IR 05000280/1992018
| ML18153D149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1992 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153D148 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-92-18, 50-281-92-18, IEB-92-001, IEB-92-1, NUDOCS 9210140127 | |
| Download: ML18153D149 (17) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGU_LATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50~280/92-18 and 50-281/92-18 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
~~inge, Resident Inspector Approved by: 0:;j $. ~*
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
Scope:.
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of operations, maintenance, surveillance, quality verification, licensee event review, action on previous inspection items, bulletin review, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), and commitment tracking. During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's backshifts or weekend operations on August 16, 18, 24, 27, 31 and September 4, and Results:
In the opera~ions area, the following item was noted:
The operability determination that was made when the C component cooling water heat exchanger performance became degraded, although not conservative; was in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 91-18 (paragraph 3.b).
9210140127 920930 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
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- In the maintenance/surveillance functional area, the following item was noted:
Several weaknesses were identified during the installation of a thermostat on a control room chiller. The craft used an uncontrolled vendor manual drawing and a station procedure was n6t utilized to calibrate the thermostat (paragraph 4.a) *
In the safety assessment/quality verification area, the following item was noted:
"
Several examples were identified concerning commitment tracking system items being closed without performing the r~quired actions. ~his was identified as a weakness (paragraphs IO.a and b).
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REPORT DETAILS. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Artigas, Supervisor, Quality Assurance W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
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- . M. Biron, Supervisor, Radiation Engineering H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services_
- R. Blount, Superintendent rif Engineering
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
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- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
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D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection A. Fletcher, Assi~tant Superintendent of Engineering
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
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M. Kansler, Station Manager
- A. Meekins,.. Supervisor, Admi ni strati ve Services J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
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- R. Saunders, Assistant Vice Presidentr Nuclear Operations E. Smith, 5ite Quality Assurance Manager *
- B. Stanley, Supervisor, Station Procedures
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
- G. Thompson, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering
- A. Wheeler; Shift Supervisor, Nuclear NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- * J. York, Resident Inspector S. Tingen, Resident Inspettor
- Attend~d Exit Interview Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph. * Plant Status Unit I began the reporting period in power operation. The unit was at approximately five percent reactor power at the end of the inspection period with the main turbine off-line because of repairs being perfor~ed on the C station service transformer (oil was leaking *from one of the insulator bushings).
Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operation. The unit was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 49 of continuous operatio Both ~nits ~amped power tti allow cleaning of condenser water-boxe The water:-boxes were being clogged by hydroids and other marine lif The seasonal effects of hydroid growth is discussed_ further in paragraph 3.d~
.. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to app~oved procedures. The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify opE)rations safety and compliance with TSs and to ~aintain awareness of the overall operation of th~ facilit Instrumentation and ECCS lineupi were periodically reviewed from control room indication to asses~ operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection piograms, radiological work practices, plant security programs and housekeepin DRs were.reviewed to assure that potential safety con-cerns were properly addressed and reporte Verification of Plant Records (TI 2515/115)
The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's ability to obtain accurate and complete readings from both
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Jicensed and non-licensed operqtor To accomplish this objective the inspector~ considered the licensee's efforts associated with their self-monitoring program in this area and also independently conducted a sampling of these logs/records fo~ accuracy and completenes (1)
Implementation of the Licensee's Program On the corporate and station levels, the licensee has initiated a Level I action item to address the evaluation of the i~tegrity of records and log The fo1lowing Level II tasks have been or are being performed to achieve the
.Level I objective:
Task Review RO logs and security entry
- data to verify that pl ant records are being taken properl Issue required reading to ROs and confirm understanding of integrity standards for record keeping and log Review.RO data and log requirements to determine if data is necessary and demands on operators are reasonabl. Status Complete Complete.
Complete
Identify and review other dept's records
_and logs (Fire Proteition, Flood Prdtection Rad Protection, NSS, QA, etc.) to v~rify data integrit Revi~w necessity for taking above log Due Date-9/30/92 Due Date 10/30/92 The inspectors reviewed the licens~e's first completed task in which a revi.ew was made of RO 1 ogs and security entry data to verify that pl ant record_s were being _taken properl The licensee randomly selected 14 log readings over a period of six days in April of this yea The areas selected were EOG 1 and 2, Unit 1 safeguards, the fuel building, and the security diese Two of the entries could not be confirmed because of security computer problems, but 12 of the log entries were verifie The licensee concluded that there were no instances of improper log takin The licensee intends.to institute a program to take similar samples on a quarterly basi *
The inspectors will follow the results of the other tasks in this project, particularly the accuracy of the logs and records from departments other than operation (2)
Inspectors Review of Logs/Records The inspectors selected five days, March 7, May 24, June 19, July 3, and August 4, 1992, for a review of records/log Four of these days were weekends and/or holiday The security computer entrance and exit times (wher~ available)
were reviewed for all three shifts on each of these days to determine if.the assigned oper~tor entered the folJowing areas: all three EDG's, both units safeguards, the fuel building, and the security di~se This represented a sample of approximately 100 entrie Generally the entries.were verifiable. A computer problem occurred during one of the shifts on August 5 and *all of the entries could not be verified. The only other recotd that could not be ve~ified was the 2:00 a.m. log for entry to the security diesel on March 7. - The licensee does-allow the assigned operators to get other operators to help in taking the logs, but the security records did not show any of the other shift operators ent~ring the room in which th~
security diesel is locate A computer check.of the security records revealed that the security diesel cardreader made 54 entrance misreads and 62-exit misreads for the month of March (the month in which the record was questioned). Since this area does not have many entrances, the 1 arge_ number of card misreads was an
- indication of an equpment proble Subsequent to March, maintenance was performed on the card readers, resulting in a substantial reduction in misread Based on the card*
reader problems and also on int~rvi~ws with the ~on-licensed operator, the licensee contluded that the r~cord had been take The inspectors concluded from the information examined that the licensee has the ability to obtain accurate and complete readi~gs from both the licensed and non-1 i censed ope.raters. *
Review of CC Heat Exchanger Operability Determination*
At ll:46 p.m. _on August 29, the C CC heat exchanger radiation monitor alert alarm initiated and would not clea SW samples from the heat exchanger were obtained and did not contain-any contamination~
After several hours with the alarm locked in, operators suspected that SW flow to the heat exchanger was blocked and the heat exchanger needed cleanin However, operators did not declare the heat exchanger inoperable at this tim At 3:52 a.m. on August 30, the CCC heater exchanger was isolated to clean the SW inlet side and a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO was entere Fpur bags.of trash, mostly hydroids, were removed from the heat exchange The head of the heat exchanger was covered with trash essentially blocking flow to all the tube At 7:30 a.m., the heat exchanger was placed. back in service and the radiation monitor alarm cleare The licensee concluded that the cause of the radiation alarm was that the heat exchanger became pa~tially drained due to tube blockage and, therefore, was not able to shield the radiation from the CC syste As previously stated, operators suspected that SW flow through the heat exchanger was blocked which degraded performance but did not declare it inoper~ble until several hours later. The inspectors reviewed this operability determination and concluded that the operators actions were in accordance with the guidance provided in GL 91-18, Resolution Of Degraded and Nonconforming Condition Section 5.5 of the GL ~tates that timeliness of operability
~eterminations should be *commensurate with the safety significance of the issue and that the allowed outage times.contained in TSs generally provide reasonable guidelines for safeti significanc * Surry TSs allowed an outage time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for the CCC heat exchanger to be inoperable;_however, the heat exchanger was returned to service much sooner, within approximately 8 ho~rs after identification of the degraded conditio Inspection of Unit 1 EOG Room During a plant tour on*August 27, the inspectors noted that the electrolyte level of the No.I EOG control battery was lower than usual and was at or slightly below the lower battery cell level mar The inspectors notified operations and the system engineer
- for evaluation and correctio* The -system engineer's inspection determined that all cells were at or slightly above the low level mark and the electrical system engineer indicated that the electricians would adjust the level and v~rify acc~ptable battery conditions by performance of the weekly P Operability of the battery_ was verified acceptable by operations and the system enginee Macrofouling in the Service Water System On August 24, the inspectors met with_the licensee to discuss macrofouling in the SW system caused.by hydroid VIMS wa retained to determine the origin of the hydroids. A search for arid monitoring of the hydroids in five locations was performed by VIM These locations were in the canal, the forty-eight inch diameter headers, and one entrance to the CC heat exchanger The conclusion was that none are growing in the canal, but 75 percent of the hydroids are coming from the river, and 25 percent are growing in the upper level intake structure and the piping* syste *It was discovered during this investigation that this particular type of hydroid is affected by temperature and salinity. (No growth occurs below* 55 degrees Fahrenheit.) These parameters have been compared against the amount of hydroids removed duting cleaning of the CC heat exchanger and condenser water boxe The hydroid growth has been 1ess this summer because the increase in rainfall has lowered the salinity to approximately one part p*er.
thousand, which is below the most desirable salinity of approximately seven parts per thousan Several areas are being evaluated for dimihishing the effects of hydroid One would be to coat the upper level and piping components with a retarding layer to curtail the growth of hydroids, and the second would be to utilize more effective screen Coating samples have been placed in the canal and one of the lower level screens is especially designed and constructed to minimize hydroid infusio These evaluations are currently underway and the residents will continue to follow the progra * Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports On August 22, the* licensee made a non-emergency one hour 10 CFR
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50.72 report concerning a localized power failure that caused the LEOF to be declared inoperabl The LEOF was declared inoperable at 9:20 a.m. because of the un~vailability of emergency response facilities, i.e. the computer circuit breaker had tripped and the computer had to be reboote Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified
6 Maintenance Inspections (62703, 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure.
. Replacement of Thermostat On A Contra l R.oom Chill er On August 12, the inspectors witnessed the replacement of the thermostat on main control room chiller l-4S-E-4 This
- maintenance was accdmplished in accordance with work iri~tructions in WO 380013054 A supervisor had signed the WO indicating that it was acceptable to replac~ the thermostat witho~t A SNSOC approved work instruction, and the work package al so cont.ained PM sheets. Review of the chiller's work history indicated that the thermostat was last replaced on August 12, 199 Each control room chill~r is designed to have four stages of*
coolin The thermostat senses.chilled water temperature which activates the required number of stage During normal operation, two stages are utilize In the event that a larger load i * placed on the system, temperature of the chilled water would increase and the third and fourth stages would automatically star While observing the re~lacement of the thermostat, the inspectors noted that the replacement was a different model than that being remove In order to replace the thermostat, approximately 10 electrical leads had to be disconnected and reconnecte The craft performing the work utilized a schematic on the chiller panel door to determine the proper location to reconnect the lead This schematic was not a station approved drawin The inspectors reviewed vendor manual Westinghouse Installation Bulletin PC-61, Installation/Operation/Maintenance For Chiller PC 090, dated.May 1973, and concluded that the electrical schematic for thermostat ins ta 11 at ion was mi ss*ing f ram the station's official cop The inspectors consider it a weakness that the craft had to use an uncontrolled vendor manual drawing for the installation of the thermostat electrical connections:
The inspectors reviewed the specified PMT requirements for this maintenanc Procedure O-MPM-0210-01, Control Room Chillers l-VS-E-4A, l-VS-E-48, Jnd l-VS-E-4C Perfor~ance Check, dated March 18, 1992, contained the required retests for thi maintenanc.
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The inspectors were informed that the new thermostat was calibrated and adjusted prior to.installation per a procedure provided by a contractor. The inspectors reviewed the contractor procedure and concluded that it was not a SNSOC approved station procedure. This was also identified as a weakness in that station procedures were not utilized to calibrate this safety related componen At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was
writing a station procedure to calibrate the thermostat that would be approved by SNSO * Within the areas inspected, no violations were *identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure and TS requirement The following surveillance activities were reviewed: Volun~ary Entry Into TS 3.0.1 To Perform PT* TS Table 4.1-1, Item 40, requires that an intake canal _low level*
channel logic test be performed on a monthly basis. lwo intake canal level switches are iristalled at each unit's high level intake structur At a level of 23.5 feet in the intake ~anal; the four level switches provide a signal into two separate trains of 3/4 matrices to trip the turbine generator and close CW and SW MOVs in both unit *
- Intake canal level switch logic testing is accomplished by PT a:a, Intake Canal Level Logic Test,. dateo February 24, 199 In order to perform logic testing, the output of one train_ is b]ocke TS table 3.7-2, Item 5, previously allowed a train of intake canal low level to be blocked for up to two hours for the purpose of logic testing. _However, TS Amendments 164 and 165, implemented in January, 1992, inadvertently deleted the allowance to block a train of intake canal low level for two hour During the inspect1on perio~, the licensee fdentified this discrepanc The deletion of the two hour allowance for logic chan~el testing was dis~ussed in a conference call with the NRC staff on August 14. During this conference call the.licensee discussed their position which was to voluntarily enter TS 3.0.1 iri order to perform intake canal level logic testing. A proposal to submit a TS amendment to reinstate a permissible bypass action for logic testing and that a LER would not be required for this voluntary entry into TS 3.0.1 was also discusse TS 3.0.-1 allows the entry into a six hour LCO for conditions that are not specifically addressed in TS On August 15, the licensee entered TS 3.0.1 for approximately eight minutes while performing logic testing on the B train intake canal level cir~ui Performance Testing of Containment Spray Pump-Unit 1 On August 18, the inspectors witnessed the testing of.containment spray pump 1-CS-P-lA using periodic test 1-PT-17.1, Containment Spray System, dated May 21, 199 The inspectors observed the starting of the pump from the control room and then went to the safeguards area to observe the taking of test dat The
- inspectors also reviewed a copy of the completed periodic tes No discrepancies were note Samp]ing the Waste Gas Decay Tank On August 25, the inspectors observed the interaction between operations and chemistry personnel in sampling the Unit I B waste gas decay tan The operator manipulated valves in accordance with operation procedure OP-23.2.12, Sampling 1-GW-TK-IB, dated February 8, 1990, and the chemistry technician obtained the sample in accordance with chemistry procedure CH-31.331, Waste Gas Decay Tank Sampling, dated June 25, 199 This manual sampling had to be performed (twice daily) because both automatic analyzers were out of service for an extended period of tim The results were entered into the daily liquid waste operators lo No discrepancies wer-e note Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500) Review of Safety Evaluation For Placing Unit 2 C MFRV On the Jack At the end of the last inspection period, the automatic controller for the SG C MFRV, 2-FW-FCV-2498, erroneously indicated 100%
demand causing the valve to go to the full-open positio The control room operator promptly identified this condition, placed the controller in manual, and recovered the level in the C SG. In order to troubleshoot the controller, the C MFRV was placed on its jac In this configuration, the valve is locked in the open position. A safety evaluation, SE S-92-173, was performed by the licensee to evaluate placing the valve on its jac The inspector reviewed this S The plant is designed such that on an SI initiation signal, an automatic feedwater isolation occur On a feedwater isolation, both main feed pumps trip, both main feed pump downstream MOVs shut, all thr,ee MFRV bypass valves shut, and all three MFRVs shu The main feed pumps and downstream MOVs, and MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves are not classified as safety related component The feedwater lines are isolated during an SI condition in order to prevent excessive cooldown of the RC This mitigates the effects of an accident such as a steam line break, which in itself causes excessive RCS cooldow Feedwater line isolation also reduces the consequences of a st~am line break inside the containment by stopping the entry of feedwate An automatic feed water isolation also occurs on a high-high SG water level in any one SG to prevent carryover of water into the turbine generator. Another design feature of the plant to prevent excessive cooldown of the RCS* is that the MFRVs automatically shut on a low Tavg condition following a reactor tri The MFRVs ~re air/spri*n~ operate On a feedwater isolation signal, the SOVs that supply air *to-the actuators are deenergized and reposition to bleed off the air from the actuator and the spring ~huts the valve When a MFRV controller is placed in the manual mode.of operation, the v.alve will still go shut on a feedwater isolation signa However, when the valve is placed on its jack, with the stem locked in the open position, the valve wtll not reposition on a feedwater isolation signal~
Evaluation SE S-92-173 established administrative controls to substitute manual operator action for automatic MFRV closure capability while the C MFRV was on its jac *
TS Table 3.7.3, Item 3 requires that main feedwater isolation instrument channels be operable, but TSs do not specifically address operability of the components (MFRVs, main feed pumps, main feed pump discharge MOVs) actuated by the main feedwater isolation instrumentation channel The safety evaluation SE S-92-173 concluded that placing the Unit 2 t MFRV on its jack wa not a violation of any condition required by TS The licensee discussed their position with the NRC staff on August The licensee was requested to verify that their use of manual operator actfons was in accordance with the guidance of GL 91~18 and that the opefator could respond within the time assumed in the accident analysi The licensee was also asked to review the affected TS and submit clarification if necessar The main steam line break analysis assumes seven seconds of full main feedwater flow following an SI. Corpofate Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Group reanalyzed the main steam line break and concluded that thirty seconds of full main feedwater flow following an SI*
were acceptable under *the current plant condition Based on this analysis a control room operator was assigned the responsibility to shut the C MFRV upstream MOV within 30 seconds of a Unit 2 reactor trip or SI while the MFRV was on its Jac The SE analysis also concluded that if the*operator was not able to shut the MOV then the automatic tripping of the main feed pumps would limit the mass flow rate into the SGs to less than that assumed by the analysis. The inspectors concluded that the Safety Evaluation for placing the Unit 2 C MFRV on its jack was adequat On August 7, the Unit 2 C MFRV was placed on its j~ck and was placed back-in the automatic mode of operation on August 1 Within the area inspected, no violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below and evaluated the adequacy of corrective actio The inspector's review also included followup on the licens~e's implementation of corrective actio.
1 (j {Closed) LER 50-280/92-004, 4160 Volt Bus lJ Undervoltage Signal Caused by Personnel Error* Resulted in Automatic-start of Emergency Diesel Generator Number 3. This iss~e involved an ESF signal being generated by a contractor working around and possibly bumping the lJ bus UV relay duri~g Unit 1 refueling outage modifications. * The licensee conuni tted _ to perfonni ng an HPES evaluation to determine how the event may have been prevente The inspectors reviewed the event when it occurred on March 18, 1992; and held discussions with the contractor and his forema There was very close working conditions in the panel involved and the inspectors did not ~bserve any insulation material between the worker and the relay that was bumped.. The licensee's HPES review (92-08) determined that human factors associated with accessibility (i.e. 18 inch cabinet), worker dexterity (i~e. being right handed) were c6ntributors as well as scheduling the work around an energized componen The licensee's proposed corrective actions tracked by LARs 51041, 51141, _and 51142 which jnvolve better scheduling of work, inclusion of the affected equipment in the picture library, and required reading for operations personnel, should preclude further events of this typ It should be noted that the same work was performed on Unit 2 under the same hazards without inciden (Cl~sed) LER 280/91-21, Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Room Fire Suppression System Inoperable due to Person~el Error in-Administr~tively Controlling the Exit Doo This issue involved personnel blocking open the EOG No: 1 door without establishing provi~ions to shut the door if a fire in the room would have occurred. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence included posting signs on fire doors cautioning personnel that the door is a fire boundary, routinely inspecting automatic door release mechanisms to ensure that they are in working. condition, revising the GET program to enhance training on fire suppression system boundary doors and on how to properly use the automatic door release device, and color coding station fire doors to indicate their safety-significance to station operation. During routine walkdowns the inspectors verified that caution signs were installed on the fire doors adjacent to areas with carbon dioxide fire suppression system The inspectors reviewed-PT 24.llA, Fire Doors, dated May 14, 1992 and verified th~t the procedure
cohtained instructions to ensure automatic release devices are in place and in satisfactory conditio The station was evaluating color coding fire doors and this item was being tracked by CTS item 136 *
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Action on Previous Inspecti-0n Items (92701, 92702)
(Closed) VIO 280,281/91-06-01, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For missed PT This issue involved ineffective corrective action to prevent the untimely performance of PT The licensee
responded to this violation in a letter dated May 13, 1991~
In the letter the licensee stated that the program for scheduling PTs would be improved by formalizing communications between the group that schedu"es PTs and the groups that perform PTs, appointing.a point of *contact in
- each group that is responsible for th_e performance of PTs to coordinate with the PT scheduling group, developing a monthly and nine day look ahead PT schedule, and enhance the process for notific~tion that the scheduled PT has been performe The inspectors reviewed SUADM-ENG-09, Test Control, dated August 7, 1992 and concluded that the corrective actions were properly implemente Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
NRC Bulletin Review (92703)
1 (Op~n) NRC Bulletin 92-01 Supplement 1, Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier Systems. *The inspectors revie~ed the licensee plans to resc1ve the Thermo-Lag issues identified by the bulletin supplemen Curren:ly the licensee plans to resolve the issues de~cribed by this supplement the same way as that described in the original bulletin_ response, dated July 29, 199 The licensee, in their original response, listed all -
areas where thermo-lag was being used and noted those areas that theJ believed were inside and*outside the scope of the original bulleti Therefore, the licensee will only have to expand the scope of their fire watch routes to cover the two or three new areas included by the supplem_en They also plan to revise the JCO to recognize these new area The licensee indicated in their response to the original bulletin that they would work with the industry group in resolving the Thermo-Lag issue and that they would continue the compensatory fire watches until the issue is finally resolve The inspectors conducted to~rs of ttte ateas in question and held discussions with the area fire watch as well as accompanying him on one of his rounds.* The fir~watch was aware of his responsibilities and had written instructions laying out his route and the areas of concer The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee activities in this are Within the areas inspected, no violations were -identifie ISFSI Review The licensee has written a DR (S-92-1431)" on recent conditi.ons discovered at the dry fuel storage pa Specifically, recent surveys indicated that the radiation dose rat~ at 2 meters was greater than the cask TS limit of 10 mrem/hr at 2 meters distanc The licensee
-determined that due to cask spacing on the pad, ~hine from the other casks caused an erroneous readin The licensee's position is that the surveillance requirement for measuring radiation dose is "L" (after loading) and does not require periodic remeasurin The dose rate (fence) is required to be performed on a quarterly frequency and was found to be acceptabl *
Another problem documented on the DR was that cask contamination of 4000 DPM/100cm2 was noted on one of the cask (CASTOR V/21-500.11-005).
Measuring of contamination levels is also on an "L" frequency and not
- r*equ ired on periodic frequenc However, the 1 i censee believes that the increase in contamination is due to paint_flaking fro~ the outside of*
the cask. The licensee is. correcting the specific problem and trying to
- determine if the paint flaking is caused by h.ea *
- The inspectors, along with regional person.nel, reviewed the licensee's cask interpretation without noting any problem The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee activity in.this are Within the arejs inspected, no violations were identified. *
1 Review of CTS Item Closeout CTS Items 1462 and 1662 During the previous inspection period, LER 280,281/91-15, Two Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Chillers Inoperable Due to Thermostat Failure and Inoperable Emergency Power Source, was closed by the inspectors. This issue involved the failure of the thermostat in control room chiller VS-E-4 The LER stated that an evaluation would be performed t_o determine the cause of the thermostat failure and appropriate preventive measure would be taken to prevent recurrence based on the results of_ the
evaluatio CTS No. 1462 was assigned for this ~ctio The i nsp_ectors reviewed the 1 icensees actions to ~lose this commitmen CTS No. 1462 stated that a ~DE would be performed on the
_ thermostat removed from chiller l-VS-E-4A and initiate preventive measures based on the iesults of the evaluation. The inspector reviewed COE 114573, d~ted August 9, 199 The COE concluded that the thermostat inaccuracies were attributed to setpoint changes within the four stages of the thermostat caused by mounting plate distortion during.installation or vibration of the equipmen The COE also stated that the thermostats were factory sealed and were therefore not able to withstand repeated setpoint adjustment The CDE recommended that the control panels for all three MER 3 *
control room chillers be replaced since the original components were difficult to obtain.. CTS No. 1462 stated that a Type III study was issued on August 13, 1991 to replace the chiller control panels, and that the control panels had nbt been ordere It also stated that in the interim, engineering recommended changing the thermostats on all three MER 3 control room chillers every twelv~
month CTS 1462. was closed and a new CTS item No. 1662, was opened to develop a PM prog~am to replace the thermostats every 12 month The inspectors questioned the PM coordinator on whether a PM had
- been developed to accomplish this and were i-nformed that no such PM existe Further review revealed that due to amisunderstanding between engineeting and licensing, CTS No 1662 was closed without performing the required act i o* The inspectors al so cone l uded that it was inappropriate to close out CTS No. 1462 prior to the installation of new chiller control panel The closing of CTS items 1462 and 1662 without performing the required actions was identified as a CTS program weakne~ After the irispectors identified these deficiencies, the licensee reopened CTS items 1462 and -166 * CTS Item 1441 During the previous inspection period, LER 280,281/91-16, Two Main Contra l Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Chi 11 ers Inoperable Due to Thermostat Replacement and Inoperable Chiller* Service Water Pump, was closed by the inspectors. This issue involved failure of a control room chiller SW pump due to a motor tefminal lug failur~.
The LER stated that an evaluation would be performed to determine the cause of the service witer pump failure and appropriate
. preventive measures would be taken based on the results of this evaluation.. CTS No. 1441 was assigned to follow this actio The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions to close CTS No. 144 CTS item 1441 was close The basis for the closure was that DR S-91-1605 would.follow this issu DR S-91-1605 was also close The basis for this closure was that COE 114592 was performed for the SW pump failure and that the CDE's corrective actions would be tracked by LAR 5082 The inspe*ctors revi~wed COE 114592 which cone l ud.ed that the SW pump failed due to an open phase within the moto The open phase was attributed to the use of split barrel lugs used on internal motor connection It was concluded that since station procedures prohibit the use of split barrel lug *the split barrel lugs were installed when the motor was
manufacture The COE concluded that corporate electrical engineering should evaluate if the use of split barrel lugs are acceptable and determine if further corrective actions are require LAR 50821 was assigned to track the corporate evaluatio *
LAR 50821 was closed. 1he basis for the closure was that corporate had completed the evaluation and recoR1T1ended corrective action The evaluation concluded that motors with split barrel lug connections w~re not an operabili~y concern if properly installed; however, motors with these types of conne~tions should be inspected for degradation during routine maintenance activitie LARs 50924 and 50925 were assigned to maintenance arid site services, respectively, to revise all applicable procedures that install, replace, repair or inspect motors to perform the required inspection LAR 50924 was still ope It was assigned to electtical maintenance to revise procedures to inspect motor connections for split barrel lug '
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LAR 50925 was.close The basis for the closure was that site services was not responsible for changing maintenance procedures that install, repair, replace or inspect motors. All motor work performed by site services is done in accordance with NUS 2030, Specification For Electrical Installation, which prohibits the use of split barrel lugs. The inspectors disagreed with the basis for the closure of LAR 5092 Although NUS 2030 prevents site
- services personnel from installing split barrel lugs, it does not prevent site services from installing a motor with split barrel lugs installed by the manufacture The inspectors discussed this issue with station engineering. Station engineering agreed with the inspectors and initiated a change to NUS 2030 that would require inspection of motor leads to_ensure correct installJtion of split barrel lug The inspectors concluded that this was another example where the station's CTS program closed an item prior to performing the required action.
Exit Interview The results*were summarized on September 9, with those individuals i dent i fi ed by an asterisk in Paragraf)h_ The fo 11 owing summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
Item Number
.* LER 280/92-004 LER 280/91-021 VIO 280,281/91-06-0l BU 92-01 Status Closed Closed Closed Open 1 Index of Acronyms and Initialisms CC COMPONENT COOLING WATER cm2 CENTIMErER SQUARED Description 4160 Volt Bus IJ Undervoltage Signal Caused by Personnel Error Resulted in Automatic Start.of Emergency Diesel,Generator Number Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Room Fire Suppression System*
Inoperable Due to Personnel Error In Administratively Controlling the Exit Doo *
Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For Missed PT Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System COE CAUSE DETERMINATION EVALUATION
.CFR CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
~---------
~------- ---- -----
~ HPES -
ISFSI -
JCO LAR
- LER LEOF -
.PM PT QA RCS RO SE SG SI SNSOC -
sov SW Tavg TI TS
'"
UV VIMS -
COMMITMENT TRACKING SYSTEM CIRCULATING WATER
. DISHHEGRATION PER MINUT DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM*
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERAT6R ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE GENERAL EMPLOYEE TRAININ GENERIC LETTER HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION LICENSING ACTION REQUEST LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOCAL EMERGENCY OPE~ATIONS FACILITY LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLIER OPERATING PROCEDURE POST MAINTENANCE TEST PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PERIODIC TEST QUALITY ASSURANCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REACTOR OPERATOR SAFETY EVALUATION STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY INJECTION
. STATION NUCLEAR.AND SAFETY OPERATING COMMITTEE SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SERVICE WATER
.AVERAGE TEMPERATURE TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UNDERVOLTAGE THE VIRGINIA INSTITUTE OF MARINE SCIENCE VIOLATION WORK ORDER