Actions: The licensee created Work Plan 700129508-0180 Release Band Brake, in order to successfully lower the suspended load while taking into account all nuclear and industrial safety precautions and vendor recommendations. The licensee also revised procedure PM 3160-3, Auxiliary Building Crane Periodic Mechanical Maintenance, in order to ensure that the EATL is properly lubricated prior to testing the torque setting.
Corrective Action References: 501000085675 and 501000085766
Performance Assessment:
None
Enforcement:
The ROP's significance determination process does not specifically consider violations associated with Independent spent fuel storage installations under 10 CFR Part 72.
Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which involves 10 CFR Part 72 requirements using traditional enforcement.
Violation: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72, Section 150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that the licensee shall prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall require that these procedures be followed.
Contrary to the above, until June 20, 2024, the licensee failed to prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstance. Specifically, the licensees procedure for setting the torque setting on the auxiliary building crane EATL was inadequate to ensure that the setting was in the correct band for the crane to be able to lift and move a loaded cask. Additionally, the licensees contingency procedure for a crane failure did not provide adequate guidance to perform emergency lowering of the load in a timely manner in order to prevent exceeding the 34-hour TS time to add helium to a loaded spent fuel cask.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Complete Required Inservice Testing of Safety Related Cooling Water Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.55(a)(1)(iv)when the licensee failed to perform required inservice testing (IST) on safety related cooling water valves. Specifically, the licensee failed to test two safety related cooling water (CL)valves in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (O&M) code, Section ISTC-3510, Exercising Test Frequency.
Description:
On January 2, 2024, during the performance of the quarterly IST of the cooling water system, MV-32038 had dual indication when stroked to the closed position. The valve was re-stroked per the governing procedure, and then indicated shut, and the quarterly test was completed satisfactorily.
On March 9, 2024, during the next quarterly IST test, MV-32038 again had dual indication when stroking the valve closed. However, when the valve was re-stroked, it continued to have dual indication, and the test result was unsatisfactory.
On April 25, 2024, the quarterly test was re-attempted with additional steps added to adjust the limit switch on the valve. However, it was discovered that MV-32038 was degraded and was in fact not closing completely. On April 27, 2024, Operations made the decision to move on with the test for the remainder of the cooling water system valves due to the upcoming late date for completing the test. Operations completed the quarterly test of the cooling water system except for MV-32028, and the two cross connect valves immediately upstream, MV-32322 and MV-32329. These three valves were declared IST Inoperable.
Inspectors questioned the lack of testing for all of the required valves and compliance with the ASME O&M Code requirements. On May 8, 2024, additional diagnostic testing was performed on MV-32028 which determined that the valve could not meet its safety function, and the valve was declared to be inoperable per TS as well as IST, although the cooling water system itself remained operable. Based upon questions from the inspectors, the licensee performed the required IST testing of MV-32322 and MV-32329 on June 1, 2024, restoring operability and compliance with the ASME O&M Code requirements.
Corrective Actions: The licensee declared the valves IST inoperable and entered the issue into their CAP for resolution. The two cooling water cross connect valves were tested and returned to service on June 2, 2024.
Corrective Action References: 501000080543, "Timed MV-32038 Twice Due to Dual Light" 501000082686, "MV-32038 Dual Indication" 501000084597, "SP 1159 Completed Unsat" 501000084671, "PSR Item Exceeded IST Timing Frequency" 501000084692, "IST Inoperable CL Return Valves" 501000084730, "SP1159 Completion Not Documented in SAP" 501000085115, "MV-32038 High Running Torque" 501000086170, "SP 1159 Completed Unsat"
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the failure to complete the required IST testing was with the ability of the licensee to foresee and correct and is therefore a performance deficiency. Specifically, on April 27, 2024, the licensee chose to not complete the required IST testing of MV-32322 and MV-32329.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This issue was similar to example 2.a in IMC 0612 Appendix E - Example of Minor Issues, and was therefore screened to More Than Minor (MTM).
Specifically, the licensee's failure to complete the required IST testing of the safety related cooling water valves (MV-32322 and MV-32329) resulted in the inoperability and unavailability of the valves to perform their safety function and reduced the reliability of the safety related cooling water system, threatening the operability of the system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Inspector assessed the significance of the issue using IMC 0609 Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions Section A. Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems) and determined the issue screened to Green by answering No to all of the screening questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. The inspectors determined that the decision to not test the safety related cooling water valves was, in part, due to a lack of conservative bias.
Enforcement:
Violation: The NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.55a specify
- (a) Documents approved for incorporation by reference. The material listed in this paragraph
- (a) is incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 1 CFR part 51. Further, paragraph (a)(1)(iv) specifies ASME Operation and Maintenance Code. The editions and addenda for the ASME Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants are listed in this paragraph. The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) is currently required by 10 CFR 50.55a to implement the IST requirements in the 2004 Edition through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME O&M Code with applicable conditions. The PINGP describes the implementation in plant procedure H10.1, Inservice Inspection Program.
The 2004 Edition of the ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTC, Inservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants, paragraph ISTC-3510, Exercising Test Frequency, specifies in part that, Active Category A, Category B, and Category C check valves shall be exercised nominally every 3 months, Contrary to the above, from April 28, 2024 thru June 2, 2024, the licensee failed to exercise active Category 'B' valves within their nominal 3 month (+25%) interval. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform the required quarterly inservice tests of valves MV-32322 and MV-32329 in accordance with the ASME O&M Code, ISTC-3510 as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation 3.0.3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000282,05000306/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 when the licensee failed to recognize the need to enter the LCO and complete the required ACTION statement. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter TS LCO 3.0.3 and secure movement of irradiated fuel upon the inoperability of the second train of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSVS).
Description:
While performing a licensing basis review for the 1{2}R-37 and 1{2}R-30 radiation monitors in December of 2023, the licensee identified vulnerabilities associated with TS 3.7.12 ABSVS.
TS 3.7.12 specifies that two trains of ABSVS are required to be operable during Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, or during the movement of irradiated fuel. The radiation monitors have a safety related function and are credited during a fuel handling accident (FHA) for initiating ABSVS on a high radiation signal, which secures auxiliary building normal ventilation system (ABNVS),preventing an unfiltered release to the environment and minimizing the dose to control room personnel. If any one of the four radiation monitors is inoperable, it causes the ABSVS for that train to become inoperable. The licensee entered the results of the licensing basis review into the corrective action program (CAP) on December 12, 2023. Actions were taken to perform a past operability review (POR) and to make revisions to the procedures.
Subsequently, during the dry cask storage campaign, the licensee handled fuel several times between April 23, 2024, and May 20, 2024. On July 11, 2024 the licensee initiated two CAP documents to address a potential issue of 1R-37 being out of service during movement of irradiated fuel and to perform a POR to determine if there were any instances of past inoperability of ABSVS.
On July 26, 2024, the licensee completed the POR and determined that ABSVS had been Operable the entire time, even during movement of irradiated fuel, and thus no concerns were identified. Based upon a review of the source documents, the inspectors challenged this determination. Subsequent to the Inspectors questions, on August 20, 2024, the licensee revised the POR and identified several instances during movement of irradiated fuel where the radiation monitors were inoperable, causing respective trains of ABSVS to be inoperable, subsequently Technical Specification LCO 3.7.12 Conditions and Action statements did apply. In most instances fuel moves were completed within the allowed ACTION time.
However, the licensee identified one instance, on May 2, 2024, from 1252 until 1325, where both trains of ABSVS were inoperable. This condition is not allowed by TS and required entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 which specifies, When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.
During their reportability review, the licensee determined the following: There are no conditions in 3.7.12 that apply to two trains of ABSVS being inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies due to radiation monitors out of service. With no applicable condition in Tech Spec 3.7.12, entry into LCO 3.0.3 would have been required since LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when the LCO is not met, and the associated action is not provided. This guidance can be used when there are no conditions that apply. LCO 3.0.3 states that the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. A timeline is established in LCO 3.0.3 to shut down the impacted unit. However, since the applicability of the LCO is movement of irradiated fuel, a unit shutdown would not provide appropriate remedial measures. The required action in this case would be to suspend the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has entered this issue into their CAP program, revised their TS basis document, and revised their fuel handling procedures to provide clearer guidance.
Corrective Action References: 501000079970, "TS 3.7.12 FHA Issues" 501000084008, "Evaluate Tech Spec Bases LCO 3.7.12" 501000085931, "CAP Closed with Action Not Performed" 501000085922, "TS 3.7.12 Missing in Fuel Handling Procedure" 501000087599, "1R-37 OOS Impacts to TS 3.7.12"
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to comply with TS LCO 3.0.3 requirements was within the ability of the licensee to foresee and correct and was therefore a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, movement of irradiated fuel was conducted with both trains of ABSVS inoperable, preventing automatic isolation of ABNV in the event of a high radiation signal. In addition, the review of IMC 0612, Appendix E - Example of Minor Issues found example 3.d to be similar and that the specifics of this issue resulted in a more than minor determination.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Inspectors answered all the questions in Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, as NO; therefore, the issue screened to Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. The inspectors determined the licensees failure to evaluate the impact of the inoperable radiation monitors was due to complacency. The potential impact of the radiation monitors on the ability to meet TS LCO 3.7.12 was a known issue that had previously been entered into the CAP approximately 6 months prior to the event.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS LCO 3.7.12 requires that while the plant is in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, or during the movement of irradiated fuel, two ABSVS trains shall be OPERABLE.
TS LCO 3.0.3 requires, in part, that, When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.
Contrary to the above, between 1252 and 1325 on May 2, 2024, during the handling of irradiated fuel, both trains of ABSVS were inoperable, in that one 'A' train and one 'B' train radiation monitors were inoperable, thereby inhibiting the high radiation initiation signal of each train of the ABSVS. With the LCO not met and an associated ACTION not provided, the licensee failed to place the unit in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Specifically, with both trains of ABSVS inoperable, the licensee failed to take action to place the unit in a MODE in which TS LCO 3.7.12 did not apply, by securing movement of irradiated fuel.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Follow-up of 11 Cooling Water Strainer Backflush Control Valve Code Non-Compliance 71152A On March 8, 2023, the 11 CL strainer backflush valve, CV-31652, was declared ASME O&M Code (Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants) inoperable due to inability to meet the Inservice Testing (IST) limiting stroke time (LST) of 2.0 seconds. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP.
On April 7, 2023, a CAP was written in response to an NRC-identified minor violation received for returning CV-31652 to service without first completing repair, replacement, or analysis and identification of the cause of the deviation.
Condition Evaluation (CE) 500000323341 stated in part, To meet the code requirement, CV-31652 needs to be repaired replaced or evaluated. Work Order 700121181 was generated to replace the control valve and is being tracked.
The final corrective action was replacement of the CV-31652 solenoid valve on June 13, 2023. Following replacement, the open stroke time for CV-31652 returned to baseline and was restored to compliance below the limiting stroke time in the IST program.
The work order completion notes stated the internal rubber material was degrading on the solenoid valve. Subsequently the licensee increased the replacement frequency for similar components to address the extent of condition in that valve group. In addition, the frequency of testing was increased from quarterly to monthly to rapidly detect changes in the stroke time.
Corrective actions planned include changing the H10.1 ASME Inservice Testing Program, procedure to provide additional instructions and add clarity. Also, the site created an action to determine if there was a trend in IST non-conformances.
Inspectors determined that the licensee's actions were adequate to restore compliance with the OM Code and addressed the minor violation.
The inspectors concluded that no more than minor findings or violations were identified during this review.
Observation: Follow-up of Loss of CT-11 Offsite Power Source to Bus 16 71152A Inspectors reviewed the issue of loss of CT 11 power source to bus 16 as a follow-up PIR item. On October 17, 2023, at 0147 with Unit 2 off line and Unit 1 at full power, vendor personnel were performing procedure PE-2RS-X-Y, Transformer 2RS Relay Testing. Maintenance personnel incorrectly positioned a switch in the substation, which caused the loss of power to bus 16. The load sequencer automatically selected the alternate offsite power source to re-energize bus 16. The licensee entered the associated TS LCO, updated the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) online risk monitor, and restored the tripped source within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee entered the issue into the CAP as QIM 501000077842, Loss of CT-11 Due to 1H4 Trip.
Corrective actions taken included Transmission and Distribution, maintenance, and operations groups reviewed high risk plans and verified temporary barriers were in place, including additional oversight, prior to commencing work. In addition, paired observations to ensure HU tools were implemented in accordance with site standards and department reviews of hard match and peer check standards were completed at the beginning of shift meetings.
Inspectors assessed the licensee's CAP performance and determined that the actions taken or planned were adequate to address the CAQ.
The inspectors concluded that no more than minor findings or violations were identified during this review.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 21, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Thomas Conboy and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 16, 2024, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Bryan Currier, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 11, 2024, the inspectors presented the ISFSI cask loading inspection results to Bryan Currier, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
ISFSI Cask Neutron Shielding Baseline Radiation Dose
Rates for Establishing Trending Analysis
4084.01
Certificate of Calibration
11/16/2023
Calibration
Records
TG276645355-1
Certificate of Calibration for Torque Tool
03/04/2024
501000040465
Aux Bldg Crane Remote Intermittent
05/12/2020
501000061222
Aux Building Crane 2 Ind. Lights Stay On
03/11/2022
501000063897
Cask Project - Procedure Use & Adherence
06/15/2022
501000070913
Crane Hoist Would Not Respond to Command
2/24/2023
501000080883
TN40HT Cask 45 Lowering OP Sys Pressure
01/16/2024
501000085675
Aux Bldg Crane Stopped Movement
05/21/2024
501000085759
Hose Melted during Cask Venting
05/23/2024
501000085766
Cask 54 Evaluation
05/22/2024
Cask 13 ISFSI License Renewal Inspection Results
05/26/2012
Corrective Action
Documents
Cask 1 Aging Management Inspection Results
05/26/2012
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
501000085635
NRC Identified - Out of Tolerance Record
05/21/2024
608000001174
Cask 54 Extended Vacuum Assessment
Engineering
Evaluations
TN40HT-427
Thermal Evaluation of TN-40HT Cask #54 Vacuum Drying
Time Limit
2.48 - 5708
Altr Cask XMT Manifold Iso Vlv
2.48 - 5741
Orano Non-Conformance of TN40 Cask Lid Fabrication
2.48 - 5764
Orano SNCR 2022-013 Basket Unit 5 Non-Conformance
Report
Miscellaneous
2.48 - 5772
Orano Non-Conformance Report SNCR 2022-100
BOP-MT-24-002
Magnetic Particle Examination
03/08/2024
NDE Reports
BOP-PT-24-005
Liquid Penetrant Examination
03/08/2024
D58.5.6
Auxiliary Building Crane Main Hoist Troubleshooting
D95.1
TN-40 Cask Loading Procedure
60855
Procedures
D95.2
TN-40 Cask Unloading Procedure
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
D95.3
TN-40 Cask Removal and Storage Procedure
D95.8
Auxiliary Building Crane Malfunction with a Loaded Cask
PINGP 1389
Crane Daily - Frequent and Functional Inspection
PM 3160-3
Auxiliary Building Crane Periodic Mechanical Maintenance
SP 1075.HT
TN-40HT Fuel Selection and Identification
TP 1281
Quarterly ISFSI Radiation/Contamination Survey
PI-M-20231220-5
TP 1281 ISFSI Quarterly Survey
2/28/2023
Radiation
Surveys
PI-M-20240311-4
TP 1281 ISFSI Quarterly Survey
03/11/2024
Self-Assessments A-PROG-FL-
22-1
22 ISFSI Audit
10/17/2022
700112873-0010
Perform Quarterly Inspection of ISFSI
11/20/2023
700112939-0010
SP1079 ISFSI Dry Cask Press Mntr Sys Cal
04/22/2024
700116590-0010
PM 3562-23-Aux Bldg Rigging Sling Insps
01/02/2024
700123294-0010
Aux Bld Hoisting Equip&Rigging Insp
01/15/2024
700124290-0010
SP1076 ISFSI Qtr Sfty Status
2/07/2024
700124384-0010
Perform PM 3160-3 Aux Bld Crane Insp For
04/01/2024
700124384-0020
Elec: PM 3160-3 Aux Bld Crane Elec Insp
04/02/2024
700125498-0010
03/06/2024
700128245-0010
SP 1402 Auxiliary Building Crane and Lift Beam Inspection
04/26/2024
700129508-0180
Release Band Brake
700129537-0010
SP 1075 TN-40 Fuel Selection and Identification
05/15/2024
700139744-0010
SP1075 TN-40 Fuel Selection and ID
07/17/2024
700139880-0010
Reinspect 54HT Top Nozzles
07/01/2024
700139880-0040
Inspection Cask and Lift for Cleaning
06/21/2024
Work Orders
MO 70010136B-
0010
Special Lift Fixture for TN-40 Cask
04/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
501000087407
Lube Oil Piping Bent
07/03/2024
Fire Area 73
Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, El. 695'
Fire Plans
Fire Area 75
Auxiliary Building Unit 2 Operating Level, El. 735'
Miscellaneous
24 LOR NRC
EXAM
SUMMARY
(PRAIRIE
ISLAND)
Prairie Island 2024 Licensed Operator Requalification NRC
Exam Results Summary
08/30/2024
Calculations
Calculation Doc
No: GEN-PI-077
Fuel Handling Accident Dose Analysis - AST
Corrective Action
Documents
501000087408
WO Documentation Issues
07/03/2024
Procedures
PE 0009
4kV Switchgear Preventive Maintenance
Work Orders
700086343
PE-B16-2 Bus 16 Inspection/Doble
10/14/2024
1C20.8
Instrument AC Distribution System
Procedures
B20.8
Instrument AC Distribution System
501000079389
Radiation Monitors No Longer SR
11/28/2023
501000079970
2/12/2023
501000085115
Plant Operability Review. Satisfactorily Completed SP1159,
COOLING WATER VALUVES QUARTERLY TEST per
WO-000700122604-0010. CAP 501000080543 Issued for
Having to Cycle MV-32038 a Second Time due to Dual Light
Indication Not Clearing the First Time it Was Closed.
05/08/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
501000087599
Plant Operability Review. While Completing a Review of the
Design and Licensing Basis of 1[2]R-37 and 1[2]R-30 per
QIM 501000079389, it Was Identified That the Current
Issues with 1R-37 out of Service May Impact Auxiliary
Building Special Ventilation Systems Operability per
TS 3.7.12 While Moving Irradiated Fuel Assemblies.
07/11/2024
Engineering
Evaluations
2000015288
Reportability Determination Evaluation; 1R-37 OOS Impacts
to TS 3.7.12
07/11/2024
Applicability
Determination
(AD) No.: 9652
50.59 or 72.48 Applicability Determination and Prescreening;
Approval 602000028876; AD Title: PCR 602000035991: C11
Miscellaneous
Prompt
Operability
Determination
Approval: 602000017425, CAP: 501000087617; POD:
500000330391; Background: 501000087617 SR 3.7.12.4
Bases Update Issues
Request Number:
CV-31279 Q1
RE: CV-31279; How is the Current Licensing Basis Being
Met with CV-31279 Open and Inoperable?
08/28/2024
Miscellaneous
Screening No.:
5802
50.59 Screening; 602000018712; 1R-30, 1R-37, 2R-30,
2R-37, Out of Service Actions, PCR C11 Radiation Monitors
Procedures
SP 2244
Containment Air Sample Valves Quarterly Test
SP 2244 CNTMT AIR SAMPLE VLVSQTR
09/25/2024
CV-31279 Dual Light Indication
09/12/2024
Work Orders
0030
CNTMT AIR SMPL RTRN INT ISOL CV-31129; PMT
SV-33935
09/18/2024
Miscellaneous
PI 1R34 Timeline
Prairie Island 1R34 Summary
Calculations
Sensitivity
Calculation for
MV-32128
VOTES Calibrator S/N ESV-140; Work Order Number:
700126719
08/13/2024
Drawings
XH-1001-7
Flow Diagram Safety Injection System, Unit 2
2000017728
Worker Signoffs to Document Completion
08/13/2024
Engineering
Evaluations
2000017729
Preventative Maintenance Checklist
08/13/2024
Engineering
Report
NSPM Nuclear MOV Program; MOV POST-TEST DATA
REVIEW WORKSHEET; Valve Number: MV-32128; Test
Date: 08/13/2024; Work Order 700126719
08/13/2024
Miscellaneous
NSPM Nuclear
MOV Program
MOV Diagnostic Test Instructions/Criteria; Schedule WW
2419; Valve Number: MV-32128; Work Order: 700126719
08/13/2024
SP 2089B
Train B RHR Pumps and Suction Valves from the RWST
Quarterly Test
Procedures
SP 2102
Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Quarterly Test
114
MV-32128 21 RHR HX CC INLET D70
08/16/2024
SP 2088B TRN B Safety Injection QTR Test
SP 2089B-2B RHR PMP & SUCT VLV FROM RWST
07/02/2024
09/05/2024
WO Operation:
700126719-0010
Func. Loc: PI:2: _CC:MV-32128; Name: 21 RHR HX CC
INLT MV; Job Description: Periodic Inspection & Testing
Work Order Task:
20
AUX BLDG M-U AIR UNIT W/FAN; WO
No: 700122280-0020
Work Orders
Work Order Task:
700068909-0020
AUX BLDG M-U AIR UNIT W/FAN
Calibration
Records
Amp-200 #7711-
015
Calibration Data Sheet
07/31/2023
AMS-4 #293273
Calibration Data Sheet
2/25/2023
ARGOS-5 #2306-
193
Calibration Data Sheet
06/18/2024
Box Calibrator
- BX3
Vendor Calibration Report
04/04/2024
GEM-5 #600692
Calibration Data Sheet
03/09/2024
Hi-Q Model CF-
18V #293117
Calibration Data Sheet
08/22/2023
Ludlum Model 9-3
- 536398
Calibration Data Sheet
2/05/2023
Ludlum Model 9-3
- 536398
Calibration Data Sheet
2/05/2023
MG-3000
Electronic
Dosimeter
- A0EB4C
Calibration Data Sheet
01/04/2024
Mirion 6LB
- 600583
Calibration Data Sheet
03/01/2024
RADECO H-
809V1 #293155
Calibration Data Sheet
2/26/2023
RO-2A #293249
Calibration Data Sheet
2/05/2023
SAM-11 #293281
Calibration Data Sheet
2/11/2024
Whole Body
Counter
Calibration Report
Fast Scan #1 Calibration
08/19/2023
501000079223
WATER INTRUSION INSIDE GAS RAD MONITOR
11/21/2023
501000083944
Adverse Trend: Effluent Rad Monitor OOS
04/10/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
501000085568
WW2418: Some Friskers Not Source Checked
05/17/2024
Engineering
Evaluations
Technical Basis
Document #17-
2
Area Radiation Monitor Alarm Setpoints
Technical Basis
Document #23-
003
ARGOS-5 and GEM-5 Passive Monitoring Capability Testing
08/28/2023
Engineering
Evaluations
Technical Basis
Document #24-
2
Elimination of Periodic Whole Body Counts
03/18/2024
FP-RP-ICC-02
Tool and Equipment Monitor Operation and Calibration
FP-RP-ICC-04
Operation and Calibration of the Mirion GEM-5
FP-RP-ICC-05
Operation and Calibration of the Mirion ARGOS
Contamination
Monitors
FP-RP-NISP-01
Portable Survey Instruments
Procedures
SP1783.6
Victoreen Radiation Monitor Electronic Calibration
Self-Assessments 71124.05 NRC
Inspection SSA
for 2024
RP Instrumentation Self-Assessment
05/30/2024
700011626
1A West Rad Mon Trn A
09/14/2023
Work Orders
70098729
SP1027.20 - NMC RM TRN A Cal - Gaseous Monitor
Calibrations
2/19/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
501000080557
Elevated Septic System Tritium Sample
01/04/2024
501000088877
Operator Aid 593
08/15/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
501000088878
Sewage Truck Release Process
08/15/2024
Drawings
OA-593
Shield Building Stack Effluent Release Flow Paths
22 Land Use Census at Prairie Island
09/30/2022
23 Land Use Census at Prairie Island
10/13/2023
24 June Monthly Effluent Monitor Report
07/30/2024
L-Pl-24-021
23 Annual Radioactive Effluent Report
05/09/2024
PIGB2022-218
Unit 1 In-Service Purge Gaseous Effluent Release Report
10/18/2022
PILB2024-178
Liquid Batch Tanks Liquid Effluent Release Report
08/02/2024
Miscellaneous
PILC2024-188
Unit 2 Turbine Sump Liquid Effluent Release Report
08/12/2024
C21.1-5.2
2 ADT Monitor Tank Release
CY-ADMIN-024
Effluent Surveillance Requirements
Procedures
CY-ENVR-513
Effluent Surveillance Sample Collection
CY-ENVR-521
Chemistry Weekly Release Report
H4
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
RPIP 4518
Septic Tank Sampling
Self-Assessments QF0406
Review of Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent
Treatment and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
CC MSPI Data Collection (Logs)
June 2024
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
CC MSPI Data Collection (Logs)
May 2024
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
CC MSPI Data Collection (Logs)
April 2024
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, CC
MSPI Data Collection (Logs)
March 2024
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
February
24
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
November
23
71151
Miscellaneous
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
January
24
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
December
23
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
October
23
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
August 2023
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Data, and
July 2023
CC Availability
and Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling MSPI Monthly Date, and
September
23
71151
Miscellaneous
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
September
23
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
July 2023
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
August 2023
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
October
23
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
December
23
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
February
24
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
March 2024
71151
Miscellaneous
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
November
23
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
January
24
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
April 2024
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
May 2024
Cooling Water
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Cooling Water MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
June 2024
71151
Miscellaneous
Generation
Occurrences
Unit Shutdowns and Power Changes
April 2024
Generation
Occurrences
Occurrence Record - Unit Shutdown, RFO/PMIO
Occurrence, Unit Shutdown, Reactor Shutdown, and Logs
March 2024
Generation
Occurrences
Unplanned Power Change for 12 CW Pump Casing Leak
Repair
June 2024
Generation
Occurrences
Occurrence Record - Unit Shutdown, Occurrence
Record - Reactor Shutdown, Occurrence
Record - RFO/PMIO Occurrence, and Logs
February
24
Generation
Occurrences
Reactor and Unit Shutdowns
November
23
Generation
Occurrences
Occurrence Record - Unit Shutdown, Units 1 and 2
December
23
Generation
Occurrences
Units 1 and 2 Shutdown History
January
24
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation, Units 1 and 2
January
24
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation, Units 1 and 2
December
23
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Reporting - Generation, Units 1 and 2
November
23
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation, Units 1 and 2; and
Station Generation Data
August 2023
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation, Units 1 and 2; and
Station Generation Data
September
23
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation, Units 1 and 2; and
Station Generation Data
July 2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Monthly
Operating Report
- Generation
Monthly Operating Report - Generation Data, Units 1 and 2;
and Station Generation Data
October
23
MOR -
Generation
Occurrences
Generation Occurrences, Units 1 and 2
August 2023
MOR Generation
Occurrences
Generation Occurrences, Units 1 and 2
September
23
Operations
Generation Occurrences, Units 1 and 2
July 2023
PI Summary
Report
IE01 - Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
07/2023 -
06/2024
PI Summary
Report, Prairie
Island Unit 1
PIs IE01 - Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours,
MS06 - MSPI Emergency AC Power System, MS07 - MSPI
High Pressure Injection System, MS08 - MSPI Heat
Removal System, MS09 - MSPI Residual Heat Removal
System, MS10 - MSPI Cooling Water System
07/2023 -
06/2024
PI Summary
Report, Prairie
Island Unit 2
PIs IE01 - Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours,
MS06 - MSPI Emergency AC Power System, MS07 - MSPI
High Pressure Injection System, MS08 - MSPI Heat
Removal System, MS09 - MSPI Residual Heat Removal
System, MS10 - MSPI Cooling Water System
07/2023 -
06/2024
Data
Planned Downpower on Unit 2 for Condenser Cleaning.
Unplanned Power Change on Unit 1 for DC Control Power
Restoration
May 2024
QF0739,
Approval
2000017241
How is PINGP Assured That the Past Usage of the
Come-Alongs Installed on the MSIVs Has Not Deformed the
07/15/2024
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data,
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MPSI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
July 2023
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data,
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
August 2023
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data,
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
September
23
71151
Miscellaneous
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
June 2024
Availability and
Reliability
Unit 1 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Unit 1 Residual
Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO Notes
May 2024
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units and
Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
April 2024
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
March 2024
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
February
24
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
October
23
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
December
23
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
January
24
Availability and
Reliability
Units 1 and 2 Safety Injection MSPI Monthly Data, Units 1
and 2 Residual Heat Removal MSPI Monthly Data, and LCO
Notes
November
23
Station
Generation Data
03/31/2024
Station
Generation Data
04/30/2024
Station
Generation Data
05/31/2024
Station
Generation Data
06/30/2024
U2 Refueling
Outage, U1
RFO/PMIO Occurrence, Unit Shutdown, Reactor Shutdown
October
23
Unit 1 EAC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
September
23
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
August 2023
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
July 2023
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
October
23
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
December
23
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
November
23
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
January
24
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
February
24
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
June 2024
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
May 2024
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
April 2024
71151
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 1 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
March 2024
Unit 2 EAC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
September
23
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
August 2023
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
July 2023
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
March 2024
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
April 2024
71151
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
June 2024
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
February
24
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
January
24
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
November
23
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
December
23
Unit 2 Emergency
AC Power
Unit 2 Emergency AC MSPI Monthly Data, and SOMS
Narrative Logs
October
23
501000080246
Part 21 AutoPIPE Error Notification
2/21/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
501000081004
S&L Notification, Bentley Critical Error
01/19/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
501000088615
POR 87599 Question of Past Op
08/06/2024