IR 05000280/1992022
| ML18153D190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1992 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153D189 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-92-22, 50-281-92-22, NUDOCS 9212140097 | |
| Download: ML18153D190 (12) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/92-22 and 50-281/92-22 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
October 3 through 31, 1992 Inspectors:
Approved by:
SUMMARY Scope:
I fv{3t>(?,~
11a Siefned This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the area of operations, maintenance, safety assessment and quality verification, and system walkdown During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's backshifts or weekend operations on October 4, 22, 25, and 31, 199 Results:
In the operations area, the inspectors noted that several discrepancy reports concerning operations errors were issued by the licensee during this inspection perio One discrepancy report involving the failure to follow procedure for performing operational steps with several examples is identified as a non-cited violation (paragraph 3.b).
In the maintenance/surveillance functional areal the following items were noted:
The failure to independently verify danger tags in accordance with OPAP-0010 was identified as a non-cited violation (paragraph 4.a).
An unresolved item with two parts were identified. The first part involved a possible discrepancy between the procedure (VPAP 1402) for tagging requirements and the practice of not tagging instrument line The second part involved the practice of bench calibration of instruments versus calibrating the instrument in place as required by the procedure (paragraph 4.c).
A degraded material condition concerning missing panels on the Unit ID high level screen was identified. Another area identified the material condition of the Unit I containment personnel airlock regarding failure of a leak check and problems with equalization valves (paragraph 3.d).
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- REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted
. Licensee Employees R. Allen, Supervisor, Operations
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
- M. Bowling, Manager, Corporate Nuclear Licensing
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Engineering H. Collar, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
- L. Hartz, Manager, Corporate Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
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- A. Meekins, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations R. MacManus, Supervisor, System Engineering
- J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager R. Saunders, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- B. Stanley, Supervisor, Station Procedures J. Swientonjewski, Supervisor, Stat~on Nuclear Safety NRC Personnel M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operations and was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 55 of continuous operatio Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operation and was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 105 of continuous operation.
- 2 Operational Safety Verification (71707,:42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedure The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify operations safety and compliance with TSs and to maintain awareness of the overall operation of the facilit Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and housekeepin Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were.. properly addressed and reporte Observation of Reactor Operator Action On October 18 while I&C was securing from a Unit 2 Channel IV process PT on 2-MS-FT-2495, annunciator H-D-7 (Steam Dump Permissive) was received when the RO placed the steam dump control switch back to "on".
The RO reset the alarming signal and noticed rods stepping i He also saw that turbine load had decreased due to a runback of approximately 20 M A bad channel test switch on Channel IV first stage impulse pressure was identified and DR S-92-1713 was issue The inspectors observed the RO's actions, and did not identify any problem * Operational Errors During the previous inspection period, the inspectors met with the Surry Operations Superintendent to discuss what appeared to be an increasing trend in the number of operational errors. Errors occurring during the period September 14 through September 29 which resulted in deviation reports were evaluated by the inspectors and were discussed in IR 280,281/92-2 During this inspection period, additional discrepancy reports involving personnel errors were reviewed and discussed with operations management, and are described as follows:
DR No. S-92-1460, dated September 2:
The Unit 2 letdown was diverted with its flowpath isolated due to a lineup for the periodic test. This caused the low pressure relief line to lift and flow back to the VC This also caused the gas levels to increase in the auxiliary building and caused HP to evacuate the buildin The inlet to the primary drain tank was shut by procedure but was not recognized by the two ROs or SRO in the control roo DR No. S-92-1526, dated September 15:
Procedure precautions were not complied with resulting in a small amount of water being induced in the Band C RSHX DR No. S-92-1685, dated October 11:
While mixing boric acid in the batch tank, the operator made an error on detetmining the number of bags required for the batc Consequently, more boric acid was added than planned. Also, contributing to the problem was that the procedure referenced pounds for the boric acid but the purchased bags were in kilogram DR No~ S-92-1687, dated October 12: During performance of procedure O-OPT-EG-001 for testing of the No. 3 EDG, the RO noted that the load on the EDG rapidly increased from 400KW to 2300KW with no operator actio The SRO investigated the cause and noted that the speed droop knob had not been adjusted.to the scribe mark as required by step 6.1.34 of the procedure. This step had been signed off by the operator. The licensee reduced the load on the diesel and secured the EDG without completing the test. Although the possibility did exist, no damage was done to the ED This failure to follow procedure identified by the licensee is identified as NCV 280,281/92-22-01, Failure to Follow Procedure for Performing Operational Steps. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meets the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Polic DR No. S-92-1673, dated October 7:
When control room chiller, 1-VS-E-4A, was tagged out for maintenance in
- accordance with procedure MOP-21.6 the on/off switch was not red tagged to prevent operatio The step was signed off in the procedure. This is a second example of NCV 280,281\\92-22-0 As a result of the personnel errors noted during the previous inspection period and during this inspection period, operations management provided a hightened level of attentio As discussed in IR 280,281/92-20, operations management planned to meet with the shift supervisors. During this inspection period, the meetings were hel The managers who attended analyzed the reasons for these personnel errors and formulated corrective actions. Then briefings were conducted with each of the shifts in order to raise the sensitivity for potential problem The inspectors attended one of these shift briefings on October 31, and considered the briefing to be informative and well conducte The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's activities in this are Followup on Verification of Plant Records During a previous inspection period, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to obtain accurate and complete log readings from both licensed and non-licensed operators. A licensee review
- had concluded that there were no in~tances of improper log taking but identified an intent to institute a program to take similar samples on a quarterly basis. During this inspection period, procedure OC-56, Operator Rounds Verification, dated October 12, 1992, was put into effect to accomplish this task. This checklist is performed on demand by the shift supervisor when notified to do so by operations managemen During this inspection period, this procedure was performed three times without any problems being identifie Station Material Condition During this inspection period, the following material condition deficiencies that effected plant operation were noted:
The Unit ID high level intake screen was consistently operated with stainer baskets missing or damaged, and had to be rotated by manual actions so areas of missing baskets would remain out of the wate The Unit I personnel airlock failed to meet the leakage acceptance criteria established by its surveillance test, and several other maintenance items were worked, i.e.,
repairs to the escape manway and the inner door equalizing valv Between 1980 through 1991, it was noted that 170 WOs were written on the personnel airlock for both unit Within the areas inspected, one non-cited violation was identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703, 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Unit IH Bus Transformer Fan On October 21, the inspectors witnessed maintenance associated with a Unit IH bus 4160/480 volt noisey transformer cooling fa This maintenance was accomplished in accordance with WO 380013390 The fan's abnormal noise was the result of a broken fan blad Electricians disabled the fan by disconnecting the leads to the fan, and the fan was to remain in this condition until plant conditions would support deenergization of the transformer for replacement of the fa The transformer has six cooling fans of which five were still operationa The licensee had previously completed an evaluation that concluded that the transformer was operational without any of the cooling fans; however, it was perferable to utilize the cooling fan The inspectors observed the electricians installing red danger tags on the disconnected leads and noted that the tags were not independently verified as required by OPAP-0010, Tag-Outs, dated
- July 15, 199 When installing the.tags, the electrician who installed the danger tags and the electrician that verified the tags were working together in lieu of being independen The failure to independently verify the danger tags in accordance with OPAP-0010 was identified as NCV 280/92-22-0 This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. The electrical shop supervisor discussed this issue during shop meetings and was evaluating the need to enhance training in the area of danger tag The inspectors also noted that VPAP-1402, Control of Equipment, Tag-Outs, and Tags, dated May 31, 1990, did not specifically address the installation of danger tags by electricians; however, it did address the installation of danger tags by the Operations Departmen The issue of who is allowed to install danger tags was discussed with the corporate administrative procedure writer This has been previously identified by the licensee and the licensee was evaluating the need to revise administrative procedures to resolve the issu Replacement of a Section of a Boric Acid Line A pinhole leak was discovered on a rarely used one inch diameter manual boration line. The inspectors observed the replacement of a part of this line between manual valve 2-CH~228 and check valve 2-CH-22 The length of the replacement was approximately 17 feet and, because of complexity in the shape, involved 22 weld The pipe was prefabricated in two pieces to minimize exposure to radiatio The work was performed to WO 3800133828 and maintenance procedure MCM-1801-01, Piping/Components Repair/Replacement, dated February 27, 1992. Site QC performed cleanliness, fitup, and tack weld inspections both in the shop and during the fabrication and installation of the two pieces of pipin The new piping replaced a section from close to the manual isolation valve to approxi-mately three inches past where leaking was occurrin When the piping was refilled a leak occurred in the old piping approxi-mately a quarter inch past the new weld which was near the previous leaking are The licensee removed and replaced an additional three feet of the old piping and no further leaks occurre The inspectors reviewed some of the material certifications for the weld wire, and the stainless steel 304 piping and elbows, and found that they conformed to the chemistry and mechanical requirements in the appropriate specification Weld procedure technique PlOl-803, which provided two methods for welding, was used for all of the weldin The gas tungsten arc welding method was use The inspectors verified that all six of the welders used in this project were qualified for the position and techniqu....
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The sections of removed p1p1ng, approximately 17 feet, were sent to the site metallurgical laboratory for analysi Sectioning the pipe revealed that only about a foot of the removed piping was affected. A metallurgical cross section revealed that pitting occurred first on the inside diameter then transgranular stress corrosion progressed from the pits and penetrated the wal Through-wall penetrations had not occurred from all of the pit The licensee has sent a sample to the Westinghouse Laboratories for a more in-depth analysis to see if the reason for this through-wall cracking can be determine The inspectors will continue to follow the failure analysis to determine if any other parts of the system could be affecte Replacement of the Unit 2 Channel IIIC SG Level Transmitter On October 22, the inspectors monitored the licensee activities associated with the replacement of a failed SG level transmitter (02-FW-2496).
This transmitter was located inside*the sub-atmospheric containment and required limited time entry by the mechanics due to SCBA bottle air restrictions. The inspectors monitored the licensee prejob briefing, reviewed the controlling procedure, and reviewed the other job controls associated with the detector replacement and subsequent calibration. The inspectors observed the following items associated with the maintenance activity:
1)
During the pre-job briefing, the I&C mechanics discussed the fact that they would turn off the power to the transmitter at the test switch on the drawer and would isolate the tubing prior to disconnecting the fitting The licensee did not mention tagging of the control switch or the isolation valves; therefore, a request was made for a copy of the tagging record from operations. The inspectors were informed that no tagging would be needed for the transmitter replacemen Since under normal operating conditions the SG level transmitter would be monitoring system parameters of approximately 900 psi and 550 degrees Fahrenheit, the inspectors questioned the licensee's basis for not tagging the equipmen The inspectors were informed that since operations does not control instrument valves and switches, I&C generally never requests tagging of I&C equipment for maintenanc The inspectors reviewed the licensee's controlling procedure for tagging, VPAP-1402 revision O, Control of Equipment, Tag-out, and Tag This procedure referenced regulatory guides and standards which formed its basis. These included Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations) and (ANS) 3.2-1982, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants. This procedure requires equipment status to be identified by tags, labels, or operating
records and also defines the ~se of danger tags. Step states that danger tags are used in the station to establish boundaries for safe wor The inspectors discussed the apparent discrepancy between the actual practice of not tagging instrument valves and the practice described in VPAP-140 Licensee management informed the inspectors that they did not apply the requirements of VPAP-1402 to I&C work activities, but they did not have any interpretation or documented basis for that practice. The inspectors requested that the licensee provide a basis for I&C not complying with the requirements of VPAP-1402 since the words of the procedure appear to appl Pending receipt and review of the licensee's basis, this is identified as one example of URI 280,281/92-22-03, I&C Maintenance Practice (2)
During the pre-job briefing the licensee alsd. discussed the planned testing for the detector replacemen The maintenance personnel discussed the fact that the new detector had been bench calibrated and that they were going to install it, and then verify that the indicated percent level values were close to the other two channel The inspectors questioned this practice since the TS would requires a channel calibration and the definition in the TS implies in-place testing that includes the instrument loop as well as the detector. The licensee testing procedure 2-
.PT-2.SA, Steam Generator Level (L-2-496), dated February 20, 1992, implied that it was important to calibrate up through the panel test points so that a reference value for future functional testing could be establishe After questioning by the inspectors, the licensee performed the calibration in place as required by the procedur The licensee indicated that the new PMT program would require in-place testing for detector replacement as wel The inspectors questioned the licensee's past practices since the maintenance personnel involved felt comfortable in not performing in-place testing. The licensee indicated that they would review past detector replacement activities to ensure that the TS required calibration was performed at the time of installation or that a subsequent calibration satisfied the requirement Until this information is provided and evaluated, this is identified as the second example of URI 280,281/92-22-03, I&C Maintenance practic Within the areas inspected, one non-cited violation was identifie.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500) Review of Licensee's Corrective Action Audit Report
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The inspectors reviewed Audit Reper~ 92-14, Corrective Action, dated September 22, 199 The purpose of this audit was to evaluate actions taken to correct deficiencies identified at Surry, North Anna, and Corporate. Areas reviewed were deviation reports, work orders, MSRC, PPRs, SNCRs, and Maintenance of Record The audit identified a strength concerning the fact that WOs issued to complete corrective actions for DRs were completed within 30 day The audit identified one finding involving the closure of DRs to the LARs commitment tracking syste The finding identified that the LARS did not contain the administrative controls for the closure of station deviations required by VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and, secondly, that LARS commitment tracking items were not always accomplished in a timely manne With the exception of the one finding, the audit concluded that the corrective action programs reviewed were effectively implemente The inspector did not identify any problems with the audit repor MSRC Meeting
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t On October 20, the inspectors attended a MSRC meeting conducted at the statio Items discussed at the meeting included contractor performance, service water fouling problems, proposed TS changes, audit findings, independent review results, and the recent Surry INPO evaluatio TS 6.1.2.b requires that the MSRC be composed of a Chairman and a minimum of four member During the October 20 meeting, ten MSRC members were present which exceeded TS requirements. Approximately half of the MSRC members were consultant The inspectors noted that in-depth discussions were held on several issues, which was particularly evident during the discussion on the proposed cold water interlock TS chang This proposed TS change was not approved by the committe The committee did review and approve several other TS change Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Walkdown (71710)
The AFW for both units was walked dow The inspectors used the appropriate drawings in conjunction with the operating valve checkoff list procedure l-OP-31.2A, Auxiliary Feedwater, dated October 8, 1992, to check for proper Unit 1 AFW valve alignmen All of the valves checked were found to be in the proper position. A much smaller sample was taken for Unit 2 and no problems were identified. There were no gross packing leaks, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling on any of the valve The inspectors found that housekeeping was acceptable with the appropriate levels of cleanliness being maintained for both the unit No prohibited ignition sources or flammable materials were present in the vicinity of the system Before commencing the walkdown, drawings were obtained for three hangers on the suction side of the AFW pumps located in the Unit 1 safeguards building basemen These were hanger Nos. 1, 11, and 1 The configuration of the hangers and supports appeared to conform to the drawing and the alignment appeared to be correc The inspectors verified that the instrumentation calibration dates were correct for the following AFW pumps instrumentation:
Pump No.l-FW-P-3A (Motor Driven Pump)
Discharge Pressure Gage l-PI-1558 Suction Pressure Gage l-PI-1568 Pump No. l-FW-P-2 (Turbine Driven Pump)
Discharge Pressure Gage 1-PI-lSSA Suction Pressure Gage l-PI-156A The inspectors also verified that the instrumentation calibration dates were correct for four flow instruments on Unit A tour was made of both control rooms to ascertain that the annunciators as well as the instrumentation were in working orde Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Exit Interview The results*were summarized on November 4, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in Paragraph Th~ following summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
Item Number NCV 280/92-22-01 NCV 280/92-22-02 URI 280,281/92-22-03 Status Closed Closed Open Description Failure to Follow Procedure for Performing Operational Steps, paragraph Failure To Independently *
Verify Danger Tags, paragraph I&C Maintenance Practices, paragraph Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license....
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10 Index of Acronyms and Initialisms AFW ANS cc CFR DR ECCS -
IR KW LARS -
MW MSRC
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NCV NRC OPAP -
PMT PPR PSI PT QA QC RO RS RSHX
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SCBA -
SG SNCR -
WO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY COMPONENT COOLING CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATION INSPECTION REPORT KILOWATT LICENSING ACTION REQUEST SYSTEM MEGAWATT MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW COMMITTEE NONCITED VIOLATION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE POST MAINTENANCE TESTING POTENTIAL PROBLEM REPORT POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH PERIODIC TEST QUALITY ASSURANCE QUALITY CONTROL REACTOR OPERATOR RECIRCULATION SPRAY RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS STEAM GENERATOR SURRY NONCONFORMANCE REPORT SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS UNRESOLVED ITEM VOLUME CONTROL TANK VIRGINIA POWER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WORK ORDER
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